Tankeswar Gayari vs State Of Assam

N. Kotiswar Singh, J

Heard Mr. A. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, Amicus Curiae as well as Mr. M. Phukan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the

State of Assam.

The present appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dima Hasao,

Haflong, in Sessions Case No. 25/2011 convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life

and a fine of Rs.1,000/-(Rupees One Thousand Only) and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for another 3(three) months.

The appellant had been convicted on the charge of killing the son of the informant on 18.08.2011. The deceased was a Truck driver who had gone

to a sand quarry at Panimur in Dima Hasao District for loading sand where he was hacked to death by the appellant with a dao.

On an ejhahar being filed on 18.08.2011, an investigation was conducted and as many as 11(eleven) witnesses were examined including the expert

witnesses. The weapon of crime was also seized from the scene of crime. In course of the investigation before the trial, the appellant made a

confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in which he admitted to committing the offence which briefly sums up the prosecution case also.

The relevant portion of the confessional statement reads as follows:-

“On 18.08.2011 at about 8:30 am I returned from my home to our work site at Panimur Balighat where we used to collect sand. We were

6(six) persons but I came first and cleaned the camp. Suddenly I person appeared in drunken mood and started abusing me with filth

language. He also assaulted me with fist and blows. I became angry and picked up a dao and started assaulting him with the dao which

caused grievous injury to the person and as a result he succumbed to death. I ran away from the PO and reached the Kapili river and saw

5(five) other who used to work with me. They were coming to the camp. I narrated the incident to them and out of fear fled away and took

shelter in my uncle house. Thereafter, I surrendered before police at Diyungmukh PS and admitted that I committed the crime. Police

arrested me and forwarded me to Court.

When asked for the reason for killing the person by the Magistrate at the time of recording the said confessional statement, the accused stated

that:-

“I was angry with him because at first he disturbed me while I was playing cards alone and secondly he started abusing me with filthy

language because I told him not to disturb me, but he continued to use slang words and as a result I lost my tempter and out of anger I

assaulted him with a dao.

Though, there was no eye-witness, the accused admitted to the aforesaid killing of the deceased by assaulting the deceased with a dao in his

statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as well as before the Court in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The aforesaid statement was

corroborated by the medical evidence which indicated the nature of injuries as follows:-

“Wounds â€" position, and character :

Lacerated wound seen in the â€

(I) Right wrist dorsal aspect 2â€​ x 1â€​ x ¾â€​

(II) Left palm on the palmer aspect 2½â€​x 1â€​ x ¾â€​

(III) Right side of neck 2½â€​ x 1â€​ x ¾â€​

(IV) Upper front of neck right side 1â€​ x ½â€​ x ¼â€​

(V) Right mastoid region 3â€​ x 1â€​ x 1â€​

(VI) Right temporal region 2½â€​ x 1â€​ x 1â€​

(VII) Left frontal 2â€​ x 1â€​ x 1â€​

(VIII) Left cheek 1½â€​ x 1â€​ x ¾â€​

On the basis of the aforesaid evidences on record and primarily based on the confessional statement made by the appellant, the trial Court rendered

the finding that the ingredients of Section 302 IPC were proved and convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC. At the same time the learned Trial

Court also discounted the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

Considering the plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant would be confining his submission to the applicability of

Exception 4 as provided under Section 300 IPC, it may not be necessary to go in detail to various evidences on record. It has been submitted that

there was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased, but had acted under grave provocation and heat of the moment

on being abused and assaulted by the deceased.

It has been accordingly submitted that since the death caused was culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as there was no intention for causing

death of the disease it will be covered by Part II of Section 304 IPC and as such, the punishment of imprisonment of life awarded to the appellant be

converted to imprisonment which may at best be extended to 10 years.

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was convicted primarily on the basis of the confessional statement made by him

under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

While the appellant admits to the causing of death of the deceased by assaulting with a dao, it has been clearly mentioned in his confessional statement

that the incident happened after the deceased provoked the appellant after the deceased came to the place of occurrence in a drunken state and used

abusive and filthy language towards the appellant. The deceased also assaulted the appellant with fist and blows. Because of the aforesaid

provocation the appellant lost his temper and in a fit of anger assaulted the deceased with a dao.

Accordingly it has been contended that it would be very clear from the confessional statement that there was no pre-meditation for causing death of

the deceased as the assault by the appellant arose in a sudden fight between him and the deceased when the deceased came and disturbed the

appellant in a disorderly manner by using filthy language. It thus can be said that incident happened in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.

The appellant also contends that the confessional statement clearly indicates that there is no material on record to show that the appellant had taken

undue advantage except that he had used a dao out of anger. It cannot be also stated that the appellant had acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The

blow made by the appellant with a dao was done in a fit of anger and the injuries caused though serious and which proved fatal cannot be said to be

cruel or unusual manner as mentioned under Exception 4.

According to learned counsel for the appellant, the death of the deceased cannot be considered to be a murder punishable under Section 302 IPC

in any manner but a culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as provided under Exception 4 mentioned in Section 300 IPC.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that having established that it was not a murder, but a culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the

case of the appellant would come under Part-II of Section 304 IPC as the appellant caused the death of the deceased without any intention.

Accordingly, it has been submitted that the punishment which could be awarded would be imprisonment which may be extended to 10(ten) years or

with fine or both. Under the circumstances, a prayer has been made that the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC may be converted to

conviction under Part-II of Section 304 IPC.

Mr. M. Phukan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand argues that the evidences otherwise show that there was intention on the

part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased, as clearly evident from the nature of the weapon used as well as the nature of the injuries

caused. It has been submitted that dao is a dangerous weapon which can easily cause death which was indiscriminately used by the appellant. The

Post-mortem report shows that the deceased had suffered as many as eight wounds including on the head, neck and on the hand. The skull was

fractured. The deceased died of shock and haemorrhage due to the injuries caused by the striking of dao.

Relying in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surain Singh â€"vs- State of Punjab reported in (2017) 5 SCC 796, the Ld. APP has

submitted that it is not necessary that intention is to be discernible in an advanced stage but intention can be formed even at the spot. Therefore, even

if the killing of the deceased by the appellant may not be premeditated, it cannot be said that the appellant had no intention to kill the deceased is

clearly evident from the nature of the injuries suffered by the deceased.

It has been submitted that it is clearly discernible that the appellant knew very well that injuries caused were likely to cause death and the appellant

had the intention to cause these injuries which ultimately proved fatal. As such, it has been submitted that even if the case of the appellant does not fall

under Section 302 IPC, it certainly would fall under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC.

Having heard the rival contentions we proceed to examine the issues.

Section 299 IPC defines what amounts to culpable homicide. Culpable homicide is committed when anyone causes death by doing an act,

i) with the intention of causing death, or

ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury is likely to cause death,

or

iii) with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.

Section 300 IPC on the other hand deals with the scope and meaning of murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Murder is defined as such culpable homicide which is caused with the intention of causing death. In other words, “culpable homicide†is the

genus and “murderâ€​ is its species and all “murdersâ€​ are “culpable homicidesâ€​ but all “culpable homicidesâ€​ are not “murdersâ€​.

As to what amounts to murder and what amounts to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and how to draw conclusions to that effect on the

basis of the evidences and the circumstances available, and what should be the appropriate punishment awarded in the light of different punishments

stipulated under Sections 302 and 304 IPC, has been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu

Punnayya [(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] in the following words,

“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’ its species. All ‘murder’ is

‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally, … ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose

of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable

homicide. The first is, what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide,

which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is

punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of

culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable

homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

The academic distinction between “murder†and “culpable homicide not amounting to murder†has vexed the courts for more

than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these

sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these

provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table

will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.

(See table on facing page)

Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite

under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of

health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of

nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the “intention to cause death†is not

an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the

likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This

aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.

Section 299 Section 300

Subject to certain exceptions

A person commits

Culpable homicide murder

if the act by which the death is caused is done -

INTENTION

(a)With the intention of causing death; or (1)With the intention of causing death; or

(b)With the intention of causing such bodily (2)With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender

injury as is likely to cause death; or knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the

harm is caused; or

(3)With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the

bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death; or

KNOWLEDGE

(c)With the knowledge that the act is likely to(4)With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that

cause death it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is

likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk

of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.

Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2)

of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an

enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the

rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or

special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the

offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.

In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words “likely to cause death†occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299,

the words “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature†have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to

cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if

overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of

the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death

which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word “likely†in clause (b) of Section

299 conveys the sense of “probable†as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death†mean that death will be the “most probable†result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary

course of nature.

For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the

intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC

1874 : 1966 Supp SCR 230 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509.] is an apt illustration of this point.

In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 SCR 1495 : 1958 Cri LJ 818.] Vivian Bose, J. speaking for this Court,

explained the meaning and scope of clause (3), thus (at p. 1500):

“The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, ‘thirdly’. First, it must establish

quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.

It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that

some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it

must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the

offender.â€​

Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case of even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily

injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be

“murderâ€​. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not

necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that

clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in

general â€" as distinguished from a particular person or persons â€" being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a

practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed

by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder†or

“culpable homicide not amounting to murderâ€, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three

stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the

death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering

whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide†as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie

found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the

court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the

definition of “murder†contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be “culpable

homicide not amounting to murderâ€, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the

second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the

exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murderâ€, punishable under the

first part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.

Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, we may examine the evidences on record.

There is no doubt, based on record, especially the confessional statement made by the appellant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that the appellant had

caused the death of the deceased by striking with dao. Under the circumstances, it has to be further examined as to whether the case of the appellant

is covered by any of the four situations contemplated under Section 300 IPC. As mentioned above, to bring a case within the ambit of the first

situation under Sec. 300 IPC, the appellant must have struck the deceased with the intention of causing death. It appears from the evidence however

that, the appellant struck the deceased out of sheer anger and as such it is doubtful as to whether the appellant had real intention to cause the death of

the deceased.

As regards the second situation, the issue is whether the appellant with intention caused the body injury as the appellant knew to be likely to cause

death of the deceased. And as regards the third situation, it has to be seen whether the appellant had struck the deceased with the intention of causing

bodily injury and such bodily injury intended to be infected was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Similarly, to bring the case

within the fourth situation contemplated under Section 300 IPC, the question will be whether the appellant had committed the said act knowing that it

was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and committed such

assault without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury.

Thus, it is quite apparent the intention or knowledge on the part of the appellant is prerequisite for bringing the offence within the purview of Section

300 IPC.

In this regard, we have noted the submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam that considering the nature of the weapon used

and also the nature of the injuries suffered by the deceased, it can be said that the appellant had the intention to cause such bodily injury as he knew

that that such injuries are likely to cause death of the deceased so as to come within purview of second proposition of Section 300 IPC. Otherwise

also, the case can definitely come under the third proposition as the bodily injuries caused to the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary cause of the

nature to cause death.

We have given our anxious thought to the submission advanced by the Ld. Addl. P.P. and we are of the view that such a submission has force. It

cannot be denied that the appellant was using a dao, which is a dangerous weapon and he struck the deceased several times on the vital parts of the

body, i.e., on the neck and the head and the deceased died of shock due to the aforesaid injuries sustained by the deceased. To that extent it can be

said that he had intention to cause such bodily injuries which in ordinary course of the nature would cause death and as such the case of the appellant

would come under the purview of the third proposition of Section 300 IPC, in which event, the appellant would be convicted for murder and punishable

under Section 302 IPC.

However, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra), as mentioned in paragraph 21 thereof,

even if the case falls under Section 300 IPC, if the case comes under within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, offence would still be

“culpable homicide not amounting to murderâ€​ punishable under the first part of Section 304 of IPC.

To examine this, it may be appropriate to revisit the confessional statement made by the appellant explaining the reason for his act, for the reason

that there was no eye witness and the conviction of the appellant was primarily based on the confessional statement made by the appellant.

The appellant in his confessional statement explains that he was angry with the deceased because, firstly, the deceased disturbed him while he was

playing cards alone and secondly, the deceased started abusing him with filthy language because of which he told him not to disturb him. However, the

deceased continue to use slang words and as a result, he lost his temper and out of anger the appellant assaulted him with a dao. The appellant also

stated that the deceased had also assaulted him with fist and blows.

Though the appellant has not led any evidence in his defence and did not deny the charges in his statement when examined by the trial court under

Section 313 CrPC, it appears that he caused the death of the deceased without any premeditation but in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon the

sudden quarrel and without the appellant having taken undue advantage. Though the blows made with dao by the appellant proved fatal, it cannot be

said that he had acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Thus, we are of the view that even if the case of the appellant may appear to come within the purview of the offence of “murderâ€, yet, the

case can also fall within the Exception 4 enumerated in Section 300 IPC.

As provided under Section 300 IPC, five exceptions have been carved out making certain “culpable homicides†not be to murders. One such

exception is Exception 4 which reads as follows:-

“Exception 4 -- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a

sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.â€​

We have already noted that there was no eye-witness to the said assault of the deceased by the appellant. The witnesses were informed by the

appellant himself after he committed the act.

The trial court also seems to have based the conviction of the appellant primarily on the confessional statement made by the appellant which the trial

court held to be true and voluntary in nature. If that is so, the plea that the appellant had assaulted the deceased on the spur of the moment and in the

fit of anger on being provoked by the deceased appears to be the most likelihood, in which event, it was not premeditated. Further, the confessional

statement does not indicate that the appellant had taken undue advantage or that he acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Hence, we are of the view

that Exception 4 clause would be applicable.

Having held that the case of the appellant will be covered by Exception 4, as provided under Section 300 IPC, we convert the conviction of the

appellant from Section 300 IPC to Part I of Section 304 IPC. The act of the appellant which otherwise is a “murder†which has been converted

to “culpable homicide not amounting murderâ€​, because of the applicability of Exception 4 is thus, made punishable under Part I of Section 304 IPC

keeping in mind the principles enumerated in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra) (vide para 21 thereof).

Accordingly, on altering the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 IPC to Part I of Section 304 IPC, and considering the circumstances in

which the death occurred, we sentence the appellant to undergo imprisonment for a term of 10 (ten) years and fine of Rs. 5000/-(five thousand

rupees), and to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 (three) months in default of payment of fine. The period of imprisonment already undergone shall

be offset in computing this 10 (ten) years imprisonment.

For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is partly allowed.

Registry will furnish a copy of this judgement and order to the Sub-Jail, Dima Hasao or the concerned jail authority where he is presently

undergoing imprisonment.

The Registry to remit the LCR.