Tapan Kumar Kar vs Union of India and Others

Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J.�The petitioner, who was working as a Constable under the Central Reserve Police Force has filed this application seeking issuance of

"a writ in the nature of certiorari/mandamus or any other appropriate writ/writs, direction/directions, order/orders quashing the order contained in Annexure-14, so also the orders contained in Annexure-18 and any other documents prejudicial to the interest of petitioner;

And direct the opposite party No. 3 to reinstate the petitioner in his service as a regular constable allowing all consequential service and financial benefits right from the date of his appointment by regularizing the period of his illegal termination till reinstatement i.e. from 20.06.92 to 25.4.97, from 25.3.99 to 21.4.99 from 10.10.99 to 5.2.2000 and from 29.9.2000 till the date of his reinstatement."

The case of the petitioner is that he was enlisted as a temporary Constable (G.D.) as per order dated 01.05.1991, Annexure-1 passed by the Commandant, 114 Bn. CRPF., Bhubaneswar in August, 1991. He was deputed to 113 Bn. CRPF, Hyderabad to undergo basic training with his co-recruits from 07.08.1991 to 20.06.1992. On 20.06.1992, he was surprised to receive the order of his termination from service from the Commandant, 113 Bn. CRPF, Hyderabad which was passed without any basis or holding any inquiry into any misconduct. Therefore, he approached this Court by filing O.J.C. 340 of 1993. After hearing the parties, this Court vide judgment dated 18.11.1996 (1997 Lab IC 1553 (Ori)) quashed the order of termination and directed the opposite parties to reinstate him in service forthwith but directed that the petitioner would not be entitled to any salary from the date of termination till reinstatement. In compliance with the said judgment, the petitioner was reinstated in service on 25.04.1997. After a lapse of five years opposite party No. 5-Commandant again started a departmental proceeding on 03.05.1997 on the self-same ground on which he was terminated from service earlier and was reinstated in service vide judgment of this Court. In the departmental proceeding the petitioner was imposed punishment by the disciplinary authority without giving him an opportunity to prefer appeal vide Annexure-4 dated 24.03.1999. Consequently, he had to undergo punishment of discharging the duties of Quarter Guard for 28 days with effect from 25.03.1999 to 22.04.1999 with forfeiture of all pay and allowances. After execution of punishment, the petitioner could be able to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority where he was found not guilty and was consequently exonerated of the punishment. After reinstatement, he was posted in various places in India including the troublesome places like Jammu and Kashmir where he discharged his duty like other Constables. He was served a movement order on 09.10.1999 vide Annexure-5 with 2nd time basic training at RTC-II-Avadi which order was, however, stayed by this Court vide order dated 26.11.1999 while entertaining the writ petition bearing O.J.C No. 13467 of 1999. By then, the petitioner in compliance with the movement order dated 09.10.1999 had proceeded to Avadi but during transit he lost his personal belongings between Vijayawada and Nellore. He reported this fact to Railway Police Station, Chennai Central. He was given a Police Certificate from the Railway Police Station, Chennai Central, Tamilnadu vide Annexure-6 in that regard and thereafter he want to RTC-II, Avadi and reported the above facts to the Sr. Sepoy (H.C.) who refused to accommodate him as he had no training accouterments. The petitioner contacted 113 Bn. over telephone, but he was informed that they had nothing to do in the matter since he had been issued the movement order. He fell ill and came back to his village and underwent treatment as he was suffering from infective Hepatitis. While undergoing treatment on 16.10.1999 he intimated this fact to the Commandant 113Bn., Hyderabad requesting 15 days'' C.L. or leave till the recovery of his health condition vide Annexure-7. Instead of considering his predicament, the Commandant 113 Bn. issued him a letter on 25.10.1999 directing him to report to duty immediately with all connected documents failing which disciplinary action would be initiated against him vide Annexure-8. The petitioner challenged the movement order vide Annexure-5 on the ground of mala fide and arbitrariness of the opposite parties in O.J.C. No. 13467 of 1999 and this Court by order dated 26.11.99 granted him interim protection in Misc. Case No. 12564 of 1999 and the said interim order was extended by this Court vide order dated 16.12.1999 in Annexure-9. The petitioner after being fit returned to 113 Bn. Hyderabad and reported to duty on 06.02.2000 and being allowed to join he continued to perform his duty. The medical report produced by him was accepted by the concerned authority. While so continuing he was served with a memorandum containing articles of charges on 09.03.2000 in Annexure-11 series which read as follows:

"Article-I

That the said No. 913143277 Recruit Tapan Kumar Kar of HQ/113 Bn. While functioning as Recruit/GD committed an act of "disobedience of orders" in his capacity as a member of the force u/S. 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that, when he was given movement order dated 09.10.99 with direction to report to the Principal, Recruits Training Centre-2 CRPF, Avadi he failed to report there.

Article-II

That the said No. 913143277 Recruit Tapan Kumar Kar of HQ/113 Bn. While functioning as Recruit/GD committed an act of "Misconduct" in his capacity as a member of the force u/S. 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949, in that, when he was given movement order dated 09.10.99 with direction to report to the Principal, Recruits Training Centre-2 CRPF, Avadi he proceeded to his hometown without prior permission of competent authority."

The articles of charges mentioned above only indicate non-compliance with movement order Annexure-5 which had been stayed until further orders by this Court in O.J.C. No. 13467 of 1999. The petitioner came to know about the proceeding on 23.03.2000 which was taken up by opposite party No. 3 on day to day basis on 25.03.2000 with shortest possible notice depriving him of the opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses effectively and on 23.04.2000 he submitted an application before enquiry officer-cum-Commandant, Warangal in Annexure-12 praying to summon the defence witnesses officially as named therein and permit him to engage a lawyer or retired police officer as his defence assistance and also to fix the venue of enquiry at Bhubaneswar for examination of un-official witnesses. On his application vide Annexure-12, the enquiry officer illegally and arbitrarily neither passed any order assigning any reason nor did allow him to get examined his defence witnesses or to supply him copies of the desired documents. He was thus given no opportunity to get his desired witnesses examined in defence. The enquiry officer without providing any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice with bias and prejudice submitted a report on 05.07.2000 vide Annexure-13. On the basis of the said report, the D.I.G. of Police CRPF, Hyderabad passed the final order of removal of the petitioner from service on 29.09.2000 at Jammu and Kashmir vide Annexure-14. Against the said order of removal, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 15.05.2001 in Annexure-16. The appellate authority vide order dated 04.01.2002 in Annexure-18 confirmed the order of his removal from service passed by the disciplinary authority vide Annexure-14. Hence the present writ petition.

Mr. P.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the entire inquiry proceeding was vitiated in non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, more particularly non-supply of the documents asked for by the petitioner as well as non-examination of material witnesses and also not allowing him defence assistance. He further submitted that the harshest punishment i.e., removal from service, imposed by the disciplinary authority, confirmed by the appellate authority is liable to be quashed being violative of the principles of natural justice.

To substantiate the allegations, Mr. Nayak has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others, ; Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, ; Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Others, ; A.K. Roy and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, ; Inspector-General of Police and another v. Sukanta Kumar Nayak, 1993 Lab IC 521 ; Hardwari Lal Vs. State of U.P. and Others, ; Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, ; Sri Janardan Mohanty Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and Tapan Kumar Dalai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .

Mrs. Bharati Dash, learned Central Government Counsel for the opposite parties, refuting the allegations of the petitioner, argued that there was compliance with the principles of natural justice by supplying him the documents, his material witnesses having been examined and as such no prejudice was caused to him and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned orders.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, this Court proposes to deal with the case on the basis of the allegations made, materials available on record and the law governing the field. The Parliament enacted an Act to provide for the constitution and regulation of Armed Central Reserve Police Force called "Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949" (hereinafter referred to as the "1949 Act"). Section-9 to Section-14 thereof deal with offences and punishments. Sub-section (1) of Section-11 reads as follows:

"11. Minor punishment--(1) The Commandant or any other authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal anyone or more of the following punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force, that is to say-

(a) reduction in rank;

(b) fine of any amount not exceeding one month''s pay and allowances;

(c) confinement of quarter-guard for not more than twenty-eight days, with or without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue or other duty; and

(e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the Force.

The removal from service has been contemplated under 1 (e) of Section-11. In exercise of power under Section-18 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act 1949, the Central Govt., has made a rule called the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the "1955 Rules"). Chapter-VI of 1955 Rules deals with discipline. Rule-27 states about the procedure for the award of punishments. As per the table under sub-rule (A) of Rule-27 Clause-8 deals with removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the Force which reads as follows :

Sub-rules (3), (4) and (5) of Rule-27 reads as follows:

(3) when documents are relied upon in support of the charge, they shall be put in evidence as exhibits and the accused shall, before he is called upon to make his defence, be allowed to inspect such exhibits.

(4) The accused shall then be examined and his statement recorded by the officer conducting the enquiry. If the accused has pleaded guilty and does not challenge the evidence on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he pleads "Not guilty", he shall be required to file a written statement, and a list of such witnesses as he may wish to cite in his defence within such period, when shall in any case be not less than a fortnight, as the officer conducting enquiry may deem reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he declines to file a written statement, he shall again be examined by the officer conducting the enquiry on the expiry of the period allowed.

(5) If the accused refuses to cite any witnesses or to produce any evidence in his defence, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he produces any evidence the officer conducting the enquiry shall proceed to record the evidence. If the officer conducting the enquiry considers that the evidence of any witness or any document which the accused wants to produce in his defence is not material to the issues involved in the case, he may refuse to call such witness or to allow such document to be produced in evidence, but in all such cases he must briefly record his reasons for considering the evidence inadmissible. When all relevant evidence has been brought on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders."

In view of the above mentioned provisions of law available and taking into the fact of the case, it is to be considered whether there was compliance with the provisions of law or not.

A. Violation of the principles of natural justice

In the enquiry proceeding conducted by the enquiry officer on day to day basis, no opportunity was given to the petitioner for cross-examination of the witnesses. Request was made by him for cross-examination of the witnesses on 24.03.2000 and 25.03.2000. As required under the law, enquiry officer was to provide adequate opportunity to the petitioner to meet the charges against him by effective cross-examination to know what were the materials available against him so that he would have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. As it appears from the materials available on record that no such opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses by providing him adequate materials and opportunity.

6A. The age old principle laid down by the Apex Court is in the case of Khem Chand Vs. The Union of India (UOI )and Others, which has been followed by many judgments of the Apex Court. It is settled that the delinquent in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to an opportunity to know the material against him; to have the evidence recorded in his presence; to have the right of cross-examining the witnesses examined and to have a chance to examine witnesses in support of his defence. But, in the present case because of the day to day proceeding, it appears that no such opportunity was given to the petitioner.

b. Denial of opportunity to engage defence assistance

6B. As it appears, in the reply dated 23-04-2000, the petitioner clearly stated that since the gravamen of charges involved intricate points of law and facts, it is not possible on his part with inadequate academic attainment to put up a successful defence with irrefutable digression for which he required the help of defence assistance well conversant with relevant law and rules to present his defence case convincingly for demolishing the charges completely. Therefore, he sought permission to engage a lawyer or a retired police officer as his defence assistance. But no order was passed by the enquiring officer on the said representation vide Annexure-12. Further, the appellate authority considering such contention stated that prayer for service of a defence assistance was untenable under CRPF Rules and particularly when no presenting officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority. The Assistant Commandant-cum-Enquiry Officer being a highly qualified and experienced person and acquainted with all intricacies of law while discharging his duty as an enquiry officer also acted as the prosecutor. Therefore, in absence of any legal assistance it was difficult on the part of the petitioner who was a Class-IV employee to combat with the enquiry officer-cum-prosecutor who was well versed with facts and law both. The finding of the appellate authority that there being no such provision under the Rules to appoint a defence assistance therefore, that opportunity was not given to the petitioner was absolutely misconceived one.

6C. In Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, , the Apex Court held that the silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication. This view has also been re-affirmed by the Apex Court in S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others, . In paragraph-10 of the case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Others, , the Apex Court held as follows :

"Even in a domestic enquiry there can be very serious charges and adverse verdict may completely destroy the future of the delinquent employee. The adverse verdict may also stigmatize him that his future would be bleak and his reputation and livelihood would be at stake. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a managerial function and enquiry officer is more often a man of the establishment. Ordinarily, he combines the role of a presenting-cum-prosecuting officer and an Enquiry Officer, a judge and a prosecution rolled into one.......A man of the establishment done the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment office or part of it. Can it even be compared to adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a Court presided over by an unbiased Judge."

6D. But no material has been produced before this Court by the opposite parties to counter the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, the necessary implication would be that even if Rule-27 of 1955 Rules does not mention any such provision, essence of compliance with the principles of natural justice cannot be denied.

6E. In Inspector-General of Police and another (1993 Lab IC 521 (Ori)) (supra), this Court held in paragraph-16 as follows :

"so, it would not be incorrect to think that the right to be represented by a defence assistance in the enquiry was regarded as a part of natural justice."

6F. This Court also referring to decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, held that violation of natural justice would even amount to violation of Article-14 of the Constitution of India. In pargraph-17 of the judgment this Court observed that Article-21 comes to play even where livelihood is involved and the procedure about which this Article speaks of has to be fair, just and reasonable.

6G In A.K. Roy and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed in paragraph 95 that the embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detune being aided or assisted by a friend who is not legal practitioner. It was further observed that every person whose interest is adversely affected as a result of the proceeding which have a serious import is entitled to be heard in those proceeding and be assisted by a friend. The further observation in paragraph-95 is that "Just as a person who is dumb is entitled, as he must to be represented by a person who has speech, even so, a person who finds himself unable to present his own case is entitled to take the aid and advice of a person who is better situated to appreciate the facts of the case and language of the law.

6H. In view of the well settled principle of law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, this Court holds that the denial of engagement of defence assistance amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice.

c. Refusal to examine defence witness by the enquiry officer

6I. No reasonable opportunity was provided to the petitioner to put forth his defence case successfully inasmuch as the defence witnesses cited by him were systematically refused to be examined by the enquiry officer without specifying any reason to the detriment and colossal prejudice to the petitioner and summoning of official witnesses according to sweet will to depose in favour of the prosecution was nothing but bias against the petitioner. The procedure laid down under Rule-27(c)(5) of CRPF Rules has been given a complete go by inasmuch as no reason was stated by the enquiring authority as well as the appellate authority as to why the defence witnesses cited by the petitioner were not material to the issue involved in the proceeding.

6J. The petitioner in his application for affording him opportunity to get his defence witnesses examined as per Annexure-12 clearly and categorically cited as many as 13 number of material witnesses and documents to be produced by them, points to be proved and through whom they were to be summoned. Out of them, first witness was OIC (SHO) Govt. Rly. Police Station Chennai Railway Station who had to prove the kit bag of the petitioner being stolen as he had investigated into the said case of theft which was true, second witness was Sentry constable who was on duty at entry gate of RTC-II Avadi in between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. of 10.10.1999 through Gate Entry Register in which the name of the petitioner had been entered and he had been allowed to go inside the campus of RTC.II. Third was Battalion Hav. Major of RTC-II who was a Punjabi Sardar, who had to prove that the petitioner had met him and had reported to him about his arrival for basic training on 10.10.1999, but he abused the petitioner and did not accept the movement order. Defence witness No. 4 was the revered Principal, RTC-II, Avadi who had to produce the advance intimation sent from CRPF Bn. 113 about the arrival of the petitioner for basic training on 10.10.99 and any other previous correspondence made with him. He had to prove that the petitioner was deputed for basic training whimsically without obtaining any order from his higher authorities and without any previous programme for which the RTC-II staff were not prepared to accept the movement order which was not lawful. Witness No. 5-Srikant Kumar Sarangi was a person who had met the petitioner at Chennai Railway Station when he was badly suffering from fever and was in a semi conscious condition. Ashok Kumar Das, the brother-in-law of the petitioner was a Constable of Police V.S.S. Nagar Police Out-Post who had helped the petitioner to go to his village. Trilochan Kar was a person who got the petitioner admitted at the Primary Health Centre, Bari and then at the District Headquarter Hospital Jajpur. Kshetrabasi Swain was a person who had helped the petitioner for his treatment and witness Nos. 9 and 10 were the treating physicians of the petitioner. Witness No. 11 was the Officer-in-Charge (SHD) Binjharpur P.S. who had to prove that on receipt of the letter from the commandant 113 Bn. CRPF, he had made enquiry at the native village of the petitioner, about his illness and treatment as well as loss sustained by him due to super cyclone. Witness No. 12 was an Officer/Asst. of CRPF Bn. Office who had to prove that no action had been taken on intimation of the petitioner dated 16.10.99 to the Commandant. Witness No. 13 was J.P. Bharati S.I. (A) 133 Bn. Who had to prove that the medical certificates produced to the petitioner were genuine ones.

6K. In Hardwari Lal Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , the Apex Court set aside the dismissal order for non-examination of material witness which offended the principles of natural justice.

6L. B. Non-consideration of material documents

(a) No materials produced with regard to disobeying of movement order.

6M. There is no iota of evidence from the side of the prosecution disclosing the source establishing the allegation that the petitioner disobeyed the movement order intentionally or deliberately and for which there was initiation of proceeding and his removal from service and therefore the charges were illegal, arbitrary, perverse and not sustainable under law.

6N. The petitioner having been removed from the service on the basis of no evidence, the punishment imposed by the disciplinary-authority as well as the appellate authority was grossly bad and untenable in the eye of law and as such Annexures-14 and 18 are liable to be quashed.

6O. In Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, , the Apex Court observed in para-45 that Court while exercising its power of judicial review has to see whether sufficient material had been brought on record to sustain finding-conscience of Court does not have much role to play.

6P. (b) The petitioner disclosed the circumstances in his representation dated 16.10.1999 for which he could not report himself before 113 Bn. which were not rejected by the authority as false or fabricated and as such initiation of proceeding against the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of the movement order or on the ground of misconduct was an outcome of non-application of mind inasmuch as in appeal when such contention was raised the appellate authority also ignored the same. That itself is a ground that materials available on record were not taken into consideration by the authorities.

Another facet of argument is that from the evidence available in Annexures-12, 14 and 18 it appears that in absence of any contrary material of proof on record that the illness of the petitioner was false or the documents submitted before the authorities for grant of leave were not genuine, the certificate issued by the medical officer could not be ignored by the disciplinary as well as appellate authority. On the self same allegation, the authority could not have proceeded with the proceeding to hold that the allegation of charges levelled against him was proved. The prosecution having not adduced or proved any documentary evidence, primary or secondary, to establish the charge of non-compliance with the movement order, adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the prosecution and no inference could have been drawn on the basis of hearsay knowledge of P.Ws. 1 and 2 as they were not competent witnesses in the proceeding.

As it appears, in the departmental proceeding the authorities concerned had not considered under what circumstances the petitioner failed to report on duty before 113 Bn. In the absence of any documentary proof that the petitioner did never go to RTC II Avedi in disobedience of the movement the impugned order cannot be sustained. The authorities having not enquired into the genuineness of explanation of the petitioner and the certificate produced by him for grant of leave and the same having not been discarded by the disciplinary authority himself who was the authority to grant leave, the Rejection or non-acceptance of the explanation of the petitioner in absence of contrary materials, the entire proceeding was vitiated.

There is no justifiable reasons to indicate as to why the petitioner was to be sent for basic training for second time as the same could not be a substitute for refresher course. Admittedly, the petitioner had undergone the basic training and thereafter he having been posted to discharge the duties of a regular Constable in different places including troublesome places like Jammu & Kashmir for more than two and half years after the order of reinstatement passed by this Court quashing the order of termination from service.

Needless to indicate, the movement order dated 09.10.99 was stayed by this Court in Misc. Case No. 12564 of 1999 on 26-11-1999 arising out of O.J.C. No. 13467 of 1999. But, during pendency of the writ petition since the removal order had been passed by the authority concerned and the petitioner had preferred appeal, the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous by this Court. The authority during continuance of the interim order could not have passed removal order. The petitioner having preferred appeal thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the authority, this Court thought it proper not to go into the writ petition and allowed the authority to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding.

Mrs. Bharati Dash, learned counsel appearing for the Central Government referring to the counter affidavit strenuously urged that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition as the order of termination was issued because of initiation of proceeding at 113 Bn. CRPF Hyderabad and the order of removal from service having passed at Hyderabad. But as it appears, the petitioner is a native of the State of Orissa and a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. Besides, earlier this Court had entertained the writ petition filed by the petitioner in OJC 340 of 1999 which was disposed of on 18.11.1996 : (1997 Lab IC 1553 (Ori)) for self-same cause of action.

In Sri Janardan Mohanty Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , this Court taking into account the fact that the petitioner while posted at Ranchi, had been removed from service. He being a permanent resident of Orissa, question arose whether the cause of action arose in Orissa or not. This Court held that right to invoke Article-226 of the Constitution of India was a constitutional right which should not be made illusory or unenforceable upon narrow construction of the concept of cause of action. The service of copy of the appellate order will give rise to a cause of action if service of the said order was an integral part of the cause of action. Since part of cause of action arose in the State of Orissa where he was served with a copy of the order, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ application and the petitioner cannot be denied the relief on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Similar view has also taken by this Court in Tapan Kumar Dalai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, where this Court held that the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial. The appellate order vide Annexure-18 having been addressed to the petitioner to his local address, this Court has territorial jurisdiction. In that view of the matter the plea taken by the opposite parties that this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter cannot be sustained.

On the analysis of facts and law made above, this Court holds that the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 20.09.2000 (Annexure-14) and confirmation thereof by the appellate authority vide order dated 04.01.2002 (Annexure-18) having been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice are vitiated. Accordingly, the same are quashed. The opposite parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with all consequential financial and service benefits to him as due and admissible in accordance with law.

The writ application is thus allowed.