High CourtsSingle Bench

Tarlok Nath vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 22 March 1968 · Citation: (1968) 03 P&H CK 0012

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.S. Narula, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 — Section 24
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ No. 657 of 1965
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 1,322 words

R.S. Narula, J.—Tarlok Nath petitioner, a displaced landowner from Bahawalpur State, was allotted 73.8 standard acres of land in village Naghtala and another 73-8 standard acres in village Gangoha in Tehsil and District Hissar on a. temporary basis awaiting the receipt of authentic copies of the relevant revenue records from Pakistan. Permanent rights in respect of the entire holding were conferred on the petitioner in due course. By order, dated December ''2/5, 1960 (Annexure ''A''), the Assistant Registrar-cum Managing Officer gave an additional allotment of 1-2 standard acres of land to the petitioner in village Naghtala, consequent on a decision of the Government to increase the valuation of the land left by displaced persons in Bahawalpur State. On a reference by Shri S. D. Kitval, Assistant Registrar-cum-Managing Officer, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order, dated May 15, 1963 (Annexure ''B'') held that the total entitlement of the petitioner according to the revenue records received from Pakistan was 137 3/4 standard aces aid against that the Petitioner had already got a total area of 148-3 1/4 standard acres. Shri J.M. Tandon, Chief settlement Commissioner, accordingly cancelled the excess area of 1090 standard acres including the additional area of 1-2 standard acres allowed to the petitioner by the order of the Assistant Registrar-cum-Managing officer dated December 2/5, l960 (Annexure ''A''). The whole cancellation was ordered out of the land allotted to the petitioner in village Naghtala The permanent rights in respect of the excess land were ordered to be cancelled.

2.

Maghur Singh and others, respondents 3 to 7, then applied for review of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the ground that they were vendees of the land allotted to the petitioner in village Naghtala. They prayed that the excess land should be retrieved from the petitioner''s holding in village Gangoha. Notice of the application of respondents 3 to 7 was given to the petitioner. After hearing him, Shri J. M. Tandon. Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his impugned order, dated October, 7, 1964 (Annexure ''C''), held that the petitioner having conceded that he had, in fact, sold the entire land originally allotted to him in village Naghtala to respondents 3 to 7, it was in the interest of justice that the excess land should be retrieved from the other holding of the petitioner. He, however, maintained the order for the cancellation of 1-2 standard acres of land from village is Naghtala. It was to quash the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated October, 7, 1934 (Annexure ''C'') that the present writ petition was filed on March, 6, 1960. Dispossession of the petitioner from the excess land ordered to be retrieved from him was stayed by Dulat and Grover, JJ. while admitting this writ petition on March 12, 1965. The petition is contested by respondent No. 3, who has filed a return, dated May 26, 1965, and by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who have filed a written statement, dated February 21, 1968.

3.

At the hearing of the petition, only two submissions have been made by Mr. H. S. Wasu, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner. It is urged by him that the excess should have been retrieved from that part of the land which was last allotted to the petitioner. It is submitted by the counsel that though the land in both the villages might have been allotted by the orders passed on the same date, the land in village Naghtala was given to him after the Gangoha land and, therefore, the land last given to him should be taken away from him. Counsel is unable to say if this point was urged before Shri J. M. Tandon, Chief Settlement Commissioner, in the review proceedings. In any event, this point has not been taken in the writ petition. Nor is the counsel able to show any statutory provision under which such a right could be claimed. In these circumstances, I do not find any force in this contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner.

4.

The only other argument of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to review his earlier order. The argument is that howsoever equitable the relief granted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner may be, the order cannot be sustained if it lacks inherent jurisdiction. The reply of the State is that the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner u/s 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, are unfettered and plenary and the Chief Settlement Commissioner can, therefore, pass any appropriate order in matters like this, if the interests of justice so demand. I am not inclined to agree with this contention. Power of review can only be exercised if it is conferred by a statute on the appropriate authority. The only jurisdiction to review granted by the Act is contained in section 25 thereof. Sub section (2) of section 25 reads as under.

(2) Clerical or arithmetical mistake in any order passed by an officer or authority under this Act or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may, at anytime be corrected by such officer or authority or the successor, in-officer of such office or authority.

I am not inclined to interfere in this case, even on the second argument advanced by the Learned Counsel for three reasons. Firstly, if an order or part of an order is set aside by the authority which passed it at the instance of certain persons who had no notice of the proceedings in which the earlier order was passed, on the ground that they were persons directly affected by the first order bat had no notice of those proceedings, it does not, in my opinion, amount to a review of the original order in the strict sense. Such an order would merely amount to setting aside an ex parte order on the ground that a necessary party had not been heard and his interest was affected by the order in question, This case seems to fall in that category. The petitioner having known that he had disposed of the entire land in village Naghtala should have disclosed this fact to the Chief Settlement Commissioner at the first stage. I have no doubt that if he had done so, the Chief Settlement Commissioner would have originally cancelled the excess land from the other village. It cannot be denied that respondents 3 to 7 were persons affected by the order and had a right to claim ''hat they should be heard. Secondly, it was a mere accident that the Chief Settlement Commissioner did not know about the sales in favour of respondents 3 to 7 and, therefore, in my opinion, the case would fall within the expression accidental slip'' used in sub-section (2) of section and for correcting the same the Chief Settlement Commissioner had the power of review under the above quoted provision. The third reason for declining to interfere in this case has weighed with me most. Grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. One of the considerations which weigh with this Court in granting or refusing to grant such a relief is the conduct of the petitioner who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. In as much as the petitioner did not inform the Chief Settlement Commissioner of the sales in the first instance and wants to count on a hyper-technicality, the Court is not bound to interfere, even if the petitioner could make out some kind of a case. Equities are against the petitioner and in favour of respondents 3 to 7. The impugned order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner has been passed to advance the interests of justice. Net having found the order to lack in inherent jurisdiction, I do not find my way to interfere with the same.

5.

None of the points raised before me having succeeded, I dismiss this petition with costs.