Tarsem Singh vs Ram Karan Singh and Others

Ranjan Gogoi, C.J.—This is an application u/s 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for special leave to appeal against the order dated 26.08.2011 by which the accused-respondents have been acquitted, inter-alia, of the charge u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It may be mentioned, at this stage, that the learned trial Judge had convicted one of the accused, namely, Harjinder Singh @ Rajinder Singh while acquitting the accused-respondents. Aggrieved the complainant has filed this application for grant of special leave.

We have considered the judgment of the learned trial Court and also the evidence of PW1 and PW3 who according to the appellant were the eye witnesses and had proved the involvement of the accused-respondents sufficiently so as to warrant their conviction u/s 302 with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

In an appeal against the acquittal the power of the Appellate Court, though akin to the power exercised while hearing an appeal against the conviction, is normally to be exercised in a slightly more circumscribed manner for if the reasons cited by the learned trial Court being possible reasons and not indicating any perversity, then the view of the learned trial Court should be allowed to remain on record even if the Appellate Court is to take another view on the evidence placed before it.

It is from the aforesaid perspective which has been settled by long line of decisions of the Apex Court that we will proceed to examine the merits of the application for grant of special leave to appeal against the order of acquittal.

A consideration of the judgment of the learned trial Court particularly paragraphs No. 22, 23 and 24 would go to show that the learned trial Court has given cogent reasons for disbelieving the evidence of PW1 and PW3. PW1, who though claims to be an eye witness to the occurrence, had admitted in his cross examination that he came to know about the involvement of the accused-respondents only from PW3. This is an inherently unacceptable fallacy. That apart PW1 had also admitted that he did not state before the police the details of the involvement of the accused-respondents which he had unfolded in the course of his evidence before the learned trial Court. The FIR was lodged after few days of the incident and despite the delay in lodging of the FIR there is no mention of the specific role of the accused-respondents which has been sought to be ascribed to them in the evidence adduced. Similarly, relying on certain glaringly inherent inconsistencies in the evidence of PW3 Bhag Singh, the learned trial Court had thought it proper not to record any conviction on the basis of the statement of the said witness.

The discussion above would lead to the conclusion that the reasons cited by the learned trial Court for acquitting the four accused-respondents do not indicate any perversity and the view recorded is a perfectly possible view. In such a situation even if we are to disagree with the ultimate conclusion of the learned trial Court (it is made clear that no disagreement is being expressed) interference with the order of acquittal will not be justified. We, therefore, decline to grant special leave to the complainant-applicant to institute the appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.

Criminal Miscellaneous application is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.