Tasneem Ahmad & Another vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P.Lucknow and Others

M.P. Singh, J.—This writ petition is directed against an order dated 1761988, passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. Lucknow allowing the impleadment application of the respondent no. 3, in revision filed by the petitioners, under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicle Act.

The petitioners are joint holders of a Regular Stage Carriage permit, for the route AmrohaSambhal via Joya. They moved applications on 721984, under Section 57(8) of the Motor Vehicle Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, before the Regional Transport Authority, Moradabad, for inclusion of a portion from Sambhal to Hasanpur via Adampur in their Regular Stage Carriage Permit. These applications were published in the U.P. Gazette on 1121984 for inviting objections from the persons lively to be affected by the said inclusion. No body filed any objection. The Regional Transport Authority, Moradabad, considered the aforesaid applications in its meeting held from 23rd to 25th January, 1986, and on 13th March, 1986. The Regional Transport Authority rejected the applications by the order dated 1331986, against which Revision (No. 228 of 1986) was filed by the petitioners under Section 64A of the Act.

On 1731988, the respondent No. 3 moved an application before the Tribunal for impleadment in the said revision. The petitioners filed objection.

On 1761988, the Tribunal allowed the said application of respondent no. 3 and permitted him to be impleaded as opposite party no. 2 in the revision. Against this order the present petition has been filed.

Heard Shri U.K. Dhaon, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri B. Nath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondent no. 3.

The only point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that since the respondent no. 3 had failed to file a representation, then in view of Section 57(4) of the Act, he was not entitled to oppose the grant of permit at Revisional stage. In support of his contention he has relied upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court, reported in All India Reporter 1980, Allahabad, 14, Pradeep Kumar v. State Transport Tribunal and another.

In that case the State Transport Appellate Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioners to be impleaded as party in the appeal against which the petitioners filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding:

�If an existing operator fails to file a representation as contemplated by Section 57(3) of the Act, he is not entitled to oppose the grant of permit. Section 57(3) lays down that no representation in connection with an application made for the grant of stage carriage permit shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and simultaneously a copy of the objection is furnished to the applicant by the person making such a representation. Before an existing operator can claim right to oppose grant of permit he must file written objection before the appointed date and serve a copy thereof simultaneously to the person who may have made application for the grant of stage carriage permit. If the existing operator fails to comply with these two conditions he has no right of hearing before the Regional Transport Authority in opposition to the grant of permit. The Appellate Tribunal while exercising its appellate powers under Section 64 of the Act must act in accordance with section 57 of the Act in granting stage carriage permits. The appellate tribunal exercises the same powers as are exercised by the Regional Transport Authority. Since the petitioner had no right to oppose the grant of permit to the respondent before the Regional Transport Authority he could not do so even before the Appellate Tribunal as he had not filed representation in accordance with Section 57(3) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, justified in rejecting the petitioner''s application.�

In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner''s learned counsel the relevant provisions of the Act may be examined, Section 57 provides that:

(1) ����

(2) ����

�(3) On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier''s permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representation in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered:

(Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or on any route within the region, under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under subsection (3) of Section 47 or subsection (2) of Section 55, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in this subsection.

�(4) No representation in connection with an application referred to in subsection (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the persons making such representation.''

(5) ���..

(6) ���.

(7) ���.

�(8) An application to vary the conditions of any [permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the (number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it) or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier''s permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit:

Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles.�

Against an order of the Regional Transport Authority an appeal lies under Section 64 to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal who will, after giving such persons and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. There are different clauses of Section 64 (1) each dealing with different situation independent of each other. A party claiming a right of appeal must bring his case within one or other of the clause enumerated therein. A person, who is not specifically mentioned under Section 64 (1), has no right of appeal. The list of appealable orders under Section 64 (1) of the Act is not exhaustive. The State Government can frame Rules to provide for other orders being made appealable under causeI of Section 64 (1) read with section 68 of the Act.

Section 64A was brought in the statute book by means of Section 59 of Act No. 100 of 1956.

Section 64A runs as follows:

�The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on an application made to it call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies; and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the orders made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final;

Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order;

Provided further the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time;

Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this Section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.�

This has given the State Transport Appellate Tribunal a regional Jurisdiction. The scope of Section 64A is very wide and applied to all nonappealable orders. It confers the revisional power, either on its motion or on an application made to it to call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority as the case may be and in which no appeal lies. This power enables the Revisional Authority to correct the errors of the subordinate authorities, where there is violation of principle of natural justice or order is otherwise inequitable and manifestly unjust.

The last proviso, which is mandatory in nature, provides that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The copy of the impleadment application has been filed as Annexure2 alongwith the writ petition. In paragraph5 of that application it has been clearly said by the respondent no. 3 that he was holder of a regular stage carriage permit for the route SambhalHasanpur via Adampur. He has already filed revision (No. 38 of 1986) against the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Moradabad on 2681978 allowing variation of the routes of certain persons on the portion SambhalHasanpur in respect of permits Nos. 753, 781, 774, 747, 779 and sending the applications for publication for the variation of the route in respect of the permit No. 773.

It has been stated in paragraph6 of the application that the app was an existing operator on that route and will be affected by the order of the Tribunal in case the said revision is allowed.

The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon a case reported in All India Reporter 1965. Supreme Court, 456, Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan and others. The facts of that case in brief are:

On May 24, 1948 the Municipal Board of Pushkar passed a resolution that the Bus stand should be shifted to another site by the side of the road which passes by the police station. By the same resolution it was resolved to construct a passengers shed, piyaoo, baths, latrines, urinals and other facilities for the convenience of the passengers at the new bus stand as proposed. The Regional Transport Authority in its meeting held on the 3rd and 4th December, 1959 considered this proposal and passed a resolution in the following words:

�The Bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot of land at the junction of the Hallows Road with Ganera Road near the Police Station and Kalkaji''s Temple. The present bus stand on the northern Patri between Hanumangarhi Temple and Brahmannandji Baghichi will cease to be a bus stand and will be a bus stop only. The bus will not pass through the city. They will go back from the bus stop to the new bus stand. The Municipal Board will provide the necessary facilities. The buses will shift to the new bus stand after such facilities are provided.�

The said resolution was notified in the Gazette on 28th June, 1960.

Long before this notification was made, two residents of Pushkar, Jai Narain and Madan Mohan moved before the State an application for revision of the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, changing the Bus stand. Their application purported to be under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicle Act, was rejected on 1821960. In the meantime five more Bus operator of Ajmer Pushkar route moved a fresh application in revision under Section 64A against the same decision of the Regional Transport Authority to change the Bus stand.

The State Transport Authority allowed the revision and reversed the decision of the Regional Transport Authority directing that the old Bus stand should continue to be recognized as Bus stand for Pushkar.

Against this order of the State Transport Authority the Municipal Board filed a writ petition in the High Court. Main points raised were

(1) That the order of the Regional Transport Authority had been under Section 76 of the Motor Vehicle Act and was therefore not liable to revision;

(2) That, in any case, the application was barred by limitation; and

(3) That the State Transport Authority having already rejected one application in revision against the Regional Transport Authority''s order changing the bus stand could not entertain another application on absolutely the same grounds.

The High Court decided all the points against the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition against which the Municipal Board filed an appeal in the Supreme Court with special leave.

Apart from the other points involved in the case, the Supreme Court had considered the effect of relevant proviso of Section 64A also.

�The other point which was brought to our notice during the arguments at the Bar is that the order of the State Transport Authority dated the 6th January, 1961, was made without compliance with the second proviso to Section 64A. That proviso is in these words:

�Provided'' further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.''

�This appears to us to make it necessary that before making any revisional order under Section 64A the State Transport Authority has to see that a person likely to be affected by that revisional order receives notice of the matter and is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The requirement of this proviso was admittedly not complied with before the State Transport Authority made the order on January 6, 1961 in the present case. If the High Court''s attention had been drawn to this failure on the part of the State Transport Authority to comply with this statutory requirement, we have no doubt that the High Court would have felt compelled to quash the revisional order made.

Now, that we find that this statutory requirement was not complied with before the revisional order was made, we do not think it will be proper for us to ignore this infirmity in the order. It is true that the learned AttorneyGeneral contended that as soon as the Court accepts the plea that the revisional order challenged by the appellant by their writ petition is invalid for the reason that the appellate authority did not comply with the provisions of Section 64A the writ petition ought to be allowed and no opportunity can or should be given to the said authority to reconsider the matter. We are not impressed by this argument. We are satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, we ought to exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and send the matter back to the revisional authority to be dealt with in accordance with law, because there is no doubt that by adopting this course full justice will be done between the parties.�

In the case of Pradeep Kumar (Supra) an application for impleadment was made in appeal under section 64. There is no provision in this section corresponding to Section 64A of the Act. There is specific provisionunder Section 64A that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass any order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The language of Section 64A clearly shows that the revisional authority is bound to hear the person against whom the prejudicial order could be passed in revision. The supervisory or revisional power is vested in the higher or superior Tribunal to satisfy itself about the soundness or correctness of the order of the inferior authority. One usually accepts difference between the two powers (appellate and supervisory). An appeal confers a right upon the aggrieved party to complain in the prescribed manner to the higher forum, whereas supervisory or revisional powers are exercised to see that the subordinate Tribunal do not transgress the limits of law and keep themselves within the power conferred on them. The case of Pradeep Kumar (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondent has no application on the facts of the present case as the High Court had no occasion to consider the last proviso of Section 64A of the Act whereas the Supreme Court had clearly decided this question.

The impugned order is just and equitable. It causes no prejudice to the petitioners.

For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The respondent no. 3 is permitted to be impleaded as respondent no. 1 in the revision. The Revisional Authority will dispose of the revision within a period of one month from the date of presentation of a copy of this order.

(Petition dismissed)