Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. vs Manmohan Verma

J.V. Gupta, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge, with enhanced appellate powers, dated 23rd September, 1981, whereby the order of the trial Court granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant from using the premises as godown and for running a transport company was maintained.

The plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit in the trial Court for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-petitioner from carrying on the business of a transport company, from using as a godown-the premises known as one large hall and two small rooms in 116 Industrial Area, Chandigarh, alleging that he is owner and landlord of the said premises and that the defendant has taken the said premises on rent under an oral agreement of lease undertaking that the demised premises shall be used in industrial purposes alone for which the premises is meant and that the defendant will abide by the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulations) Act, 1952 and the rules, notifications and bye-laws made thereunder. But the defendant has started using the said premises for running a transport company by sub letting the premises to one Mr. Goyal and the remaining portion is being used for godown purposes by storing glacerine, etc, which is a hazardous goods and user of which is contrary to law and in violation of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder it was further alleged in the plaint that the Chandigarh Administration had issued notice dated 29th May, 1981 to the respondent plaintiff regarding the contravention of the terms of conveyance deed/allotment letter, where by he has been threatened that the building in suit would be resumed, and a suit u/s 8-A of the Act for forfeiting 10% of the consideration money of the site will be instituted. It has been further alleged that in case the defendant did not stop the misuse of the premises, the building shall be resumed and the plaintiff will be deprived of the property, which he has built after incurring huge expenditure. In this way the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and may be harassed and prosecuted unnecessarily for the misuse done by the defendant. The application was resisted by the defendant petitioner. After hearing the parties, the trial Court accepted the application filed on behalf of the plaintiff for temporary injunction. In appeal the lower appellate Court has affirmed the order of the trial Court Dissatisfied with the same the defendant has come up in revision in this Court.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that during the pendency of the revision petition an order of resumption of the premises in dispute had already been passed on 3rd November, 1981 and an appeal filed on behalf of defendant as well as on behalf of the plaintiff is pending. In the appeal ad-interim stay orders have been granted against the order of resumption In these circumstances, according to the Learned Counsel the loss, if any, had already accured to the plaintiff and, therefore, there is no occasion to sustain the order of temporary injuction issued against the petitioner.

It was next contended that in case the plaintiff himself rented out the premises for the purposes of godown, including inter alia for storing any material, finished or unfinished products and packing material, then, according to the Learned Counsel, the plaintiff is estopped by his conduct to fib a suit for injuction against the defendant as to restrain him from using the premises for a purpose for which the Plaintiff himself had agreed by a written agreement In support of his contention, Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to Smt. Uma Kumar v. Jaswant Rai Chopra (1960) 62 P.L.R 460. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran v. H.C. Shukral 1972 R.C.J. 289.

On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the matter already stands concluded by the judgment of this Court reported in Mrs. Amarjit Kaur Sadhu v. Malabar Cane Furniture Sector 22 B Chandigarh (1979) 2 R.C.R. 596 and an unreported Judgment of M.R. Sharma J. in Civil Revision No. 1956 of 1981, decided on 15th September, 1981 He further cited Supreme Court Judgment in Faquir Chand v. Shri Ram Rattan Bhanot 1973 R.C.R. 221 for the proposition that the landlord was not estopped from ejecting the tenant for using the premises for commercial purposes when the same was let out for residential purpose by the landlord, as it was against the statute, because there is no estoppel against the statute. The Learned Counsel for the respondent also con tended that grant of ad interim injunction is a matter of discretion and both the Courts have exercised that discretion in favour of the plaintiff and this Court will not interfere with the same in revisional jurisdiction. In support of this he referred to The The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Another, Balanagar Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway,

I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties at great length. In a similar situation on the question of approval it has been observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Faquir Chand''s case (supra).

The provision of clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 is something which has to be given effect to whatever the original contract between the landlord and the tenant The leases were granted in 1940 and the buildings might have been put up even before the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 came into force. It was that Act that for the first time provided the kind of remedy which is found in clause (k) The relevant provision in that Act enabled the landlord to get possession where the tenant whether before or after the commencement of the Act used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate notwithstanding previous notice. The anxiety of he legislature is to prevent unauthorised user rather than protection of the tenant or strengthing the hands of Development Authority in effecting forfeiture. The Development Authority can always resort to the terms of the lease. There is no estoppel here because both the landlord and tenant knew that the tenancy was not one permitted under the terms of lease of the land In any case here can be no estoppel against the statute. It would not benefit the tenant even if it is held that the landlord cannot under the circumstances, evict him. The landlord will loss his property and the tenant also will lose. He cannot, after the Development Authority takes over the building, use it for a commercial purpose. We thus reach the conclusion that the lease in its inception was not void nor is the landlord estopped from claiming possession because he himself was a party to the breach of the conditions under which was leased to him Neither the clear words of the section as in Woman Shriniwas Kini v. Rati Lal Bhagwandas, nor a consideration of the policy of the Act lead us to the conclusion that the lease was void in its inception if it was for an unauthorised user.

Apart from the above entitial S.P. Goyal J. has also discussed in Mrs. Amarjit Kaur Sandhu''s case (supra) has discussed the whole matter arising out of the similar circumstances. In that case the Courts below have refused the temporary injunction as claimed by the plaintiff, but the ''same was allowed in the High Court in the revision petition. In that case it has been further observed that even though it may be that the landlords permitted the manufacture and repair of furniture in the demised premises it would be of no consequence, because even the landlords are not entitled to use the premises in contravention of the conditions of sale. There is practically no distinction and none has been pointed out to distinguish the said case with the facts of the present case.

The mere fact that the order of resumption has already been passed and the appeals against that order are pending is no ground to vacate the temporary injunction already granted by the Courts below. An a matter of fact the apprehension of the plaintiff that the property in dispute may not be forefieted for misuse, has come true. In the circumstances he cannot be allowed to suffer any more by the conduct of the defendant for misusing the premises.

For the reasons recorded above the petition fails and is dismissed with costs However, the petitioner is allowed time upto 30th March, 1982 for winding up the business of godown and transport company after which this injunction order will come into force This order has been passed because at the time of motion hearing the operation of the impugned order was stayed by this Court vide its order dated 9th October, 1981.