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Tej Pal Singh vs Union of India (UOI)

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 26 July 1990 · Citation: (1992) 61 ELT 57

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jai Singh Sekhon, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 — Section 9(1), 9AA(1) · Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 204, 482 · Customs Act, 1962 — Section 110
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 761-M of 1990
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 494 words

Jai Singh Sekhon, J.—On the complaint filed by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise Division, Chandigarh on behalf of the Union of India for offences under Sections 9(1) (b) & (bb) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944, punishable u/s 9(1)(a) of the Act, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar, vide his order dated 15-10-1989 had summoned the Managing Director, M/s. Punjab Callulose Ltd. by passing the following order (Annexure P.2):

"Complaint presented today. It be registered. The complaint is presented by the Public Servant in the discharge of his official duties, so there is no need for recording the preliminary evidence. So the accused are ordered to be summoned to face trial for 8-11-1989.

The complaint also made request for his exemption from-the Court till further orders as he has to look after his official duties. Since the complainant has to look after his other official duties, his personal appearance is exempted till further orders and Shri Amar Raj Saini, Advocate, is allowed to appear on his behalf."

2.

The petitioner seeks the quashment of the above-referred order u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inter alia on the ground that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had failed to apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and had passed an order in a mechanical manner and contends that the impugned order is illegal being violative of the provisions of Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3.

Mr. A. Mohunta, the learned counsel for the complaintant-respondents maintains that the perusal of the complaint itself reveals that the respondent-Company as well as its Managing Director have ex facie committed the above-referred offences as certain goods were allowed to leave the premises of the company without payment of central excise duty and the goods were seized from the premises of M/s. Nitco Roadways, Chandigarh u/s 110 of the Customs Act.

4.

No doubt, the perusal of the complaint does ex facie make out a case for summoning the accused-respondents to face trial for the above-referred offences, especially when according to Section 9AA(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, every person responsible for running the affairs of the company or conduct of its business is liable for the above-referred offences unless he proves that he has no knowledge of the commission of such offence, but all the same, the trial Court having failed to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no option but to quash the above-referred order and send the case back to the trial Court for passing a self-speaking order in accordance with the provisions of Section 204 of the Code. This view is supported by the decision of Single Bench of this Court in Lachhman Das v. Union Territory, Chandigarh 1985 (2) C.L.R. 120. It is ordered accordingly.

5.

A copy of this order be sent to the trial Court which shall pass the requisite order by 17th August, 1990.