Tej Parkash Singh and Another vs The Director Consolidation of Holdings and Others

Inder Dev Dua, J.—This writ petition relates to the consolidation proceedings in village Saloh, Tehsil Nawanshahr, District Jullundur, and it is alleged that the consolidation officer concerned had made the block of the land of the Petitioners in repartition according to the provisions of the scheme, which was upheld by the Settlement Officer, (Consolidation). Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 took the matter on appeal and the Assistant Director, Consolidation by his order, dated 30th October, 1959, allowed the same. The order of the Assistant Director is alleged to have made certain adjustments in the area allotted to the Petitioners contrary to the provisions of the scheme. Feeling aggrieved by his order, the Petitioners took the matter to the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, u/s 42, of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act and on 17th June, 1964, the Director declined to go into the merits of the Petitioners'' grievances on the ground that as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Roop Chand v. The State of Punjab 1963 P.L.R. 576 (S.C), the present petition was in competent because an order of the Assistant Director had been passed u/s 21(4) of the Consolidation Act, as a delegate of the State Government.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has argued that by virtue of Section 11 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation), Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, (Punjab Act No. 25 of 1962), where the State Government or an officer to whom powers of the State Government u/s 42, have been delegated, has passed an order against an osier of the Assistant Director of Consolidation passed by him under Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Consolidation Act, as a delegate of the State Government, then the order u/s 42, shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been valid and would not be open to question on the ground that it could not be made u/s 42 against the order of the delegate of the State Government. This validating provision, according to the argument, overrides every other law, judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority. The counsel has in all seriousness argued that according to this provision even after the amendment, it would be open to the Director to pass a valid order on applications pending before him u/s 42 of the Consolidation Act on the date, of the amendment. This position is sought to be supported by the submission that Section 11 of the amending Act does not restrict its operation to the orders passed before the date of amendment. I am wholly unable to accede to this contention. The very language of Section 11(a), in my opinion, restricts its operation to the orders already passed and it does not deal with the power or jurisdiction of the Director to validly dispose of pending petitions on the date of the amendment. To accede to the argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioners'' learned Counsel would really amount to holding that the Supreme Court decision is wrong and, therefore, to overruling the Supreme Court decision which the amending Act did not even purport to do. The Act, inter alia, merely clothed with validity certain orders already pastel by the Director under an erroneous view of law. May be that the Legislature has by an oversight failed to make provision for the disposal of applications u/s 42 of the Consolidation Act pending with the State Government or the Director to whom powers of State Government may have been delegated, against orders passed by the Assistant Director u/s 21(4), but that by itself cannot justify a strained or forced construction of Section 11(a) of the amending Act. The Court, it may appropriately Be pointed out, is not at liberty to amplify an unambiguous enactment so as to include within its ambit matters which upon the plain meaning of the statutory language, cannot be considered to be included, even though fully convinced that the omission was inadvertent and in all probability undesigned. To do so would virtually mean re-writing the statute or legislation in the guise of construction which, quite clearly, is not open to the Court. And except for the bald submission, the Petitioners learned Counsel has not been able to support his contention either by precedent or by principle. I am, therefore, unable to accede to the contention.

The counsel has then submittal that this Court should in fairness consider in the present proceedings the validity of the order, of Assistant Director, dated 30th October, 1959. I think the counsel is justified in making this prayer on the facta and circumstances of this case. We have been taken through the under of the Assistant Director and the grounds of grievance contained in paragraph 3 of the petition, but it has not been possible to discern any error apparent on the face of the record justifying interference on writ side. The criticism levelled by him really pertains to the merits of the controversy which requires adjudication on facts, which quite clearly is not the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Before finally closing, it is fair to state that at the time of admission of this writ petition, it was represented that this petition raised a point in common with the one raised in Civil Writ No. 2818 of 1964 and, therefore, both petitions were ordered to be heard together, we have just disposed of Civil Writ No. 2818 of 1964 and the point raised in that petition has accordingly not been pressed in the present petition.

For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.