Teja Singh vs State of M. P.

Deepak Verma, J.

The applicant was prosecuted for commission of offences u/Ss. 304-A and 337 of the I.P.C on the ground that on 1.6.1984 he was driving a dumper bearing No. UTL 9621 in rash and negligent manner. The said dumper was coming from Rewa side and was proceeding towards Shahdol. While it was near Barghat, an accident had taken place in which one Surendra Kumar had died and Chandrahhan had received injuries.

The prosecution story, in short, is that while Surendra Kumar was riding his bicycle on which Chandrahhan was also sitting, a dumper, driven by the applicant came in a rash and negligent manna from the opposite side and gave a violent dash to them. On account of said dash Surendra Kumar had died in the hospital and Chandrahhan had received certain injuries. The applicant had abjured his guilt and submitted that the accident had taken place as Surendra Kumar was not able to control his bicycle on which he was carrying Chandrahhan also.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The proseuction had examined Shyamlal, P. W. 1, Nareshalal, P. W. 2, Vijayshanker Jaiswal P.W.3, and Chandrahhan Jaiswal, P.W.4.P.Ws. 1 and 2 are said to be the eye witnesses and P. W. 4 is the boy who was being carried on bicycle by deceased Surendra. In his evidence, he has deposed that he was dashed from the front portion of the truck but lateron, he has deposed that he was dashed from the backside of the truck. Thus, there appears to be contradiction in the evidence of P. W. 4, Chandrahhan, who was also victim of the said accident. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 is not worthy of credence and they appear to be interested witnesses. The sole testimony of P. W. 4 is not sufficient enough to hold the applicant guilty of the charges. High speed of the dumper does not prove the rashness and negligent of the driver. On a highway the vehicle are being driven in high speed. But, while driving the vehicle on highway drivers are required to be cautious so as to avoid accidents. There cannot be any presumption of negligence from the mere fact that man was knocked down was killed in a motor accident. The requirement of Section 304-A of the I. P. C. is that it has to be proved that the person had died on account of rash and negligent act of the driver of the offending vehicle. The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that the dumper, in question, was being driven in high speed. Therefore, this would not be sufficient to hold the applicant guilty of the commission of the said offence. Mere excessive speed of a vehicle shall not amount to rashness and negligent acts. The applicant had also deposed that there were speed-breakers near the site of the accident, therefore, he was required to slow down his vehicle. After the accident the applicant had himself gone to the police station to lodge the report. In a motor accident claims case the parents of the deceased have been awarded a sum of Rs. 36,400/- plus interest. Thus, parents have already been compensated adequately. The incident had taken place almost 11 years back. Therefore, it would not be proper to send the applicant behind the bars, after such a long lapse of time.

Learned counsel for the respondent/State has relied on a judgment in the case of Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, in which it has been held that in the revisional jurisdiction, the Court has very limited power to interfere. In this case also, it was a case u/S. 304-A of the I. P. C. wherein it was already proved that the accident had taken place on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the accused/applicant, as has been mentioned by me, in this case, the prosecution has failed to prove that the dumper, in question, was being driven rashly and negligently, on account of which the accident had taken place and, therefore, the basic ingredients of Section 304-A of the I. P. C. were not made out.

Consequently, the revision is allowed. The sentence and the fine imposed by the learned Magistrate'' and confirmed by the appellant Court are hereby set aside and the applicant acquitted of the charges u/Ss. 304-A and 337 of the I.P.C.