Tek Chand vs State of Haryana

Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu, J.

The present petition has been filed by Tek Chand under section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the complaint Annexure P/2 and resultant proceedings thereof pending in the Court of Judicial magistrate Ist Class, Panipat under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The brief facts of the case are that on 3081984 Shri A.N. Sharma, Food Inspector, inspected the premises of Tek Chand who was having in his possession about 10 litres of cows milk for public sale. The Food Inspector demanded a sample of the milk for analysis and purchased 660 mililitres of cow milk which was divided into three equal parts and was sealed into three dry and clean bottles in accordance with the rules. One sample was got analysed from Public Analyst, Haryana, who found that the sample contained milk fat 8.0% and milk solids not fat 7.5%. The sample was deficient in milk solids not fat contents to the extent of 12% of the minimum prescribed standard. Thus, complaint for the trial of the petitioner for an offence under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was presented.

The petitioner alleged that no offence whatsoever was made out against him of which cognizance could be taken by trial Court and the proceedings against him amounted to an abuse of the proceedings of Court. It was contended that earlier the trial Court adopted procedure of warrant trial and charge was framed against the petitioner on 15101985. The trial continued for about three years when on 1461988 the trial Court ordered fresh trial of the case in a summary manner. The trial court had no jurisdiction to revert back and was not legally competent to proceed with the retrial of the petitioner in respect of the same offence. In this case the Public Analyst had opined that milk solids not fat was 12% deficient while the fat content in the milk was higher than the minimum prescribed standard which led to an inference that no water had been added to the milk and the milk was not adulterated. Stirring of the milk was not mentioned in the spot memo and much reliance could not be place on the printed complaint containing the word `stirred''. The sample was not taken in a proper manner after making the entire milk homogeneous and in this way the milk which was otherwise rich in its fat contents was found deficient in milk solids not fat.

In the return filed by the respondent the averments made in the petition were denied.

I have heard the counsel for the parties.

Although various ground were set up in the petition on the basis of which the complaint Annexure P/2 was sought to be quashed, yet at the time of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the milk fat contents being more than the prescribed standard and milk solids not fat being deficient there could be an error in the method of taking the sample and the sample cannot be said to be adulterated. This contention of the learned counsel, however,does not appear to be tenable. The question whether the Food Inspector committed any error in taking the sample can be determined only after the evidence is led. In the complaint it is mentioned that sample was taken after mixing the whole contents properly and making the same uniform. The complaint is, thus, not liable to be quashed on the ground that there was some error in the method of taking sample. It was not necessary for the Food Inspector to mention in the spot memo that the milk was properly stirred and made homogeneous before sample was taken.

It was next urged on behalf of the petitioner that the sample in this case was taken on 3041984 and even after the expiry of about 9 years the case had not been disposed of. The trial Court first adopted the procedure of warrant trial without recording any reasons and after about a period of three years order Annexure P5 was passed for holding the trial in a summary manner. The trial Court committed an error by changing the procedure.Even after summery procedure was adopted the trial was not completed and this delay in the conclusion of the trial itself amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. In support of his contention the learned counsel placed reliance on the case of P.N. Mathur v. State of Haryana, 1991(3) Recent Criminal Reports 79 . In this case the trial Court followed procedure of warrant case and subsequently changed the procedure to a summary trial. it was held that in case the trial court came to the conclusion that the proper procedure had not been followed it was not open to the Court to order a fresh trial and the only course open to the Court was to record a finding of acquittal.

In the instant case a charge was framed against the petitioner on 15101985 copy of which is Annexure P4 whereby procedure of warrant trial was followed but on 1461988 the Court observed "that Section 16A of the Act which was mandatory in nature envisaged the trial under Section 16(1) of the Act to be in a summary way except where it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case was such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed. The case is being tried as a warrant case without assigning any reason. As such procedure is in violation of mandatory provisions and I hereby order fresh trail of the case in a summary way." Even after passing of this order the case remained pending and a period of nine years has elapsed. The change in the mode of trial after a period of four years of taking of the sample and delay in concluding the trial itself amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner who had undergone sufficient harassment and mental agony in facing the trial for almost nine years was within his rights to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

As a result I accept this petition, quash the complaint Annexure P2 and all subsequent proceeding arising therefrom.