Television Producers Chambers of Commerce and another vs Union of India and others

The prayer in W.P. No. 1251 of 1993 is as follows :

..... to issue a writ of certiorified mandamus calling for the records pertaining to the scheme of licensing the time slot for Metro (II) Channel as

announced in the press dated 17-1-1993 in ''The Hindu'' and the application form along with these guidelines and quash the same and forbear the

respondents herein from proceeding with the above scheme .....

The prayer in W.P. No. 1317 of 1993 is as follows :

.... to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to the second respondent''s scheme for telecast of programme

provided by outside private parties on Doordarshan Metro Channel as notified in ''The Hindu'' dated 17th January, 1993 and quash the scheme

and consequently direct the respondents to frame a fresh scheme in accordance with law ....

The petitioner in W.P. No. 1251 of 1993 claims that he is the General Secretary of the Association whose members are producers of various

Television programmes and telecasting their programmes through Doordarshan Kendras. It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the writ

petition that after the advent of Doordarshan in India, no Statute has come into force governing the functioning of the entire Electronic media

including AH India Radio. A reference to Central Act, 25 of 1990 viz. Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1950 is made in

the affidavit which received the assent of President on 12-9-1990 and it is alleged in the affidavit that the said Act has not yet been notified by the

Government. It is also alleged in the affidavit than on 17-1-1993, an advertisement appeared in ''The Hindu'' inviting applications from interested

parties for allotment of time slot of half-an hour each between 8.00 p.m. and 9.00 p.m. on the Metro (II) Channel of Doordarshan at Delhi,

Bombay, Calcutta and Madras with effect from 26-1-1993. It is also stated in the affidavit that the said notification mentioned that the forms would

be available till 4.00 p.m. on 18-1-1993 in all the Kendras, and that duly filled forms in all respects should be submitted in the concerned Kendras

on 21st and 22nd January, 1993 between 11.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. It seems the said notification further stated that computerised printed receipt

will be given by the concerned Kendras indicating the date and time of submission of each application. It is also alleged in the affidavit that the

members of the association are aggrieved by the notification which appeared in ""The Hindu"" on 17-1-1993 as the same is arbitrary and without

any authority of law. The petitioner also alleges in the affidavit that the Scheme announced by the respondents 1 to 3 is highly arbitrary and violative

of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the respondents have no legal authority to announce the scheme as the same has not been permitted by

any legislation and as such it is ultra vires of the provisions of the Constitution. It is also alleged in the affidavit that the proposed scheme is

amounting to the grant of a largesse by an executive action to few selected individuals cannot be sustained and the same is totally arbitrary and

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also alleged in the affidavit that since the Central Act 25 of 1990 has not yet been notified,

there is no power for the respondents to come forward with the present Scheme. It is also alleged in the affidavit that as per notification, the basis

of selection is ''First Come First Serve'' basis, and that the programme in Doordarshan being a creative work cannot be assigned on a mere ''first

come first service'' basis. A reference to earlier writ petition filed before this Court in W.P. No. 13808 of 1991 is made in the affidavit stating that

the guidelines framed by respondents 1 and 2 in pursuance of the directions of this Court in W.P. No. 13808 of 1991, do not contain such a

Scheme. It is also stated in the affidavit that in the absence of any authority, the announcement of such scheme is arbitrary. It is also alleged in the

affidavit that the Scheme is opened for only days viz. 16th and 18th January, 1993, that the applications should be collected by the interested

persons individually only at four Metro Kendras at Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and they should be submitted on 21st and 22nd of

January, 1993 between 11.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. Referring to this, it is alleged in the affidavit that it is highly impossible for any interested persons

all over the country to reach all the four Kendras in just two days and that the public notice is given only on 17-1-1993. It is also stated that since

no interested person might be having a programme which is already produced and in the absence of such produced programme being ready the

commencement of the programme on 26-1-1993 under this Scheme is an impossibility. It is also pointed out in the affidavit that such an

impossibility is ought to be implemented, it clearly points out that few vested interest are already ready with some programmes and only such

persons will be given the time slot which itself is an arbitrary action. It is also stated that the object of the Scheme cannot be making the Metro II

Channels again a Film based one in the absence of the prepared programmes because of the inadequacy of time to produce the serial in a matter of

one or two days. It is further alleged that by keeping the distribution of applications only for two days viz. 16th and 18th of January, 1993, the

respondents herein have sealed the opportunity of many people from applying for the same as they will not be able to reach the destination in the

shortest possible time. It is also stated in the affidavit that there is no criteria for grant of licence under the Scheme and that the eligibility criteria

does not give any emphasis for the creative work or to their experience in a particular line and is open to every individual who have no prior

experience in the particular field. It is also stated that if without any quality control, if the programme is allowed to be telecast by the licensees, it

would only result in the destruction of our cultural values and religious understanding. It is also stated that the Scheme does not have any system of

censor about the programmes likely to be telecast and as such the proposed Scheme is arbitrary in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Satwant Singh Sawhney Vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of India, New Delhi and Others, , and also in Shree

Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai Vs. Sri A.V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another, . It is also stated that under the present Scheme, there is no method

of screening prior to the telecast of the programmes and that the right to stop the programme or give directions to change the contents of

programme, if exercised, would resuit in multifarious litigations including seeking damages against Doordarshan. With these allegations, the

petitioner is before this Court with the aforesaid prayer.

Writ Petition No. 1317 of 1993 is filed by the members of the Television Producers'' Association of South India (TEPASI) by Secretary, for

the same relief as has been asked in Writ Petition No. 1251 of 1993. The petitioner alleged in the affidavit that the Scheme of the second

respondent is totally arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it is opposed to the purpose for which Doordarshan was

created. It is further stated that Doordarshan is a ""STATE"" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and that it is duty bound to follow

rational policies in awarding contracts and distributing largesse. It is also stated that the Scheme does not have any rational behind it and that its

purpose shows to help certain vested interests. It is also stated that experience in producing or directing programmes is not a relevant factor for

participation in the Scheme, that there is no selection involved in the grant of licence and as such the grant of licence based on first come first

served basis is totally arbitrary. It is also alleged that the speed with which the Scheme is being rushed through shows that the respondents have

already picked the persons to whom it will be granted. It is also stated that the second respondent could have advertised the Scheme earlier and

that the Scheme lacks bona fides. It is also stated that to allow television programmes from outside the State or abroad without any emphasis on

quality, would not only deprive the local producers of their livelihood but would also lead to destruction of moral and social values. It is also stated

that the proposed Scheme is opposed to public interest and as such it is illegal. It is further alleged that every citizen in the country has a right to see

good programmes on Doordarshan, that the proposed Scheme lacks in following guidelines and that is only on commercial interest. It is also

alleged that such a scheme is totally opposed to public interest and is violative of fundamental right of every citizen to view good programmes. It is

also stated that the apex Court of the land has held that every citizen has a reasonably expectation from the State and the public sector

undertakings and that no action can be unreasonable and unjust. With these allegations the petitioner is before this Court with the prayer stated

supra.

I have heard Mr. K. E. Baskaran, for M/s. Naidu and Bhat learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. 1251 of 1993 and of Mr. K.

Chandru, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in W.P. 1317 of 1993 in extenso. Learned Counsel Mr. K. E. Baskaran contends that the

proposed Scheme is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, that by paying licence fee of Rs. 80,000/- per half-an hour

time slot, no person will be able to give any good programme and that in the result, the public at large will not have good programmes at all. It is

also argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 1251 of 1993, that applications in all Metro Kendras are issued simultaneously

and as such the policy ''first come first served'' has no meaning at all. The learned Counsel also argued that when a person gets an application at

Madras at 11.00 a.m. and if another person may make another application at Calcutta at the same time i.e. 11.00 a.m. and as such it is not

possible to decide to whom the licence has to be given. The learned Counsel argued that the proposed Scheme is passed without any authority of

law. It is also argued by the learned Counsel that the proposed Scheme does not satisfy the test of reasonableness, which is a must, when the

Government proposes to frame a Scheme for granting licence in this matter.

Mr. K. Chandru, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 1317 of 1993 contends that it is true that nobody can have arty

objection for privatisation, but the scheme is projected all of a sudden and that from the point of view of the public, it is not a healthy practice.

According to the learned Counsel the viewers a section of public, will not have any good programme if creativity is completely spoiled by granting

of such licences under the guidelines framed and impugned in this writ petition. According to the learned Counsel, allotment alone is made under

the Scheme and the Association represents a section of the public and also the producers who have legitimate expectation that the doordarshan

will publish a Scheme without unreasonableness. Tn other words, according to the learned Counsel, every citizen, from a Government, should not

get an unjust treatment and as such the petitioner association expects reasonable procedure to be proposed Scheme which is notified by the

Doordarshan is highly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Having given my careful consideration to the arguments of the learned Counsel for both petitioners and having gone through the materials placed

before this Court. I do not see any merit at all in these writ petitions. Director General, Doordarshan has notified in the daily ""The Hindu'' dated

17-1-1993 about the new scheme, calling for applications from interested persons for allotment of time slots of half-an hour each between

8.00p.m. and 9.00p.m. on the Metro (II) Channel of Doordarshan at Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta with effect from 26-1-1993. It seems

Doordarshan has decided to set aside one hour time in the Second Channel of ail the four Metros of Doordarshan for allotment of time slots to

private parties to offer their programmes of entertainment nature and it may be of own production of sourced programme for telecast. The time set

apart for the said Scheme is 8.00 to 9.00 p.m. daily in two half-an hour slots. The Scheme would be operative from 26-1-1993 to 31-7-1993

commencing from 26-1-1993, a person who is interested, has to obtain a licence under the said Scheme for which guidelines are framed and

certain terms and conditions are also provided along with the application form. A licence fee of Rs. 80,000/ - per half-an hqur time slot per Metro

Channel would be charged and applications can only be for either a single Metro or network on all the four Metros. If the applicant applies for

network of all the four Metros, the total licence fee would be Rs. 80,000/- x 4 = Rs. 3,20,000/- would be charged. The selected person is

expected to enter into a contract with Doordarshan before the commencement of the telecast. With regard to allotment of time slots, interested

parties can apply for a half-an hour time slot per week for a minimum duration of 13 weeks or a maximum duration of 26 weeks and no time slots

will be allotted for periods ranging between 13 and 26 weeks. The licence fee for a half-an hour time slot will be Rs. 80,000/- and as such the

licence fee for the 13 half-an hour slots would be 10,40,000/- for a single Metro or Rs. 41,60,000/- for the Metro network. It seems 25% of the

said amount has to be paid by way of bank draft at the time of agreement and for the remaining 75% a bank guarantee would be furnished by the

party. As and when the initial amount of 25% gets exhausted, the parties are expected to pay another instalment of 25% payment and

correspondingly the amount of bank guarantee will also be reduced. As such, the entire bank guarantee will be revolved till the allotted time slots

have been telecast by Doordarshan. It is also seen that no party will be allotted more than two half-an hour time slots in a week, and it is open to

the party to choose either to combine two half-an hour time slots into one hour on the same day of the week or can be split into two separate half-

an hour time slots for different days of the same week. It is also seen that preference would be given to parties applying for twenty-six time slots in

comparison to those who apply for thirteen time slots. It seems that time slots will be allotted on first come first served basis and the basis of

determination would be determined by the computer printed receipt, indicating time and date of submission of the applications. With regard to the

nature of the programme, the guidelines say that the programme would be either own productions or sourced pro- grammes from within the

country or abroad and they should be primarily programmes of entertainment nature and should conform to one broad theme in the programme for

the entire duration of the time slots applied for. All copy-rights and other legal matters pertaining to the programmes are the responsibility of the

applicant and it is the responsibility of the applicant to conform to and abide by Doordarshan guidelines, advertisement Code and provisions of the

Indian Cinematographic Act. A declaration also has to be made in a stamped paper. With the abovesaid guidelines, applications are furnished to

persons at all the four Kendras, viz. at Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta till 18-1-1993 4.00p.m. and duly filed applications in all respects

have to be submitted to Doordarshan at concerned Kendras on 21-1-1993 and 22-1-1993 between 11.00a.m. and 4.00p.m. It is also made

clear that all licences are expected to generate revenue through sponsorship and advertisement on their own. Eligibility criteria for licensees is also

shown in the terms and conditions to be observed by outside private telecast of programmes on Doordarshan is also given in the notification. It is

also stated, with regard to quality rating, that a power of review is kept with the Government. Clause 4 of the terms and conditions to be observed

by outside private parties and clause 6 provides for suspension/revocation of licence.

A reading of the terms and conditions to be observed by outside private parties for telecast of programmes on Doordarshan and the detailed

outlines of the Scheme, which have been produced before this Court, clearly shows that this is a Scheme of giving a licence to telecast for a

particular time slot to private parties. The Doordarshan gets licensing fee of Rs. 80,000/ - per half-an hour and all licences are expected to

generate revenue through sponsorship and advertisement on their own. Virtually, it is a scheme of licensing one hour per day between 8.00 and

9.00 p.m. to private parties to telecast their programmes of entertainment nature, after receiving a licence fee of Rs. 80,000/ - per half-an hour. In

my view, the Scheme itself cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal, as the Exchequer gets a sum of Rs. 80,000/- per half-an hour. That apart, as

seen from the records, the scheme is only for a short period, commencing from 26-1-1993 to 31-7-1993. In such circumstances, I do not see any

reason to hold that the petitioners in both writ petitions, are affected or aggrieved in any way. If the members of the Associations are interested in

taking out a time slot, it is open to them to pay the necessary licence fee io the Doordarshan and take it. If they are not interested, the matter ends.

I do not think that any producer or any member of the petitioner Association has got a fundamental right to submit a serial to the Doordarshan or

to make money out of any serial which they submit to Doordarshan, thinking that this is a source of livelihood for them. The Doordarshan is not

meant to lieu for charity to the members of the petitioners Associations. If Government of India wants to augment its resources by allotting one

hour time in the Second Channel of all the four Metros, as mentioned above, after receiving licence fee of Rs. 80,000/- per half-an hour, I do not

think the petitioner Associations can attack the said decision, i.e. the proposed scheme in this case. The Scheme may be a new method. But that

does not mean that it can be said that it has no legal basis. The All India Radio and Doordarshan are run only on guidelines and no separate

enactment governs them. Even the present programmes which are given in Doordarshan by the petitioners are done only under guidelines and

instructions. If the argument of the petitioner Association in W.P. No. 1251 of 1993 is to be accepted, in my view, it means that if the petitioner

Association has produced any material for the Doordarshan and if the Doordarshan has used it, then it has to be said that Doordarshan is acting

without authority of law. So the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since the Act has not come into force, the Government of

India has no power to frame the real scheme has no meaning at all. Whether to notify the Act, as not is entirely the lookout of the Government and

it is not for this Court to ask the Government to notify a particular Act of Legislature. When Parliament has passed an Act, empowering the

executive to notify this Court cannot interdict and direct the Government to notify a particular Act on a particular date. It is completely within the

realm of Legislature and Executive and I do not think the absence of notifying the Act will vitiate the present Scheme, which is impugned in this writ

petition, which has been announced by the Central Government and the Doordarshan.

I am not able to accept the arguments of Mr. K. Chandru, based on the principle of ''legitimate expectation''. The Supreme Court in Food

Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, has held that the mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen is not a

distinct enforceable right. The only question that arises for consideration in these cases is whether the decision taken by Doordarshan is arbitrary. It

has been held by the Supreme Court, in the. abovementioned case, as follows :--

..... Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant''s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more

important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the

public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate

expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent....

On the facts and circumstances of the cases on hand, I am of the view that the decision taken by the respondents is a bona fide one and that there

is no arbitrariness in the same. By adopting the scheme, public exchequer gets the revenue at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per half-an hour. In my view,

it cannot be said that the scheme is a method of commercialisation. It is only a scheme of giving licence for telecast of programmes by outside

private parties on Doordarshan, of entertainment nature. I am not able to understand why the petitioners Association should feel aggrieved by the

Scheme. The mere fact that anybody can take part in getting licences by this Scheme cannot be a reason for striking down this Scheme, itself. As I

have already stated Doordarshan is not meant for making money by the members of the petitioner Associations, done. If the public interest is

looked at in my view, the Courts should see only whether the Revenue gets the maximum. From the arguments made before this Court, it is seen

the licence fee is too high as arty producer cannot make much profit out of it. That itself shows that the Government gets maximum from the

persons who apply for licences for half-an hour time slots. No person is excluded by this Scheme. Each and every citizen of this country can apply

for licence. No person is allowed to take away more number of shows arbitrarily. It is limited to maximum duration of 26 weeks. It is also argued

that the basis of ''first come first served'' , is arbitrary. I do not think that it can be said to be an arbitrary condition on the facts and circumstances

of the cases on hand. In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, , the Supreme Court has held as follows :

... The Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, but the Government is still a

Government when it enters into contract or when it is administering largess and it cannot, without adequate reason, exclude any person from

dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily....

It has further observed as follows :--

..... It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into

contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private

individual deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant.

The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant or largess including award or jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. must be

confined and structured, by rational relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norms and if the Government departs from such form, such

standard or norm in any particular case or cases, tthe action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the

Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or

discriminatory.....

In the cases before me, it cannot be said that any person can be picked up and chooses. Every citizen has been given an opportunity subject to

certain conditions that he should satisfy the authorities concerned and by ful filling the conditions and regulations of the new Scheme. A Division

Bench of this Court in Krishnaswamy Associate (P.) Ltd. v. Television Producers Chambers'' of Com merce, 1992 WLR 664, has considered

elaborately the effect of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the administrative quasi-judicial actions of Government and the distinction from

administrative actions gene rally operating in private law field. The Division Bench has considered the judgment of the apex Court in Union of India

(UOI) and Another Vs. Cynamide India Ltd. and Another etc., , wherein it has been held as follows :

.... Legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is

self-evident. In the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing, in which case the

substantial non-observance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may have the effect of invalidating the subordinate

legislation. But where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice of hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to

read natural justice into such legislative activity. It is true that, with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line between

legislation and administration to vanish an illusion. Administrative quasi-judicial decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, conversely,

legislative activity tends to fade into and present an appearance of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity....

In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, Represented by its Partner Shri Kasturi Lal, Jammu and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, ,

the Supreme Court has pointed out thus (at pp. 1999 and 1201 of AIR) :

There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the

terms on which largess may be granted and the other, in regard to the persons who may be recipients of such largess.

So far as the first limitation is concerned, it flows directly from the thesis that, unlike a private individual, the State cannot act as it pleases in the

matter of giving largess. Though ordinarily a private individual would be guided by economic consideration.... of self-again in any action taken by

him, it is always open to him under the law to act contrary to his self-interest or to oblige another in entering into a contract or dealing with his

property. But the Government is not free to act as it likes in granting largess such as awarding a contract or selling or leasing out its property.

Whatever be its activity, the Government is still the Government and is, subject to restraints inherent in its position in a democratic society. The

constitutional power conferred on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprincipled manner, it has to be

exercised for the public good. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and

guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without

reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a.... contract or looses out or otherwise deals with its

property or grants any other largess, h would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if it

fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....

The second limitation on the discretion of the Government in grant of largess is in regard to the persons to whom such largess may be granted. It is

now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, , that

the Government is not free, like an ordinary individual in selecting the recipients for its largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it

pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. The law is now well established that the Government need not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it

must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure, where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving

jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private

individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with some standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or

irrelevant. The governmental action must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be based on some principle which meets the test of reason and

relevance. This rule was enunciated by the Court as a rule of administrative law and it was also validated by the Court as an emanation flowing

directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14. The Court referred to the activist magnitude of Art. 14 as evolved in E.P. Royappa Vs.

State of Tamil Nadu and Another, and Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, and observed that it must follow as a

necessary corrollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with

anyone, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons

similarly circumstance, but it must act in conformity with some standard of principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination

and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discriminatory

ground. This decision has reaffirmed the principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in governmental action which lies at the core of our

entire constitutional scheme and structure.

Laying down, however, the test of reason- ableness, the Supreme Court has in this judgment observed Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, Represented

by its Partner Shri Kasturi Lal, Jammu and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, .

Now what is the test of reasonableness which has to be applied in order to determine the validity of governmental action. It is undoubtedly true, as

pointed out by Patanjali Sastry, U. in State of Madras Vs. V.G. Row, , that in forming his own conception of what is reasonable in all the

circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judge participating in the decision, would play

an important part, but even so, the test of reasonableness is not a wholly subjective test and its contours are fairly indicated by Constitution. The

concept of reasonableness in fact pervades the entire constitutional scheme. The interaction of Arts. 14, 19 and 21 analysed by this Court in Mrs.

Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, clearly demonstrates that the requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread

through the entire fabric of fundamental rights and, as several decisions of this Court show, this concept of reasonableness finds its positive

manifestation and expression in the lofty ideal of social and economic justice which inspires and animatex the Directive Principles. It has been laid

down by this Court in E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, and Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, that

Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and since the principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically

and essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, is projected by this Article, it must characterise every governmental action whether it be

under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. So also the concept of reasonableness runs through the totality

of Article 19 and requires that restrictions on the freedoms of the citizen, in order to be permissible, must at the best be reasonable. Similarly Art.

21 in the full plenitude of its activist magnitude as discovered by Mcnka Gandhi''s case, insists that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal

liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law and such procedure must be reasonably fair and just. The Directive Principles

concretist and give shape to the concept of reasonableness envisaged in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and other Articles enumerating the fundamental

rights. By defining the national aims and the constitutional goals, they set forth standards or norms of reasonableness which must guide and animate

governmenlal action. Any action taken by the Government with a view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive Principles would

ordinarily, subject to any constitutional or legal inhibitions or other overriding considerations, qualify for being regarded as reasonable, while an

action which is inconsistent with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would prima facie incurred the reproach of being unreasonable.

So also the concept of public interest must as far as possible receive its Orientation from the Directive Principles. What according to the founding

fathers constitutes the plaines requirement of public interest is set out in the Directive Principles and they embody per excellence the constitutional

concept of public interest. If, therefore, a governmental action is calculated to implement or give effect to a Directive Principle, it would ordinarily,

subject to any other overriding considerations, be informed with public interest.

Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and found to be wanting in the quality

of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid.

Having said as above, the Supreme Court indicated the Corollary in these words (at Pp. 2000 and 2001 of AIR):

It must follow as necessary corrollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the

cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot for example, give

a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other

considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such considerations may be that some Directive Principle is sought to be

advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a

welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not

otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property. We have referred to these considerations on!y illustratively, for there may be an infinite

variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total valuation of

various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the

action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest. But one basis principle which must guide the Court in arriving at its determination on

this question is that there is always a presumption that the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging

its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged

to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. The Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is

unreasonable or without public interest because as we have said above, there are a large number of policy considerations which must necessarily

weigh with the Government in taking action and therefore the Court would not strike governmental action as invalid on this ground, unless it is

clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public interest. But where it is so satisfied it would be the plainest duty of the Court under

the Constitution to invalidate the governmental action. This is one of the most important functions of the Court and also one of the most essential for

preservation of the rule of law. It is imperative in a democracy governed by the rule of law that governmental action must be kept within the limits

of the law and if there is any transgression, the Court must be ready to condemn it. It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in

every Government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenon in some countries, that the legislative check "". .

. . is getting diluted, it is left to the Court as the only reviewing authority under the constitution to be increasingly vigilant to ensure observance with

the rule of law and in this task, the Court must not flinch or falter. It may be pointed out that this ground of invalidity, namely, that the governmental

action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of mala fides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence

of mala fides.....

(Underlining is mine).

So if the Scheme, which is impugned in these writ petitions, is tested at the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it cannot be said

that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the activity of the Government of India is not guided by public

interest. I am not satisfied with the bald allegations stating that certain persons are already chosen and as such this scheme itself is to be held as

bad. It is well settled that mere bald allegations are not sufficient to hold that the Scheme itself is bad in law.

In a case where fresh tenders were called for, a Division Bench of this Court in Chokhant International Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of The Port

of Madras, 1987 WLR 529 has held as follows (at p. 557);

.....We must, therefore, bear in mind the fact that unless we are satisfied that the Board of Trustees had not acted like a body are reasonable men

or that the decision which they have taken was not such that a reasonable person in the circusmtances of the case would not have taken, or that

they had taken into account any extraneous considerations which affect their decision, the decision to call for fresh tenders will not be open to

challenge. In view of trie undoubted legal position that if one of the tenderers must also be given an opportunity to give higher bids, the Board of

Trustees, in our view, were quite justified in closing all the tenders and calling for fresh tenders.....

In Shri Sachidanand Pandey and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, when considering the question whether without inviting

tenders or without holding a public auction, the Government can negotiate straightway with Taj Group of Hotels, the Supreme Court has held as

follows (at p. 1133);

..... On a consideration of the relevant cases cited at the bar of the following propositions may be taken as well established: State-owned or

public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed.

Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a

property, is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be

situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and

should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is a important so as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an

appearance of bias, jobbery and nepotism.

But the facts of the cases before me are stronger than the case in the abovementioned decision, infavour of the Government. Here it is only a case

of licensing. As I have always stated it is of public interest, and in the interest of the Revenue.

In the very same way, if the Scheme and the guidelines are looked at, I do not think it can be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. As and

when the Scheme starts functioning, if it is found that the respondents have acted arbitrarily, it may open to licensees to object to it and if the

licensee contravenes the conditions, the Doordarshan can enforce the conditions of the licence. That is why the power to revoke licence is kept

with Door-darshan. This itself shows that it is a scheme of licensing and not a question of lease or contract or a tender. The licence fee is fixed for

half an hour and if any citizen wants to get it, he has to get the same after paying the amount according to the terms and conditions.

That apart, no principle of selection arises in the scheme announced. No question of appointing an expert committee also arises. If a person

applies for licence, after paying the necessary fees, it should be given on the basis of ""first come first served"". The principle of ""first come first

served"" is an accepted principle in an unreported decision of this Court in S. Meenakshisundaram v. The State of Madras Rep. by the Secretary to

Government, Food Department, Madras (Writ Petition No. 272 of 1967 dated 23-4-1969) even in the grant of permit to establish rice mills in the

State. In that case, the grant of permit is made on the basis of ""first come first served"" and also on the basis of the quantity of paddy available

within a radious of three miles of the place where the new mill is to be situated. The learned Judge, Alagiriswami, J.) (as he then was) has taken the

very same view in unreported decision in W.P. Nos. 2029 of 2030 of 1969. As such, the clause made in the Scheme in the cases on hand, that the

first come first served"" cannot be said to be arbitrary. It cannot be presumed or assumed that any licence granted to any person will vitiate the

terms and conditions and the norms prescribed for particular hours. It cannot also be presumed that the programmes so produced will be of no use

and against the public interest. A reading of the Scheme itself shows that it is put on a trial basis. How far the Scheme is going to be workable is a

thing to be seen only in future. Time alone can show how the Scheme works. At this stage, no decision can be arrived at, assuming that useless

programmes will be given by licensees to the views and as such the viewers are going to be affected. The petitioner Associations in both cases

cannot claim th.at they are only the guardians of viewers as if they are givinggood programmes to the viewers to suit their tastes.

That apart, I do not think the petitioners herein can be said to be ''aggrieved persons'' to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

This Court has taken a consistent view, with regard to grant of permits under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, (Central Act 21 of 1958)

1958, that the existing mill owner is not a ""person aggrieved"", when permit or licence under the Act is granted to another person for entitling him to

file a writ petition. Applying the principle on the facts of the cases on hand, I am of the view the petitioners before me have no locus standi to

question the grant of licence to others if they satisfy the conditions of the new scheme introduced by Doordar-shan. It is an accepted principle that

rivalry in the same trade is permissible in law and no person can complain that this commercial interest is prejudicially affected: This is the view

taken by a Full Bench of this Court in M.L. Krishnamurthy and etc. Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Vellore and another, etc., after considering

the earlier judgments of this Court. If looked at that angle, I do not see how the petitioners Associations can be said to be ""aggrieved persons"" to

come up before this Court and challenge the Scheme introduced by Doordarshan for licensing for certain time-slots, after certain conditions are

complied with. As I have already stated, nobody is prevented from applying for licences. Nobody can say that equals are treated unequally. The

members of the Associations could have very well availed of the opportunity if they mean real business. It is true that the meaning of the word

person aggrieved"" may vary, according to the context of the Statute. But, on the facts and circumstances of the cases on hand, the petitioner

Associations cannot at all be said to be ""persons aggrieved"". On this ground also, the writ petitions are bound to fail.

That apart, I am of the view that no mandamus can issue on the facts and circumstances of the cases on hand. I do not think any duty is cast

upon the respondents by Charter, Common Law, Custom or even contract which can be enforceable by the issue of writ under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. (See Professor De Smith -- Judicial Review of Administrative Action -- IV Edition, page 540).

The decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Satwant Singh Sawhney Vs. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer,

Government of India, New Delhi and Others, and also in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai Vs. Sri A.V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another, have

no application to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. In my view, the Doordarshan, which is a State, has not prevented anybody from

applying under the Scheme for screening his programmes provided he is prepared to pay the required licence fees and follow the guidelines and

conditions of the new scheme. For the reasons stated above, I see no merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for ,the petitioners in both

cases. Accordingly, these writ petitions shall stand dismissed.

Petitions dismissed.