Temple Thakurdwara Sita Ram vs Nanku etc.

D.B. Lal, J.—This second appeal is brought from the decision of the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, confirming on appeal the decision of the learned Compensation Officer whereby an application u/s 11 of the Himachal Pradesy Big Landed Estates Act, filed by Shri Nanku and others for acquisition of proprietary rights in land measuring 14 bighas 10 biswas, situate in village Barota, was allowed, and the tenants were granted proprietary rights. Nanku and four others claimed to be tenants and they filed the petition u/s 11 with the usual allegation that they were entitled to the acquisition of proprietary rights against their landowner which was temple Thakur-dwara Sitaram through its Mahant Nand Lal Dass. The contention of the landowner was, that it being a temple, was protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the proprietary rights could not be conferred upon the tenants Nanku and others. The learned Compensation Officer granted opportunity to both the parties to adduce their evidence. Mahant Nand Lal Dass gave his statement on behalf of the temple while four witnesses were examined on behalf of Nanku and others. After considering the evidence, the learned Compensation Officer held, that proprietary rights could be conferred upon the tenants and he accordingly granted the petition and awarding compensation, conferred proprietary rights upon Nanku and others. The temple came in appeal before the learned District Judge. It was again contended that Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution protected the conferment of the proprietary rights but this contention was repelled and the order made by the learned Compensation Officer was confirmed. In consequence, the appeal was dismissed. This second appeal is directed against that decision of the learned District Judge.

The freedom of conscience and right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion is enshrined in Article 25. Similarly freedom to manage religious affairs of every religious denomination is engrafted in Article 26. Both these fundamental rights, however, cannot be stretched to confer upon any religious denomination a secular right to acquire or not to be deprived of, any property under a statute. To that extent a religious denomination is to be considered as any other citizen. This question was pointedly raised in a case arising in this very High Court of which the report is Sri Namdhari Gurudwara v. Nakbinoo and Ors. 1969 Delhi Law Times 592. It was held by a learned Judge that these Articles of the Constitution do not extend protection beyond religious practices, rites and ceremonies which may be essential or which may form integral part of any religious denomination These Articles cannot be read to create any special secular privilege or right in favour of any religious denomination to claim property to the exclusion of the other. Religious denomination cannot be held to have been intended to be clothed with greater constitutional guarantees and privileges than individual citizens in respect of ownership of property. Thus taking ownership from a religious denomination of lands, within Section 11 of the Act, will not be defeated nor can it be held to be illegal or un-constitutional. This being the legal position the plea regarding Articles 25 and 26 will not prevail.

It was then contended that the learned Compensation Officer neither allowed the parties to lead evidence nor considered any evidence in order to hold as to whether any benefit u/s 11(2) of the Act could be granted to the landowner. The record depicts quite the contrary. Ample opportunity was given to lead evidence. In fact the evidence was led and considered by the learned Compensation Officer. In the circumstance, the decision could not be set aside on merit. At any rate I am unable to find any circumstance which may compel me to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned District Judge.

While the appeal was pending in this Court, one of the Respondent Shikra seems to have died. No application was filed by the Appellant within time to bring on record his legal representatives. As such the appeal might have abated against the legal representatives of Shikra and there may be a conflict in the decree so far as the proprietary rights of Shikra are concerned. But this controversy need not be gone into, because the appeal itself is devoid of any merit and is being dismissed. Honce I refrain from making any observation as to whether the appeal has been abated in entirety or only against the deceased Respondent.

ORDER

As a result of what I have stated above, this appeal has no force and is, therefore, dismissed. However, I make no order as to costs.