Thakur Himmat Singh vs Board of Revenue, M.P. and another

P.K. Tare, J.

By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for writs of certiorari and mandamus, the Petitioner an Ex-Jagirdar seeks to get the order of the Board of Revenue, dated 31-10-1981 quashed holding that the Board of Revenue had no power of review in respect of appeals decided by it against the orders of the Jagir Commissioner u/s 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Sam vat 2008 (Act No. 28 of 1951). The Board of Revenue, relying on its earlier decisions, as also other cases, held that once an appeal u/s 29 of the Act was disposed of, there was no power of review and Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 6fi of 19r>0) could not be invoked for tho purpose by virtue of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008. The Petitioner challenges this view as incorrect; while the learned Government Advocate supports this on the reasoning of the learned Members constituting the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue.

Section 2 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008 which is a definition section provides as follows:-

Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined in this Act shall have the same meaning as is assigned to them in Qanoon Mai, Gwalior State, Samvat 1983, or in the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, or in Qawaid Jagirdaran, Gwalior State, Samvat 1970, or in the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State, 1928, as the case may be.

According to the said section, for any of the words not specifically defined by the Abolition of Jagirs Act, it is permissible to refer to the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 for a clarification.

The Jagir Commissioner under the Abolition of Jagirs Act is required to fix the compensation payable to the Ex-Jagirdar. Similarly, the Tahsildar is empowered to do certain acts. Section 28 of the Act relates to appeals from the orders of the Tahsildar to the Collector, whose decision is made final. Further on, Section 29 provides that the Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissioner u/s 4, 10, 11, 13 or 14 has a right of appeal to the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Board of Revenue is made final. It is further provided that the appeal under Sub-section (1) of Section 29 is to be disposed of by a Bench of the Board of Revenue consisting of two members.

It is Section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act that calls for an interpretation in the present case. It relates to the procedure before the Jagir Commissioner or the Board of Revenue. It is as follows:-

The Jagir Commissioner, or any other officer conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tahsildar, a3 the case may be, shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in relation to original of appellate proceedings as the ease may be, under the said Act.

Upon an analysis of the said section, the following conclusions, in my opinion, emerge:-(i) That the original authorities under the Abolition of Jagirs Act while conducting an enquiry under the Act have to follow the procedure laid down by the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 as far as may be. If there be a conflict between the provisions of the Abolition of Jagirs Act and the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, the former should prevail, otherwise the procedure is to be regulated by the provisions of the latter Act.-(ii) That the Collector and the Board of Revenue hearing appeals from the orders of the Tahsildars or the Jagir Commissioner shall have the same powers in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in relation to appellate proceedings. Therefore, while hearing an appeal, the Board of Revenue has all the powers of an appellate Revenue Court. Can it therefore, be said that the Board of Revenue can entertain an appeal u/s 29 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act-only and dispose of the same, but cannot exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate Revenue Court either u/s 39 or Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, or is it that the power of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act is to be restricted to the powers as detailed in Sections 43 and 44 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Before I answer this question, I think it necessary to examine the reasoning of the learned Members of the Board of Revenue.

The Board of Revenue relied on the Division Bench case of this Court in Rajaram and Ors. v. Rani Jamit Kunwar and Ors. 1961 MPLJ 944 in holding that no inherent power of review exists in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, but it is a creation of the statute which places limitations in the manner provided. So far as this proposition is concerned, we are in full agreement with the same. That view was later on followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Deorao Jadhav v. Board of Revenue 1963 MPLJ 70 [M.P No. 10 of 1962, D/- 5-12-1982-Reported in 1962 M.P. Rev. Nir. 682 (December issue)]. But the later Division Bench has also taken the view that by virtue of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, a review u/s 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 lies. In that case, the Jagir Commissioner had reviewed his order. The Board of Revenue expressed the opinion that Section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act did not empower the Jagir Commissioner to review his own order. But the Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Krishnan and Sharma JJ., took the contrary view and reversed the order of the Board of Revenue basing its conclusions on the Supreme Court case of The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, .

The learned Members of the Board of Revenue in their exhaustive order have considered the two Martin Burn Ltd. Vs. R.N. Banerjee, and Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Their Workmen (Supra). At this stage, I may observe that the learned Members of the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue considered the general aspect with reference to the power of review and ultimately came to the conclusion that Section 40 of the Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 could not be invoked by virtue of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act in contending that the Collector or the Board of Revenue could exercise power of review.

Before proceeding to consider the question involved, I may observe that there are similar provisions in other enactments. Such as Section 85 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act No. 1 of 1951. I may observe that Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008 is similar in all respects except the phrase ''so far as may be'' to Section 85 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act No. I of 1951. The said section is as follows:-

The Compensation Officer, the Claims Officer, the Revenue Officer empowered to sanction a rehabilitation grant and any authority hearing appeals from the orders of such officers shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917, or the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928, as the case may be, and shall have the same powers in reference to proceedings before them as a Revenue Officer has in reference to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be, under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917, or the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928 as the case may be.

Coming to the SCC, I may observe that the question before their Lordships was whether by virtue of Section 9 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the Appellate Tribunal could exercise powers of review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 9 of the said Act is as follows:-

(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers a= are vested in a civil Court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. v. of 1908). (10) The Appellate Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed, and subject thereto, it may, by order, regulate its practice and procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act v. of 1908), shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act or the rules or orders, made thereunder, apply to all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal.

It was with reference to the special provisions that their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that the provisions of the CPC to the extent that they do not contravene any specific provisions of the Act and the rules are pro-tanto applicable to the procedure before the Labour Appellate Tribunal; and for that reason the provisions of Order 41, Rule 21 of the CPC would be attracted forthwith.

In The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, , their Lordships had to consider the same question whether Order 47 of the CPC in terms was applicable to the proceedings of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Their Lordships reiterated the earlier view expressed in the case of Martin Bv.rn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee AIR 1938 SC 79.

As pointed out by my learned brother, Newaskar J. the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the two cases would not conclude the decision of the instant question, as we find a basic difference in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act relating to procedure. The question for consideration is whether by virtue of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008, all the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 are attracted, including the power of review u/s 40 thereof ?

However, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that there would be a distinction between the provisions of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and Section 9 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Api ellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. It was pointed out that in the Supreme Court case of Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee (Supra) the phrase ''when hearing tin appeal'' was held by their Lordships to qualify the phrase ''Civil Court'' and, therefore, the operation of Section 9 (1) could not be related to the case of the Appellate Tribunal hearing an appeal only. It was pointed that there is a distinction between the provisions of the said section and Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, as the words ''hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tahsildar'' cannot be related to the Revenue Officer, as was done by their Lordships in the case mentioned above. Therefore, it was suggested that the power of the Revenue Board and the Collector exercising powers of a revenue officer would be related to the case of hearing appeals, with the result that no further remedies would be available in respect of such appellate order passed by the Appellate Authority under the Abolition of Jagirs Act. According to the Learned Counsel, this necessarily excludes the power of review and the power of revision as conferred by the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. In our opinion, this argument cannot be said to be without any basis, whatsoever. That view is plausible, although this line of reasoning ignores the further phrase which occurs in Section 30of the Abolition of Jagirs Act. I may emphasize the same by reproducing it ''and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them us a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as tie case may be, under the said Act.''

The case of Rajaram and Ors. v. Rani Jamil Kunwar Devi and Ors. 1961 MPLJ 944 was a case where the Additional Deputy Commissioner had reviewed his own order under Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act No. 1 of 1951. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the power of review was granted by Section 15 (3) of the said Act. Therefore, it could be exercised only in accordance with the restrictions and limitations laid down by the said section. I am certainly in agreement with that view. To that extent, the powers of review u/s 40 of the former C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 stood modified; and the power of review could only be exercised subject to the limitations and restrictions specified by Section 15 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act No. 1 of 1951. But where no such specific provision is made and the procedure applicable to original revenue proceedings and appeals is provided for, can it be said that the power of review granted by Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 can be said to be non-existent. It is pertinent to note that the Board of Revenue hearing an appeal has all the powers of an appellate revenue Court as under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, except to the extent of inconsistency with the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008.

Subsequent to the decision in Deorao Jadhav v. Board of Revenue 1963 MPLJ 70; two Division Benches have taken the same view in Muhut Singh v. Bhanicar Singh Civil M.P. No. 10 of 1962 and Col. Sardar Chandrojirao Angre v. Board of Revenue and Ors. M.C.C. No. 9 of 1962, D/- 20-12-1962 (both cases of Gwalior Bench).

However, on account of the distinguishing features in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court would not conclude the matter and, therefore, I agree with my learned brother that this question needs a further and thorough consideration. Consequently, I join my learned brother in making a reference to the Full Bench, although I am not able to adopt all the reasoning of my learned brother suggested in the order of reference.

ORDER

V.R. Newaskar, J.

The only question involved in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is whether the Revenue Board can exercise powers of review with reference to a proceeding by way of appeal which it has disposed of in exercise of its powers u/s 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, No. 28 of 1951.

The Revenue Board, which was moved for exercising its powers of review, was inclined to take the view that such power has not been granted Under the terms of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act either expressly or by necessary implication. It took into account the provisions in the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Section 30 and held that that provision did not imply powers which the Board is competent to exercise u/s 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. It distinguished the cases cited before it in that connection namely, Sakti Narain v. Bir Singh, Martin Burn Ltd. Vs. R.N. Banerjee, and The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, . The present petition is directed against that decision.

It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that such refusal to exercise jurisdiction by entertaining and considering on merits the review petition filed before it by the Board was not lawful. It is consequently urged that the Board may be directed to entertain and to consider the review petition on merits. Reliance is placed upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Deorao Jadhav v. Board of Revenue 1963 MPLJ Note 70 : 1963 JLJ 88, in that connection.

It is not disputed and is clear from the provisions contained in the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act that no specific power of review has been granted to the Revenue Board by any direct provision contained in the Act. It is also well settled, as is held in the decision of this Court in the case reported in Rajaram v. Rani Jamit Kunivar 1961 MPLJ 944 : 1961 JLJ 1113, that unlike inherent powers to correct clerical errors or accidental slips or omissions as are referred to tinder Section 152, C.P.C. no tribunal has inherent powers to review its own decision unless such power has been granted to it either expressly or by necessary implication. In that case their Lordships the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Pandey. held, relying upon the decisions in Nathulal Vs. Collector, Sawai, Jaipur, , Lata Pryaglal v. Jai Narayan Singh ILR 22 Cal. 419, Sri Sri Sri Ramachendra Maradaraj Deo Garu Zamindar of Khallikote and Attagada Estates Vs. Beero Pollai and Another, and the later Rajasthan decision reported in Jaikishan v. State of Rajasthan, as clearly established that in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings there is no inherent power of review. Their Lordships quoted with approval the observations in Lakb Pryaglal v. Jai Narayan Singh (Supra), to the following effect:-

I cannot admit that such a power is inherent in every Judicial or Revenue Officer. It is a power expressly given by law to Judicial Officers under certain conditions, and therefore it cannot be assumed that when not so given it is inherent in every officer.

And those in Nathulal v. Collector, Sawai Jaipur (Supra):-

It is well settled principle of law that when a matter is finally disposed of by a judicial or gaisi-judicial authority that authority, in the absence of any statutory provision becomes FUNCTUS OFFICIO and is left with no authority to re-hear and give a fresh decision unless such authority is given to it by law Thus it is clear that apart from correcting clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission, there is no inherent power to review a final decision given on merits inter partes.

Having regard to the view thus expressed by the Division Bench of this Court, with which I respectfully agree, it is clear beyond doubt that there is no inherent power of review in a body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power and such power has to be looked to in express words of the statute or in its necessary intendment.

This is also the view taken in the decision in Deorao Jadhav v. Board of Revenue 1963 MPLJ 70 : 1963 JLJ 88, which is a case directly upon the point under consideration. In that case the Division Bench referred to Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and relying upon the following portion of the section it came to the conclusion that such power of review is attracted by the general application of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Their Lordships took reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, , in that connection. The portion of Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act which their Lordships quoted and relied upon is as follows:-

(The tribunals) shall have the same powers in relation to proceedings before them as the Revenue Officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings under that Act.

If the reasoning which their Lordships employed is correct there is no doubt whatever that the Board would undoubtedly possess the power of review and their refusal would be improper.

In order to appreciate the view taken in the aforesaid case it will be necessary first to refer to Section 28 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act which entitles a person aggrieved by an order of the Tehsildar u/s 23 to appeal against that order to the Collector whose decision is final. Section 29 entitles the Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissioner u/s 4, 10, 11, 13 or 14 of the Act to prefer appeal against such an order to the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Board of Revenue in such an appeal "shall be final". Then comes the material provision namely, Section 30. It is as follows:-

The Jagir Commissioner, or any other officer conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar, as the case may be, shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be, under the said Act.

In order to understand the exact implication of this section in so far as it relates to powers of the Board of Revenue with reference to an appeal disposed of by them it will be conducive to clarity if we quote the material portions of the section and omit those which are not material for our purpose:

The Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar, as the case maybe, shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer ha8 in relation to appellate proceedings, under the said Act.

The section is headed by the word ''Procedure'' and it specifically deals with the procedure which ought to be followed by the Board or the Collector, hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar. The powers which it speaks as being exercisable by the Board of Revenue as an appellate tribunal are those which it could exercise in relation to appellate proceedings under the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. If interpreted in this light it is clear to us that it in no way attracts powers of review which a revenue officer is competent to exercise u/s 40 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. If the procedure which the Board of Revenue has to follow has reference to the stage when it is hearing appeals and the power which it could exercise has also reference to the stage while it is hearing appeals it could not be said that in pursuance of such powers it could review the decision given by it in an appeal. If that were so it will be dealing with the case not while hearing it but after it is decided by it. As far as I can see the words ''Board of Revenue hearing appeals'' should really govern the question as regards the competency of a review petition. The procedure applicable under the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and the powers in relation to proceedings before the Board which they could exercise under the aforesaid Act mean only such procedure and powers as are applicable to appeals. A Revenue Board hearing appeal against an order of the Jagir Commissioner cannot exercise powers of review. He can only exercise such powers after the appeal is disposed of. Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act thus interpreted cannot, in my view, attract Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act.

In Deorao Jadhav''s case 1963 MPLJ Note 70 : 1963 JLJ 88 the Division Bench relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Asa Ram and Another Vs. Mst. Ram Kali and Another, . That decision in its turn followed their earlier decision reported in Martin Burn Ltd. Vs. R.N. Banerjee, . Section 9 (1) (10) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act which was referred to by their Lordships for importing power of review is as follows:-

(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. v. of 1908).

(10) The Appellate Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and subject thereto, it may, by order, regulate its practice and procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act v. of 1908), shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder, apply to all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal.

Dealing with these provisions their Lordships observed as follows:-

It may be noted that the Labour Appellate Tribunal not only exercises appellate jurisdiction by way of hearing appeals from the awards or decisions of the Industrial Tribunals but also exercises original jurisdiction when applications are made to it u/s 22 of the Act to obtain its permission in writing to alter the conditions of service applicable to the workman or to discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in appeals pending before it. If an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 22 during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, it also entertains complaints in writing at the instance of the employees aggrieved by such contravention and the Labour Appellate Tribunal decides these complaints as if they are appeals pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This is also an exercise of original jurisdiction though under the express terms of the Section the exercise of that jurisdiction is assimilated to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Whatever be the nature of the jurisdiction thus exercised by the Labour Appellate Tribunal whether original or appellate that jurisdiction is exercised by it by virtue of the provisions of the Act. and Section 9 of the Act has reference to the exercise of the whole of that jurisdiction, when it talks of the powers and procedure of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In regard to such powers and procedure no distinction is made between the exercise of original jurisdiction and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and these provisions apply equally to the jurisdiction exercised by it whether under Sections 7, 22, or Section 23 of the Act.

Section 9(1) of the Act invests the Labour Appellate Tribunal with the same power as are vested in a civil court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act v. of 1908). A question was mooted before us whether the words when hearing an appeal'' were to be read with the words ''Appellate Tribunal'' or with the words ''a civil court''. It was argued that these words went with the words ''Appellate Tribunal'' and, therefore, the powers of a Civil Court under the CPC were to be exercised by the Labour Appellate Tribunal only when it was exercising its appellate jurisdiction and hearing matters which fall within the purview of Section 7 or Section 23 of the Act and not when it was exercising original jurisdiction and hearing application u/s 22 of the Act. This construction of the provisions of Section 9 (1) of the Act however suffers from this disability that it takes no count of the fact that the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the Act itself exercises both original as well as appellate jurisdiction and if such a construction was put on these provisions the result would be that there would be no provision as regards the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal when it is exercising original jurisdiction. The powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal which are sought to be provided in Section 9(1) of the Act are not limited only to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by it but have reference to the whole of the jurisdiction which is vested in the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. The words ''when hearing an appeal'' have, moreover, been used between the words ''a civil court'' and ''under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908'' which in the context in which they have been used could only have been meant to refer to a civil court. Whatever the jurisdiction the Labour Appellate Tribunal is exercising-whether original or appellate-it is vested with the powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when it is hearing an appeal. The very juxtaposition of the words ''when hearing an appeal'' with the words ''a civil court'' is sufficient in our opinion to invest the Labour Appellate Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction whether original or appellate with the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the CPC when it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and hearing appeals. See Clerical Employees of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company 1953 Lab. A.C. 522 and Chitu v. New Union Mills Ltd. 1954 Lab. A.C. 252.

Having regard to this reasoning and particularly the juxtaposition of the words ''when hearing an appeal'' with words ''a Civil Court'' in Section 9 it seems clear to us that that decision cannot be taken aid of in interpreting the words used in Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act. The circumstance that the decision given by the Board of Revenue hi an appeal is final and the juxtaposition of the words ''hearing appeals'' with the words ''Board of Revenue'' lead, in our opinion, to a result different from that obtaining in the cases dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions. We are therefore, of the view that the decision in Deorao Jadhav''s case 1963 MPLJ 70 : 1963 JLJ 88 deserves reconsideration.

The case may, therefore, be placed before Hon''ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench for the purpose.

[The case was heard by the Full Bench consisting of the Hon. the Chief Justice, and Newaskar and Tare JJ.

OPINION-

This is a reference by two learned Judges of this Court hearing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking, inter alia, a writ of certiorari for quashing an order dated 31st October 1961 of the Board of Revenue rejecting the Petitioner''s application for a review of the decision dated 14th February 1959 of the Board of Revenue in an appeal u/s 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act). The Board of Revenue held that it had no power to review its decision given in an appeal u/s 29 of the Act. The question that the learned Judges of the Division Bench have referred to us for decision is whether the Board of Revenue has the power under the Act to review its decision given in an appeal preferred to the Board of Revenue u/s 29 of the Act against an order of the Jagir Commissioner.

An appeal against a decision of the Jagir Commissioner lies to the Board of Revenue u/s 29 (1) of the Act which runs as follows:-

29 (1) The Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissioner u/s 4, 10, II, 13 or 14 may, within ninety days from the date of the communication of such decision to it or him, appeal to the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Board of Revenue shall be final.

The Act does not contain any provision giving to the Board of Revenue the power to review its decisions or orders. It is now well settled that the power to review is not inherent in a Court and can only be exercised if it is permitted by statute. This has been made clear by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Rajaram v. Rani Jamit Kunwar Devi 1961 MPLJ 944. This proposition has been very recently laid down by the Supreme Court also in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Seth Balkishan Nathani and Others, where it has been held that there is no provision in the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (I of 1951) which authorizes the Deputy Commissioner to review an order made by him u/s 40 (3) of that Act; and, therefore, the Nistar officer has also no power to start proceedings to reopen the order made by the Deputy Commissioner or to review it. Shri Phadke, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, did not, and indeed could not, question the proposition that the power to review must be expressly given by statute. He, however, submitted that the Board''s power to review its orders and decisions is to be found in Section 30 of the Act. That provision is as follows:-

Procedure - The Jagir Commissioner, or any other officer conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar, as the case may be, shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, BO far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceeding before them as a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be, under the said Act.

It was argued that Section 30 of the Act did not deal merely with the procedure that the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer conducting an enquiry under the Act or the Board of Revenue and the Collector while exercising their appellate jurisdiction were required to follow; that it also gave to these authorities the same powers which a revenue officer exercised in relation to original or appellate proceedings- under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007; that Section 40 of the Tenancy Act gave to the Board and also to any Revenue Officer the power to review their own decisions; and that consequently Section 30 of the Act read with Section 40 of the Tenancy Act conferred on the Board of Revenue the power to review its decision given in an appeal u/s 29 of the Act. Learned Counsel commended to us for acceptance the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Deorao Jadhav v. Board of Revenue 1963 MPLJ 70 : 1963 JLJ 88 where it has been held that Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act attracts Section 40 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and both the Jagir Commissioner acting as an original Court and the Board of Revenue acting as an appellate Court have the power to review their own orders.

The construction put by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner on Section 30 of the Act cannot be accepted. The first half of Section 30 clearly prescribes the procedure which the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer conducting an enquiry under the Act and the Board of Revenue and the Collector when hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar are required to follow when it says that they "shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be". This portion of Section 30 does not in any way deal with the powers which the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer as an original authority or the Board of Revenue and the Collector as an appellate authority can exercise in their original or appellate jurisdiction. The second half of the section no doubt provides that these authorities "shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be" under the Tenancy Act. But this provision has not the result of conferring on those authorities the power of review given to the Board or any Revenue Officer u/s 40 of the Tenancy Act. The power conferred by the second half of Section 30 is limited first by the expression "in relation to proceedings before them", and, again, by the expression "as a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings". Section 30 in the very beginning speaks of the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer functioning as an original authority and the Board of Revenue and the Collector functioning as an appellate authority. The power that is conferred by the latter half of the section is therefore in regard to the original proceedings before the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer or the appellate proceedings before the Board of Revenue and the Collector and that power is the same which a Revenue Officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings under the Tenancy Act.

Now, the proceedings initiated for the review of a decision given, whether by the original authority or by the appellate authority, are not a continuation of the original or appellate proceedings or a substitute for an appeal. They are separate substantive proceedings where the correctness of the judgment, or order, or decision given in original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be, is questioned. The various stages through which an application for review passes have been described by Jenkins C.J. in Sha Vadilal Hakamchand v. Sha Fulchand Umedram ILR Bom. 56. Therein it has been pointed out that when an application for review of a decision is made, the Court may either reject the application at once, or grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted. The rule may then be discharged or made absolute. If it is made absolute, the case is reheard on the merits and may result either in a repetition of the former judgment or decree or fn some variation of it. After thus describing the several stages of the procedure the learned Chief Justice remarked:-

Though in one aspect the result is the same whether the rule be discharged or on the re-hearing the original decree be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for, in the latter case, the whole matter having been re-opened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relegated to, and still rest on, the old decree.

The analysis made by Jenkins C.J. of the review proceedings abundantly shows that the proceedings for a review of a decision given by the original authority or the appellate authority are quite independent of the original or appellate proceedings in which the decision sought to be reviewed was given. There can be no occasion for the initiation of a review proceeding unless and until the original or the appellate authority first gives its decision; and it is only if on the review being allowed the decision of the original or the appellate authority is set aside that a rehearing of the matter before the original or the appellate authority becomes necessary. In the rehearing of the matter the original or the appellate authority, of course, exercises the same powers as it did while deciding the matter initially. But from this it does not follow that in entertaining and disposing of a review petition the original or the appellate authority exercises the power it can while dealing with the matter in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. The power to entertain a review petition and allow it must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only within the limitation prescribed by the statute for the exercise of that power. It is a power entirely different from the power which the authority exercises while disposing of a matter in its original or appellate jurisdiction. It is thus reasonably plain that by the second half of the section the power that has been conferred on the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer or the Board of Revenue and the Collector is the power which the Revenue Officer has while disposing of original or appellate proceedings under the Tenancy Act. This power "in relation to original or appellate proceedings" clearly does not include the power u/s 40 of reviewing a decision given in original or appellate proceedings.

The conclusion that the Board of Revenue has no power to review a decision given by it in an appeal u/s 29 is also supported by the fact that u/s 29 (1) of the Act the decision of the Board of Revenue has been given finality. If the Legislature intended to confer on the Board of Revenue the power to review its own decisions, it would have done so by inserting an express provision to that effect in the act like Section 40 of the Tenancy Act and not by the circuitous method of giving to the Board the power of review which a Revenue Officer has u/s 40. The absurdity of this circuitous method becomes all the more clear if it is noted that Section 40 gives to the Board also the power to review.

The decision in Deorao Jadhav''s case 1963 MPLJ 70 : 1963 JLJ 88 that the last clause of Section 30 of the Act attracts the provisions of Section 40 of the Tenancy Act and thus gives to the Jagir Commissioner acting as the original Court and the Board acting in appeal the power of review is based solely on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, , that as the CPC applies to the proceedings before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the provisions of Order 47 of the Code apply to those proceedings, and hence the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its own order. The decision of the Supreme Court turned on the construction of Section 9 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which provided that the Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court when hearing an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was held by the Supreme Court that if the CPC applied to proceedings before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, than the provisions of Order 47 would also apply to those proceedings. The learned Judges deciding the case of Deorao Jadhav (1) found Section 9 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and Section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act to be similarly worded. With all respect to the learned Judges, it is difficult to accept the view expressed by them in Deorao Jadhav''s case (1). Quite apart from the fact that arguments by analogy are misleading and it is not legitimate to construe the meaning of one section in one Act with reference to the meaning and effect of another section in another Act, there is no similarity whatsoever between the wording of Section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act and Section 9 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. The two sections of the two Acts differ lolo caelo. The material difference between the two provisions is that whereas u/s 9 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the Tribunal was given all the powers which vested in a civil Court when hearing an appeal under the Code, and, as held by the Supreme Court, the Code was applied in its entirety to proceedings before the Tribunal including the power of appeal and of review, Section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act gives to the authorities mentioned therein only that power which a Revenue Officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings under the Tenancy Act. The content of the power conferred by Section 30, as already explained above, is not wide enough to include the conferment of the power of review. Section 30 nowhere makes Chapter IV of the Tenancy Act applicable in its entirety to the proceedings before the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer, or the Board of Revenue or the Collector under the Abolition of Jagirs Act. There are two unreported cases, Mukut Singh v. Bhanwar Singh C.M.P. No. 10 of 1962 and Col. Sardar Chandrojirao Angre v. Board of Revenue and Ors. M.C.C. 9 of 1962, D/- 21-12-62 (both cases of Gwalior Bench), where also, following the decision in Deorao Jadhav''s case 1963 MPLJ 70 : 1963 JLJ 88, it has been held that the Board of Revenue can review its decision given in an appeal u/s 29 of the Act. The observations made about the decision in Deorao Jadhav''s case (1) apply equally to the two unreported cases.

For the foregoing reasons, this reference must be answered by saying that under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act the Board of Revenue has no power to review its own decision given in an appeal u/s 29 of the Act.

[After the Opinion of the Full Bench was received, the case was heard by the Division Bench which passed the following Order.]

V.R. Newaskar and P.K. Tare, JJ.

The Petitioner was a Jagirdar of Kaiyanpura which was included in the erstwhile Jhabua State which merged into Madhya Bharat and now forms part of Madhya Pradesh.

In this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India one of the questions raised was that the Board of Revenue had failed to exercise its powers of review which it possessed on the erroneous assumption that it possessed no such powers.

This question was considered by the Full Bench of this Court on a reference made by the Bench hearing the appeal. The Full Bench answered the question against the Petitioner by holding that the Board was right in holding that it had no power of review.

After the receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench the matter was placed for consideration of other questions which were raised in the petition with reference to the decision of the Board of Revenue.

The material points raised before the Board of Revenue and decided by the Board against the Petitioner as to merits are as given below:-

The income derived from alienated villages should be excluded from Gross Income of the present Jagir.

The total excise income of the Jagir should be treated as net income as 25% is already deducted as administrative charges.

In calculating the average yield of Forest Revenue for 20 years under Sub-clause (e) of Clause 2 of Schedule I of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act the period of years 1949 to 1951 should be excluded as during that period the State had taken over management of the area under the Scheduled Areas Jagirs Management Act.

Receipts of Nazarana should be included in the Gross Income.

With reference to the above questions raised before the Board of Revenue, it held as below:

With reference to Point No. 1:

Alienated village? cannot be separated from the present Jagir for the purpose of calculation of Net Income since those villages formed part of the entire Jagir as shown in the records alienation being only for providing maintenance to junior members:

With reference to Point No. 2:

The Petitioner cannot be allowed total excise income from Kalyanpura Jagir for the basic year a3 being the Net Income having regard to Sub-clause (e) to Clause 2 of Schedule I since in the basic year the Jagir derived only 25% (75%) from the total income under an agreement with the erstwhile State of Jhabua.

With reference to Point No. 3:

The provision in regard to the Forest income in Sub-clause (e) of Clause 2 of Schedule I is mandatory and the period of 20 years preceding basic years could not have been altered for calculating the forest yield.

With reference to Point No. 4:

Nazarana cannot be allowed under Sivai-Jama as such income does not fall under any of the categories enumerated in Section 123 of the Settlement Manual of former Gwalior State.

There was one more point raised as No. 5. But it was decided in favour of the Petitioner and therefore has no relevance for the present petition.

Petitioner raised the following grounds as to merits apart from the ground regarding competency of a review petition before the Board of Revenue:

I. The Income from alienated villages of the Jagir was not excluded in calculating the Gross-Income of the Jagir. It ought to have done so as such alienation could only take place with the previous permission of the Darbar (of erstwhile Jhabua State).

II. The Gross-Income from Excise was not rightly calculated. The deduction of 25% out of the total income of Excise was for management charges and the income thus payable to the Petitioner in the basic year ought to have been reckoned as net income and not Gross-Income. Deduction of 222% further for collection and Chowkidari was illegal. In doing so the Board committed an obvious error.

III. In calculating average forest yield from the Jagir for 20 years preceding the basic year, the period from 1949 to 1951 ought to have been excluded as during that period the State had taken over the management of the area.

IV. Income from Nazarana was not taken into account in calculating Gross-Income.

V. The Board did not consider illegal character of deduction from customs income.

VI. Prospective assessment of fallow lands was not taken into account in calculating the Gross Income.

Out of these this Court cannot take into consideration grounds v. and VI as they were not the grounds dealt with in the order of the Tribunal (The Board of Revenue).

It is said that these grounds were raised but not considered. Mere raising of grounds is not enough. It must appear that grounds had been pressed. It is only the grounds pressed before the Board and dealt with by it that can form the subject-matter of the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. We are bound, to assume that the points mentioned by the Board alone were pressed. Contentions with reference to these grounds Nos. v. and VI cannot be allowed to be urged before us.

As regards ground No. 1 there is no substance in the contention raised. The Jagir wa3 one and the alienation of certain villages to junior members of the family of the Petitioner Jagirdar was an internal arrangement made for the purpose of their maintenance. Those villages, therefore, could not have been treated as a separate Jagir under the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, the Net Income of the Jagir was rightly calculated.

As regards ground No. II it is clear from the documents Annexture 1 -A and 2 relied upon by the Petitioner that a share of Excise income derived from the Jagir was allowed to the Jagirdar only by way of grace and for their due up-keep (Parwarish) that share alone has to be taken into account as the income from excise. The deduction of 25% was in no way for defraying the expenses of administration or collection.

Reliance has been placed in this connection upon the later decision of the Board dated 27-9-1961 wherein, while dealing with the question as to method and extent of deduction according to Schedule I of the Abolition of Jagirs Act, the Board observed:-"As we read Schedule I, Sub-clause (2) (c) which deals with the excise income we see no justification for deducting any amount from the gross excise income that fell to the share of the Jagirdar. The scheme of Schedule I shows that all incomes from the various sources such as land, forest, excise etc. are first taken into account for ascertaining the gross income of the Jagirdar and deductions, if any, are to be made from this gross income in accordance with para 4 thereof. In other words, the cost of collection etc., are not to be deducted from such source of income individually; such cost has to be deducted from the gross income and only upto the prescribed extent laid down in para 4. We, therefore, agree with the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the total income from excise revenue should have been included in the gross income of the Appellant without deducting "v cost of collection,"

We agree with the view of the Board as regards the method of calculation namely the gross-income of the Jagirdar has to be calculated by adding together the income of all the heads enumerated in Section 2 of Schedule I, Abolition of Jagirs Act.

After thus calculating the gross income, net income is to be ascertained by making the various deductions enumerated in Section 4, Abolition of Jagirs Act. It would not be a correct procedure to take each item and to deduct therefrom cost of collection etc. and that too upto the prescribed extent. We further ''agree that as per item (e) in Section 2 of the Schedule I excise compensation or excise income or both as the case may be for the basic year has to be included in ascertaining the gross income without deducting the cost of collection. The Board calls the cost (expenses) of collection as Shahi Haque. It is really unnecessary to introduce any such phrase since it is always safer to confine ourselves to the expression used in the Act.

But Mr. Phadke wants us to hold on the basis of this decision that in determining the gross income the total excise income within the limits of the Jagir should be taken into account in the present case on the strength of the above observations. With this part of his contention we do not agree. All that the decision lays down is that in calculating excise income for its being added to make up. gross income the expenses of collection referred to in Section 4 (ii) , Abolition of Jagirs Act cannot be deducted. This however does not help the Appellant.

On the terms of the document 2 it is clear that what was allowed to the Jagirdar by the erstwhile State of Jhabua was excise compensation for they having enjoyed excise rights within their Jagir by way of ''Parwarish'' or grace although circumstances had changed due to non-production of excisable article and due to setting up of a proper administration for sale of excisable articles at places fixed under Government Orders it was the State which was really earning the income and the Jagirdar had no hand in it.

The Board''s view on this point is correct.

Ground No. Ill also is untenable. The terms of Clause 2 (e) of Schedule I to Abolition of Jagirs Act provides in specific terms that the period of 20 years referred to therein is the period preceding next before the basic year. There are no exceptions made in the matter of reckoning of these 20 years and even if during any portion of those 20 years the area forming the Forest area of the Jagir had been taken over by the State pursuant to Scheduled Areas Jagirs Management Act, still that period cannot be excluded. All that has to be done is to include the income of those years too as being the income from the Jagirdar''s Forest area. The conclusions reached by the Board are in conformity with the statutory provisions and no reasons are given on behalf of the Petitioner on what legal grounds the Board was bound to depart from the words of the statute.

As regards income from Nazarana there is no such item indicated in Section 2 of the Schedule I of the Abolition of Jagirs Act. Mr. Phadke wants us to hold that it is Sewai-jama. The term ''Sewai-Jama'' is not defined in the Abolition of Jagir3 Act. Its meaning therefore has to be taken as indicated in Section 2 (2) of the Abolition of Jagirs Act.

That provision is as follows:

Section 2 (2) .-Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined in this Act shall have the same meaning as is assigned to them in Qanoon Mai, Gwalior State, Samvat 1983, or in the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, or in Qawaid Jagirdaran, Gwalior State, Samvat 1970, or in the Manual for Jagirdars of the Holkar State, 1928, as the case may be.

The Board derives its meaning from Section 123 of Settlement Manual. Section 2 (2) of the Abolition of Jagirs Act really does not make reference to Settlement Manual of Gwalior State, and the word therefore has to be understood in its ordinary sense. But in determining what it means in the case of village income Settlement Manual of Gwalior State can be looked to as a relevant matter.

Besides this ''Nazarana'' is something which is a personal tribute to the holder of the Jagir and is really not the income of the Jagir village and consequently there is no justification to include it as Sewaijama item of the Jagir.

The petition therefore is unsustainable. It is consequently dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fees shall be charged at Rs. 100.