High CourtsSingle Bench

Thana and Others vs Bhagwanlal and Another

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 8 July 1987 · Citation: AIR 1988 MP 285 : (1988) MPLJ 279

HON’BLE JUDGES
T.N. Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Madhya Pradesh Rin Vimukti Tatha Rin Sthagan Adhiniyam, 1975 — Section 3
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 1977
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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 719 words

T.N. Singh, J.

The short point to be decided in this case is interpretation of the term "debt" of the definition Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Gramin Rin Vimukti Tatha Rin Sthagan Adhiniyam, 1975, for short, the Adhiniyam.

Few facts, to be stated to appreciate background of the instant lis, may be recounted shortly. Admittedly, each of the appellant is a ''marginal farmer'' defined in Clause (g) of Section 3 and each of them is also a ''member of scheduled caste'' defined in Clause (h) thereof. They had instituted a suit for declaration of their title in respect of some land, which was dismissed but they were saddled with costs which were assessed at Rs. 152.30 paise. The successful defendants, the respondents herein, levying execution of that decree for costs, the appellants raised objection invoking the protection of the Adhiniyam. The Executing Court allowed the objection but on appeal the decision being reversed the plaintiffs, who are also judgment-debtors, are before me in this appeal.

The best that can be done in this matter is to state legislature''s own language to demonstrate that the view taken by the lower appellate court is not sustainable in law. I quote the definition : --

"(d). "Debt" includes all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act whether due or not due."

There is no doubt at all that the definition is an inclusive defintion and it speaks of "all liabilities" due by the debtor. By enumerating some of them it is also made clear legislatively that such "liabilities" may arise in different manners under different circumstances. Such liabilities may arise when loan is taken from a "creditor" in cash or kind and such a loan may be secured or unsecured but it is also significantly made clear that ''liabilities'' payable under a "decree or order of Civil Court" shall also be regarded as "debt" under the Adhiniyam. The lower appellate Court fell into error by attaching undue importance to the word "creditor" though legislature''s view is that the key expression of the definition clause is "all liabilities" and not "creditor" and this is made abundantly clear, beyond dispute. Indeed, any ''''liability" arising undera decree, whether in respect of principal sum or for costs, would be a "liability" that would be "debt" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 3.

Before I say more on the context and setting of the term construing the definition as a whole I would stress the primacy of the object of the Adhiniyam and read its long title -- "An Act to provide for relief from indebtedness to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, small and marginal farmers, landless agricultural labourers and rural artisans in rural areas." Evidently, care is taken to insure the weaker section of the people against "indebtedness" of all kinds which may arise due to any cause. Indeed, it is for this reason that the term "debt" is evidently defined in an inclusive fashion. Indeed, the words whether due or not due" which are the terminal expressions of the definition qualifying the expression "subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act" also lend assurance to the construction suggested. A loan may be due payable or not due on a particular date but a decree when passed is for an ascertained sum and it is a present ''liability'', even if not enforced through execution. It is killed, though not enforced, and is live and not time-barred. Legislature has evidently taken care to cover all cases of all manners and types of "liabilities" by making the definition an inclusive definition and butressing this position further by qualifying "liabilities" by the word "all". This is all for the day.

For reasons given above I have no hesitation to say that the decretal debt in respect of the costs for which the execution was levied by the respondents-decree-holders is statutorily discharged u/s 4 of the said Adhiniyam and the execution is accordingly liable to be struck out.

The appeal is accordingly allowed but there shall be no order as to costs as there is no appearance by the counsel for the respondents.