The Administrator-General vs Thotta Radhakrishnan Chettiar and Others

K.S. Menon, J.—This is an appeal from the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly, dismissing E.P. No. 205 of 1929 in

O.S. No. 16 of 1914 on the ground that it is barred by limitation.

The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Execution Petition is barred by limitation.

This petition is filed by the Administrator-General of Madras representing the estate of Eapoor C. Ramalingam Chettiar, who it is alleged, had

become entitled to the rights of the late Thotta Rajagopala Chettiar, who was the fourth plaintiff in the suit. The final decree in the suit, which was

one for sale of the mortgaged properties, was passed on 2nd November, 1920; and this petition was filed on 24th June, 1929. The first contention

of the appellant is that as the decree was subsequently amended by an order made on 13th July, 1929, (Ex. G) on an application made by one of

the defendants in the suit and one of the items of the decree was deleted, he is entitled to have the date of the amendment taken as the starting

point for purposes of limitation and that if it is so done, this application is not barred. But, as already observed, this application was filed before the

date of the said amendment and is for the execution of the final decree as originally passed on the 2nd November, 1920, and not of the amended

decree. Further, no application has till now been made by the appellant either for the execution of the amended decree or for the amendment of the

execution petition. In these circumstances, so far as this execution petition now before us is concerned, time began to run from the date of the final

decree and not from the date of the amendment, and the amendment does not enure to the benefit of the appellant. The records in the case

reported in Thiagaraja Thevar v. Sambasiva Thevar (1933) 66 M.L.J. 492 : 1933 ILR 57 Mad. 795 relied on by the appellant, show that, in that

case, there was an application for amendment of the execution petition after the decree was amended. The decision therein, therefore, does not

help the appellant.

It is next argued that as one of the decree-holders namely Purushotham Chetti, who was the eighth plaintiff in the suit, was a minor on the date of

the final decree and is still a minor, and as the other decree-holders were not in a position to give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the

said minor, the right of all the decree-holders to apply for execution is not barred by reason of the provisions of Section 7 of the Indian Limitation

Act. The said Purushotham Chetti is one of the sons of the first plaintiff and was brought on record on the death of the first plaintiff when the appeal

against the original decree was pending in this Court. He was then represented by his elder brother, Venkatarangam Chetti, the sixth plaintiff as his

next friend. But in the final decree, it was Kothandarama Chetti, another brother of his, and the seventh plaintiff in the suit, who was his next friend,

and not Venkatarangam Chetti. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the said Venkatarangam Chetti, who is the eldest son of the first

plaintiff, was the manager of the branch to which Purushothatn Chetti belonged, till 23rd July, 1922, when a partition was effected between the

members of that branch. There is evidence to support this finding and we see no reason to come to a different conclusion. The argument advanced

on behalf of the appellant is that though Venkatarangam Chetti, the manager of the branch to which the minor belongs was a party to the suit, still

as he was not the next friend of the minor, he was incompetent to give a valid discharge binding the minor also. In other words, the argument

amounts to this. As the minor was represented in the suit by Kothandarama Chetti, he and he alone could have given a valid discharge binding the

minor, and even that, only with the permission of the Court obtained in accordance with the provisions of Order 32, Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code,

and Venkatarangam Chetti, even though he was the manager of the branch, was incompetent, in the circumstances to give a valid discharge binding

the minor.

Ordinarily the manager of a joint Hindu family is competent to give a valid discharge by himself without the concurrence of the rest of the family

including the minors. If however, he happens to be the guardian ad litem or the next friend of a minor member of his family, it has been held that he

would not be competent to give a valid discharge in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or decree wherein he occupies such a position without

obtaining the permission of the Court under Order 32, Rule 6 in respect of the interest of such minor. In the case of Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram

Row (1913) 25 M.L.J. 150 : L.R. 40 IndAp 132 : ILR 36 Mad. 295 (P.C.) where the compromise (c)f a suit entered into by the father, who was

the guardian ad litem of his minor son without obtaining the leave of the Court u/s 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, was called in

question by the minor subsequently, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

No doubt a father or managing member of a joint Hindu family may, under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, enter into

agreements which may be binding on the minor members of the family. But where a minor is party to a suit and a next friend of guardian has been

appointed to look after the rights and interests of the infant in and concerning the suit, the acts of such next friend or guardian are subject to the

control of the court....The Courts in India seem to think that because Kajaram was a party to the suit of 1886 and was also guardian ad litem for

his minor son, who was a member of the joint family whom-Rajaram was representing, it was open to him to enter into the compromise in his

personal capacity, and as it was a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim, it became binding on the minor by virtue of his having acted as the

managing member of the family. How far the acts of a father or managing member may affect a minor, who is a party to the suit represented by

another person as next friend or guardian ad litem, is a question which does not arise in the case, and their Lordships are not called upon to

express an opinion on it. But they consider it to be clear that when he himself is the next friend or guardian of the minor his powers are controlled

by the provisions of the law and he cannot do any act in his capacity of father or managing member which he is debarred from doing as next friend

or guardian, without leave of the Court. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the object of the enactment.

The same principle was applied to Execution Petitions in the case of Al. Vr. Ct. Lakshmanan Chetti and Others Vs. V.R. Rm. V.L. Subbiah

Chetti (dead) and Others, . In that case it was held that the father, who was the next friend of his minor sons in the suit and in the decree, was''

incompetent to give a valid discharge in respect of the decree without leave of the Court obtained under Order 32, Rules 6, Civil Procedure Code,

and that, Section 7 of the Limitation Act applied. If therefore in the present case Venkatarangam Chetti had been the next friend of the minor it is

clear that he could not have given a valid discharge affecting the interests of that minor without obtaining the leave of the Court and that, according

to the decision in Al. Vr. Ct. Lakshmanan Chetti and Others Vs. V.R. Rm. V.L. Subbiah Chetti (dead) and Others, Section 7 of the Limitation Act

would apply. But in this case Venkatarangam Chetti was not the next friend of the minor in the final decree, though he was so in the earlier stages

of the case. His powers as manager of the branch to which the minor Purushotham Chetti belonged was not therefore restricted or curtailed by any

statutory rule like the one in Order 32, Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code, and we do not think that his right as such a manager to receive money due

under a decree and give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the minor was, in any way, affected by the fact that it was another brother of

his who was representing the minor as next friend.

We have not been referred to any decision directly bearing on this point in which it was held that the fact that another person was the next friend

of the minor, precluded the manager of the family to which the minor belongs, from giving a valid discharge. The two decisions relied on by the

learned advocate for the appellant are cases where the compromises during the course of the suit entered into by the father without obtaining the

sanction of the court u/s 462 of the old Code corresponding to Order 32 Rule 7 of the present Code, were subsequently challenged by the minor

son who was represented by the father and not by another, as his next friend. It was held that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 462

of the old Code or Order 32 Rule 7 of the new Code rendered the compromise invalid so far as the minor was concerned. In neither of these

cases was there any question of the application of the provisions of Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act or of the nature of the powers of a

manager to give a valid discharge of a decree in favour of himself and a minor member of the family represented by another member.

In the case of Vijaya Ramayya v. Venkatasubba Rao (1914) 30 M.L.J. 465 : ILR 39 Mad. 853 the contention was that, as the compromise

was entered into by the father who was not the guardian ad litem of the minor, no sanction of the Court was necessary u/s 462 Criminal Procedure

Code. (1882) and this Court (Ayling and Hannay, JJ.,) negatived the contention observing:

We cannot accept the suggestion that when he had no responsibility for them, and when their interests were entrusted to another person he should

have larger powers to bind them. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.

In the case before us there is no question of any compromise being effected by the managing member on behalf of the minor without obtaining

the leave of the Court under Order 32 Rule 7 corresponding to Section 462 of the old Code. The decision in Vijaya Ramayya v. Venkatasubba

Rao (1914) 30 M.L.J. 465 : ILR 39 Mad. 853 therefore is no authority, for the position that in cases like the present the ordinary powers of the

manager to give a valid discharge of a decree are restricted when he is not the next friend of the minor.

Again, in the case of Gur Mallappa v. Mallappa Mdrtandappa I.L.R.(1919) 44 Bom. 574 the question was whether a compromise entered

into by the mother of a minor, with the consent of the guardian ad litem of the said minor, but without the leave of the Court obtained by either the

mother or the guardian, Vas valid and binding on the minor, Heaton, J., observed:

That compromise in my opinion was contrary to law because in effect it defeated the purpose of Section 462. That section, I think, necessarily

implies that during the continuance of proceedings in Court, the dispute between the minor and another party which the Court had to decide could

not be compromised except by the guardian ad litem of the minor, and by him only with the leave of the Court.

Macleod, C.J., was not however prepared to go so far. His Lordship observed:

My brother Heaton, however, thinks that on general principles when a minor is represented in a suit by a guardian ad litem other than his natural

guardian, the powers of his natural guardian to deal with the minor''s interest which are involved in those proceedings are suspended. I am not

prepared to go so far as that, but on the facts in this case I am not disposed to differ as Neelava had applied to the Court to sanction the

compromise and thereby, I think she put it out of her power to settle the creditor''s claim as the minor''s natural guardian without the Court''s

consent.

On the other hand, in the case of Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row I.L.R (1913) 36 Madd. 295 this Court, (Benson, O.C.J.) and Sankaran

Nair, J., against whose judgment the appeal to the Privy Council was preferred, observed as follows:

If, therefore, some other person had been the minor''s next friend or guardian for the suit, then the plaintiff''s father could have entered into the

agreement now in question with Tuljaram the judgment-debtor on his own behalf without any reference to Section 462 Civil Procedure Code.

Their Lordships of the Privy Council however, did not decide that question, expressly observing that it did not arise for decision in that case, as

already pointed out.

In the case of Al. Vr. Ct. Lakshmanan Chetti and Others Vs. V.R. Rm. V.L. Subbiah Chetti (dead) and Others, also, Coutts-Trotter, C.J.

was inclined not to disagree with the view that where the father is not the guardian ad litem he could take money and give a valid discharge, but his

Lordship observed that he would like to reconsider that position when occasion arose.

As the provisions of Order 32, Rules 6 and 7 do not restrict in any way the powers of a father or a manager in a joint-Hindu family to receive

the amount of a decree and to give a discharge so as to bind a minor member of his family also, who is a party to the suit, without obtaining the

leave of the Court, in cases where such father or managing member is not the next friend of the said minor, and as there is no other provisions,

statutory or otherwise, imposing such a restriction, we do not think that those powers of his are in any way affected by the mere fact that another

person is the next friend of the minor.

The view we take of Section 7 is in accordance with that expressed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Abed

Hossain v. Abdur Rahaman where Nasim Ali, J. observed,

Section 7 contemplates a legal capacity to give discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability. The section requires that the co-

decree-holder in addition to his capacity as a co-decree-holder must have such a legal capacity as would empower him alone or to realise the

decretal debt and give a discharge without putting the decree into execution, even if his minor co-decree holder had been under no disability and

had the capacity to give his assent.... Familiar instances of such legal capacities are those of a partner and the karta of a joint Hindu family. Their

legal capacity to give discharge is derived from the substantive law,

Even if it has to be held that in cases of this kind where the father or the managing member is not the next friend of the minor, such father or

managing member has to obtain the leave of the Court, we do not think that that affects his capacity to give a discharge. His position as the

manager of the family gives him the right to give a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the family, adult or minor. This right is

derived from the substantive law and is not affected in any way by any of the formalities which may have to be gone through in enforcing it. One of

such formalities may be - we do not at all say that it is to inform the Court and obtain its leave. These acts merely relate to the procedure and are

not such as will affect his capacity. We find that the Allahabad High Court also has taken the same view, for in the case of Rati Ram v. Niadar

I.L.R.(1913) 41 All. 435 Walsh, J. said,

It is no doubt true that when the matter is in the execution court, it is literally true, speaking of it as a matter of procedure, to say that a discharge

cannot be given, because payment, for example, has to be made in and through the Court or certified by the Court, so that the discharge becomes

an order of the court itself. But I take the very clear view, and I think it removes all the difficulties in this case, that Sections 6 and 7 are dealing, not

with procedure, but with the legal status of individuals, and the expression ""where a discharge can be given.

is merely intended in Section 7 to be a definition of a person who in the ordinary-legal language is described as being able to give a discharge.

That is a definition of his legal. capacity in. relation to the other persons jointly interested, and not a description of his physical powers under

the procedure of the execution Court. The fact that the leave of the Court may have to be obtained, therefore, does not affect the capacity to give

a valid discharge. In any view of the case, therefore, Venkatarangam Chetti and the other adult decree-holders would have been competent to give

a discharge without the concurrence of the minor--Purushotham Chetti. We therefore hold that time began to run from the date of the final decree

and that the present petition is barred.

It was then contended that, as Venkatarangam Chetti was the manager of the branch to which Purushotham Chetti belonged only till 23rd July,

1922 and not for the full period of three years after the passing of the final decree, even if time began to run from the date of the final decree it

should be deemed to be arrested on the date when Venkatarangam Chetti ceased to be the manager. But Section 9 of the Limitation Act, lays

down that ""where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it"". And there is no provision in the Limitation Act

which supports the contention raised by the appellant.

The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent.