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Judgment
N.V. Balasubramanian, J.—The writ petition raises an interesting question as to the scope, ambit and interpretation of Section 19 of the
Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Private Colleges Act). The petitioner is a college at Sivakasi.
The first respondent was employed as a demonstrator in Chemistry. He was appointed as a probationer in the subject Chemistry by an order
dated 6.8.1977 of the petitioner. The appointment was a temporary one for the academic year 1977-78 which ended on 31.5.1978. The first
respondent''s service came to an end on the expiry of the academic year 1977- 78. In the academic year 1978-79, a regular vacancy arose in the
petitioner''s college. The first respondent was appointed in the post of demonstrator of Chemistry with effect from 5.7.1978, and the first
respondent also joined duty on 5.7.1978. The first respondent was taken in as a probationer for a period of 2 years with effect from 5.7.1978. An
agreement in Form 7A prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Rules, 1976 was entered into between the petitioner and the first
respondent on 2.1.1979. The petitioner extended the period of probation of the first respondent for a further period of one year from 5.7.1980, by
its order dated 8.5.1980. The petitioner college considered the case of the first respondent for confirmation of his probation and decided not to
confirm him in his post by its order dated 1.7.1981. The first respondent was also relieved from service with effect from 4.7.1981.
The first respondent preferred an appeal before the second respondent against the order of termination of his service. The second respondent
upheld the order of termination holding that the period of probation prescribed by the petitioner- college is not in any way contrary to the
agreement in Form 7 A and it is not necessary for the petitioner-college to obtain prior approval of the competent authority before terminating the
services of the probationer.
The first respondent filed a further appeal before the third respondent. The third respondent i.e. Private Colleges Appellate Tribunal, Madras
(hereinafter called as Appellate Tribunal) held that the first respondent was a probationer on 4.7.1981 when the services of the first respondent
were terminated. The Appellate Tribunal held that the period of probation ended on the afternoon of 4.7.1981 and hence, the first respondent must
be considered as a probationer on the date of passing of the resolution by the petitioner college on 29.6.1981 or on the date of the memorandum
of the petitioner on 1.7.1981 or on the date of the order on 4.7.1981.
Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent though submitted that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal is not correct, it is
unnecessary to probe the matter further and decide the question whether the first respondent was a probationer or not because the finding of the
Appellate Tribunal was not challenged in a separate proceeding, and the case itself proceeded on the basis that the first respondent was a
probationer on the date of his termination of the services.
The Appellate Tribunal also held that the order of the termination is a simple order of termination and the order was not punitive in nature.
Though the Appellate Tribunal held that the order of termination is only an order of termination simpliciter, the Appellate Tribunal further held that
the order of termination passed by the petitioner-college was vitiated for want of prior approval of the competent authority. The Appellate Tribunal
held that u/s 19(1) of the Private Colleges Act, the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' would include the termination of the service simpliciter.
According to the Tribunal, Section 19 of the Private Colleges Act would apply even to the case of a probationer and since the petitioner-college
had not admittedly obtained necessary prior sanction of the competent authority before it passed the order of termination, the order of termination
was not legal in law. The Tribunal relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs.
Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, to hold that the prior sanction of the competent authority was required for their termination simpliciter
of the probationer.
The Appellate Tribunal referred to the Form of agreement under the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules and the Form under the Tamil
Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act and found that in the agreement prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules,
there is a specific clause to the effect that the termination of the probationer shall be done only with the previous permission of the competent
authority specified under Rule 17, whereas such a provision was conspicuously absent in the Form prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Private
Colleges (Regulation) Rules. The Appellate Tribunal held that though under the agreement such a clause is not found under the Tamil Nadu Private
Colleges (Regulation) Rules, still on the basis of the decision in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh
and Others, the termination of the services of the first respondent would require previous sanction of the competent authority. In this view of the
matter, the Tribunal held that the order of termination was liable to set aside. Though the Tribunal has considered other points that arose before the
Tribunal, it is unnecessary for this Court to consider the same, because they are not subject matter of the challenge in the present proceedings. The
Appellate Tribunal found that the first respondent was employed temporarily elsewhere and the first respondent was held to be entitled to be
reinstated, but without backwages and he was entitled to the pay and allowances from the date of joining duty in the respondent- college with all
improvements from the date of the order. This order is the subject-matter of the challenge in the present writ proceeding.
Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that Section 19 of the Act will not apply to the case of
simple order of termination of the probationer. According to him, the probationer has no right to the post and Section 19 of the Act deals with
cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. From this, he submitted that the expression, ''dismissal'' removal or reduction in rank''
contemplates cases of the person employed in a permanent cadre, and the action that has been taken against such person-employed for dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank, by way of punishment. Hence, he argued that the expression of ''otherwise terminated'' occurring in Section 19 of the
Act should be read ejusdem generis along with the earlier clause and if the principles of ejusdem generis are applied, the expression ''otherwise
terminated'' would take in only a case of termination of an employee whose services were terminated on the basis of certain disciplinary
proceedings initiated by way of punishment He also submitted that the Act is a self-contained one and u/s 1 l(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Private
Colleges (Regulation) Rules, a committee of every college shall enter into an agreement with the teachers under Form 7-A, and under the
agreement there is no provision for getting a prior approval of the competent authority before the termination of the petitioner. He referred to Form
7A under the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules which specifically contains a clause to the effect that, ''termination of probationer shall
be done only with the previous permission of the competent authority specified under Rule, 17''. He, therefore, contended that in the absence of
such a clause in Form 7A which is a complete Code relating to the service conditions of teachers in the Private Colleges, the Tribunal was not
correct in holding that prior sanction of the competent authority was required for the termination of the probationer. He also referred to the
Government Order of the Commissioner and Secretary to Government in G.O.Ms.No.1606, dated 24.8.1983 wherein a reference was made to
the direction of the Government to the effect that an opportunity should be given to the staff on probation by the management to express their view
in the matter of extension of probation and the prior approval of the competent authority is necessary for such extension of probation or for
discharge of certain probationers. The Government has directed the Director of Collegiate Education to implement the orders of the Government
and requested to submit necessary draft amendments to the existing para 2 in Form 7A and 7C of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation)
Rules, 1976 for incorporating the suggestions. Mr.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel submitted that the Government Order clearly indicates that
there is a difference between the agreement prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules and the Tamil Nadu Private
Schools (Regulation) Rules, and till the suggestions are incorporated in the statutory form, there is no necessity to obtain prior approval of the
competent authority. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is also vitiated on the ground that the decision
of the Tribunal was. arrived at on the basis of All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and
the decision of the Supreme Court in that case arose under the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Educational Institutions Control Act. The Supreme
Court in that case considered the validity of the Act with reference to the applicability to the minority institutions and the Tribunal erred in holding
that the decision in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, would be applicable to the
facts of the case. He referred to a decision in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and
contended that the decision of the Supreme Court cannot afford the basis for deciding the issue that arose before the Tribunal. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the question before the Supreme Court was with reference to the validity of Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private
Educational Institutions Control Act with reference to the minority institutions and there was no decision by the Supreme Court on the question of
getting prior approval before termination of a teacher under the said Andhra Pradesh Act. He referred to the judgment of Chandrachand, C.J. and
the judgment of Fazal Ali. J and submitted that Fazal Ali.J has not decided the question of getting approval u/s 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act,
Learned counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Others, and contended that
what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found there in nor what logically follows from the various observations
made in it.
He referred to several authorities in support of his view that the decision in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of
Andhra Pradesh and Others, cannot be construed as an authority for the decision that prior approval of the competent authority is necessary
before the termination of the probationer and the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that the decision of the Supreme Court in All Saints High
School case, would conclude the case is erroneous. Learned counsel particularly referred to a decision in H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao
Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and Others Vs. Union of India and Another, and contended that it is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a
sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the
question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment. Learned counsel also referred to a decision in Amar Nath Om Prakash and Others Vs.
State of Punjab and Others, to the effect that the judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes and judges interpret words of statutes and
their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Learned Senior Counsel also referred to a decision in Prakash Amichand Shah Vs. State of
Gujarat and Others, and contended that a decision often taken its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered and the
scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. He also referred to a decision in
Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 213 and contended that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the
background of the facts of that case and it has been said long time ago that a case is only as authority for what it actually decides and not what
logically follows from it. Learned counsel also referred to another decision in T. Chandrasekaran v. Pachiappa''s Trust, 1989 I L.L.J. 711 and
contended that when the condition empowering the transfer is not settled and set out in the statutory form, and the Government has not exercised
its rule making power to bring in that condition, neither the private schools nor their staff could adopt and adhere to any such condition by any
other made and hence, it would be futile to hang upon any term which is being sought to be introduced by the executive fiat into the statutory
contract entered into between the private schools and their staff and that Government Order has no sanctity in the eye of law and cannot be taken
advantage of for the exercise of such power under it. On this basis learned senior counsel submitted that the contract entered into between the
petitioner and the first respondent is a statutory contract and when there is no provision in the contract that prior approval of the competent
authority is required before termination of a probationer, such a clause cannot be read into the statutory contract. Learned counsel therefore,
submitted that the statutory contract cannot be supplemented by bringing in the theory of the inherent conditions of service and if it is done, it would
be travelling beyond what the statutory provisions have expressly provided for. Learned counsel therefore, submitted that when the contract has
not provided for any prior approval of the competent authority before the termination of the probationer, such a requirement cannot be foisted
upon the petitioner-college. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki
Ammal College, 1981 (II) M.L.J 415 wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that the words, ''otherwise terminated'' in Section 19(1) of
the Act, should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words, ''dismissal, removal or reduced in rank'' and where the order of termination
does not ex facie disclose any stigma or penal consequences, it is not an order of punitive termination and such a termination does not fall within the
scope of Section 19(1) of the Act. Learned counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Jagadeesan Vs. Ayya Nadar Janaki Ammal
College and Another, which arose on an appeal from the decision of this Court in S. Jagadeesan Vs. Ayya Nadar Janaki Ammal College and
Another, . Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the observation of this Court on the scope of the words, ''otherwise terminated'' u/s
19(1) of the Act, runs counter to the observation of Chandrachand C.I in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of
Andhra Pradesh and Others, and so, the decision was not correct. The Supreme Court referred to the observations of Kailasam, J. in All Saints
High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and the question regarding the scope of the words,
''otherwise terminated'' in Section 19(1) of the Act was left open to be decided by the prescribed authority along with other questions involved.
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of this Court, without expressing any opinion on its correctness or otherwise. From this, learned
counsel contended that if in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, the Supreme Court
has already decided that the prior approval of competent authority was required even to a case, where service of the probationer was terminated,
then there was no necessity for the Supreme Court to set aside the judgment of this Court. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the
question was not decided in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, the question was left
open by the Supreme Court in Jagadeesan''s case, 1983 (II) M.L.J 190 and hence, the view of the Tribunal that the decision in All Saints High
School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, would form the basis, cannot be sustained in law.
Mr.Chandru, learned counsel for the first respondent referred to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. He referred to Section 19 of the
Act and contended that the expression ''otherwise terminated'' in Section 19 should be give wider meaning and should not be construed as
ejusdem generis. According to the counsel for the first respondent. Section 19 covers both the teachers and other persons employed in Private
Colleges and there could be no dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of all the persons covered u/s 19 of the Act, nor their appointment should
be otherwise terminated except with prior approval of the competent authority. Section 19 of the Act, according to learned counsel will apply not
only to the permanent employees, but also to the probationers and if the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' is read as ejusdem generis, then the
protection granted u/s 19 will not be available to permanent teachers or to any other persons employed in permanent cadre in the private colleges,
because their services can also be terminated without prior approval where proceedings are not taken by way of punishment. He referred to
Section 20 of the Act, and contended that though the marginal notes to Section 20 refers to orders of punishment. Section 20 will apply to all
cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or otherwise termination of service whether by way of punishment or not. He also referred to
Section 24 of the Act which provides that the chapter to have overriding effect over the other law for the time being in force. He contended that
considering the object behind the act, it is necessary that the prior approval of the competent authority should be obtained before the termination of
the service of the petitioner. He referred to a decision in P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, to show the purpose and object behind
the Act. He referred to another decision in The State Bank of India Vs. Shri N. Sundara Money, and contended that the termination embraces not
merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact of termination however, so produced. He referred to another decision in Miss. T.N.
Chandra v. S.I. Corporation (A) Ltd., and Anr., 1992 I L.L.J. 739 and contended that even before completion of probation and confirmation, the
jurial relationship of an employer and employee exists, and a probationer is also entitled to benefits of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act,
1947 before termination of his service. He referred to a decision in K. Rajeswari v. T.P. Sankaran and Anr., 1977 T.L.N.J. 537 and contended
that whenever there is a termination of employment by the act of management, that will attract Section 19 of the Act. He referred to a decision in
Selvaraj v. Jesudasan, 1983 (II) M.L.J. 406 and Anr. decision in R. Jesudasan Vs. K. Selvaraj and Others, which dealt with a case of Section 22
of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 wherein a provision similar to Section 19 of the College Act was
considered and while construing Section 22 of the Private Schools (Regulation) Act, this Court held that whenever there is a dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank or otherwise termination of service of a staff of a school, it should be done only with the prior approval of the competent
authority. He also placed strong reliance on a decision in Rajaji Middle School v. Mariapushpam, 1987 W.L.R. 333 wherein a learned Judge of
this Court held that the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' cannot be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words, ''dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank ''found in Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the words, ''otherwise
terminated'' would embrace a case where the service of a teacher is terminated by the management accepting the letter of resignation tendered by
the teacher. Learned counsel submitted that this judgment has also been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in R. Jesudasan Vs. K. Selvaraj
and Others, and the Bench heard the matter along with other matters arising out of the appeal. He referred to All Saints High School, Hyderabad
and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and places strong reliance on the observation of Chandrachud, C.J. and contended
that the expression ''otherwise terminated'' would cover cases where all appointments are otherwise terminated without any stigma or aspersion
and it does not result in any evil consequences. He particularly referred to the judgment of Kailasam, J. at pages 1085 and 1086 and contended
that Section 19(2) of the Act prescribes the procedure that is contemplated for the College proposing to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or
otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher. He also referred to the judgment of FazaJ Ali, J at pages 1052 to 1068 and contended that
Section 6(2) controls the power of institution concerned in the matter of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or the termination of the
appointment of any employee in Private Educational Institution and that any action taken against the teacher without complying with the provision
of the Act would be void with no consequences. He contended that after four years of service, the services of the first respondent were terminated.
He referring to the order of termination of service and contended that it was in fact a termination of the services of the first respondent. He referred
to a decision in M. Committee v. S.D. Gupta, 1974 L.I.C. 1036 : 1974 All L.J. 465 and contended that every case of termination of service
would be within the scope of 16- G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the said section applies to the case of probationer and the
service of the probationer cannot be terminated unless notice of termination was served after obtaining approval of the Inspector. He also referred
to a decision in Prabhu Narain v. Dy. Director Education, Varanasi, 1977 L.I.C. 1095 and contended that the Delhi High Court in the case of
Private School Education Act wherein similar question arose, has taken a view that what was otherwise terminated means an additional protection
over and above the protection of the order of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank and even where there is a termination of simpliciter, an
appeal against the order would lie, and this Court has necessary powers to adjudicate the question under Article 226 of the Constitution. He also
referred to a decision in Rama Bhadoor and Anr. v. Thungabadra Sugar Works (P) Ltd., 1979 S.L.J. 489 and unreported judgments in
W.P.No.1685 of 1983 dated 31.3.1984 and W.P.No.8293 and 8294 of 1981 dated 25.1.1991 and W.A.No.857 and 858 of 1991 dated
13.8.1991. Then, he referred to Jawahar Colleges Staff Association Etc. Secretary, Jawahar Science College Etc. v. University of Madras and
Ors., 1994 W.L.R. 84 and contended that even in a case of temporary employee, the provision of Section 19 would apply. He referred to
decisions in The State Bank of India Vs. Shri N. Sundara Money, , Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore Vs.
M. Boraiah and Another, and Miss. T.N. Chandra v. S.L. Corporation (A) Ltd. and Anr., 1992 (I) L.L.J. 739 and contended that on the basis of
the decisions the order of termination of service is in direct contravention of Section 19 of the Act and the order of Appellate Tribunal setting aside
the order of termination is legally correct.
Mr.Thiagarajan, in his reply referred to a decision in T. Chandrasekaran v. Pachaiyappa''s Trust, 1989 I L.L.J. 711 and contended that the
parties are not governed by the master and servant jurisprudence, but by the provision of the Act. He cited a decision in R. Jesudasan v. K.
Selvaraj, 1989 I L.L.J. 941 and contended that the scope of industrial adjudication is entirely different as found in the said provisions and it is not
possible to draw any party between the scope and the provisions of the Act and no guidance need be taken with regard to the conferment of
power, incurring of obligations and consequences of breach of prescriptions from the statutes, other than the relevant one dealt with by the Court.
He referred to a decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. M/s. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd., wherein the Supreme Court held that is
neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from the context of the
question under consideration and treat it to be complete Law'' declared by the Supreme Court. On the basis he submitted that the decision in All
Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, cannot form the basis for deciding the issue and the
order of the Appellate Tribunal is liable to be set aside.
I have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the first respondent.
Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 was enacted to provide for regulation of private colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu. The
object of the Act is set out by the Supreme Court in Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Techology, 1981 I L.L.J. 558 as under: -
The Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 regarding appeal and revision; penalties and procedure and other miscellaneous matters.
The executive power of the State Government to that extent gets circumscribed and it has to exercise its power only inconformity with the
provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder
The entire case proceeded on the basis as to what is exact ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court All Saints High School, Hyderabad and
Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . The Supreme Court in that case was concerned with the constitutional validity of several
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975 and the main ground of challenge before the
Supreme Court was that the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Act directly interfered with the internal management of the educational institutions and
curbed the constitutional freedom which has been granted to the minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India and therefore,
violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution and the Provisions were ultra vires and wholly inapplicable to the appellant-institution. It is, in this
context of constitutional validity of the said provision, the Supreme Court examined the several provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act. It is
unnecessary to refer the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court with reference to other provisions of Andhra Pradesh Act, except Section 3
(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act which provides that subject to any rule that is made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educational
institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, nor shall his appointment in enacted, inter alia, for the regulation of the conditions of
service of teachers employed in private colleges. The avowed purpose and object of the Act is to confer protection to the teachers of private
educational institutions against arbitrary action of or victimisation by the management of such educational institutions"" In All Saints High School,
Hyderabad and Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , the Supreme Court considering the question of validity of
A.P.Recognised Educational Institution Act, under Article 30(1) of the Constitution held that the main object of the legislation is to regulate the
service conditions of the teachers of private colleges Act and for ensuring the services of the teachers. The Act in effect protects certain rights
granted in favour of the teachers employed in Private Colleges and at the same time, imposes certain duties on the management.
In Jawahar College Staff Association etc. Secretary Jawahar Science College etc. v. University of Madras and Ors., 1994 W.L.R. 84 a
Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and held the object of the Act as
under: -
The Act is passed regulating the private colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu providing permission for establishment and management of private
colleges; constitution of college committee; appointment of Special Officer in certain cases; terms and conditions of service of teachers and other
persons employed in private colleges; control of private colleges; accounts audit, inspection and returns, general provisions be otherwise
terminated except the prior approval of the Government authority. It is clear that Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act is in part materia with
Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Colleges Act. Chandrachud, C.J. considered Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and held as under:-
Saction 3(1) not only applies to cases in which a teacher is, what is generally termed as ''punished''; by an order of dismissal, removal or reduction
in rank but it also applies to cases in which an appointment is also applies to cases in which an appointment is otherwise terminated. An order of
termination simpliciter which involves no stigma or aspersion and which does not result in any evil consequences is also required to be submitted
for the prior approval of the competent authority"".
Fazal Ali, J. though held that Section 3 suffers from the vice of excessive delegative power, and Section 3 is violative of Article 30(1) of the
Constitution, has not expressed any opinion on the interpretation of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Kailasam, J, in his separate judgment
upheld the validity of Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Act in its application to minority institutions, but has not expressed any opinion
on the interpretation of Section 3(1) of the Act. The only decision on the scope and ambit of Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act is found in
the judgment of Chandrachud, C.J. and the other two learned Judges have not expressed their dissent in their judgment to the judgment of learned
Chief Justice and hence, the only judgment on the scope of Section 3(1) of Andhra Pradesh Act is found in the judgment of learned Chief Justice.
Hence, it can be safely concluded that it is the decision of the Supreme Court on the scope that ambit of Section 3(1) of Andhra Pradesh Act
There can be no dispute about the proposition of law pleaded by Mr. Thiagarajan learned senior counsel that it is difficult to read a word, a clause
or sentence occurring in a judgment of Supreme Court divorced from its context as containing a full expression of the law of question when the
question did not even fall to be answered in the judgment, vide H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and
Others Vs. Union of India and Another, . Similarly, the S C in Amar Nath Om Prakash and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, has observed
as under:-
We considered it proper to say as we have already said in other cases that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lenghtly discussions but the discussion is meant to
explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes"".
The Supreme Court in Prakash Amichand Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, expressed the same view in the following terms:-
A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should
never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation"".
Mr.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,
(1987) 1 SCC 213 and the Supreme Court in that case held as under:-
It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides, and not what logically follows from it"".
Since, I have already held that the decision of the learned Chief Justice is the decision of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to consider the
arguments of Mr. Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel as regards the general proposition of law as regards the ratio decidendi of the case. Further,
it cannot be said that the order of Appellate Tribunal is based wholly on the decision in All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others Vs.
Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . The Appellate Tribunal has interpreted Section 19 of the Act in its own terms and on that basis, it
came to the conclusion that the order of termination of the first respondent cannot be sustained in law. Hence, it is necessary to consider the scope
of Section 19 of the Act.
Section of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, has to be construed in the context of statutory scheme, the object and purpose
of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act Section 19(1) reads as under: -
Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers of other persons employed in private colleges (1) Subject to any rule that may
be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or shall his
appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority"".
Section 19 of the Act applies to all teachers and other persons employed in any private college. They may be permanent teachers or permanent
employees or probationery teachers or employees. Section 19 prohibits that no such teachers or employees shall be dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank or their services shall otherwise be terminated except with prior approval of the competent authority. On a perusal of Section 19, it
is clear mat except without the prior approval of the competent authority, there shall not be any removal, dismissal, or reduction in rank of any
teacher or other persons employed in a private college or termination of their appointment. In other words, the prior approval of the competent
authority is a sine qua non for the orders contemplated u/s 19 of the Act to take legal effect. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that
the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' should be read ejusdem generis with the earlier three expressions, ''dismissal, removal or reduction in rank''
and if there is no punitive action, Section 19 of the Private Colleges Act has no application is not acceptable. An expression, ''otherwise'' is an
expansive term to include within itself all cases other than the cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. If such a natural meaning to the
expression, ''otherwise'' is not given, the intention of the legislature will be easily defeated. The order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
normally may be of a punitive character. The intention of the legislature in inserting the term, ''otherwise terminated'' in Section 19 of the Act is clear
that they intended to give additional protection to the termination of teachers or other persons employed where their services are terminated for any
reason by the management and for such a termination also, the management should obtain the prior approval of the competenty authority. The
latter clause, in my opinion, applies to all cases which do not fall within the first limb of Section 19 of the Act. Secondly, if the expression,
''otherwise terminated'' is to be read applying the principle of ejusdem generis, then the legislature need not have used the expression ''otherwise
terminated'' as the termination of service by way of punishment would fall within the ambit of ''dismissal or removal'' of service as found in the first
limb of Section 19 of the Act. The intention of the legislature in using the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' is clear that the legislature intended to
cover cases of termination of services other than the cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. That apart, it is necessary to bear in mind that
Section 19 of the Act grants protection not only to the probationers, and temporary teachers but also to the permanent teachers or other persons
employed in private colleges and if a restricted meaning is given to the expression, ''otherwise terminated the protection afforded to the permanent
teachers and employees u/s 19 will become illusory. Hence, I am not accepting the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that the expression,
otherwise terminated'' in Section 19 of the Act should be given a restricted meaning.
I drew support for my above conclusion from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Case of All Saints High School, Hyderabad and
Others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, wherein, the learned Chief Justice held that the order of termination simpliciter would also
require to be submitted for the prior approval of the competent authority. There is absolutely no reason not to rely upon the judgment of learned
Chief Justice to hold that even a simple order of termination will fall within the scope of Section 19 of the Act.
That apart, for the construction that I have placed on Section 19 of the Act, I derive judicial support from the decisions of this court on the
interpretations of Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulations)Act, 1973 where the language employed in Section 22
of the Act is in part materia to Section 19 of the Colleges Act and the object of Private Schools (Regulation) Act is also similar to that of Private
collages (Regulation) Act. This Court in Rajaji Middle School v. Nariapushpam, 1987 WLR 333 and R. Jesudasan Vs. K. Selvaraj and Others,
has taken a view that the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or otherwise termination of a staff from a school should be done only with the prior
approval of the competenty authority and it should be done only in that manner and it impliedly prohibits doing of the same in any other manner.
This Court in the latter decision held that when the private school does not comply with the statutory prescription and fulfil the conditions precedent
to its action in dispensing with the services of the staff, its action will have to beheld as ab initio void, and there are no reasons to depart from the
view or to take a different view than that has been taken by this Court which considered a similar expression used under the Private Schools
(Regulation) Act, where the scheme of the Act and the structure, language of the provisions are similar. That apart, the expression, ''termination''
had a meaning and this Court in K. Rajeswari v. T.P. Sankaran and Anr., 1977 T.L.NJ. 537 held that where there is an act of management in
terminating the service whether it may be by acceptance of a resignation letter or it may be by the termination of a probationer, there is a
termination of employment by the act of the management. For it is by an act of management of accepting the resignation, there is an act of
termination of the probationer on the part of the management and there is a termination of the employment of the employee and not the offer of
resignation by itself. This judgment has been followed in Rajaji Middle School case, 1987 WLR 333, wherein this Court has held as under:-
... even in a case where the termination of service is brought about by the management accepting the letter of resignation, such termination is
brought about by the action of the management. It might be that the action on the part of both the teacher and the management brings about such a
termination. But there is no escape from the conclusion that such termination was brought about by any action on the part of the management.
Indeed, this is what Mr.Justice Balasubramanyan pointed out in A.S.No.1607/ of 1974. If the said expression were to be interpreted bearing in
mind the avowed object of the Act, I am thoroughly satisfied, the said expression covers a case where a termination of service is brought about
otherwise than by punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It is not in dispute that the other construction will be against the very
object and purpose of the Act On my understanding of Section 22, there is clear indication that the expression, ''otherwise terminated'' has no
nexus to other modes of termination such as dismissal or removal...It is seen from the said provision that, ''dismissal, removal or reduction'' are
brought in one sentence, while ''otherwise terminated stated disjunctively. In my view, this is a clear indication by the Legislatures that, ''otherwise
terminated'' has nothing to do with the penal mode of termination of service. To appreciate what really the legislature intended to convey under the
clause ''whose appointment is otherwise terminated'' in Section 23 and ''nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated'' in Section 22 of the Act
both the sections have to be read together with the background of the objective that is sought to be achieved by them. If so read, I am fully
convinced that ''otherwise terminated'' has not to be read ejusdem generis with the proceeding words, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.
Above all, I do not find any justification whatsoever to contain the widest amplitude that is unmistably revealed by the said clause, nor do I find any
merit in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the title or the marginal note of these two Sections will indicate that
''otherwise terminated'' should also be of a penal nature.."".
As a matter of fact, in a recent judgment in the case of A.B. Narasimhan Vs. The Management of Olcott-Memorian High School and Others, a
learned Judge of this Court has held that the intention of the Legislature is that permission should be obtained before any order of termination or
dismissal is imposed and there is no scope for any post approval and the provisions of the Act or Rules would not contemplate such post approval.
Learned Judge also held that the Section contemplates only for a prior approval of the competent authority.
It is relevant to mention, in this context, certain other decisions of other High Courts relied on by the learned counsel for the first respondent. In
the case of Miss Ratna Bablani v. Director of Education (Delhi Admn.) and Ors., 1978 S.L.J. 44 the Delhi High Court considered the scope of
Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 which reads as under: -
8(2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in
rank nor shall be his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director"".
The Delhi High Court while considering Section 8(2), held that Section 8(2) applies to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and also to
otherwise termination, because the words, ''be otherwise terminated'' are an additional protection over and above the protection against the orders
of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The Delhi High Court further held that the protection granted u/s 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act
would extend to termination simpliciter.
A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in M. Committee v. S.D. Gupta, 1974 A.L.J.465 (Luc) while considering Section 16(G)(3)(a) of the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921, held that the provision would apply to every case of termination of service, and the section would apply to a
probationer also. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court also held that the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated unless notice of
termination was served after obtaining the approval of the Inspector. The same view has been reiterated by a Division Bench of the same High
Court in Prabhu Narain v. Dy. Director, Education, Varanasi, 1977 L.I.C. 1095 wherein the Division Bench held that it is incumbent of the
management to seek approval from the District Inspector of Schools before the proposed termination of services. The Division Bench also held
that the provisions regarding approval of termination of service of a teacher would apply to the probationers also. Hence, I hold considering the
judicial pronouncements cited supra, Section 19 is in absolute term creates a statutory bar to the termination of service on the ground of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank or the termination of the services of the persons covered u/s 19 of the Ace except with the prior approval of the
competent authority under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976.
It is now necessary to consider another argument advanced by Mr.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel that the statutory contract entered into
between the petitioner and the first respondent does not impose any such condition, and hence, such a requirement cannot be foisted on the
petitioner. The learned counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in T. Chandrasekaran v. Pachaiyappa''s Trust, 1989 I
L.L.J 711. The Division Bench in construing the provisions of Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, held as under:-
The Act is a piece of modern legislation and it has tended to place the broad general provisions and statements of principles in its body, relegating
the working of the details of the provisions and the principles to the rule making authority. In its wisdom, the Legislature thought that the conditions
of service in private schools should be a matter of prescription by the Government. It has not left that discretion with the management of private
schools. The statute having intervened and vested the Government with the authority to prescribe the conditions of service it is no longer possible
to envisage the parties entering into a contract, the terms of which run beyond the prescriptions done by the Government. The prescriptions are to
be done by statutory mode. They have to be done by resorting to the rule making power. In fact, this processes has been resorted and exhausted
for the time being. The rules got formulated. The forms are part and parcel of the rules. They are statutory in character. Neither there could be a
term expressed nor a term implied in any contract of service between the management of the private schools and their staff, which has not been laid
down and settled by the statutory prescriptions. In Madan Mohan Rao (Dr) v. State of Tamil Nadu (by Secretary to Government, Education
Department, Madras) and Anr., 1984 (I) L.L.N. 285 a Bench of this Court opined that the parties are not governed by the master and servant
jurisprudence, but by the provisions of the Act. We respectfully agree with that view"".
He also placed reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment in R. Jusudasan v. K. Selvaraj, 1989 (1) L.L.N.941 wherein the same view was
reiterated by another Bench of this Court and where it has held that under:-
We also stressed the impact of Section 28 of the Act, with reference to the overriding effect of the provisions of the Act on any agreement or
contract of service made before or after the date of the commencement of this Act"".
There can be no quarrel over the proposition that after the enactment of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, the terms and
conditions of the services of the teachers are statutory in nature and character and not contractual in nature. The Act regulates the terms and
conditions of the service of teachers with reference to the qualification, appointment, conditions of service and the code of conduct to be observed
by them. The Act also restricts the power of dismissal, removal reduction in rank and suspension of teachers or termination of teachers. The Act
also provides for appeal against the order and Section 24 of the Act clearly mandates that the Chapter will have overriding effect over any other
provisions of law, award, agreement or judgment and decree of Court, Tribunal or other authority. So there is no difficulty in holding that the terms
and conditions of the teachers are statutory in nature.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also raised a contention that under Form-7A of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976
there is no provisions as that is found in Form 7A under Rule 15 of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Rules which reads as under:-
Termination of the probationer shall be done only with the previous permission of the competent authority specified in Rule 17"".
And for that purpose, learned counsel relied upon as seen earlier, the G.O.Ms.No.1606, dated 24.8.1983 issued by the Commissioner and
Secretary to Government directing the incorporation of the similar agreement in the existing paragraph- 2 in Form 7A and 7C of the Tamil Nadu
Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976. No doubt, the Government has directed the incorporation of a similar clause found in Form VII-A of
Private Schools (Regulation) Act to the Form 7A of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act. The belief or the assumption of the
executive about the need to incorporate such a provision in the agreement cannot make the law. It is not known what prompted the Government to
issue such a direction, but, as already observed, the case has to be decided on the statutory language employed in the form, as it exists on the date
of impugned order and not on the basis of the views of the executives. Form 7A deals with form of agreement to be executed by a college
committee of a college in respect of a permanent teacher. This form is prescribed under Rule 11, sub-rule (2)(1) of the relevant Rules. It is seen
from the agreement dated 2.1.1979 executed between the college committee and the first respondent that the petitioner-college has adopted Form
7A with slight modification, because Form 7A deals with the appointment of a permanent teacher, whereas the first respondent was appointed on
probation and taking into account that aspect of the matter, certain minor variations have been made in the agreement executed between the
petitioner and the first respondent though there is no clause akin to the clause as found in the Private Schools (Regulation) Rules. But, the absence
of such a clause as found in Private Schools (Regulation) Rules in the terms prescribed under the Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, does not
dispense with the statutory requirement of getting prior approval of the competent authority before terminating the services of the first respondent.
Under Clause 6 of the agreement, it has been specifically provided that the teacher and the college committee shall conform to all the
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act and the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976 and in view of the
specific clause found in Clause 6 there is no reason to exclude the application of Section 19 of the Act to the facts of the case. The decision relied
upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in T. Chandrasekaran''s case, 1989 (I) LLJ 711 has no application to the facts of the case, because
in T. Chandrasekaran''s case, 1989 (I) LLJ 711 the teacher was transferred from one place to another and the absence of clause in the agreement
providing for transfer as a condition of service and the absence of a provision in the Act made this Court to hold that it is not permissible to travel
beyond that statutory sphere and enter into a contractual service to spell out an implied term or an inherent power to .transfer. The Court has also
held that if such a condition of service is not expressly provided by the statutory prescription, then it must be taken to have been excluded or
denied or prohibited. This decision has no application to the facts of the case, because it is a case where in the agreement entered into between the
college and the first respondent, there is a specific reference to the applicability of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation)
Act, which would include Section 19 of the Act and u/s 19 of the Act, as already seen, the termination cannot be effected except with the prior
approval of the competent authority. I, there hold that the decision of this Court in T. Chandrasekaran ''s case, 1989 (I) LLJ 711 in effect supports
the case of the first respondent to the extent where there is a statutory prescription, that must be taken as a part and parcel of the condition of
service. The form of agreement entered into between the college and the first respondent specifically refers to the applicability of the relevant
provisions of the Act and there arc absolutely no reason to exclude the operation of Section 19 of the Act to the facts of the case. The other
decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in R. Jesudasan''s case, 1989 (I) LLJ 711 also does not help the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the first respondent is well founded in his submission that the order of termination of the service of the first respondent is
void ab initio. As already seen, he relied on following decisions: (1) K. RaJeswari v. T.P.Sankaran and Anr., 1977 T.L.N.J. 537; (2) Selvaraj v.
Jesudasan, 1983 (II) M.L.J.406; (3) R. Jesudasan Vs. K. Selvaraj and Others, ; (4) Rajaji Middle School v. Mariapushpam, 1987 W.L.R.333;
(5) M. Committee v. S.D.Gupta, 1974 A.L.J.465 : 1974 L.I.C. 1036; (6) Prabhu Narain v. Dy.Director Education, Varanasi, 1977 L.I.C. 1095;
(7) Rama Bahadoor and Anr. v. Tungabhadra Sugar Works (P) Ltd, 1979 S.L.J. 489. In these cases, it has been held that there is a termination of
violation of the provisions of the Act, the order of termination contrary to the provisions of the Act, is only a null and void order and it has no effect
at all. Consideration of other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent on the scope of the termination relating to the
industrial disputes or the Shops and Establishments Act need not be made, because as held by this Court in T. Chandrasekaran''s case, 1989 (I)
LLJ 711 and in R. Jesudasan Vs. K. Selvaraj and Others, , the scope of industrial adjudication is entirely different as found in the said provisions
and as expatiated by the pronouncement, it is not possible to draw any party between the scope of the provisions of the Act and the scope of the
concerned provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and no guidance need be taken with regard to the conferment of the power incurring
obligations and consequences of the breach of the prescription of the statute others than the relevant one dealt with by the Court. Respectfully
following this view, it is not possible to draw any analogy or substenance from the cases decided under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Shops
and Establishments Act to hold that the order is liable to be struck down.
Though I find force in the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel Mr. Thiagarajan in the context of the facts and circumstances of
the case, I am of the view that Section 19 of the Act would squarely apply to the facts of the case and the prior approval of the competent
authority is necessary before putting an end to the services of the first respondent. In this case, admittedly, the prior approval of the competent
authority was not obtained by the petitioner-college before terminating the services of the first respondent by the petitioner-college. Consequently,
the order of termination of the first respondent does not take effect or become effective unless approved by the competent authority and hence, the
order of the third respondent does not require interference by this Court, with the result, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and it is
accordingly, dismissed with costs of the first respondent. The costs is Rs. 250/-