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Judgment
D. Murugesan, J.—The questions raised in these Writ Appeals filed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board are common and hence, they are
disposed of by this Common Judgment.
The appellant, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, formulated a Scheme for extension of K.K. Nagar(Nerkundram),Chennai in an extent of 460 acres
of land. On the basis of the proposal from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued Notification u/s 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act"") G.O.Rt. No. 124 Housing dated 8.5.1975 and published the same in the Government Gazette
dated 11.6.1975. 6 Declaration u/s 6 of the Act was published on 9.6.1978. Some of the land owners by name P. Vijayakumar, P.C. Sekar @ P.
Chandrasekara Pandan, P. Palanivelu questioned the Notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6 and obtained interim stay of all further proceedings
by order dated 3.4.1981 in W.P. No. 1807 of 1981. The said Writ Petition was dismissed for default on 19.2.1991. By the dismissal of the Writ
Petition, interim stay granted on 3.4.1981 stood vacated. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted u/s 9 and 10 of the Act on 21.8.1991 and
6.9.1991. The abovenamed land owners filed Review Petition No. 21 of 1991 on 17.9.1991 and the said petition was allowed on 27.9.1991 and
the Writ Petition was restored to file. Thereafter, the Writ Petition itself was allowed on 29.10.1991 and the Notification u/s 4(1) was quashed.
Questioning the above, the State Government filed an appeal before the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 18316/1992 and the said SLP was
allowed on 1.11.1995 upholding the Notification. In view of the order of the Supreme Court, based on the enquiry already conducted, common
award was passed on 31.10.1997.
The erstwhile land owners viz., the first respondent in each of the Writ Appeal Nos. 1895 and 1896 of 2003 questioned the award and also
prayed for consequential directions forbearing the land acquisition officer from proceeding further with the acquisition proceedings. All the Writ
Petitions were heard and by common order dated 26.4.2001, the learned single Judge allowed all the Writ Petitions quashing the land acquisition
proceedings as the award was not passed within a period of two years as provided u/s 11-A of the Act.
Likewise, the first respondent in each of the Writ Appeal Nos. 1641 to 1650 of 2003, claiming to be purchasers of land subsequently filed
individual writ petitions almost with similar prayer questioning the award. By common order dated 16.4.2001, the learned single Judge has allowed
all the Writ Petitions, quashing the acquisition proceedings on the same ground, viz., award was not passed within a period of two years as
provided u/s 11-A of the Act.
Questioning both the orders, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board has preferred the above Writ Appeals.
We have heard Mr. K. Chelladurai, learned Counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Mr. C. Thirumaran, learned Government
Advocate appearing for the State, Mr. K. Duraisamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent in W.A. Nos. 1641 to 1650/2003
and Mr. J.R.K. Bhavanandam, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent in W.A. Nos. 1895 and 1896 of 2003.
Based on the pleadings and the rival contentions, we are called upon to decide the following points:
1) Whether the first respondent in W.A. Nos. 1641 to 1650 of 2003, subsequent purchasers after declaration u/s 6, can maintain the Writ
Petitions questioning the award?
2) whether on the facts of the case, entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed on the ground that the award was not passed within a
period of two years as contemplated u/s 11-A of the Act?
3) Whether the award is liable to be quashed for want of prior approval of the competent authority as contemplated u/s 11 of the Act?
Point No. 1: It is the contention of the appellant Board that the lands were purchased by the first respondent in each of the Writ Appeal Nos.
1641 to 1650 of 2003 only on 28.10.1992 and 3.2.1994, after Declaration u/s 6 was made on 9.6.1978. The question as to whether a
subsequent purchaser could maintain the Writ Petition came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through
its Chairman and another Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and others, and the Supreme Court has held as follows:
That apart, since M/s Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land after the notification u/s 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the
State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the
regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration u/s 6 was published
In Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
Another contention raised by Shri Ravinder Sethi is that the claimant in the first appeal had purchased the property after the declaration u/s 6 was
published and that therefore he does not get any right to challenge the validity of the notification published u/s 4(1). Since his title to the property is
a void title, at best he has only right to claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the land which is predecessor-in-title
had. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Others, ; Gian Chand Vs.
Gopala and Others, ; Mahavir and Another Vs. Rural Institute, Amravati and Another, and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute
1995 (3) 583 : AIR 1983 SCW 2114. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the settled legal position
In Mahavir and Another Vs. Rural Institute, Amravati and Another, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
We do not find any justification warranting interference in this matter. Admittedly, notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act(for short, ""the
Act"") was published on January 29,1957 and thereafter the owner sold the properties to the petitioners on June 11,1957 and August 22, 1958.
Declaration u/s 6 was published on August 14,1958. Thus, it could be seen that the sales made after the publication of the notification u/s 4(1) are
void sales and the State is not bound by such a sale effect by the owner. Admittedly, the notice u/s 9 and 10 was served on September 23, 1958
and award was made on October 9,1959 and possession was taken on November 18, 1959. Thus the acquisition was complete. The possession
of the Government is complete as against the original owner and title of the original owner stood extinguished and by operation of Section 16 the
State acquires the right, title and interest in the property free from all encumbrances. So any encumbrance made by the owner after notification u/s
4(1) was published does not bind the State
In view of the above law declared by the Supreme Court, a subsequent purchaser has no right to question either 4(1) notification or Section 6
declaration or the regularity as to the manner in which possession was taken.
The next incidental question falls for our consideration is as to whether such purchaser would be the person interested within the meaning of
Section 3(b) of the Act. Section 3(b) of the Act defines the expression ""person interested"" to include all persons claiming interest in compensation
to be made on account of the acquisition of the land under the Act and the person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an
easement affecting the land. The above section is an inclusive definition and it is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition, a person
should claim an interest in the land when the land was notified u/s 4(1) or under Declaration u/s 6. A person becomes a ''person interested'' if he
has any interest on the date of the award to claim compensation. The Scheme of the Act first deal with the persons who are interested in land and
these persons are heard u/s 5-A of the Act. The ordinary meaning of ''person interested'' in land is expanded by Section 5-A(3) of the Act for the
purpose to include a person who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation. In view of the above provision, even a subsequent
purchaser has a right to make objection u/s 5-A of the Act after 4(1) notification and declaration u/s 6 but before the award was passed and
would be certainly entitled to question the award. As the subsequent purchaser would be aggrieved by the award, he would be entitled to question
the award in respect of the issues as to whether the award was passed within the period of two years from the date of declaration u/s 6, whether
prior approval of the Government or the Collector or the competent authority authorised in that behalf was obtained, before the award was passed
and as to the quantum of compensation. Accordingly we hold that the first respondent in each of the Writ Appeal Nos. 1641 to 1650 of 2003 can
maintain the Writ Petition questioning the award.
Point No. 2: Section 11-A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 and came into force with effect from 24.9.1984. Prior to the above
inserted Section, the collector should pass the award within a period of three years from the date of Declaration u/s 6. By virtue of the provision of
Section 11-A, the period of three years was reduced to a period of two years and on and from 24.9.1984, the Collector shall pass the award
within a period of two years from the date of declaration u/s 6. On the facts of this case, this Court while entertained the Writ Petition No. 1807 of
1991 had granted interim stay of all further proceedings by order dated 3.4.1981. The said order of stay was in force till the Writ Petition was
dismissed for default on 19.2.1991. As there was no stay, enquiry u/s 9 and 10 of the Act was conducted on 21.8.1991 and 6.9.1991. Before the
award was passed, the respondents/land owners filed Review Petition No. 21/1991 and the said petition was allowed on 27.9.1991 and the Writ
Petition was restored to file and ultimately, the Writ Petition was allowed and Section 4(1) Notification was quashed on 29.10.1991. According to
the respondents/land owners inasmuch as there was no stay for the period between 19.2.1991 and 27.9.1991, the period of 249 days, shall be
taken into consideration while computing the period of limitation to pass the award.
Section 11-A reads as under:
The Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made
within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded
In terms of Section 11-A of the Act, the Collection shall make an award within a period of two years from the last date of the publication of
declaration u/s 6 and the said provision is mandatory. In the event, no award is made within that period, the entire acquisition proceedings shall
lapse. This position in law is settled in the judgment reported in State of U.P. and Others Vs. Rajiv Gupta and Another, .
Its bare reading indicates and emphasises the limitation within which the award should be made and has been statutorily determined, namely, the
Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. It is common knowledge that after
declaration was published, years used to roll by to make the award and the owners of the lands were put to great hardship. Parliament intended to
relieve the owners of the lands from this hardship and pegging of the price prevailing as on date of publication of Section 4(1) notification. It is,
therefore, a mandatory duty cast on the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award strictly in accordance with the limitation u/s 11-A. If no
award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. In other words, on expiry of two years from the
date of the publication of the declaration unless the proviso is attracted, if no award is made in the meantime, in the eye of law the proceedings
initiated u/s 4(1) of the Act culminated in the declaration made u/s 6 shall stand lapsed and no proceedings, in the eye of law thereafter do exist, to
take further action
This leads to the next question as to the computation of period of two years and for that purpose, explanation to Section 11A is referable. The
said explanation contemplates that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. As the Section is unambiguous, the period of stay by Court
shall necessarily be excluded while computing the period of two years. This position in law is held by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported
in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat and another, .
In fact, the question as to whether the period of stay of dispossession can also be taken into consideration for the purpose of exclusion of
limitation u/s 11-A came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the judgment report in in Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu
2000(2) SCC 597 after referring to Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat and another, , Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan Vs.
State of Karnataka and Others, and Government of Tamil Nadu v. Vasantha Bai 1995 Supp(2) 423it has been held by the Supreme Court as
follows:
''Thus, the position is now well settled that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court, the period which such stay operates would stand
excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed. In the light of the said
interpretation it is now idle to contend that the Government is debarred from proceeding with the acquisition. The appeal is accordingly dismissed''
An analysis of the above judgments would show that when the acquisition proceedings are stayed or even when dispossession of the land is
stayed, such period of stay can be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of two years and the position in law is well settled.
It is the contention of the respondent that the period where there was no stay, cannot be excluded and if the period of 249 days is also taken
into consideration while computing the limitation, the award is beyond the period of two years. In the given case it is to be seen that the challenge
to Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration at the instance of the original land owners, though was stayed in the Writ Petition on
3.4.1981 and by the dismissal of the petition on 19.2.1991, the stay already granted shall be deemed to have been automatically vacated. On a
Review Petition filed by the land owners, the Writ Petition was restored to file on 17.9.1991. As the Writ Petition was restored, interim stay which
was deemed to have been vacated by virtue of the dismissal of the Writ Petition, shall deem to have come into force from the date on which it was
restored. While computing the period of limitation, the entire period from the date of institution of the Writ Petition till the date of disposal shall be
taken into consideration. This position of law is declared by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in Venkataswamappa Vs. Special
Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), .
It is then contended that since limitation period of one year from the date of the publication u/s 4(1) had elapsed and the stay granted by the High
Court or this Court was only of dispossession of the appellants from the lands, the Notification u/s 4(1) now stands lapsed by Explanation 1 to
proviso to Section 6(1). We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the Writ Petitions came to be filed in March, 1989 in the same month in
which the substance of the publication of the Notification u/s 4(1) was made and the proceedings were pending before the learned single Judge, the
Division Bench and in this Court. Under these circumstances, the entire time taken from the date of filing of the Writ Petitions till the date of the
receipt of the order of this Court stands excluded and the limitation of one year would start thereafter only. Accordingly, we hold that the
Notification u/s 4(1) has not been lapsed....
In this regard, it must be also noticed that the scheme framed by the appellant Board was of the year 1975. A large extent of nearly 460 acres of
land was sought to be acquired for implementation of the housing scheme. Section 4(1) notification was published as early as on 11.6.1975. In
view of the pendency of the Court proceedings, the award came to be passed only on 31.10.1997. It is the specific case of the appellants that
after possession was taken by the Government, the lands were handed over to the Housing Board and the scheme was implemented. In acquisition
proceedings though the Court cannot lightly interfere with the acquisition proceedings, once possession is taken and infact the scheme was
implemented. We are conscious of the fact that the respondents have questioned only the award to which they are entitled, but public interest
demands that the award cannot be interfered with after the scheme was implemented as third parties interest had also come in and it could be
upsetting the entire scheme.
That apart, the order in the Writ Petition, quashing the Notification u/s 4(1) was questioned by the State before the Supreme Court and the
challenge was accepted and the order in the Writ petition was set aside by the Supreme Court on 1.11.1995. In view of the order of the Supreme
Court, notification u/s 4(1) and Section 6 Declaration were restored and hence it must be held that the proceedings were deemed to had been
pending from the date of institution of the Writ Petition till the final orders were passed by the Supreme Court on 1.11.1995. The period of two
years shall be reckoned from the date of the order of the Supreme Court and if so reckoned it will be within the period of two years as the award
was passed on 31.10.1997. Hence, we are of the considered view that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the award
was not passed within a period of two years should be rejected.
Point No. 3: It is the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents that in terms of Second proviso to Section
11(1) of the Act, no award shall be made by the Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate Government. In this case, award was
passed by the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) without prior approval of the government and hence, the award must be quashed. The first
proviso to Section 11(1) was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 and it contemplates that ''Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under
this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this
behalf''. By that provision before the award was passed previous approval must be obtained from the appropriate Government. However, by the
said proviso it is also provided that such approval could be obtained from such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf.
In exercise of the said power, the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 2003 Revenue dated 13.12.1984, notified the following.
''Under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (Central Act 1 of 1894) as amended by the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Central Act 68 of 1984), the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby authorises:
i) the Commissioner of Land Administration, to approve every award in which the total compensation to be allowed exceeds ten lakhs rupees and
(ii) the District Collector to approve every award in which the total compensation to be allowed does not exceed ten lakhs rupees''
The above notification had empowered the District Collector to approve the award if the amount of compensation does not exceed Rs. 10
lakhs. Subsequently, the above notification was again examined by the Government and an amended notification was issued in G.O. Ms. No. 1027
Revenue Department dated 25.9.1992. Para 3 of the above notification reads as under:
The Government examined the suggestion of the Commissioner of Land Administration mentioned in para 2 above. They direct, in modification of
orders issued in the Government Orders first and second read above, that the power to approve both the pre valuation statement and awards for
payment of compensation not exceeding Rs. 20 lakhs be delegated to the Collector/Additional Collector/District Revenue Officer. Prevaluation
statements and awards for payment of compensation in excess of Rs. 20 lakhs shall be approved by Commissioner of Land Administration.
Inspection of cases is left to the Commissioner of Land Administration at his discretion.
By that notification, the District Revenue Officer is also empowered to approve every award in which the total compensation to be allowed
does not exceed Rs. 20 lakhs. It is true that the notification appended, merely refers to substitution of Rs. 10 lakhs into Rs. 20 lakhs. There is no
reference as to the power of approval by the District Revenue Officer. The Government Order issued in the name of the Governor, delegating the
power to District Revenue Officer for approval of the award, where the amount of compensation is less than Rs. 20 lakhs shall be considered in its
entirety. In view of above paragraph, which have extracted above, the decision of the Government is clear in delegating the power of approval to
the District Revenue Officer, in case the award of compensation is less than Rs. 20 lakhs. Merely because, there is no specific mention in the
appendix in the Notification, the power of delegation ordered by the Governor cannot be held to be inoperative. In view of the subsequent
notification, the District Revenue Officer is also empowered to approve the award of compensation upto Rs. 20 lakhs. Admittedly, in this case, the
total compensation is only Rs. 2 lakhs. We have perused the file produced by the learned Government Advocate. From page 43 of the file, it is
seen that the Special Officer had signed the draft award on 15.10.1997 and the same was approved by the District Revenue Officer on
21.10.1997. After the approval of the same, the award was published only on 31.10.1997. In view of the above, the contention that there was no
prior approval cannot be accepted.
For the above reasons, we find every merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. Accordingly, all the Writ Appeals are
allowed and the orders of the learned single Judge are set aside. No costs.