High CourtsDivision Bench

The Chief Administrative Officer (Disciplinary Authority), Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Ltd. and Others vs V. Krishnamurthy

Madras High Court · Decided on 3 December 1990 · Citation: (1991) 150 MLJ 1

HON’BLE JUDGES
D. Raju, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226
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Judgment

95 paragraphs · 2,135 words

D. Raju, J.—The above writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 8.7.1988 in Writ Petition No. 6803

ofl985 allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent seeking to quash the order of dismissal dated 6.5.1983 passed by the first appellant and

confirmed by the order dated 20.5.1984 passed by the second appellant and for a consequential direction to reinstate him in service with effect

from 29.9.1982 and for all attendant benefits.

2.

The respondent, at the relevant point of time, was employed as a stenographer in the Visvesvaraya Iron and Steel Ltd., a State Undertaking.

When he was working in the Madras branch, one S.K. Somanath was the Branch Manager. On account of certain allegations against the said

Branch Manager, certain enquiries were held in which the respondent figured as a witness for the management, and a result of which, the said

Somanath came to be dismissed from service. Thereupon the respondent had been transferred from Madras to Bhadravati and accordingly he

reported to duty on 29.9.1982. He was then placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings.

3.

By a charge memo dated 22.11.1982 three charges have been framed against the respondent to which an explanation dated 27.11.1982 was

submitted whereunder the respondent while denying the charges that he was responsible for any misappropriation as such, pleaded that whatever

role that he played was on the directions of the then Manager of the Madras branch and that he had no option but to obey his direction.

Thereupon, a domestic enquiry was proposed and on 19.1.1983, in the domestic enquiry, instead of the management producing evidence in

support of the charges, appears to have obtained a statement from the respondent in which the respondent has stated ""on the lines of my

explanation regarding the three charges I plead guilty and request that management to pardon me on humanitarian grounds. ""Once again he

reiterated therein the dominant role played by the then Branch Manager and highlighted the fact that it was he who really brought to the notice of

the management about the so-called irregularities and the assistance rendered by him to bring home the guilt of the then branch manager. He

emphasised in the said statement the fact that he obeyed the instructions of the superior, the then Manager, as a subordinate in good faith in respect

of the transactions covered by the charges and the moment he came to know about the dishonest intention of the then Branch Manager, he brought

into the notice of the management.

4.

Considering the statement of the respondent to be an admission of the guilt, the Enquiry Officer appears to have submitted a report finding the

respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereupon, the order of dismissal dated 6.5.1983 was passed.

5.

The respondent filed an appeal challenging the said order of dismissal and in the appeal he contended that there was no proper enquiry for

establishing the charges as well as his alleged connivance with the then Branch Manager, S.K. Somanath. The respondent also highlighted the fact

that neither the said Branch Manager called during the enquiry nor the related documents made available for the enquiry officer to examine and

come to the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of the charges. It was the contention of the respondent that the order of punishment should

have been preceded by a detailed enquiry and proof of the charges beyond doubt and neither of these requirements have been-complied with in

his case before passing the order of dismissal. The appellate authority by proceedings dated 11.3.1985 rejected the appeal without going into any

of these grounds in detail, but merely stating that there are no grounds for interfering with the punishment already awarded.

6.

The respondent questioned the order of the appellate authority in Writ Petition No. 6803 of 1985. The learned single Judge, after hearing the

learned Counsel for the respective parties, came to the conclusion that the three charges framed against the respondent could not be brought within

the fold of Standing Order No. 15(b). The learned single Judge also came to the conclusion that there was no admission of the charges by the

respondent herein, and the statement relied upon by the appellants in the peculiar background and circumstances of the case would not constitute

an admission of guilt which could result in an order of dismissal from service. On the question as to whether the non-conduct of the proper

domestic enquiry has resulted in grave prejudice to the respondent, the learned single Judge agreed with the stand of the respondent and. came to

the conclusion that the failure to hold the domestic enquiry vitiated the order of dismissal, The plea of availability of an alternative remedy by means

of an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act did not find favour of acceptance with the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge

recorded a finding that there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice in the instant case and on account of the said violation, the

order of dismissal could not be sustained. It is as against this, the present appeal has been filed by the management.

7.

In this appeal before us, Mr. T.S. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raised the following three submissions:

(i) The charges levelled against the respondent squarely fall within Standing Order No. 15 (b), either individually or collectively taken, and the

conclusion of the learned single Judge to the contrary cannot be sustained.

(ii) The respondent having admitted the guilt, there was no need to conduct an enquiry cannot be said to result in violation of the principles of

natural justice or to vitiate the order of dismissal passed.

(iii) The learned Judge ought to have rejected the writ petition on the ground that the respondent had a right to take up the matter for adjudication

under the Industrial Disputes Act and ought no to have exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8.

Mr. A. Devanathan, learned Counsel for the respondent reiterated the submissions made before the learned single Judge and sought to sustain

the order of the learned single Judge. He submitted that the order of the learned single Judge does not call for interference at our hands.

9.

On a careful consideration of the submissions made by the learned Counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the order of the learned single

Judge docs not call for any interference. So far as the first point raised on behalf of the appellants on the scope of Standing Order No. 15(b) is

concerned, we find that the learned single Judge has gone in detail in respect of each one of the charges and came to the conclusion that having

regard to the language of Standing Order No. 15(b) and the specific plea raised by the respondent that all the three charges as framed could not

be brought within the fold of Standing Order 15(b), must be upheld. In our view, the interpretation placed by the learned single Judge on the scope

of the Standing Order could not be said to be vitiated by any error of law warranting our interference in this appeal. That apart, we find that the

order of dismissal is vitiated on account of the complete violation of the principles of natural justice in not holding any enquiry as contemplated

under Standing Order No. 16, which provides a detailed procedure by stages as to how such an enquiry has to be held before dismissing an

employee. Standing Order No. 16 provides that an enquiry can be dispensed with only if in the explanation given by the delinquent

workman/employee he accepts the allegations made against him.

10.

The question that tails for our consideration now will be as to whether statement dated 19.1.1983 said to have been given by the respondent

on which heavy reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants, constitutes acceptance of the allegations made against the respondent

in the present case. After going through the relevant materials including the explanation as well as the statement dated 19.1.1983, we are unable to

agree with the plea made on behalf of the appellant that it constituted such admission or acceptance of the allegations. In our view, to constitute an

admission and acceptance of the allegations so as to dispense with the holding of an enquiry, such admission or acceptance must be specific, clear

and unequivocal. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the expression ""unequivocally or unambiguously"" had been omitted by

an amendment of the Standing Order made on 26.10.1982would not improve the case of the appellants. Even in the absence of such an

expression, with a view to bind the employee, the admission has to be clear, specific and unequivocal, and the dispensation of an enquiry could not

be ventured on vague pleas of admission.

11.

In order to get over the hurdle, the learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in

Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The State of Mysore, That decision cannot advance, in any manner, the case of the appellants. A reading of

paragraph 4 of the judgment establishes that the facts was on the basis of the admission of all facts that the inference of plea of guilt was arrived at.

In the instant case, there is no such admission of facts constituting the charges.

12.

The decisions reported in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (P.) Ltd. v. The Workmen AIR 1968 S.C. 326 and Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs.

Karunamoy Banerjee, , cannot also help the appellants because in both the cases, the enquiry has been held, witnesses had been examined and the

admission of the employee Concerned was taken only as one of the circumstances in the course of the enquiry properly and legally conducted.

Even a semblance of enquiry has not taken place in the instant case. The employee was not even asked to show cause against the charges whether

he admitted any of the facts constituting those charges. Even assuming t hat there was some vague admission in the present case, in our view that

by itself will not be sufficient to dispense with the enquiry violating the principles of natural justice and to visit the respondent with an order of

punishment straightaway. We are fortified in our above conclusion by a decision of the Constitution Bench of the apex Court reported in Jagdish

Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1961 S.C. 1070 the Court opined thus:

...In such a case, even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission, it is open to doubt whether he could be removed

from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules. But apart from this

consideration, if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal

enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in order of dismissal passed against him.

In view of the undisputable position of law that there must be clear and unambiguous admission of guilt which is not the position in the present case,

we consider that the learned single Judge was right in his conclusion that not only there was no admission within the contemplation of the Standing

Order in question, but the failure to conduct a proper domestic enquiry has resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice rendering the

order of dismissal invalid.

13.

Coming to the plea of the availability of an alternative remedy raised on behalf of the appellants, it requires to be noticed only to be rejected.

We have come to the conclusion that no proper enquiry has been conducted and that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice in

the instant case before passing the order of dismissal against the respondent. That being the position, the availability of an alternative remedy cannot

be held to be a bar for entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has always been held to be a rule of

convenience and discretion and not a rule of law. The decision reported in Basant Kumar Sarkar and Others Vs. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. and

Others, , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants is of no avail to the appellants in the. light of what we have stated above. Thus, for

what we have said above, all the pleas raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants fail. The writ appeal merits dismissal and it is accordingly

dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.