The Commercial Tax Officer vs C.P.D. Computer Peripheral Devices Private Limited and Tamilnadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench)

K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The Review Application is filed by the revenue to review the order dated 24.7.2006 made in W.P. No. 2816 of

2006. The said writ petition was filed by the first Respondent/Assessee against the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal made in T.A. No.

1320 of 2002 dated 21.10.2005 confirming the order of the lower authorities.

Before the Division Bench, it was contended by the Assessee that the the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act (Act No. 42 of 1992)

(hereinafter called ""1992 Act"") was repealed by Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal (Repeal) Act, 2004 (Act No. 34 of 2004) (hereinafter

called ""repeal Act, 2004""). Thereafter there is no forum for hearing the revision. Hence, by way of judicial review, under Article 226 of the

Constitution, writ petition is filed, which is maintainable. However, it was contended by the revenue that in view of the repeal of the Special

Tribunal Act, a revision would lie to the High Court u/s 38 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, (hereinafter referred to as ""TNGST Act"") as

it stood prior to 1992 Act. That contention was rejected by the Division Bench by observing as follows:

...4. The effect of the abolition of the Special Tribunal has already been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in T.C. Nos. 37, 38 and 115

of 1998 by judgment dated 1.4.1999, which was followed by us in T.C. No. 38 of 2000, by judgment dated 12.6.2006 (between Tvl. Mhitraa

enterprises, 33, GVK Buildings, 10th Avenue, Chennai-83 and the State of Tamil Nadu).

Even though the orders sought to be challenged in those matters arose under the Central Sales Tax Act and here, the order sought to be

challenged arises under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, the issues raised are one and the same, namely, the effect of abolition of the

Special Tribunal. In the judgment in T.C. No. 38 of 2000 dated 12.6.2006, it is held as follows:

After the amendment by Act 42 of 1992, the Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act does not permit the revision of orders passed in relation to the

matters arising under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Assessee''s remedy, therefore, can only be under the provision of the Constitution to the

extent permissible.

We are therefore of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the Assessee challenging the order of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax

Appellate Tribunal is maintainable in law....

In order to have some more clarity of the above observation, we refer the earlier proceedings. During the period when the 1992 Act was in

force, revisions have been filed before this Court in T.C. Nos. 37, 38 and 115 of 1998 u/s 38 of the TNGST Act in respect of Central Sales Tax

assessment against the order of the Appellate Tribunal. While dismissing the case, the Division Bench observed that after amendment by 1992 Act,

the TNGST Act does not permit the revision of order passed in relation to the matters arising under the Central Sales Tax Act. The said Order

was passed on 01.04.1999. However, the 1992 Act, which was in force from 22.12.1995, was repealed by Act No. 34 of 2004 on and from

13.07.2005. The Tax case Revision No. 38 of 2000, though filed in the year 2000, came to be disposed off on 12.6.2006, which is well after the

date of repeal of Act No. 42 of 1992. But T.C. Revision No. 38 of 2000 has been disposed of by following a decision dated 1.4.1999 made in

T.C. Nos. 37, 38 and 115 of 1998, which was rendered when the 1992 Act was in force. The effect of repeal of 1992 Act has not been

considered and a decision rendered in T.C. No. 38 of 2000. Thus, the reasons stated in the order, which is now sought to be reviewed, is not re-

fleeting the correct position of fact and law. Hence, the present review petition is filed by the revenue.

The maintainability of the review petition has not been disputed by either of the parties, rather both the parties argued on merits to have the

order impugned reviewed on merits with reference to the relevant statutory provisions, which are obtaining during the relevant period.

The TNGST Act, 1959 was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the levy of a general tax on the sale or purchase of goods in

the State of Tamil Nadu. Various terms have been defined u/s 2 of the Act. Sections 3, 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, etc., are charging sections.

Section 4 provided for levy of tax in respect of declared goods. Section 7-A provided for levy of purchase tax. Section 11 provided for

assessment of tax. Section 12 provided for procedure to be followed in assessment proceedings. Section 16 provided for revision of assessment

on escaped turnover.

As against the assessment/revision of assessment made under the above said provisions, the TNGST Act provided for appeal u/s 31 and 31-A

to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Appellate Deputy Commissioner. Sections 32 and 34 provided for suo motu power as against the

order of assessment and appellate order respectively by the authorities concerned. As against the order passed under Sections 31 and 31-A, a

further appeal was provided u/s 36 to the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Section 37 provided for a statutory appeal to the High Court

against the order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes u/s 34. Section 38 provided a revision to the High Court as against the

order passed under Sub-section (2), (3-A) or (6) of Section 36 by the Appellate Tribunal. Section 39 provided that the appeals or revisions under

Sections 37 and 38 are to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court.

While that being so, after advent of Tribunalism, and after the judgment of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 386 : 1987

Writ L.R. 1, approving the establishment of Tribunal under Articles 323-A and 323-B of Constitution of India, with a view to ensure effective

implementation of the TNGST Act, 1959, in regard to assessment, levy and collection of sales tax under the said Act, the Government passed

Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 58 of 1986) for establishment of Special Appellate Tribunal as the

highest hierarchy. u/s 3 of the said Act, changes were made by fiction in the TNGST Act, as if the TNGST Act should have the effect as per the

changes brought under the Act. The important change brought by the said Act was that wherever the term ""High Court"" occurred in the TNGST

Act shall have the effect as if ""Special Appellate Tribunal"" had been substituted. We need not dilate as to the changes made by the said Act in

detail for the reason that the said Act No. 58 of 1986 was not at all notified by the Government for its implementation. As the Act was not notified,

appeals and revisions were filed before the High Court only.

In the year 1992, the Government of Tamil Nadu enacted an Act called ""The Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act, 1992"" (Act No. 42 of

1992) under Article 323-B of the Constitution of India for adjudication or trial by a Special Tribunal of any disputes, complaints or offences with

respect to the levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act and the matters connected therewith or

incidental thereto u/s 6 of the Act. The other provisions upto Section 23 provided for constitution of the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal and

its functions and powers. Section 24 of the said Act provided among other things that the TNGST Act shall have effect as if, wherever the words

''High Court'' occurs, the words ''Special Tribunal'' had been substituted. Section 39 as if had been omitted. The three State Acts over which the

Special Tribunal Act was made applicable are TNGST Act, 1959, Tamilnadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970 and Tamilnadu Sales Tax

(Surcharge) Act, 1971.

The Tamilnadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act, 1992 came into effect on 22.12.1995 and the Special Tribunal started functioning thereafter. All

the writ petitions and tax cases that were pending before the High Court during that period were transferred to the Special Tribunal. The writ

petitions so transferred were taken on file by the Special Tribunal as Transferred O. Ps and likewise Tax Case (Appeals) and (Revisions) were

taken on file as Transferred Appeals and Revisions. Fresh original petitions were filed u/s 6 and Appeals and Revisions under Sections 37 and 38

of the TNGST Act were filed before the Special Tribunal. The Special Tribunal so constituted lived for a short period and the 1992 Act was

repealed by Act 34 of 2004 in to to from 13.07.2005.

As per Section 3 of the Act No. 34 of 2004, all the matters and proceedings pending before the Special Tribunal as on 13.07.2005 shall stand

transferred to the High"" Court and the High Court shall proceed with such matters or proceedings from the stage at which they are transferred. The

O. Ps which were pending before the Tribunal were transferred to the High Court and renumbered as Writ Petitions and disposed off by the High

Court. However, when the Tax Case Appeals and Revisions, which were transferred, were taken up for disposal, as said earlier, the High Court in

T.C. No. 38 of 2000 rejected the same on the ground that Sections 37 and 38 of TNGST Act, which were amended by 1992 Act to have the

effect, as Special Tribunal has not been re-amended as ""High Court"" and as such, no revision is maintainable before the High Court.

In this factual position, the question to be decided in this case is, as to whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain Tax Case appeal or

revision under Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act after repeal of 1992 Act?

Mr. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State Government and Mr. Arvind Datar. Learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the revenue Bar has contended that after the repeal of the 1992 Act, as against the order of the Appellate Tribunal made u/s 36 of

the TNGST Act, a revision would lie to the High Court. Section 24 of 1992 Act did not have the effect of brining about the textual amendment to

Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act, 1959. The expression ""as if"" used in Section 24 of 1992 Act is in the nature of a legal fiction and

substitution of the word ""Special Tribunal"" for the word ""High Court"" did not actually take place. The intention of the Legislature in having designed

Section 24 in the manner as it found, is clear that Sections 37, 38 and 39 of the TNGST Act should remain in operation, but for the purpose of

giving effect to the 1992 Act, the said provision stood eclipsed. The intention of the Legislature could be gathered from the repealing Act No. 34

of 2004, which provided that on and from the date of commencement of the repeal of 1992 Act, all the matters and proceedings pending before

the Special Tribunal shall stand transferred to the High Court and the High Court shall proceed to deal with such matter or proceeding from the

stage at which it is transferred or from any earlier stage or de novo as the High Court may deem fit.

Per contra, it was contended by Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel for the Assessee that the 1992 Act cannot be regarded as a sfand

alone legislation. Section 24 of the Act provided that the TNGST Act 1959 would have the effect subject to the modification. The modification is

by inserting ""Special Tribunal"" in the place of ""High Court"". After such modification, the High Court has no power to exercise its jurisdiction under

Sections 37 and 38. The Legislature has also understood the amendment clearly. So, they introduced Section 38-A for constitution of Sales Tax

Settlement Commission, where Section 39 was originally placed. After repeal of the 1992 Act, rightly, the Legislature re-introduced Section 39 by

Act No. 11 of 2005 (Ordinance No. 4 of 2005). He contended that the word ""shall have the effect as if"" imply substitution and not just for the

purpose of interpretation taking clue from the case of The State of Bombay Vs. Salat Pragji Karamsi, . He further contended that no right of

appeal can be conferred except by express words. Unless there is amendment to the provision, the High Court cannot exercise the appellate or

revisional jurisdiction under Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act. Learned Senior Counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case

of The State of Bombay Vs. Salat Pragji Karamsi, to support his contention.

We heard the argument of the learned Counsel on either side and perused the materials on record.

In order to resolve the issue in this case, it is necessary to refer Section 24 of 1992 Act, which reads as follows:

Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1959 as subsequently modified to have effect subject to modifications. - The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959

shall have effect as if;

(1) in Section 2, after Clause (n), the following clause had been inserted, namely:

(nn) ''Special Tribunal'' means the Special Tribunal as defined in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act, 1992;

(2) in Section 16,-

(a) in Sub-section (5), for the words ""High Court"", the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted;

(b) in Sub-section (6), for the words ""Special Appellate Tribunal"", the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted;

(3) in Section 32, in Sub-section (2), for the words ""High Court"" wherever they occur, the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted;

(4) in Section 34, in Sub-section (2),for the words ""High Court"" wherever they occur, the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted;

(5) in Section 36, in Sub-section (3), for the words ""High Court"" wherever they occur, the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted;

(6) after Section 36, the following section had been inserted, namely:

36-A. Tribunals under Article 323-B of the Constitution for sales tax matters. - It is hereby declared that the assessing authority referred to in

clause (c) of Section 2, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner referred to in Section 31, the Deputy Commissioner referred to in Sections 31-A,

32 and 33, the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes referred to in Sections 34 and 35, the Appellate Tribunal appointed u/s 30 and the

Special Tribunal referred to in Clause (nn) of Section 2 shall be the hierarchy of Tribunals for the purposes of Clause 3(a) of Article 323-B of the

Constitution for adjudication or trial of any dispute or complaint with respect to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of sales tax matters

arising under this Act;

(7) in Section 37,-

(a) including any marginal heading, for the words ""High Court"" wherever they occur, the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted.

(b) in Sub-section (1), for the words ""Board or Revenue"", the words ""Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes"" had been substituted;

(8) in Section 38, including the marginal heading, for the words ""High Court"" wherever they occur, the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been

substituted.

(9) after Section 38, the following section shall be inserted, namely:

38-A. Special powers of revision by Special Tribunal - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Special Tribunal may, of its own

motion or on application, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Joint

Commissionerof Commercial Taxes or the Appellate Tribunal in respect of any proceeding under this Act to ''satisfy itself as to the regularity of

such proceeding or the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein, and if, in any case, it appears to the

Special Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed, or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders

accordingly:

Provided that every application to the Special Tribunal for the exercise of the powers under this section shall be preferred within such period as

may be prescribed:

Provided further that the Special Tribunal may admit an application after the expiration of the prescribed period if it is satisfied that the party

concerned had sufficient cause for not presenting it within such period:

Provided also that this section shall not apply to any proceeding of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes u/s 34, or the Appellate Tribunal

u/s 36, in respect of which, appeal u/s 37, or revision u/s 38, respectively, lies to the Special Tribunal.

(2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under Sub-section (1), unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his

representations.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been preferred under Sub-section (1), the tax shall be paid in accordance with the order against which

the application has been preferred:

Provided that the Special Tribunal may, in its discretion, give such directions as it thinks fit in regard to the payment of the tax before the disposal

of the application, if the applicant furnishes sufficient security to its satisfaction, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed;

(10) Section 39 had been omitted;

(11) in Section 52, for the words ""High Court"" the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted.

From the above, it is amply clear that the above provision of the 1992 Act did not have the effect of bringing a direct amendment to the

provisions of the Act textually. The words used ""as if"" are having a great significance. In Volume I of Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition,

1971, the words ""as if"" has been defined as follows:

On the construction of an ""as if"" clause ""If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing

so, also imagine as real consequences an incidence which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or

accompanied it.... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that, having done so, you must cause or permit

your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs per Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in East and Dwellings

Company v. Finsbury Borough Council (1952) AC 109, at 133.

The word ""text"", in its dictionary meaning, means ""subject or theme"". When an enactment amends the test of another, it amends the subject or

theme of it, though sometimes it may expunge unnecessary words without altering the subject, vide Jethanand Betab Vs. The State of Delhi (Now

Delhi Administration), .

The amendments are usually made to a Statute or to statutory provisions by means of substitution, insertion or omission. If such amendments

are made, they can be regarded as textual amendments. For Example, the Finance Act, 1999 made certain extensive amendments to the income

tax Act. Section 3 of the Finance Act, 1999 provides for amendment to Section 2 of the income tax Act. That amendment has been incorporated

by means of substitution. For example, in Section 2 of the income tax Act, (a) in Clause (1B), in Sub-clause (iii), for the words ""nine-tenths"", the

words ""three-fourths"" shall be substituted with effect from 1st day of April, 2000, etc, Section 7 of the Finance Act, 1999 provides for insertion of

Section 10C, which provides that after Section 10B of the income tax Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:

10C. Special provision in respect of certain industrial undertakings in North-Eastern Region.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any

profits and gains derived by an Assessee from an industrial undertaking, which has begun or begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing

on or after the 1st day of April, 1998, in any Integrated Infrastructure Development Centre or Industrial Growth Centre located in the North-

Eastern Region (hereafter in this section referred to as the industrial undertaking) shall not be included in the total income of the Assessee....

...

Section 89 of Finance Act, 1999 provides for omission of Tenth Schedule of the income tax Act which reads that ""The Tenth Schedule of the

Income tax Act shall be omitted with effect from the 1st day of April, 2000"". The 1992 Act did not make any amendment to the TNGST Act as

aforesaid.

The amendments could be brought about by amending the parent Act itself or through another legislation or by incorporation or by reference

or by use of legal fiction. The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1986 was of the first type whereby amendments were

sought to be introduced by means of an amendment to the parent Act i.e., the General Sales Tax Act itself. However, the 1992 Act is an

independent legislation. Section 24 of the Act falls partly as amendment through another independent legislation and partly amendment by

incorporation and partly by use of legal fiction. There is actually no amendment carried out to TNGST Act, but by fiction of use of the word ""as if,

Sections 37 and 38 have to be read as though the power of appeal and revision is vested upon the Special Tribunal and imagine for the purpose of

1992 Act. No actual or real substitution of the word were carried out in the TNGST Act, but were to be imagined as if substituted for giving effect

to the object of the 1992 Act viz., for adjudication of the dispute by Special Forum i.e., the Special Tribunal of matters arising under the specified

State Act. So long as the 1992 Act remains in force. The word ""High Court"" in Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act stands eclipsed even while

the words High Court actually remained in tact in the TNGST Act. As regards Section 39 of the TNGST Act, words used is ""as if"" had been

omitted. Section 39 of the TNGST Act has to be imagined as omitted for the purpose of working of the 1992 Act. There is no effacement of the

provision in reality from the statute book. The TNGST Act has to be read as if the word ""High Court"" is not found in Section 39 for the purpose of

simultaneous and smooth working of both TNGST Act and the 1992 Act. The words used for inserting Section 38A in Section 24(9) of the 1992

Act are ""shall be inserted"". This has the effect of amending the TNGST Act by introducing a new provision to the Act itself. Now that the entire

1992 Act has been repealed in its entirety, the shadow or eclipse over the provision of Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act stands removed

with the result that the provisions begin to operate with full force in respect of dispute arising under the TNGST Act and the appellate and

revisional power of the High Court stands re-activated.

The intention of the Legislature is clear and unambiguous as it did not intend to disturb the existing machinery available under the TNGST Act

and at the same time avoid the anomaly of existing two parallel legislations to decide and adjudicate the dispute arisen under the three specified

Acts. For the purpose of achieving the above intention, the Legislature has consciously employed different expressions. Yet another object could

be seen in designing or moulding Section 24 in the manner as introduced. The machinery provision such as appeals and revisions under the

TNGST Act have been adopted by the Parliament for matters arising under CST Act by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act,

1957. Had the State Legislature directly amended the TNGST Act as done by Act No. 58 of 1986, the consequential effect of which is that the

parties would have been left without any remedy in respect of matters arising under the Central Sales Tax Act as the Special Tribunal was vested

with the jurisdiction to decide only dispute arising under the three specified State Acts. In other words, the anomalous situation would have set in,

which the Legislature wanted to avoid as the State is the beneficiary of the revenue collection under the Central Sales Tax Act. The provisions of

Sections 37, 38 and 39 of the TNGST Act as it stood prior to 1992, which remained in tact and construed and read in terms of Section 24 of Act

No. 42 of 1992 has now become operative and functional with full effect immediately on repeal of Act No. 42 of 1992. The eclipse created by

1992 Act has been now cleared. As consequence thereof, Sections 37, 38 and 39, as they stood prior to coming into force of the Special Tribunal

Act (Act No. 42 of 1992) have automatically revived.

So far as the reliance of the decision of the Supreme Court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Assessee in the case of The State

of Bombay Vs. Salat Pragji Karamsi, , we are not able to accept the contention to take a different view. The relevant facts of the said case are that

Kutch before 1948 was an Indian State. The Maharao of Kutch handed over the governance of the State to the Dominion of India on June 1,

1948, and thus it became a Centrally administered area. On July 31, 1949, the then Central Government issued u/s 4 of the Extra Provincial

Jurisdiction Act (Act XLVII of 1947), an order called the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949. Under Clause 3 of the said order certain

enactments were applied to Kutch with effect from the date of the commencement of the order. One of the enactments was the Bombay Act.

Clause 4 of the said order is that the authorities and territories mentioned in the first column of the table hereunder extracted were references to the

authorities and territories, respectively, mentioned opposite thereto in the second column of the said table.

TABLE

1 .Provincial The Chief

Government, Commissioner of

Governor or Kutch.

Chief Controlling

Revenue

Authority

Government The Central

Government or

the Chief

Commissioner,

as the context

may require.

3.High Court Court of the

Commissioner, Judicial

Kutch.

4.Provinces of Kutch or any

India, any part thereof.

Pronvince of

India or any part

thereof

5.The Province orKutch or any

Presidency of part thereof.

Bombay or any

part thereof

and under Clause 6 of the said Order, any Court may construe the provisions of any enactment, rule, regulation, general order or bye-law applied

to Kutch or any part thereof by the said order, with such modifications not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper in the

circumstances. On August 1, 1949, Kutch became a Chief Commissioner''s Province under the States Merger (Chief Commissioner''s Provinces)

Order, 1949. Clause 2(1)(c) of the said order provided that from the appointed day, the parts of States specified in the Second Schedule to the

order shall be administered in all respects as if they were a Chief Commissioner''s Province, and shall be known as the Chief Commissioner''s

Province of Kutch. The Second Schedule gives the parts of the pre-1947 Indian States which were to comprise the Chief Commissioner''s

Province of Kutch. Under Clause 4 of the Order all laws which were in force including orders made u/s 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act

of 1947, were to continue in force until replaced. On January 1, 1950, the Merged States'' Laws Act (Act 59 of 1949), came into force. By the

said Act certain Central Acts were extended to the province of Kutch including the General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897). On January 26, 1950,

the Constitution of India came into force and Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 was promulgated the same day. In the said factual matrix, when the

question arise whether the Bombay Act had been validly extended to and was in force in the whole of Kutch because of the Kutch (Application of

Laws) Order, 1949, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

...In Clause 4 of the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949, the words used are ""shall be construed as if reference therein...."" In our opinion all

that these words mean is ""shall be read as"" and if that is how these words are understood then wherever in the Bombay Act the words ""Provincial

Government"" are used they have to be read as the Chief Commissioner of Kutch; the word Government has to be read as the ""Chief

Commissioner of Kutch""; and the Province or the ""Presidency of Bombay"" as ""Kutch or any part thereof. If the Bombay Act is so read, then at the

time when the Constitution came into force the words Provincial Government or Government or Province or Presidency of Bombay were no

longer in the Act which had become applicable to the State of Kutch. On the other hand, the words there must be taken to be Chief Commissioner

of Kutch, and Kutch or any part thereof, respectively.

We are of the considered view that the facts of the cited case are totally different than the one under consideration before us. There was no

repeal of any of the order or Act in the cited decision so as to contend that the Provincial Government or Government or Province or Presidency

of Bombay were come into existence again. However, in the case on hand, by means of 1992 Act, certain changes were brought out to the effect

that wherever the word ""High Court"" comes in the TNGST Act, shall have the effect as if the words ""Special Tribunal"" had been substituted i.e.,

had been repealed with effect from 13.7.2005. As already stated, the construing a state of affairs which is not there in the Statute or which is not

real by means of the change incorporated in 1992 has automatically vanished and the original provision stood prior to coming into force of 1992

Act came into existence, because of the repeal of 1992 Act.

The intention and the scope of the repeal has been considered by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions and the Supreme Court has

uniformly held that the general rule of construction is that the repeal of a repealing Act does not revive anything repealed thereby. But the operation

of this rule is not absolute. It is subject to the appearance of a ""different intention"" in the repealing statute. ""Repeal"" connotes abrogation or

obliteration of one statute by another, from die statute book as completely ""as if it had never been passed""; when an Act is repealed, ""it must be

considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed"". Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance,

depending upon the intention of the legislature. If the intention indicated expressly or by necessary implication in the subsequent statute was to

abrogate or wipe of the former enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to

modify the former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an exemption, or by superadding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or

suspending its operation, such modification would not amount to a repeal. Broadly speaking, the principal object of a repealing and amending Act

is to ""excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject clearly inconsistent enactments"", vide India Tobacco Co. Ltd. Vs. The Commercial Tax

Officer, Bhavanipore and Others, .

However, in the case on hand, the 1992 Act has been repealed in its entirety and it is a case of total repeal or pro tanto repeal. As per Section

3 of the Repealing Act No. 34 of 2004, on and from the date of commencement of the repealing Act, all the matters and proceedings pending

before the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal on the said date shall stand transferred to the High Court and the High Court shall proceed to

deal with such matter or proceeding from the stage at which it is transferred or from any earlier stage or de novo as the High Court may deem fit.

From the above, the intention of the Legislature is clear that on the coming into force of the repeal of Act No. 42 of 1992, the original

provisions that were eclipsed during the currency of 1992 Act have again come into operation, in the sense, the superimposition of the word

Special Tribunal"" for the words ""High Court"", faded out by giving way to the word ""High Court"" and the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain

appeal or revision filed u/s 37 and 38 of the Act. By means of re-introduction of Section 39, the same has to be considered by a Division Bench of

the High Court.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that on and from the date of repeal of 1992 Act, the High Court will have jurisdiction

to entertain appeal or revision under Sections 37 and 38 of the TNGST Act, 1959, as the provisions re-emerged as they stood prior to coming

into force of 1992 Act. The order, which is impugned in this review application, has to be set aside and accordingly the same is set aside. Of

course, we are having some reservation about the reasoning of the order dated 1.4.1999 made in T.C. Nos. 37, 38 and 115 of 1998. But we are

not expressing any opinion on it in view of the subsequent development of repeal of 1992 Act. However, there is no order as to costs.