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Judgment
Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J.—This reference has been made by the Registrar of this Court on a doubt being felt as to whether the above
applications filed u/s 66-A(2) of the income tax Act, 1922, for the issue of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court have been
presented in time. The judgment of this Court sought to be appealed against was delivered on 12th November 1963. An application for copy of
the judgment was filed on the following day and the same was made ready on 12th February 1964, the time taken for filing these petitions, thus,
being 119 days. The present applications were filed on 20th June 1964, on the re-opening of this Court after the summer recess.
The Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (to be referred to here as the old Act), which provided the time-limit for filing suits, appeals and applications,
was replaced by the Limitation Act XXXVI of 1963 (to be referred to as the new Act), as and from 1st January 1964. The later enactment like
the former one being one regulating procedure, will, if there be no express provision or clear intendment to the contrary, have a retrospective
operation. On the date when the judgment of this Court was delivered, the old Act was in force. Article 179 of that Act provided a period of
ninety days from the date the decree for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Under the new Act, the period allowed is
shorter. Article 132 of the 1963 Act prescribes that the period of limitation for such an application will be sixty days from the date of the decree.
In the present case, the application for leave was filed only after the new Act had come into force. In other words, while a larger period was
available for such an application at the time when the judgment of this Court was delivered the statute in force at the time of their presentation will
give only a shorter period.
In a case when a statute of limitation supersedes another, there will be no difficulty where the right to institute the appeal or proceedings has
become barred even before the new Act came into force. No question of the application of the new Act will probably arise in such a case, except
where there is a specific statutory provision. Equally simple will be the case where the right to sue, appeal or apply accrues after the new Act came
into force. In the latter case, it will only be the new Act that will have application. But where time to file an application or appeal had commenced
to run under the old Act, but had not run out before the new Act commenced, there will arise a problem as to whether the provisions of the old or
new Act should be applied. The normal rule is that the statute in force at the time of presentation of the appeal or application alone would apply.
Where the period of limitation prescribed under the later enactment is larger, the new Act applying, the litigant will have the benefit of it. Where it is
the same as under the older Act, there will as we said, be no difficulty at all. But where there is shorter period under the later enactment for
presentation of suits, appeal or applications than the one provided for under the repealed Act, a hardship will undoubtedly be caused to the litigant.
It is to provide for such a case that such a transitional provision is enacted in Section 30 of the new Act. Section 30(a) relates to suits. Section
30(b), which is relevant for our present purpose, runs:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act.
* * *
(b) Any appeal or application for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,
1908, may be preferred or made within a period of 90 days next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such
appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier.
As we said earlier the present is a case where the period provided by the new Act under Article 132 is shorter than the one under Article 179
of the old Act. The section says that, in such a case, the time for preferring the application or appeal will be the shorter of the two periods specified
therein, viz., (i) ninety days from the commencement of the Act, i.e., till 31st March 1964, and (ii) the period allowed under the old Act. This is a
provision under the new Act itself and the reference to the period prescribed by the old Act is only for convenience of computation.
The Office has submitted that, if the time were to be reckoned under the old Act after excluding the time taken for obtaining copies of the
judgment of this Court, the last date for filing the applications would fall on 30th March 1964, and that, inasmuch as that falls within the ninety days
of the coming into force of the new Act, that will be the period that will govern the presentation of the applications now before us. There is,
however, a fallacy in the view submitted. The applications having been filed after the new Act came into force its provisions alone would apply. It
will, therefore, be wrong to compute time according to the old Act after the new one had taken its place. Section 30(b) is a provision under the
new Act. It provides the period of limitation in regard to what we have termed as transitional matters, i.e., where the time had begun to run before
the present Act came into force and expired after it came into force. In applying Section 30(b), one has first to see which of the two periods
mentioned there is the one that expired earlier. The first period prescribed is 31st March 1964, i.e., ninety days after coming into force of the Act.
The other period is the period prescribed for such appeal or application by the old Act. The question is what is the meaning of the phrase period
prescribed for such appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 as they occur in Section 30. Section 2(i) defines the term prescribed
period as the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. If that interpretation where to be applied in construing
Section 30(b) then the mode of calculation adopted by the office would be right. But this construction cannot be applied to interpret the second
clause of Section 30(b), for, that provision expressly refers to the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908, and not, as the definition would
imply to the period prescribed under the present Act. It is a well-known principle in the interpretation of statutes, that definitions or interpretations
given therein are to be applied only if it were not repugnant to the context in which they have been used. The definition contained in a statute is
undoubtedly the legislative key or the dictionary for understanding the provisions contained in the statute. But the interpretation section itself
invariably says, as it is said in the present case, that the meaning is to apply only if the context does not otherwise required. In the present case, the
period prescribed for such appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, cannot mean the period computed in accordance with the
present Act. It must follow that we have got to look into the older Act for the purpose of ascertaining the period fixed. There is no definition in the
old Act of the term period prescribed. But it is clear from Section 3 that the period prescribed referred to therein, only refers to the period
mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Act. It is true that, u/s 3 of the Act, that period has got to be computed by taking into account the provisions of
Sections 4 to 25 which occurred in Part III of that Act, but that is the provision for the computation of limitation and cannot be regarded as the
prescribed period. The distinction we wish to point out is that, the period prescribed under the old Act can only refer to the period mentioned in
the Schedule to the Act. But the actual time available to a particular litigant for the presentation of a suit or an application will be that period
together with such additions or deductions that might become necessary by applying the provisions of Sections 4 to 25. In other words, the period
prescribed under the old Act will not be the same thing as the time within which the appeal or application could be filed under that Act. To illustrate
what we mean Article 179 of the old Act prescribes a period of ninety days from the date of the decree for an application mentioned therein. Part
III of the old as well as the new enactment provides for certain additions to that period. The time mentioned therein in that part, while it can be
availed of in appropriate cases to extend time, cannot be regarded as the period prescribed. Section 30(b) must therefore be read only as referring
to the period fixed in the first Schedule of the old Act. If that be so, the period under the old Act for filing an application would have in the instant
case expired on 10th February 1964, and, so that is less than the alternative one provided for by Section 30(b), it will have to be adopted. Once
that is done, we have got to look into the other provisions of the present Act to ascertain the time within which the application will have to be filed.
Section 12 provides for exclusion of the time taken in obtaining certified copies of the judgment. If the time spent for that purpose, viz., 119 days,
were excluded, then the last day for filing the application in the instant case would be 8th June 1964. The same having expired during the summer
recess of this Court, the presentation of the petitions on the re-opening date will have to be considered as valid. The office will, therefore, be
directed to receive the applications as being filed in time.