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Judgment
This appeal by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act, for short), relates to Assessment Year 1995-96 and arises
from order dated 30th March, 2005 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal, for short) in the case of M/s Sudev Industries Limited
(hereinafter referred to as, the respondent-assessee).
The appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 4th August, 2006 on the following substantial question of law:-
‘Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in law in holding that service of notice at the factory premises of the Assessee on the
security guard was not proper service under the provisions of Section 282(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?’
For the Assessment Year (AY) 1995-96, the respondent-assessee had filed Return of Income declaring ‘nil’ income with the Income Tax
Department, Bulandshahar on 15th May, 1997. This return being belated and beyond statutory time was treated as non est. Consequently, after
recording ‘reasons to believe’ in writing, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Bulandshahar had issued notice dated 11th September,
1998 under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Act, calling upon the respondent assessee to file its return for AY 1995-96. This notice was sent
registered post vide receipt No. 4896 dated 15th September, 1998 and as per the Revenue also served on the respondent-assessee through Inspector
of Income Tax Department on 18th December, 1998 at A-7/74/1 & 2, UPSIDC Indl. Area, Sikandarabad, Bulanshahr, Uttar Pradesh. The
respondentassessee did not file return in response to the said notice, albeit their director Mr. Rajeev Aggarwal had appeared before the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bulandshahar and on his request reasons recorded for issue of notice and a copy of the notice under Section 148 were
furnished.
On 27th February, 2001, while the proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act were pending, jurisdiction was transferred from Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Bulandshahar to Income Tax Officer, Company Ward 3(2), New Delhi.
Thereupon, the Assessing Officer, Company Ward 3(2), New Delhi had issued notice under Section 142(1) dated 28th February, 2001, which was
served on the respondent-assessee requiring them to furnish details and particulars, including copy of bank accounts, monthly sale/purchase -
valuewise and quantity-wise, opening and closing stock - item-wise, quality-wise and value-wise, details of squared up accounts with confirmation, and
produce complete books of accounts. The proceedings continued with the respondent-assessee appearing through the chartered accountant, and
sometimes with Mr. Rajeev Aggarwal, director in attendance. During the course of the assessment proceedings, objection questioning jurisdiction of
the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Bulandshahar, who had issued notice under Section 147/148 of the Act was raised. This contention
was rejected, primarily for three reasons namely, (i) the respondent-assessee for the AYs 1994-95 and 1995-96 had voluntarily filed returns before the
Assessing Officer at Bulandshahr;(ii) during the course of the assessment proceeding for AY 1994-95 on a query being raised by the Assessing
Officer, the respondent-assessee vide letter dated 7.4.1995 had stated that a resolution had been passed for shifting of the registered office from Delhi
to Sikandarabad. The plea was accepted and return for AY 1994-95 was processed by ITO, Ward 1, Bulundshahar and (iii) respondent-assessee had
filed an application dated 12.5.1997 for certificate under Section 230A(1) with ITO ward-1, Bulandshahar, which was furnished on 28.5.1997.
On 22nd March, 2001, assessment order under section 144 of the Act to the best of judgment of the Assessing Officer was passed. Profit and loss
account was not submitted and filed. Only a chart, indicating purchases and sales after 1st October, 1994 when the trading operations had started, and
closing stock on 31st March, 1995 was filed. The respondent-assessee had as per the chart purchased goods worth Rs.3,06,98,078/-, sold goods worth
Rs.3,02,61,167/- and had shown closing stock of Rs. 8,74,125/- resulting in gross profit of Rs.4,37,214/-. After referring to discrepancies on current
liabilities and unsecured loans, capitalizing preoperative interest, failure to furnish confirmations from subscribers to share capital that had increased
from Rs.36,57,000/- to Rs. 317,60,500/- and also invoking Section 68 of the Act, the total income of the respondent-assessee was assessed at
Rs.2,77,83,260/-.
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in his order dated 22nd March, 2002 upheld the action of the Assessing Officer at Bulandshahar in issuing
notice under Section 147/148 of the Act for reasons recorded in detail including filing of returns of income for AY 1994-95 and 1995-96 before ITO,
Bulandshahar, letter of the respondent-assessee justifying and explaining why return for AY1994-95 was filed at Bulandshahar, issue of certificate
under Section 230A on application of the respondent-assessee by the said assessing officer and filing of belated return for AY 1995-96 before Income
Tax (Appeals), notwithstanding best judgment assessment, had also examined merits and quantum of income earned by calling upon the respondent-
assessee to furnish details relating to transactions of purchases and sales above Rs.1 lac, which were furnished. He noticed that the purchases or
sales were not paid for during the year, though the respondent-assessee had purportedly made purchases and sales of Rs.3.06 crores and Rs.3.02
crores, respectively and had claimed net loss of Rs.24,920/-. Adverse findings were recorded on several aspects, including failure to justify investment
in purchases. However, addition of more than Rs.2.28 crores made by the Assessing Officer under Section 68 of the Act was deleted observing that
addition should be made in the hands of the persons who had actually advanced money and had introduced their undisclosed income towards share
capital of the respondent-assessee. The respondent-assessee had contended that they were a public limited company and share applications had been
invited from public at large. Few additions made by the Assessing Officer were deleted and others were confirmed.
The respondent-assessee filed further appeal which has been allowed by the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 30th March, 2005, on the ground
that notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 11th September, 1998 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bulandshahar, and
addressed to M/s Sudev Industries Limited, A-74/142, UPSIDC Industrial Area, Sikandarabad, District Bulandshahar, Uttar Pradesh, was not served
as per Section 282 of the Act. Service of notice affected on 8th February, 2001 through Inspector at the above address was not on any director or any
person authorised by the respondent-assessee to receive the notice but on Ajay Pratap Singh, Security Guard. Inspector while effecting service had
recorded that the factory was not working and only security guards were present. Service on the security guard, who was not authorised to receive
notice, it was held, was invalid and therefore the re-assessment proceedings were entirely void and bad in law. Referring to the decision of Gauhati
High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax versus Mintu Kalita, [2002] 253 ITR 334(Gau.), it was held that service of notice was not a procedural
requirement, but a condition precedent for initiation of proceedings. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in R.K.
Upadhyaya versus Shanabhai P. Patel, [1987] 166 ITR 163(SC). Madras High Court in Venkat Naicken Trust and Another versus Income Tax
Officer and Another, [2000] 242 ITR 141 (Mad.) has held that when an assessee pleads that he had not been served with notice, it was for the
department to place relevant material to substantiate and prove that the assessee was served. Reliance was placed on the affidavit by Mr. Rajeev
Aggarwal that neither he, any of the directors nor an authorised person had received notice dated 11th September, 1998 issued under Section 148 of
the Act. Consequently, when the notice under Section 147/148 of the Act was not duly served, the Assessing Officer in Delhi could not have passed a
valid and legally sustainable assessment order.
We begin by referring to Section 282 as it was before substitution by Finance (No.2) Act,2009. Section 282 of the Act, was as under:-
‘Service of notice generally.
(1) A notice or requisition under this Act may be served on the person therein named either by post or as if it were a summons issued by a court
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
(2) Any such notice or requisition may be addressedâ€
( a) in the case of a firm or a Hindu undivided family, to any member of the firm or to the manager or any adult member of the family ;
( b) in the case of a local authority or company, to the principal officer thereof ;
( c) in the case of any other association or body of individuals, to the principal officer or any member thereof ;
( d) in the case of any other person (not being an individual), to the person who manages or controls his affairs.’
Section 282 of the Act dealt with procedure for service of notice and without hesitation we would hold that this provision was enacted to ensure
compliance of principles of natural justice and for ease of service, and not for hairsplitting and fault finding. Sub-section (1) to Section 282 had stated
that a notice or requisition could be served on the person therein named either by post or as if it were summons issued by a court under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (2) to the said Section refer to whom such notice or requisition may be addressed to in
different cases such as in case of a firm or Hindu undivided family, a local authority or company, any other association or body of individuals or any
other person. In case of a company notice may be addressed to the principal officer. Use of the word ‘may’ in sub-section (2) reflects that this
provision is permissive and not mandatory. Therefore, it would not be correct to hold as held by the Tribunal that the notice under Section 148 of the
Act not being addressed to the principal officer but to the company itself was invalid and completely illegal so as to not confer jurisdiction on the
assessing officer.
In Agricultural Company Rampur versus Commissioner of Income Tax, (1974) 93 ITR 353 (Delhi), notice was issued to the dissolved firm and
accepted by an accounts officer. Question arose whether the said notice was served on the firm itself as it had not been issued to a specific partner or
addressed to partners. Referring to Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Bombay versus Devidayal and Sons, (1968) 68 ITR 425 (Bom), it was
observed that notice if not addressed to a partner would not render it invalid if it was served and accepted and return was submitted in pursuance
thereof. In Agricultural Company Rampur (supra), though no notice was served on the firm, yet it was treated as a valid service as notice was
accepted by the accountant, who was working for the assessee firm as well as for the two partner companies. Reference was made to an earlier
decision of Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat I, Ahmedabad versus Bhanji Kanji’s Shop, (1968) 68 ITR 416, wherein
notice for re-assessment served on a temporary employee of a dissolved firm was held to be as valid service, observing that the conditions mentioned
in Section 63 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 similar to Section 282 of the Act, i.e. Income Tax Act, 1961, were not exhaustive and it was
permissible to serve notice by way of modes not mentioned in the said section. All that mattered was whether notice was received on behalf of the
assessee and was complied with. When no question about validity of service was raised before the Assessing officer or the first appellate authority
but before the Tribunal for the first time, the contention loses force. Belated objection regarding service of notice before the Tribunal was adversely
commented upon by the Delhi High Court.
Appropriate for our case would be observations of the Bombay High Court in Devidayal and Sons (supra) that provisions of Section 63 (2) of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 requiring that the notice in case of a firm may be addressed to any partner of the firm merely prescribes permissive mode of
service and was not intended to be either mandatory or exhaustive. Consequently, the fact that notice to the firm was not addressed to a partner
would not render it invalid when in fact it was served on the partner and accepted by him and a return was filed.
When a notice or summons are sent by registered post, the constructions which apply are different from those which apply to service through a
process server or an Inspector, as was held in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal versus Malchand Surana, (1955) 28 ITR 684 (Cal.).
Service through registered letters is one of the commonest types/mode of service. Where registered letter duly pre-paid and properly addressed is
issued, Courts invoke presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Refusal to
accept notice is treated as proper service. Referring to the said provisions, in Malchand Surana (supra), Calcutta High Court had observed that mere
fact that the physical delivery of the notice was made to a person, other than the addressee, who had no authority to receive the letter on the
addressee's behalf, would not be sufficient to prove lack or failure of proper service. Presumption would still be there and would remain unrebutted
notwithstanding that the actual service had been affected on a different person. In such a case, there could be room for rebuttal of the presumption by
further facts being proved by the addressee, who denies service but this would depend upon facts of each case. Legality and sufficiency of service
would depend on facts. Particular facts in the knowledge of the assessee must be proved and established by the assessee. Thus, mere fact that notice
was served on the brother of the assessee was not sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Primary question
would be whether the assessee had come to know about service at all, or whether the assessee having come to know that some notice had been
served, had not made any further enquiry and had not been informed and whether the presumption raised by the Sections had been rebutted according
to facts found proved in affirmative or negative [See Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab, Haryana, Jammu Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and
Chandigarh Patiala versus Lalita Kapur, (1970) 78 ITR 126 (P&H)]. There have been decisions wherein service effected by registered post letter
addressed to the assessee has been held to be valid, though the acknowledgement or service was affected on the employee or minor son or even
when there was refusal. The test as laid down in Malchand Surana (supra) and Agricultural Company Rampur (supra) applies. In Commissioner of
Income Tax versus Vins Overseas India Ltd., (2008) 305 ITR 320 (Del), referring to the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it
was held that notice sent by registered post should be presumed to be served unless rebutted by the assessee. Further, when objection with regard to
service of notice was not taken before the Assessing Officer but before the appellate authority, the rebuttal should not be easily accepted. Such
objection should be raised at the initial stage before the Assessing Officer and not after much delay. In the said case, affidavit denying service of
notice filed before the Tribunal was rejected on the ground that the assessee should not be permitted to file the affidavit as per the assessee’s
choice. Similar view on the question of presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act would hold good in the absence of the proof to the
contrary, were made in Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi (Central)-III versus Yamu Industries Ltd., ILR (2007) II Delhi 1400 and Commissioner
of Income Tax versus Madhsy Films Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 301 ITR 69.
We may now refer to Section 292B of the Act, which reads as under:-
‘292B. No return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding, furnished or made or issued or taken or purported to have been
furnished or made or issued or taken in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act shall be invalid or shall be deemed to be invalid merely by
reason of any mistake, defect or omission in such return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding if such return of income,
assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act.’
Section 292B of the Act deals with effect mistake, defect or omission in service of notice, summons etc. and states that notice, order, proceedings,
etc. will not be invalid on account of any mistake, defect or omission if in substance and effect it is in conformity with and in accordance with the
intent and purpose of the Act. The aforesaid section is a broad and wide provision which lays emphasis on substance rather than form and that
technicalities should not result in invalidating the proceedings, notice, orders, etc.
It is correct that legal dictums draw distinction between inherent invalidity which relates to jurisdiction as when the jurisdictional preconditions are
not satisfied or when limitation period for passing an order has expired, and irregularities and mistakes in proceedings while in exercise or during
jurisdiction. We need not dilate and expound on the said differentiation in detail in the present case, for service of notice under Section 148 of the Act,
it was held in R.K. Upadhyaya (supra) is an aspect relating to procedure and a pre-condition for passing of an order of assessment and not
jurisdictional pre-condition which would make the assessment order invalid when the assessee has been duly served and had participated in the
proceedings. In R.K. Upadhyaya (supra), the Supreme Court had examined the question of difference between ‘issue of notice’ and ‘service
of notice’ and pointed out dissimilarities between the provisions in the form of Sections 147 to 149 of the Act i.e. Income Tax Act, 1961, and the
differently worded provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in the following manner:-
‘2..........Section 34 conferred jurisdiction on the Income Tax Officer to reopen an assessment subject to service of notice within the prescribed
period. Therefore, service of notice within limitation was the foundations of jurisdiction. The same view has been taken by this Court in J.P. Janni,
ITO v. Induprasad D. Bhatt [AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7 SCR 539 : 72 ITR 595] as also in CIT v. Robert J. Sas [AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7
SCR 539 : 48 ITR 177] . The High Court in our opinion went wrong in relying upon the ratio of Banarsi Debi v. ITO [AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7
SCR 539 : 53 ITR 100] in disposing of the case in hand. The scheme of the 1961 Act so far as notice for reassessment is concerned is quite different.
What used to be contained in Section 34 of the 1922 Act has been spread out into three sections, being Sections 147, 148 and 149 in the 1961 Act. A
clear distinction has been made out between ‘issue of notice’ and ‘service of notice’ under the 1961 Act. Section 149 prescribes the
period of limitation. It categorically prescribes that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued after the prescribed limitation has lapsed. Section 148(1)
provides for service of notice as a condition precedent to making the order of assessment. Once a notice is issued within the period of limitation,
jurisdiction becomes vested in the Income Tax Officer to proceed to reassess. The mandate of Section 148(1) is that reassessment shall not be made
until there has been service. The requirement of issue of notice is satisfied when a notice is actually issued. In this case, admittedly, the notice was
issued within the prescribed period of limitation as March 31, 1970, was the last day of that period. Service under the new Act is not a condition
precedent to conferment of jurisdiction in the Income Tax Officer to deal with the matter but it is a condition precedent to making of the order of
assessment. The High Court in our opinion lost sight of the distinction and under a wrong basis felt bound by the judgment in Banarsi Debi v. ITO
[AIR 1964 SC 1742 : (1964) 7 SCR 539 : 53 ITR 100] . As the Income Tax Officer had issued notice within limitations, the appeal is allowed and the
order of the High Court is vacated. The Income Tax Officer shall now proceed to complete the assessment after complying with the requirements of
law. Since there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents, we make no orders for costs.’
(emphasis supplied)
Section 292B was introduced by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 with effect from 1st October, 1975. The object and purpose of
introducing the said section as explained in Commissioner of Income Tax versus M/s Jagat Novel Exhibitors Private Limited, [2013] 356 ITR 562
(Del) is as under:-
‘28. The aforesaid provision has been enacted to curtail and negate technical pleas due to any defect, mistake or omission in a
notice/summons/return. The provision was enacted by Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 with effect from 1st October, 1975. It has a salutary
purpose and ensures that technical objections, without substance and when there is effective compliance or compliance with intent and purpose, do not
come in the way or affect the validity of the assessment proceedings. In the present case, as noticed above, the respondent took the plea before the
Assessing Officer that they were never served with the notices under Section 148 of the Act......
Object and purpose behind Section 292-B is to ensure that technical pleas on the ground of mistake, defect or omission should not invalidate the
assessment proceedings, when no confusion or prejudice is caused due to non-observance of technical formalities. The object and purpose of this
Section is to ensure that procedural irregularity(ies) do not vitiate assessments. Notice/ summons may be defective or there may be omissions but this
would not make the notice/summon a nullity. Validity of a summon/ notice has to be examined from the stand point whether in substance or in effect it
is in conformity and in accordance with the intent and purpose of the Act. This is the purport of Section 292B. Notice/summons are issued for
compliance and informing the person concerned, i.e. the assessee. Defective notice/summon if it serves the intent and purpose of the Act, i.e. to
inform the assessee and when there is no confusion in his mind about initiation of proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act, the defective notice is
protected under Section 292B. In such circumstances, the defective notice/ summon is in substance and in accordance with the intent and purpose of
the Act. The primary requirement is to go into and examine the question of whether any prejudice or confusion was caused to the assessee. If no
prejudice/confusion was caused, then the assessment proceedings and their consequent orders cannot and should not be vitiated on the said ground of
mistake, defect or omission in the summons/notice.’
In M/s Jagat Novel Exhibitors Private Limited (supra), the Court had also examined the question of difference between ‘issue of notice’ and
‘service of notice’ as elucidated in R.K. Upadhyaya (supra), which had pointed out the dissimilarities between Sections 147 to 149 of the Act,
i.e., Income Tax Act, 1961 and similar provisions in the Income Tax Act, 1922 in the following manner:-
‘41. The aforesaid observations are significant. In the present case, the tribunal has not held that the jurisdictional preconditions were missing or not
satisfied. Reasons to believe have been recorded. Notice has also been issued within the limitation period. The question whether the notice was
addressed to the correct person has been examined and dealt with by us above. Service of notice is not the jurisdictional precondition but a matter
pertaining to making of the order of assessment. Before an assessment order is passed, the notice must be served. As noticed above, on 21st
February, 2002, Vijay Narain Seth, Director of the respondent company appeared before the Assessing Officer. The respondent had also filed some
details before the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order.’
Thereafter, in M/s Jagat Novel Exhibitors Private Limited (supra), reference was made to some other judgments, which are to the following
effect:-
‘42. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Anand and Company (1994) 207 ITR 418 (Cal.), it has been observed as under:-
‘In our view, the Tribunal has taken an unduly technical view of the whole matter. The judiciary in this country has never gone on technical
triviality. Even in the litigation of private parties, the courts have shown a wide measure of forgiveness in similar acts of omission or failure as pointed
out by learned counsel for the Revenue. (See Gouri Kumari Devi’s case [1959] 37 ITR 220). At page 223 of the Reports, the Patna High Court
has observed as follows:
 ‘With regard to the analogous provisions of Order 6, rule 14, there is authority for the view that the omission or failure on the part of the plaintiff
to sign the plaint is a mere irregularity which can subsequently be rectified and the omission is not a vital defect. That is the view expressed by the
Judicial Committee in Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das [1889] ILR 17 (Cal) 580 and by the Madras High Court in Lodd Govindoss
Krishnadas Varu v. P. M. A. R. M. Muthiah Chetty, AIR 1925 Mad 660. ‘
Learned counsel for the Revenue further cited Brahmaiah (Velivalli) v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Mad 867 ; [1930] 59 MLJ 674, where the Madras High
Court held that a judgment of a Bench of Magistrates has to be signed as required by law and the requirements of public policy necessitate the writing
of the full name of the Magistrate that signs the judgment and the mere putting of the initials is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory provisions
of section 265 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1889). At the same time, the said High Court also held that illustration to section 537 of the old
Act, viz., ‘the Magistrate being required by law to sign a document signs it by initials only.’ This illustration has been omitted in the amended
Act. According to the court, the omission indicates that the Legislature no longer views the initialling of the order instead of signing it as a defect
affecting the validity of the proceeding.’
In Hind Samachar Limited Vs. Union of India (2011) 330 ITR 266 (P & H) reference was made to Section 292B and Section 139(9) of the Act.
In the said case, return of income, filed by the company was signed by someone other than the authorized person. It was observed that the question
was of removal of defect, which could be rectified. Reference was made to another decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT Vs.
Norton Motors [2005] 275 ITR 595.
Bombay High Court in Prime Securities Ltd. Vs. Varinder Mehta, Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (2009) 317 ITR 27 (Bom) has observed
that Section 292B of the Act makes it clear that a return of income shall not be treated as invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission,
if the return of income is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. The return of income, if not
signed by the authorized signatory, as contemplated under Section 140 of the Act, would be a mistake, defect or omission stated in Section 292B of the
Act.
We may note, observations of the Supreme Court in Balchand Vs. ITO (1969) 72 ITR 197 (SC) wherein it was held that in construing a statutory
notice, extraneous evidence may be looked into to find out whether the technical defects or lacuna had any effect on the validity of the notice. The
facts had revealed that though there were defects in drafting the preamble of the notice, it did not affect its validity as the notice itself clearly informed
the assessee that he had to file a return of income for the relevant year.
In Chief Forest Conservator, Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Collector (2003) 3 SCC 472, the Supreme Court examined the question of
misdescription or misnomers of parties and the effect thereof and it was held as under:-
‘12. It needs to be noted here that a legal entity â€" a natural person or an artificial person â€" can sue or be sued in his/its own name in a court of
law or a tribunal. It is not merely a procedural formality but is essentially a matter of substance and considerable significance. That is why there are
special provisions in the Constitution and the Code of Civil Procedure as to how the Central Government or the Government of a State may sue or be
sued. So also there are special provisions in regard to other juristic persons specifying as to how they can sue or be sued. In giving description of a
party it will be useful to remember the distinction between misdescription or misnomer of a party and misjoinder or non-joinder of a party suing or
being sued. In the case of misdescription of a party, the court may at any stage of the suit/proceedings permit correction of the cause-title so that the
party before the court is correctly described; however, a misdescription of a party will not be fatal to the maintainability of the suit/proceedings.
Though Rule 9 of Order 1 CPC mandates that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, it is important to notice
that the proviso thereto clarifies that nothing in that Rule shall apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that
the necessary party is before the court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise, the suit or the proceedings will have to fail. Rule 10 of Order 1 CPC
provides remedy when a suit is filed in the name of the wrong plaintiff and empowers the court to strike out any party improperly joined or to implead
a necessary party at any stage of the proceedings.’
One of the questions, which arises for consideration, in such cases is whether there was prejudice. The test to be applied is whether the party
receiving the notice would be in doubt whether the said notice is meant for him or not. If the recipient of notice was not in doubt that it was meant for
him, the misnomer or misdescription is not fatal. Thus failure to mention the words ‘Principal Officer’ on the notices is not fatal.’
It is often stated that rules of procedure are handmaid of justice for the objective of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice and
not to obstruct and give technical objections primacy and position to strike down orders, when no prejudice or harm is otherwise caused and suffered.
In Uday Shankar Triyar versus Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Another,
(2006) 1 SCC 75, it was observed:-
‘17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not
entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should
not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or
perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance;
(ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
(iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
(iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
(v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and
authority of the appellant.’
Earlier in Rani Kusum versus Kanchan Devi and Others, (2005) 6
SCC 705, after referring to the ratio in Kailash versus Nanhku and Others,
(2005) 4 SCC 480, it was observed:-
‘10. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent,
but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be
denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the
provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet
extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.
The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure
should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in the judges to act ex debito justitiae
where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence, processual, as much as substantive. (See Sushil
Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar[(1975) 1 SCC 774] .)
No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or
for the court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed
according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth [(1966) 1 All ER 524 : 1966 AC 643 : (1966) 2 WLR 634 (HL)] .) A procedural law should not
ordinarily be construed as mandatory; the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates
the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath v. Rajesh[(1998) 4 SCC 543 : AIR 1998 SC 1827] .)
Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the
mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.
We would, at this stage, refer to some facts, which were not disputed and were recorded in the assessment order. Said facts were found to be
correct and were not overturned by the Tribunal. Notice under Section 147/148 had been sent by registered post vide receipt No.4896 dated 15th
September, 1998 in addition to service by the Inspector of the Income Tax Department. Secondly, upon service of the said notice, Mr. Rajeev
Aggarwal, director of the respondent-assessee had appeared before the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle Bulandshahar and on request
was given a copy of the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act and of the reasons recorded for issue of notice. The third aspect is that the
respondent-assessee during the assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer at Bulandshahar and then at Delhi, did not contest or object that
notice under Section 147/148 of the Act was not duly served as it was not served on the authorized officer or director or the notice was not addressed
to the principal officer. In case, and if, the respondent-assessee had taken the said plea, the Assessing Officer had the option to furnish and serve the
notice on the director or the authorised representative. There was no occasion for the respondent-assessee to object as Mr. Rajeev Aggarwal was
duly furnished a copy of the notice. A company being a juristic and a legal person, service cannot be in person on the Company, and has to be
affected by sending the notice to the registered office or at the place of business. In the context of the present case, we would only observe that the
object and purpose of service of notice was to inform and make the company aware that proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act had been
initiated. Initiation of proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act was upon recording of reasons to believe and upon necessary approvals. Initiation
to this extent was valid and not disputed and challenged.
It was submitted before us that the respondent-assessee had taken the plea and contested validity of service of notice on the security guard before
the first appellate authority, i.e., Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). It was accepted and admitted that no such contention was raised before the
Assessing Officer. In support, the respondent-assessee had relied on paragraph 2 of the order dated 22nd March, 2002 passed by the Commissioner
of Income Tax (Appeals), which reads as under:-
‘2. The first ground of appeal is that as the notice alleged to be issued to the assessee u/s 148 could not in law be said to be served on the assessee,
the assessment made, there under on the basis of such notice is bad in law. That the proceedings u/s 148 of the I.T. Act is illegal and uncalled for in
view of following facts:
a) The ITO, Bulandshahar did not have any jurisdiction over the case to issue the notice.
b) The ITO did not have any reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment due to omission or failure on the part of the
assessee.’
We have examined and considered order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) with reference to the aforesaid grounds.
Discussion and conclusions/findings recorded by the first appellate authority, un-ambiguously do not reflect and show that ground of invalidity of
service in terms of Section 282 of the Act was raised. There is no discussion on the issue; whether the service by registered post or by the Inspector
on the security guard would be valid. Legal effect and consequences were not considered. This would un-mistakenly support the submission of the
appellant-Revenue that this ground was not taken at the initial stage and when the first appeal was preferred and decided. Moreover, what is
important and relevant is whether this contention was raised before the Assessing Officer. Respondent-assessee accepts that this contention was not
raised before the Assessing Officer.
We would now deal with the decisions relied upon by the counsel for the respondent-assessee, which he submits support their case. In
Commissioner of Income Tax versus Rajesh Kumar Sharma, [2009] 311 ITR 235 (Del) reference was made to Section 282 of the Act and provisions
of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure and more importantly Rules 12 to 15 thereof. In the said case, as per the postal receipt notice was
addressed to ‘Sh. R.K. Prop. M/s Karol Bagh, New Delhi, Pin 110065’ and it was held that this was not the address of the assessee. The
Court had also observed that it would have been a different matter if the Revenue had been able to show that the envelope was addressed to the
correct person, but the receipt issued by the postal department was incomplete. Contention of the Revenue that the envelope was not returned and,
therefore, it should be presumed to have been duly served was rejected because of the categorical stand of the assessee that he had not received the
notice. Claim of the Revenue that the notice through process server was served on one Lalmani, who was an employeee of the assessee, was also
rejected on the ground that the assessee had stated that he did not have any employee named Lalmani and it was not the case of the Revenue that the
said Lalmani was authorised to receive notice. Pertinently, the assessee had written a letter after he was served with notice under Section 142(1) and
143(2) that he was unaware of any notice issued under Section 147/148 of the Act. The facts of the case are clearly distinguishable. Noticeably, Delhi
High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax- V, New Delhi versus Regency Express Builders Private Limited, [2007] 291 ITR 55 (Del) had dealt with
a situation where notice under Section 143(2) of the Act had been sent to the address given by the assessee and was served on one Gunanand. The
assessee had thereafter appeared through a chartered accountant. Question arose whether there was valid service, as notice under Section 143(2)
was required to be issued within the stipulated period. The appeal was allowed and the contention of the assessee was rejected, observing that the
chartered accountant had appeared before the Assessing Officer, which would show that notice under Section 143(2) had been duly served.
In Venkat Naicken Trust and Another (supra), it was held that the burden was on the Department to substantiate the plea that the assessee was
properly served. The said judgment would not be of relevance in the present appeal in view of the fact that notices were sent by registered post as
well as through Inspector. Service was affected at the factory office of the respondent-assessee. The case of the respondent-assessee is that notice
was served on the security guard and not on the director or authorised person. Director of the respondent-assessee had thereafter appeared before
the Assessing Officer and was furnished a copy of the notice. In C.N. Nataraj and Others versus Vth Income Tax Officer, Bangalore [1965] 56 ITR
250 (Mys), the assessment year involved was 1958-59 and the High Court observed that the notices were issued in the name of minors, who could
neither sue nor could be sued and had to be represented by guardians or next friend. In these circumstances, it was held that notices issued were
wholly invalid.
In the facts of the present case we would prefer to follow the decision of the Delhi High Court in M/s Jagat Novel Exhibitors Private Limited
(supra).
M/s Gopiram Bhagwandas, Dhanbad versus The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, Patna, [1956] 30 ITR 8 (Pat) is an old decision
arising under the 1922 Act. The question adjudicated was whether for the purpose of determining the starting point of limitation date of service of the
Tribunal’s order on the assessee himself or his lawyer would be relevant. Issue and question in the present case is different.
Commissioner of Income Tax versus Hyderabad Deccan Liquor Syndicate, [1974] 95 ITR 130 (AP) was again a decision under the Income Tax
Act, 1922. The dispute therein had several facets, including whether the assessing officer had elected to assess the individual members of the
Association of Persons (AOP), instead of the AOP. Reference in this context was made to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which as
noticed in R.K. Upadhyaya (supra) were different.
B. Johar Forest Works versus Commissioner of Income Tax, [1977] 107 ITR 409 (J&K) related to imposition of penalty due to non-compliance of
notices under Section 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
Dina Nath versus Commissioner of Income Tax, [1993] 204 ITR 667 (J&K) was an extraordinary case, in which service of notice under Section
143(2) was affected and the assessment order was passed on the same day, making an addition of nearly Rs.36,000/- to the assessee's income. In this
case, the service had not been effected on the assessee. Revenue’s contention that the notice was served on a partner of a firm in which the
assessee was a partner was rejected for several reasons. This order takes into account cumulative facts, which established prejudice.
In Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow versus Prem Kumar Rastogi, [1980] 124 ITR 381 (All), the issue raised related to starting
point for computation of period of limitation for appeal, and in that context it was held that the service on third person who was not an authorized agent
would not matter.
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Kanpur versus Kanpur Plastipack Ltd., [2017] 390 ITR 381 (All), notice was served on the power of attorney
holder, who was authorized to represent the assessee to conduct the case, but was not authorized to receive notice. Apparently, the assessee had not
complied and entered appearance.
Decision of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax versus Lunar Diamonds Ltd., [2006] 281 ITR 1 (Del.) was on the issue whether
notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was served within the prescribed limitation period. The decision relates to difference between ‘served’
and ‘issued’.
In Mintu Kalita (supra), it was observed that service of notice under Section 147/148 of the Act was not a mere procedural requirement, but a
condition precedent for initiation of proceedings. In the present case, the question is whether the service affected should be treated as null and void.
Ratio in Mintu Kalita (supra) has to be read in light of the pronouncement and ratio in R.K. Upadhyaya (supra).
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find sufficient justification and reason to allow the present appeal and answer the substantial question of
law in favour of the appellant-Revenue and against the respondent-assessee. It is held that the assessment proceedings under Section 147/148 of the
Act are not invalid or void for want of proper service of notice. However, an order of remand is required to be passed as the Tribunal has not
adjudicated and decided the appeal filed by the respondent-assessee on merits.
To cut short delay, it is directed that the Revenue and the authorised representative of the respondent-assessee would appear before the Tribunal
on 10th July, 2018 when a date of hearing would be fixed. In the facts of the case, the appellant-Revenue, it is held, is entitled to costs.