The Commissioner, Trade Tax vs S/S Kanpur Edibles Pvt. Limited

This Judgment has been overruled by : S/s Kanpur Edibles Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., AIR 2009 SC 814 : (2008) 14 SCALE 288 : (2008) 15 SCC 617 : (2009) 11 Vat Reporter 123 : (2008) 18 VST 485

Prakash Krishna, J.—The Commissioner of Trade Tax feeling aggrieved by order of the Trade Tax. Tribunal, Kanpur, Bench - 1 passed in four connected second appeal Nos. 1 of 2007 to 4 2007 for the assessment years 1997-98 (U.P.) and (Central) and 1998-99 (U.P.) and (Central), has field the above four revisions in this Court questioning the legality, validity and propriety of the orders of the Tribunal.

The dealer opp-party, a limited company is carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of vegetable oil and refined oil. The assessments for the assessment year 1997-98 (U.P.) and (Central) were framed by the Assessing Authority on 27 27th of February, 1997. Similarly assessment orders for the assessment year 1998-99 under (U.P.) and (U.P.) and (Central) were framed on June 17, 2000. Certain exemptions (consignment sales) were granted by the Assessing Officer, treating the claim as put forward by the dealer as correct and in accordance with law. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer, on verification of claim for exemption with regard to the consignment sales were found to be incorrect. It was discovered that Form "I" claiming exemption on the basis thereof that the transaction in questions were consignment sale was found to be incorrect as it was discovered by the departments that the respective dealers were never issued the said form F by their Sales Tax Department. The Trade Tax Department, thus formed an opinion that the turnover of the dealer opp-party has excaped assessment taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case as well as the letter written by the Sales Tax Officer, ward 61, New Delhi informing about the cancellation of registration of S/s. Garg Trading Company Subhash Park, who allegedly issued said Form F to the dealer (opp-party herein) issued four notices u/s 21 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act (hereinafter referred as the Act) for the aforesaid two assessment years under (U.P.) and (Central), after obtaining the permission as required thereunder from the concerned authority. The Deputy Commissioner (Assessment)-7 Trade Tax Kanpur who had initialed proceeding u/s 21 of the Act after considering the submission of the dealer and taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, discharged the notices and closed the proceedings u/s 21 on the finding that even if, the benefit u/s 6-A was wrongly granted on the basis of forms (F) which were never issued as found subsequently, no adverse inference can be drawn against the dealer by the order dated May 29, 2003.

Joint Commissioner Trade Tax, a higher authority, was of the view that the order dated 29.5.2003, discharging the notice u/s 21 of the Act, being illegal, initiated proceeding by invoking power conferred on it u/s 10-B of the Act. The said proceedings are still pending. However, a preliminary objection was raised by the dealer opp-party that the proceedings u/s 10-B if barred by time as it has been initiated after the expiry of the period of four years commencing, from the date of assessment order dated 27thof February, 1999 for the assessment year 1997-98 (U.P.) and (Central) and 17thof June, 2000 for the assessment year 1997-98 (U.P.) and (Central). The said plea with regard to the limitation was rejected by the Joint Commissioner (Executive) by the order dated 24thof July 2006 which was challenged by filing four second appeals being second appeal Nos. 1 of 2004 to 4 of 2007, referred to above. The Trade Tax Tribunal by the impugned order dated March 13, 2007 allowed all the appeals and held that the period of limitating would start running from the date of original assessment orders i.e. 27thof February, 1999 for the assessment year 1997-98 and 17thof June, 2000 for the assessment year 1998-99. therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings u/s 10-B of the Act is barred by time. Hance, the above four revisions at the instance of the Commissioner of Trade Tax.

All these revisions were clubbed and heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgement, as jointly agreed by the learned Counsel for the parties for the sake of convenience.

In the memo of revision following questions of law have been proposed:

Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal: Was justified in holding that the order passed by the assessing authority on 29.5.2003 is not an order in the eyes of law?

Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case the Trade Tax Tribunal was justified in holding gat discharging notice u/s 21 is not an order and cannot be revised tinder Section 10B?

Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Trade Tax, Tribunal was justified in over looking the distinction between Section 21(1) and 21(2) because explanation III of Sub-section (1) is not applicable in Sub-section (2)?

Whether on the facts and in, the circumstances of the case the Trade Tax Tribunal was justified in holding that the order passed by the assessing authority on 29.5.2003 is not an order which is revisable u/s 10-B?

All the above questions of law can be recomputed and compressed by reframing them in the following questions:

The proceedings initiated u/s 21 of the Act which was subsequently dropped by an order (in the present case dated 29thof May, 2003), is, iii the ambit of "any order" as envisaged u/s 10-B of the Act.

Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of limitation for initiation of proceedings u/s 10-B of the Act would start running from the date of original assessment order (i.e. 27thof February, 1999) for the assessment year 1997-98 (U.P.) and (Central) or 17thof June, 2000 for the assessment years 1998-99 (U.P.) and (Central) or from the date of the order passed dropping the reassessment proceedings by the Assessing Authority (i.e. 29thof May, 2003)?

Shri B.K. Pandey, the learned standing counsel submits that the order passed by the Assessing Officer on May 29, 2003 dropping the proceedings u/s 21 of the Act is an order within the meaning of words "any order" mentioned in Section 10-B of the Act. Elaborating the argument, he submits, irrespective of the fact that whether the turnover of a dealer is enhanced or not in a proceedings initiated by serving a notice u/s 21 of the Act, whenever it comes to an end, it can come to an end only by passing an order and the view taken by the Tribunal that the order dropping the proceedings is no order in the eyes of law specially for the purposes of exercising revisional power by the Commissioner or Trade Tax or any person authorised in this behalf, is legally untenable. Calculating the period of limitation of four years from the date of order passed u/s 21 of the Act i.e. 29thof May, 2003, the initiation of proceedings u/s 10-B of the Act cannot be said barred by time. In response, Shri Ashok Kumar, the learned Counsel for the dealer supports the order of the Tribunal and submits that there cannot be two assessment orders in respect of the same assessee far one assessment year and in view of Explanation III added to Section 21(1) of the Act, the order parsed u/s 21 dropping the proceedings cannot be subject matter of a revision u/s 10B of the Act.

The facts of the case are not much in dispute. Only pristine questions of law are involved as to whether the period of limitation for exercising revisional power asconfirmed u/s 10B of the Act would start from the date of assessment order or from the date of order when the assessment was sought to be reopened u/s 21 of the Act and it was dropped subsequently and the order dated 29.5.2003 is or is not an "order".

The Tribunal answered the aforesaid question in favour of the dealer placing reliance upon a Judgment of this Court in Ceat Tyres of India Ltd., Kanpur v. Commissioner of Sales Tax. U.P. Lucknow 1997 U.P.T.C. 305.

The learned Counsel for the parties repeatedly in support of their respective stands relied upon Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.) v. Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. and Anr. 1987 U.P.T.C. 404 : AIR 1957 S.C. 793. Briefly the facts of the said case may be noted. An order of assessment was passed on 7thof February, 979. It was followed by issuance of a notice dated 8thof January, 1980 u/s 21 of the Act proposing to make reassessment in respect if the relevant assessment year. The Sales Tax Officer after taking into consideration the facts of the case passed an order holding that the assessee therein was not liable to pay any more tax under the Act. The said order is dated 18thof January, 1980. Subsequently, the assessee therein in the year 1982 filed an application u/s 22 of the Act for rectification of mistake on certain grounds. A question arose as to whether the period of limitation for filing such application u/s 22 of the Act would start from the date of the original assessment order i.e. 7.2.1979 or from the date of discharging notice u/s 21 of the Act i.e. 18thof January, 1980. It was contended on behalf of the assessee therein that on the issuance of notice u/s 21 of the Act, the original assessment order ceases to be in force and that only the order of assessment which should be taken for consideration for the purposes including the application for rectification of mistake is order dated 18.1.1980.

In the factual background, the Apex Court examined Section of the Act and after taking into consideration its earlier judgement in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Excess Profits Tax, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh v. Jagan Mohan Rao and Ors. (1970) 1 SCR 726 , The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh Vs. H.M. Esufali, H.M. Abdulali, Siyaganj, Main Road, Indore, and International Cotton Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Hubil and Ors. held as follows:

...The order passed on 18-1-1980 should be construed as a (sic) order of assessment passed u/s of the Act and the initial order of assessment dated 7.2.1979 should be deemed to be the order passed again on 18-1-1980. If the assessee is able to show any error apparent on the record from the order as assessment dated 7-2-1979 which as we have observed earlier should be deemed to have been passed again on 18-1-1980, the appellant is entitled to succeed in its application for rectification provided it is made within the prescribed time, i.e., there years from the date of the order passed u/s 21 of the Act.

We do not find any merit in the submission made on behalf of the Department that the order passed on 18-1-1980 should be understood as an order discharging the notice issued u/s 21 of the Act and not an order of reassessment as such. This is obvious from the language of Section 21 itself. Section 21 authorises the assessing authority to make an order of assessment or reassessment. It says that if the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer, for an assessment year or part thereof has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or has been assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it is assessable under the Act, or any deductions or exemptions have been wrongly allowed in respect thereof, the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer and making such inquiry as it may consider necessary, assess or reassess the dealer or tax according to law. The assessing authority gets jurisdiction to make the reassessment by issuing a notice to the dealer as provided by Section 21 of the Act. When once the notice is issued under that section the original order of assessment gels re-opened and thereafter any order made u/s 21 of the Act alone would be the order of assessment in respect of the period in question. Section 21 of the Act does not require the assessing authority to puss an order deciding whether it is necessary to proceed with the inquiry under that section or not before passing an order of assessment or reassessment under that section. The only order which the assessing authority is required to make u/s 21 after a nonce is issued to the dealer under that section is an order of assessment or reassessment. It is not required to pass first an order whether it should proceed with the reassessment proceedings or not. Such a preliminary order is not contemplated u/s 21 of the Act. Hence the order dated 18-1-1980 has to be treated as an order of assessment even though it is not in the form in which an order of assessment has to be passed and not as an order merely on the question whether the reassessment proceedings u/s 21 of the Act should be proceeded with or not. In other words, it should be held mat the assessing authority had adopted the earlier order as the order of assessment passed tit the conclusion of the proceedings u/s 21 of the Act. The period of limitation for the application for rectification should, therefore be calculated from the date of the order u/s 21 of the Act. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view of the High Court expressed in its observation that since no fresh order assessment had been passed after examining the account of the assessee the ''original assessment order should be considered to remain intact as nothing is added or altered in pursuance of the order muter Section 21 of the Act.

Subsequently, Section 21 of the Act was amended by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991 being the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971 with retrospective effect through which Explanation 111 was added in Section 21(1) of the Act. The said Explanation III reads as follows:

Notwithstanding the issuance of notice under this sub-section where, an order if assessment or reassessment is in existence from before the issuance of such notice, it shall continue to be effective, as such, until varied by an order of assessment or reassessment made under this Section in pursuance of, such notice.

The statement of object and reasons attached to the Bill stated that the aforesaid fact was being promulgated Act:

In order to remove the difficulties experienced in the implementation of certain provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act 1918 and to clarify certain provisions...it was decided to amend the said Act.

On a plain reading of the Explanation 111 it is clear that until the assessment Order is varied, the issuance of notice u/s 1 of the Act will not wipe off the assessment order. To my mind the word "until" u AI in the Explanation is of great significance. It signifies that assessment or reassessment order in existence shall remain in existence and shall be subject to the order of assessment or reassessment made u/s 21 varying the assessment or reassessment order.

The dictionary meaning of word "until" as contained in "Webster''s Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of English Language at page 1567, column II is - (1) "up to the time..., (2) before..., (3) onward to or till...".

The contention of the dealer is that in view of the Explanation III to Section 21, referred to above and taking into consideration the statement of object and reasons of the Amending Act, it is clear that the said Explanation was inserted with a view to fill up the vaccume which was created by the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.) (supra). To put it differently, in substance the argument is that in view of insertion of Explanation III the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.) (supra) it is no longer open to any party to place a reliance upon it. In support of aforesaid argument strong reliance is being placed on Ceat Tyres of India Ltd. (supra).

The controversy involved in the case Ceat Tyres of India Ltd. (supra), as noted in para 3 and 4 of the report was that the assessment order was passed on 26thof March, 1984, the reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 21 of the Act was dropped by an order dated 29thof September, 1984 holding that no turnover has piped the assessment. This order dated 29th of September, 1984 was revised u/s 10-B of the Act, which was challenged in appeal unsuccessfully before the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that "the order dated 29thof September, 1984 amounts to an order of assessment and therefore that could be revised u/s 10-B." The Tribunal reached to the above conclusion on the basis of Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.)(supra). This Court examined the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.)(supra) viz-a-vis the addition of Explanation III to Section 21(1) of the Act. It was held as follows:

After the aforesaid judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court Section 21 of the Act was amended by the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991 by ''hiding Explanation HI thereto slating that notwithstanding the issuance of notice under this sub-section, where an order of assessment or reassessment is in existence from before the issuance of such notice it shall continue to be effective as such, until varied by an order of assessment of the reassessment made under this section in pursuance of such notice. This amendment is effective from the 1st March, 1973 and thus the view taken by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is no longer operative. The effect of the aforesaid explanation is that only an order of assessment reassessing the turnover by varying the same would bring about cessation of the earlier order of assessment and bring into existence an order of reassessing u/s 21 and orders discharging the notice u/s 21 or in any other manner showing that no turnover has escaped assessment would not be orders of the assessment so as to wipe out the earlier order of assessment. There was already an order of assessment dated 25-3-1984 and the order dated 29-9-1984 sought to be revised by the deputy Commissioner did not vary the turnover already assessed. On the other hand there was specific finding that no turnover had escaped assessment and therefore the notice was discharged. The result was that the earlier order did not cause to exist.

On a close reading of the aforesaid paragraph which was strongly relied upon by the learned Counsel for the dealer it is axiomatic that the plea of limitation was not at all involved in the above case. Only this much was said therein that an order of reassessment u/s 21 and orders discharging the notice u/s 21 or in any other manner showing that no turnover has escaped assessment would not be orders of assessment so as to wipe out the earlier order of the assessment. The said judgement, therefore, is no authority for the proposition from what point period of limitation will start running. The question of period of limitation was not in issue therein even remotely. Only this much was said that the order discharging the notice Sifter Section 21 is an order and it would not be an order of assessment. The said decision does not advance the case of the dealer opp. party.

The Explanation III has modified the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kundan Lal Sri Kishan Mathur (U.P.)(supra) to a limited extent. Wide proposition as canvassed by the learned Counsel for the dealer that for all practical purposes the law laid down therein by the Apex Court cannot be pressed into service, is not correct reading of Explanation III. To ascertain ambit and scope of the aforesaid Explanation III as incorporated by the Amending Act, the aims and object of the Amending Act may be looked into keeping in view "mischief rule" of interpretation of statute. The Apex in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, , in such situation has held that while interpreting an Amending Act the following four things enumerated therein should be kept in mind:

It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England us far back as 1584 when - Heydon''s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7 a (V) was decided that-

...for the sure and true interpretation at all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common low) for thing are to be discerned and considered:

1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.

2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.

3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and

4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and ''pro private commodo'', and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, ''pro bono publico''.

In In re, Mayfair Property Co. (1898) 2 Ch. 28 at p. 35 (W) Lindley M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported ''Heydon''s case (V). In - ''Eastman Photographic Material Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents. Designs and Trade Marks 1898 AC 571 at p. 576 (X) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows:

My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy.

These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion"

It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of Article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that Article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief.

The aforesaid Explanation was added keeping in view that an unscrupulous dealer may not claim that as soon as the assessment is reopened by issuance of notice u/s 21 of the Act to refund tax deposited by him in pursuance of the assessment order pleading - no assessment no liability. The Explanation III has limited field of operation, to the extent stated above.

At this stage another limb of the argument of the dealer may be noted. The learned Counsel for the dealer submits that if an order dropping proceeding u/s 21 is passed, it would mean as if it has been passed on the date when the original assessment order was passed. In other words, order passed subsequently, according to him would be deemed to have been passed on the date of original assessment order. If the said argument is accepted then it will create an anomalous situation. Take for example, as soon as an order dropping proceedings u/s 21 is passed and soon thereafter the assessing authority realizes that he has committed some mistake, he would not be entitled to correct that mistake or rectify if the argument of the dealer is accepted as in such situation in most of cases the time of four years for rectification would have expired.

Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal that the period for the purposes of calculation will start from 27thof February, 1999 and 17th of June, 2000 for the assessment year 1997-98 and 1998-99 respectively, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal lost the sight of the fact that the Joint Commissioner sought to revise the order dated 29thof May, 2003 in exercise of power vested in him u/s 10B of the Act. The subject matter for consideration u/s 10B of the Act is the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 29thof May. 2003 and not the original assessment orders dated 27thof February, 1999 or 17thof June, 2000 for the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99 respectively. The Tribunal lost the sight of this fact while deciding the appeals.

Section 10B is very widely worded and it gives jurisdiction to the concerned authority to call for and examine the record relating to any order (other than an order mentioned u/s 10A) passed by any of authority subordinate to him for the purposes of satisfying himself as to the legality and propriety of such order. It is nobody''s case that the order sought to be revised u/s 10-B was an order Sunder Section 10-A of the Act. The words "any order" u/s 10-B embarrasses every order may be interlocutor or final. To put it differently, the authorised officer on examination of record is competent to revise all the orders passed by any officer subordinate to him if the said order according to him is illegal for improper, subject to the other conditions enumerated u/s 10-B of the Act. It was then contended by the dealer that the order dated 29thof May, 2003 is not an order which can be revised u/s 10-B of the Act. The said contention on the face of it has no substance and is liable to be rejected. A copy of the order dated 29thof May, 2003 has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the revision. It runs in three pages. On a perusal of the said order it is clear that the Assessing Authority examined the account books of the dealer, considered the earlier original assessment order dated 27thof February, 1999 and the fact that on certain turnover exemption was granted and the plea of the dealer that it was stock transfer and the information received by the department that such turnover is not stock transfer as also applied its mind to the certain rulings relied upon by the dealer held that the dealer cannot be it faulted if form given by his counterpart was not issued by the concerned Sales Tax Department, is nothing but an "order" as understood in legal parlance. By no stretch I of imagination, it is other than an order. The word "order" is not a term of Article It has no fixed legal meaning. "Order" as known has been held equivalent to or synonymous of "decision". The Apex Court in C.G. Ghanshamdas and Others Vs. Collector of Madras, has held that an order need not be an order of civil court only, it can be of any statutory authority.

The full bench of this Court while interpreting word "order" in Section 26(2) of Evacuee Property Act has held that it is used in its widest connotation and includes an act of confirmation of sales. It was held that an order confirming a sale passed by Custodian is a decision or an order or a judgement See Dulari Vs. Addl. Custodian, Evacuee Property and Another, . In another case Abdul Sami and Another Vs. Mohammad Noor, an endorsement on the instrument has been held to be an order within the meaning of Section 61.

In V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I., the Apex Court has pointed out distinction in between tin "interlocutory order" and "final order", in the following words:

...We have, therefore, first lo determine the natural meaning of the expression ''interlocutory order.'' To begin with, in order to construe the term ''interlocutory'', ''it has lo be -construed in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. We are fortified by a passage appearing in the Supreme Court Practice, 1976 (Vol. I, p. 853) where it is said that an interlocutory order is to be contrasted with a final order, referring to the decision of Salaman v. Warner (1891) 1 QB 734. In other words, the words ''not a final order must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. That this is so was pointed out by Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, as follows:

Ordinarily and generally the expression ''interlocutory order'' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term, ''final orders''.

Thus, the expression ''interlocutory order'' is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term ''final order''. Now, let us see how this term has been defined in the Dictionaries and the text books. In Webster''s Third International Dictionary (Vol. II, p. 1179) the expression ''interlocutory order'' has been defined thus:

not final or definitive : made or done during the progress of an action : INTERMEDIATE, PROVISIONAL.

Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, p. 1410) defines interlocutory order thus:

''Interlocutor order'' (Judicature Act 1873 (c. 66) Section 25(8) was not confined to an order made between writ and final judgment, but means an order other than final judgment.

Thus, according to Stroud, interlocutory order means an order other than a final judgment. This was the view taken in the case of Smith v. Cowell (1880) 6 QB D 75 and followed in Manchester and Liverpool Bank v. Parkinson (1889) 22 QBD 175. Similarly, the term ''final order'' has been defined in volume 2 of the same Dictionary (p. 1037) thus:

The judgment of a Divisional Court on an appeal from a county court in an inter pleader issue, was a ''final order'' within the old R.S. C., Ord. 58, R. 3 Hughes v. Little (1886) 18 QBD 32); so was an order on further consideration Cummins v. Herron (1877) 4 Ch D 787; unless action was not thereby concluded But an order under the old R.S. C. Ord. 25, R.3, dismissing an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was not ''final'' within the old Ord. 58, R.3, because had the decisions been the other way the action would have proceeded.

Hulsbury''s Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 22, pp. 743-744) describes an interlocutory or final order thus:

Interlocutory judgment or order: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment arc to be worked out, is termed ''interlocutory''. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be Conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals....

It general a judgment or order which determines the principal mutter in question is termed ''final''.

At page 743 of the same volume, Black-stone says thus:

Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy lie sues for.... Four different tests for ascertaining the finality of a judgment or order Have been suggested : (1) Was the order made upon application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute? (2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided? (3) Does the order, as made, determine the dispute? (4) If the order m question is reversed, would the action haveto go on.

Corpus Juris Seeundum (Vol. 49 p. 35) defines interlocutory order thus:

A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both ifs to the subject-matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, While and interlocutory judgment is one which reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination.... Generally, however, a final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject-matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment is one which does not so dispose of the cause, but reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination.... The term ''interlocutory judgment'' is, however, a convenient one to indicate the determination of steps or proceedings in a cause preliminary to final judgment, and in such sense ^die term is in constant and general use even in code state. Similarly, Volume 60 of the same series at page 7 seeks to draw a distinction between an interlocutory and a final order thus:

The word ''interlocutory'', as applied to rulings and orders by the trial court has been variously defined. It refers to all orders, rulings, and decisions made by the trial court from the inception of an action to its final determination. It means, not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. An interlocutory order is an order entered pending a cause, deciding some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit and collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue An intermediate order has been defined as one nade between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment.

To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is mat it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate are order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment, Untwalia, J. in the case of madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory; order but is an intermediate order as deli led in the passage, extracted above, in I, Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Seeundum. It is obvious that an order of framing the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term ''interlocutory Her'' as used in Section 11(1) of the Act. Wharton''s Law Lexicon (14thEdition, p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:

An interlocutory order or judgment is one nude or given daring the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.

Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In oilier words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in is natural and logical sense without Hewing resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute : That is to say, if we construe Interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act.

Reverting back to the language of Section 10-B or the Act, it is apparent that the words "any order" have been mentioned therein. The use of word "any" before the word "order" further widens the meaning of "order". In view of use of word any" an inference of inbuilt legislative intent to give widest possible meaning to word "order" can be drawn. Any narrow or restricted meaning to word "order" or inhibiting or limiting the meaning to word "order" will not be in consonance with the spirit of legislative intent. The purpose and object of giving such a wide meaning to word "order" and enabling the authority concerned to revise any order passed by its subordinate is clearly understandable. The proceedings before the assessing authorities are not in he nature of adversary system. To plug the leakage of revenue such powers are powers are usually conferred in fiscal statutes on the higher authorites to revise an order passed by its subordinate, in the interest of revenue and to keep a balance the interest of revenue a well as of a dealer. Under the scheme of U.P. Trade Tax Act, like other Sales Tax Act, no appeal is provided for against an assessment order or any order passed by assessing authority, to the department. To maintain balance of conferment of power the higher officials of the department are given such power to check errors committed by their subordinates.

The interpret at on of word "any" came up for consideration before Apex Court Lucknow Development meat Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 S.C.C. 343 and it is held-

The word "any" dictionarily means one or some or all''.... The use of the word ''any'' in the context it has been used in Clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

In Shri Balaganesan Metals Vs. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty and Others, the Apex Court after making a reference to the meaning ascribed to the word in Black'' Law Dictionary 15thEdition, it was held that the word "any" has a diversity of Haling and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of statue.

The upshot of the above discussion are that (1) The order of the Tribunal holding that the period of limitation for the purposes of exercise of power u/s 10-B of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case will start from the dale of original assessment orders i.e. 27thof February, 1999 and 17thof June, 2000 for the assessment years 1978-98 U.P. and Central and 1998-99 UP. and Central respectively is unsustainable and contrary to law. The period of limitation will sum running from 29.6.2003, for the purpose of exercise of power u/s 10-13, to revise the said order dated 27.6.2003, (2) The order dated 29lil of May, 2003 passed by the Assessing Officer holding that there is no escapement of turnover and dropping the proceedings u/s 21 of the Act is an order and is revisable u/s 10-B of the Act.

In this view of the matter, the decision in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S/s. Angan Lal Faqir Chand 1996 UPTC 1087 was rightly distinguishable by this Court in Bala Ji Trading Co. v. C.S.T. 2000 UPTC 391.

In view of above discussion, the orders of the Tribunal passed in second appeals No. 01 of 2007 to 04 of 2007 cannot be sustained and the same are hereby set aside and the aforesaid second appeals filed by the dealer opp-party before the Tribunal stand dismissed.

Before saying omega to the case, it may be noted that due to an earlier order dated 9.10.2006 passed by the Tribunal directing the Joint Commissioner to decide the question of limitation first, has unnecessarily delayed and multiplied the proceedings. In fiscal matter final orders terminating the proceedings finally should be encouraged and not piece meal proceedings, otherwise it causes lot of harassment to tax payers also. W The tribunals in their wisdom should see that the proceedings come to an end finally without any delay.

All the revisions are, therefore, allowed with cost of Rs. 1,000/- each, in total amounting to Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees Four Thousands only).