The Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C., Bellary Division vs Marembee and Others

Ram Mohan Reddy, J.—This appeal is filed u/s 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, ""the Act"") by the original

employer directed against the judgment and award passed by the Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation (for short, ''Commissioner'') on 3-

1-2003 in W.C. No. 1061 of 2001.

The material facts leading to the present appeal are as under:

The applicant 1 is the widow of the deceased Latif, applicants 2 and 3 are the minor children of the deceased. The applicants jointly preferred an

application for compensation due to the death of Latif out of and in the course of employment from the appellant-Corporation. The deceased was

a driver of the appellant-Corporation appointed on 7-1-1982. The accident in question arose on 19-11-2001, at about 7 a.m. The deceased was

in charge of the bus belonging to the appellant-Corporation discharged his duties of driving the said bus from Bellary on 17-11-2001, reached

Mysore at 6 a.m. on 18-11-2001. Thereafter, the deceased drove the vehicle on its return journey to Bellary, by starting at 7 p.m., from Mysore

and reached Bellary on 19-11-2001 at 7 a.m. While at the bus-stand at Bellary in the bus itself, the deceased Latif complained of acute pain in the

chest and by the time, he was removed to the hospital, he was declared dead. The deceased Latif died due to a heart attack. The applicants filed

the application for compensation as the death of Latif was due to personal injury sustained by him out of and in the course of employment with the

appellant-Corporation.

The appellant-Corporation resisted the application by filing the written statement and contended that the deceased workman had died a natural

death. It was, thus, denied that the deceased had died due to injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant. It was

also denied that the applicants were entitled to the compensation.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the pleadings of the parties, the Commissioner settled six issues for decision making. For

the purpose of this appeal, the appellant having questioned the findings on issue 2, alone, it will be sufficient to cull out the said issue, which reads

thus:

The applicants relied upon the evidence of the widow of the deceased Smt. Marembee and also the documents exhibited in the application.

On appreciation of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the Commissioner held that the workman had died due to the injury in

the course of employment and awarded a compensation of Rs. 3,06,180/- to the applicants u/s 3 of the Act.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and award, the appellant-Corporation has filed this miscellaneous first appeal questioning the finding on issue 2

that the workman had died due to the injury in the course of employment. The controversy therefore, in this appeal is circumscribed in a very

narrow compass. The only question that requires to be determined whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the death of the workman

due to heart attack can be termed as a ''employment injury'' u/s 3 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923? If not, what order?

The deceased workman was working as a driver. He was assigned with duties to drive the bus on 17-11-2001 at about 8 p.m. to depart from

Bellary to reach Mysore at 6 p.m. on the next day that is 18-11-2001. Thereafter, he drove the vehicle on its journey from Mysore commencing at

7 p.m. on the said date and reached Bellary at 7 a.m. on the next day, that is 19-1-2001. After reaching Bellary and passengers had alighted from

the bus, the deceased complained of acute pain in the chest and immediately, he was removed to the hospital. He was declared dead due to heart

attack on arrival at the hospital. It is an admitted fact that the deceased died in the course of his employment with the appellant-Corporation. The

deceased died while he was on his duty and when he was in the bus.

The contention of the appellant-employer is that the deceased driver had died a natural death and that the death cannot be said to be out of

employment. The question is whether personal injury sustained by the deceased could be said to be injury attributable or referable to employment

or not? The Commissioner was pleased to find that the deceased workman died due to personal injury arising out of and in the course of his

employment.

Cardiac arrest or heart failure cannot per se be termed as accidents to grant compensation to the legal representative of a workman who dies

because of the same whilst merely on duty. In order to claim compensation u/s 3 of the Act, it is necessary to prove that the injury or resultant

death as the case may be is caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the employer. Therefore,

the use of words ""out of employment"" emphasize a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. It is well-settled position

of law that u/s 3 of the Act, it must be shown that there was a proximate cause and nexus between personal injury and accident during the course

of employment. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is an admitted fact that there was a causal connection between the death and

the employment whether deceased died while on duty. But what is sought to be challenged is, that the deceased driver died a natural death, due to

heart attack. The Commissioner, having examined and appreciated the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the death was

attributable to the employment. This finding of fact remains unassailable.

It is well-established that it is not necessary for the dependents of the deceased workman to prove that the deceased was engaged in some

exceptional work of a particular kind which had caused excess strain on the deceased so as to result in his death. If the work in which the

workman was engaged was likely to accelerate death, it could be said that there was proximate nexus between the death and employment. The

finding of the Commissioner that there was causal connection between death and work of the deceased cannot therefore be dislodged and

moreover, there is no contra evidence placed by the appellant- Corporation to counter such a finding.

On the evidence available on record in the present case, it has to be held, without demur, that the deceased workman had died of heart attack,

there being a pre-existing heart condition which was aggravated by the strain of the work of the deceased which resulted in his death. The fact that

the deceased Workman''s unexplained or apparently natural death had occurred during the course of employment, having established causal

connection between the nature of employment and death, the employment was attributable cause accelerating the death. That the death of the

workman was not only due to the disease from which he was suffering but on account of factors coupled with employment, has led the

Commissioner to conclude that the death occurred as a consequence of and in the course of employment. Therefore, both the conditions entitling

the applicants to claim compensation u/s 3 of the Act are fully satisfied. The contentions raised by the appellant-Corporation is one without any

merit.

u/s 30 of the Act, an appeal will lie only if it raises a substantial question of law and not otherwise. The finding that the deceased was the

person who suffered an accidental injury or not, is a pure finding of fact giving rise to no substantial question of law. Therefore, we are of the view,

that the question is rightly decided by the Commissioner and no interference is called for with the impugned judgment and award on the ground that

the question raised in the appeal is wrongly decided by the Commissioner.

The appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission without notice to the respondents. No order as to costs.