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Judgment
P. Sathasivam, J.—Since all the above three writ petitions arise out of a common award in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 on the file of Industrial
Tribunal, Madras, the same may be disposed of by the following common order.
W.P. No. 15214 of 1995 is filed by General Man-ager, Southern Railway, Madras, against the award of the Industrial Tribunal Madras, in I.D.
No. 52 of 1988 dated 15.4.1994, wherein the Tribunal has passed the Award holding that there exists the relationship of employer and employee
between the Management and the workmen and the termination of the service of the workmen mentioned in the refer-ence, other than S. Nos. 7,
30, 35, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 29 is not justified and consequently directed that they should be reinstated into service without back wages.
In W.P. No. 10980 of 1996 the workmen numbering 22 filed the same before this Court in respect of the very same award which denies the
backwages and continuity of service to them. In W.P. No. 13148 of 1996 one Subburavalu and seven others seek to quash the said award in so
far as it went against them and consequential relief of reinstatement with back wages.
For the sake of convenience I shall refer the petitioners in W.P. No. 15214 of 1995 as petitioners man-agement and respondents in that case as
well as petitioners in W.P. Nos. 10980 and 13148 of 1996 as respondent/workmen.
The case of the petitioners/management is briefly stated hereunder: It is contended that respondents 2 to 36 workmen were assigned piece rate
contract job work of stitching terricotton uniforms for the selected employees of the Southern Railway. In order to ensure quality stitching and
quick turn out of the prod-ucts the respondents 2 to 34 were accommodated in the premises of the third petitioner herein. These piece rate job
workers were engaged after calling for applications from the public who are competent enough to the stitching job. The engagement of the
respondents was on the basis of written agreement entered into with the 3rd petitioner after expressing the fact that the engagement so made in
purely of a contractual nature and that the wages would be paid on the work turn out. In the affidavit they extracted the salient features of the
agreement. Similar individual agreements from every one of the respondents have been executed. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
respondents were only engaged as individual independent contract labourers/tailors between the period 1984 and 1986 limited to a period of one
year. However, some were permitted beyond the period without renewing the said agreements.
It is further contended that the respondents there-after raised a demand that they be permanently absorbed permanently by the Railway
administration. Since they were purely engaged on a contractual basis and the wages were paid to them in proportion to the actual work turned out
on piece rates their demand could not be acceded. Thereafter, the contracts were stopped with effect from 20.12.1986 and on the very same date
the respondents were terminated. Against the order of termination, the respondents herein raised a dispute before the Central Government,
Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, who by order dated 2.8.1988 referred the said dispute to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Madras u/s 10
(2-A)(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. After elaborate trial the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 3.11.1989 in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 passed an
Award holding that there is no employer employee relationship, the workmen were engaged on a contract piece work job basis and dismissed the
claim. The respondents thereafter filed O.A. No. 469 of 1990 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras. By order dated 10.12.1991,
the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the Industrial Tribunal dated 3.11.1989 in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 and gave a specific finding that an
employer employee relationship existed in the present case and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. On such remission, the
Industrial Tribunal ultimately passed an Award dated 15.4.1994 to the effect that the respondent should be reinstated into service without back
wages. Aggrieved by the impugned award dated 15.4.1994 the petitioners having no other effective remedy approached this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India to quash the said ward on various grounds.
The contentions of the respondents/workmen as seen from the counter affidavit are as follows: The respondents herein were working under the
Southern Railway as piece rate tailors. They entered service originally on individual contract basis for a period of six months. At the end of six
month period, their contract was neither extended not their appointments were terminated by the writ petitioners. They continued to do the job on
piece rate basis under the petitioners without any break in service. The respondents/workmen''s job is to stitch uniforms to the Railway servants
and the said job is of a permanent nature. The workmen joined Socialist Workers Union in January, 1986 for a better bargaining capacity. After
joining the Union, they placed a charter of demands of 29.9.1986 claiming various benefits including con-firmation of their job and for regular scale
of pay. This infuriated the petitioners and immediately on 20.12.1986 the petitioner terminated all the 35 workers on the ground that the period of
contract has expired. The said termination was neither preceded by a notice nor the workmen were paid any compensation under Sections 25-F
and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. On completion of 6 months service, the workmen are to be conferred with temporary, status as
contemplated under Chapter 25 of the Rail-way Establishment Manual. Further, under the said chapter in para 2512 it is stated that casual
labourers who are accorded temporary status having worked for more than 6 months shall be considered for regular employment without having to
go through Employment Exchange. Since the petitioners have not acceded to the request of the workman in spite of their drawing attention to the
Railway Manual, they raised an Industrial dispute challenging the order of termination. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, quashed the
same in O.A. No. 469 of 1990 and after enquiry passed an Award holding that employer employee relationship did exist between the writ
petitioners and the workmen herein and remanded the matter back to the Industrial Tribunal to verify whether all the workmen have completed
240 days or not, to claim the benefits of Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. The writ petitioners fully participated in the
proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is further contended that after the remand, Industrial Tribunal after recording fresh
evidence, came to the conclusion that except the workmen in Sl. Nos. 7, 30, 35, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 29 all the other workers have completed
240 days, hence they are entitled for reinstatement without back wages. The said Award was passed on 15.9.1994. In spite of sending notice
therein expressing willingness by the workmen, the petitioners did not send any reply. In the meanwhile, against the denial of back wages to the 22
workers, who were directed to be reinstated, filed an Original Application No. 884 of 1995 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Since
there was no response from the petitionersmanagement, the workmen made a rep-resentation on 19.8.1995 to the Regional Labour Commissioner
and requested him to initiate action for implementing the award dated 15.9.1994 within 15 days and stated that failing which action will be initiated
u/s 29 on the Industrial Disputes Act. After the said notice, the petitioners rushed before this Court and filed W.P. No. 15214 of 1995. In the
meanwhile, original application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal by the workmen was dis-missed on 10.4.1996 in view of the
judgment of Supreme Court reported in Krishan Prasad Gupta Vs. Controller, Printing and Stationery, . Thereafter, all the workmen approached
this Court by way of W.P. No. 10980 of 1996 against the award denying backwages. The workmen who were denied reinstatement also filed
W.P. No. 13148 of 1996 challenging the said Award. It is further contended that as per the provisions of the Constitution, the Central
Administrative Tribunal was constituted and the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal remanding the matter to the Tribunal is well within its
power. Moreover, the petitioners herein participated in the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal and it is not open to contend
that the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter like this. They also questioned the Award of the Tribunal rejecting the claim for back
wages and dismissing the claim of some of them in its entirety.
In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr. B.S. Gnanadesikan, learned Counsel for the petitioners-management and Miss D. Geetha,
learned Counsel for the respondentsworkmen.
Mr. Gnanadesikan raised the following contentions:
(i) Inasmuch as the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order of the Industrial Tribunal, the order
passed by it remanding the matter to the Tribunal is bad, non est consequently the order made by the Industrial Tribunal in pursuance of order of
remand also cannot be sustained.
(ii) Even though the petitioner has not challenged the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 469 of 1990 in view of the fact that
it has no jurisdiction to decide the same even after remand, the jurisdiction and validity of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal can be
canvassed in this proceedings.
(iii) The Industrial Tribunal committed an error in holding that the termination of some of the workmen is justified, since those persons were
entrusted to work on the basis of a contract and after expiry of the period of work they ceased to be an employee of the petitioner concerned.
On the other hand, Miss D. Geetha, learned Counsel for the respondentworkmen raised the following submissions:
(i) On the relevant date the Central Administrative Tribunal was competent to consider the order of the Tribunal, hence the order of the Central
Administrative Tribunal is valid in the eye of law.
(ii) Inasmuch as the petitioner herein has participated before the Central Administrative Tribunal without any objection and allowed the Tribunal to
adjudicate the matter, it is not open to the petitioner to raise such a contention and consequently, the petitioner is estopped on the principle of
acqiesence. Further more even after remand by the Central Administrative Tribunal, the petitioner without any objection participated before the
Industrial Tribunal hence in view of the conduct of the party the objection of the petitioner has to be rejected.
(iii) The order of the termination by the petitioner is violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, hence renders retrenchment void ab
initio. In those circumstances, reinstatement with backwages should automatically follows.
(iv) Since all the workmen have completed the probationary period of 240 days, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have allowed the claim as prayed
for.
First I shall consider the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the attack of the learned Counsel for the petitioners at this stage
without raising any objection either before the Central Administrative Tribunal or before the Industrial Tribunal after remand.
By order dated 3.11.1989 the Industrial Tribunal has held that workmen are not railway employees and there is no employee employer
relationship, conse-quently held that the termination is justified and work-men are not entitled for any relief. Aggrieved by the said Award, the
workmen filed O.A. No. 469 of 1990 against the Award in I.D. No. 52 of 1988 dated 3.11.1989. By order dated 10.12.1991 the Central
Administrative Tribunal has held that the employer employee relationship exists and remanded the matter to the Industrial Tribunal to find out
whether the management has terminated the workmen violating the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr.
Gnanadesikan vehemently contended that the administrative Tribunal Act excludes jurisdiction of all courts except Supreme Court in dealing with
Service matters, subsequently, by Amendment Act 19 of 86 apart from other sections, Section 28 was also amended. The said Amendment Act
received the assent of the President on 25.3.1986 and notified in the Government Gazette dated 27.3.1996. When other amendments came into
effect from 11.1.1986, the amendments to Section 28 came into effect retrospectively from 1.11.1985. The effect of the amendment is ""No court
except the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court shall have or entitle to exercise any jurisdiction powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or
matters concerning recruitment or service matter. "" As such, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Central Administrative Tribunal
is not empowered to deal with service matters which has to be adjudicated by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Inasmuch as there is no
appeal to the Central Administrative Tribunal provided under the Act against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, the Central Administrative
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred by the work-men against the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 3.11.1989. In
such circumstances, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 469 of 1990
is without jurisdiction and nullity and non est in law. The Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction and therefore the subsequent award of the Labour
Court dated 15.4.1991 passed upon the order of remand passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal which lacks inherent jurisdiction is also a
nullity. In this connection, he relied on a decision of the Apex Court reported in Dhirendra Nath Gorai and Subal Chandra Shaw and Others Vs.
Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Others, . The following observation of the Supreme Court has been pressed into service and the same is extracted
here-under:
Where the court acts without inherent jurisdiction, a party affected cannot by waiver confer ju-risdiction on it, which it has not. Where such ju-
risdiction is not wanting a directory provision can obviously be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the
public interests, but in the interests of the party that waives it.
He also submitted that in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, , two learned Judges
of this Court can scrutinise the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Since the judgment operates prospectively and in view of the fact that
he is not canvassing the correctness of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal on merits, the learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly
conceded that he is not serious in pressing the said objection. However, according to him when the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction, the order
has to be treated as non est and therefore this Court while scrutinising the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 15.4.1994 and if the remand
order is excluded, the subsequent order of the Industrial Tribunal has to be quashed as it lacks jurisdiction.
It is also submitted that even though the original order of remand was not challenged, the correctness of the same can be canvassed in the
subsequent proceedings only for a limited purpose to show that even if the order is not challenged by way of an appeal it can be challenged in the
subsequent proceedings. It is the definite case of the petitioner that only if the right of appeal is provided against the order of remand, then in the
subsequent proceedings, it cannot be challenged as per Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, since no right of appeal
is provided against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, the same can be challenged in the subsequent proceedings. Here also in view of
the fact that the principle laid down by the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, , is applicable prospectively, the
petitioner is not serious in challenging the merits of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. On the other hand, it is the contention that
when the order of the Central Admin-istrative Tribunal is without jurisdiction, it can be ignored by this Court in the subsequent proceedings and
scrutinise the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 15.4.1994 independently, In support of his above contention, he relied on a decision reported
in Jasraj Inder Singh Vs. Hemraj Multanchand, . The learned Counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the following observation of their
Lordship in para. 14 of the said judgment and the same is extracted hereunder:
Be that as it may, in an appeal against the High Court''s finding the Supreme Court is not bound by what the High Court might have held in its
remand order. It is true that a subordinate court is bound by the direction of the High Court, it is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the
matter on a second occasion or any other court of co-ordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a
remand order cannot bind a higher court when it comes up in appeal before it.
In AIR 1981 707 (SC) , the Apex Court has observed thus:
Where the High Court in second appeal though not having jurisdiction illegally reversed the con-current finding of fact and ordered remand, the
aggrieved party can, in an appeal to the Supreme Court from the final order of the High Court after remand, challenge even the first order of the
High Court making remand and all the proceedings taken thereafter as a result of the illegal order of remand. The first judgment of the High Court
ordering remand being illegal all the proceedings taken thereafter would become void ab initio.
By relying on a decision reported in State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, , the learned Counsel submitted that there is no delay or
laches on the part of the petitioner in challenging the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground of jurisdiction.
On merits it is seen that against the order of Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 52 of 1988, dated 3.11.1989, the aggrieved Workmen preferred
O.A. No. 469 of 1990 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The petitionermanagement, in pursuance of notice from the Central
Administrative Tribunal participated in the proceedings. Against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal remitting the matter to be Industrial
Tribunal to verify whether all the workmen have completed 240 days or not to claim the benefits of Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial
Disputes Act, the petitioner has not challenged the same. No doubt, the learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that in the absence of any
specific provision for appeal, the contention of the petitioner cannot be rejected on the basis of Section 105(2) of C.P.C. No doubt, the learned
Counsel for the workmen is unable to point out any provision regarding appeal against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. However,
the fact remains under Article 132 of the Constitution of India and as per the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it is open to the
petitioner to file and appeal before the Supreme Court if they have any grievances regarding the order of remand. The other factor is that even after
remand, they did not raise any objection before the Industrial Tribunal. On the other hand, they also participated with regard to the limited
question, namely, the acceptability of the claim of the workmen regarding, Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also
worthwhile to mention the conduct of the petitioner in not taking any step against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated
10.12.1991 and subsequent participation before the Industrial Tribunal after remand by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Added to it, when the
matter was adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal after remand, the tribunal framed specific issues for determination. The verification of the Order
of the Industrial Tribunal after remand clearly shows that the petitioner herein participated in the subsequent proceedings through their counsel. In
those circumstances, on the principle of acquiescence, the petitioner is barred from contending that the Central Administrative Tribunal has no
jurisdiction to try the same. The observation of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in AIR 1950 S.C. 497 supports the case of the
workmen.
I may also point out that in the light of the provisions of Administrative Tribunal Act, Central Admin-istrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to
exercise the powers of the High Court under the principle of Alternative Institutional Mechanism. The above principle set out in S.P. Sampath
Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , has been once again reinformed in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others,
by the Apex Court. The only change made in Chandrakumar''s case by the Apex Court is that against the order of the tribunal, it is open to the
aggrieved persons to approach the High Court. The Central Administrative Tribunal which exercises the power of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India in so far as matters relating to and disputes and complaints with respect of recruitment, condition of service of
persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or one any state or of any local or other authority within
the territory of India. Article 323-A of the Constitution of India empowers the Parliament to enact legislation for the establishment of Administrative
Tribunal for the Union and the States separately. It also empowers the Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of
Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect to the disputes and complaints to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
public service. Based on the said constitutional provision under Article 323-A, the Parliament enacted Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
and conferred the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to the Central Administrative Tribunal. Pur-suant to the said Act
and Article 323-A of the Constitution, the Administrative Tribunal came into being and exercised the jurisdiction of the High Court under under
Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of dis-putes and complaints relating to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
public service. The Supreme Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, has held that Alternative Institutional
Mechanism is not violative of basic structure of the Constitution. The same view was further confirmed by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme
Court in the latest decision, namely, Chandrakumar''s case. Based on these two decisions, the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal
dated 10.12.1991 is valid. The same was passed by way of judicial review against the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The writ petitioner cannot
now before this Court question the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and cannot challenge the same as nullity. I have already given
reason for the same.
As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the workman, even on the ground of delay, laches and inaction, the contention of the petitioner
has to be rejected since the Central Administrative Tribunal has passed an order of remand on 10.12.1991. After having participated in the
proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal after remand in the year 1994, the contention of the petitioner cannot be counte-nanced. The following
decisions of the Supreme Court, namely.
(i) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, ; (ii) Chandrasekhar Singh and
Others Vs. Siya Ram Singh and Others, ; (iii) State of Assam Vs. The Amalgamated Tea Estates Co. Ltd. and Others, .
support the said contention of the learned Counsel for the workmen. In those circumstances, I am unable to accept the first two contentions raised
by Mr. Gnanadesikan and accordingly the same are rejected.
Now I shall consider the merits of the award dated 15.4.1994 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for
the petitioner that the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal is liable to be quashed as there is no proof available that the workmen put in more
than 240 days of work. Since there is no attendance register, according to be learned Counsel for the petitioner, it could not be produced. The
inference of the Tribunal that a register is maintained is not correct and the only register maintained is regarding the distribution of cloth for stitching
and payment particulars. It will not show the period of attendance. Even extracts of payments made and the register was produced under M-3, M-
4, M-5 and M-13. In those circumstances, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the conclusion of Industrial Tribunal that all the
workmen except had worked more than 240 days in a year preceding the date of termination is not based on any evidence. He also submitted that
considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Industrial Tribunal rightly rejected the claim for backwages even for those persons granted
relief with regard to reinstatement. Like-wise he also submitted that the rejection of the entire claim in so far as 9 persons is perfectly in order and
absolutely there is no material to modify or vary the order of the Industrial Tribunal by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the workmen. On the
other hand, the learned Counsel for the workmen submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has given a finding based on the evidence and thereby
based on. Ex. M-4 and Wage Register. According to her, it will go to show that the workmen were working continuously under the writ
petitioners. The supply of uniform is a continuous process as admitted by M.W. I in his evidence and the same was now done by outside
contractors. Inas-much as the petitionermanagement has not issued notice nor Retrenchment compensation to the work-men, according to her, all
the workmen are entitled to entire relief as claimed including back wages and other benefits. It is also submitted that the termination of 35 workmen
is in violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and para 2512 in Chapter XXV of the Railway Establishment Manual. The
petitioners/management failed to maintain a register of the retrenched workmen as per Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act or the Register
or Casual workmen as stipulated in para 2512 in Railway Establishment Manual for their absorption in future recruitment to class IV Establishment.
In these circumstance, according to her, the action of the writ petitioners clearly amounts to unfair labour practice.
In order to substantiate the case of the workmen, one Hayath Basha was examined as W.N. 1 who is one of the employees concerned and he
deposed that he joined the service of the petitionermanagement on 15.2.1984 and he was stopped from service on 20.12.1986. In his evidence he
has stated that though the agreement was only for five months, even though it was not renewed, even after expiry of the agreement, he worked for
3 years. while analysing his evidence, the Industrial Tribunal has observed that not even a suggestion has been put to W.W. 1 by the management
with regard to the defence that himself and other co-workers had not worked continuously till 20.12.1986. A perusal of the Annexure to the claim
statement shows the names of workmen, their respective date of joining and the date of termination. No doubt it shows that the workmen had
joined on different dates and different months. I have already said that on perusal of the oral evidence of W.W. I the Tribunal had observed that
there is not even a suggestion by the management with regard to the plea of the management. It is also seen from the evidence of M.W. 1 that the
Foreman was maintaining a register with regard to the number of pieces entrusted to particular workman and the quantity which he has finished. On
the basis of the oral and documentary evidence coupled with the particulars furnished in the Annexure filed along with the claim petition and in the
absence of any clinching contra evidence from both sides the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that except Sl. No. 21-E, Jeyapal, Sl. No.
23-M Prithiviraj, Sl. No. 24-I K. Lazar Sl. No. 26-G Krishnamurthy, Sl. No. 27-M Mohan and Sl. No. 29-M Henry Babu have worked more
than 240 days in a year preceding the date of termination. The available evidence also show that the above mentioned persons have worked only
from June, 1986. In those circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the con-clusion reached by the tribunal which is based on acceptable, oral
and documentary evidence. As stated above, in the absence of any contra acceptable evidence, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned
Counsel for the workmen.
No doubt, learned Counsel for the workmen has brought to my notice the following decisions:
(i) Ponnusamy v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1989) 1 L.l. C. 301; (ii) Daily R.C. Labour, P. & T. Dept. v. Union of India AIR 1987
S.C. 2343; (iii) Riaz Ahmed v. Munir lsmail Mohammed (1991) 2 L.L.N. 903 (Bom.); (iv) Decision in W. P No. 9679 of 1989 and W.M. Ps.
Nos. 13876 of 1989 and 1195 of 1991 dated 10.6.1996.
In all these cases this Court as well as the Apex Court on the facts and circumstances of the case have held that if the order of termination is set
aside, the aggrieved workman is entitled to reinstatement with backwages. In this case I have already explained on the basis of the materials that
only because the man-agement continued the workmen even after expiry of the termination, namely, 5 months fixed in the agreement the Industrial
Tribunal ordered reinstatement except 9 persons stated in the order. I have already upheld the order of the Tribunal since the same is based on
evidence. With regard to back-wages even though the Industrial Tribunal has not assigned specific reason or reasons, I am of the view that consid-
ering the whole issue namely the workmen were not paid daily wages, the rejection of the claim regarding backwages by the Industrial Tribunal is
fully justified. There is no dispute that the workmen concerned were paid wages depending on their work. In other words, they were paid on the
basis of the completion ""pieces"" as per the agreement. In such circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the tribunal,
namely, the workmen who are ordered to be reinstated are not entitled to back wages. In the peculiar and special circumstance and factual
position narrated above, I am of the view that the decisions cited above are not applicable to the present case. Regarding the rejection of the claim
insofar as 9 workmen as mentioned in the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal in the absence of any clinching evidence or material, I do not
find any error in the offer of the Industrial Tribunal rejecting their claim. Further, the Industrial Tribunal has also observed that those 9 workmen
were allowed to work only from June, 1986 and all the workmen were terminated with effect from 20.12.1986. In such circumstance, the
rejection of the entire claim insofar as the 9 workmen by the Industrial Tribunal cannot said to be either erroneous or unreasonable.
Net result, all the three writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.