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Judgment
Das, J.—These analogous appeals arise out of two suits instituted by the Maharaja of Dumraon for the purpose of establishing his title to, and recovering possession of two mauzas, Majhwari and Bhatauli. First Appeal No. 225 of 1921, which arises out of suit No. 24 of 1919, relates to mauza Majhwari. First appeal No 226 of 1921, which arises out of suit No. 25 of 1919, relates to mama Bhatauli. The learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed both the suits, and the Maharaja has appealed to this Court.
On the 13th November, 1836, Maharaja Jai Pragash Singh, the predecessor-in-title of the present plaintiff, made a maintenance grant of separate villages to three younger members of the family, Maheswar Baksh Singh, Rameshwar Buksh Singh and Rarmeswar Buksh Singh. There were really three separate grants in favour of three persons, but a single deed was executed to cover the three grants. We are in this litigation concerned with the grant to Rameshwar Buksh Singh which included amongst other properties mama Majhwari and mama Bhatauli. The defendants claim to be the successors-m-interest of Rameshwar Buksh Singh; but it has been found by the learned Subordinate Judge that they are the descendants of Mt. Ganno, the mistress of Rameshwar Buksh Singh. On the 5th November, 1848, Rameshwar Buksh Singh gave mokarari lease of manza Majhwari to Mt. Ganno, subject to a payment of Rs. 284-2-6 as rent by her. From 1843, mauza Majhwari has been uninterruptedly in the possession of Mt. Ganno and her descendants. So far as the other mauza is concerned, there is no evidence how it came into the possession of the defendants; but they were recorded in the record of rights finally published on the 20th August, 1911, as being in possession of mama Bhatauli by virtue of a deed dated the 8th Poos, 1299. That deed, however, has not been produced and it is the common case that no such deed was executed.
Rameshwar Buksh Singh, the grantee, died on the 14th July, 1864, leaving a widow Dulhin Kajbansi Koer who according to the plaintiff was allowed by the Raj to continue in possession of the villages granted to her husband. Sometime in 1862, Rameshwar executed a mortgage in favour of the then proprietor of Dumraon Raj in respect of several villages, including Majhwari and Bhatauli, as a security for a loan which he took from the mortgagee. In 1882, Maharaja Radha Prasad Singh, who succeeded to the Raj in 1871 and was the third in succession from the grantor, commenced a suit to enforce the mortgage security against Dulhin Rajbansi. His suit succeeded, and, in due course, he purchased the properties, including Majhwari and Bhatauli, at the judicial sale held in execution of his decree. His sale certificate is dated the 4th July, 1887. On the 17th December, 1890, Maharaja Radha Prasad executed a will by which he gave a life-interest in his estate to his wife Maharani Bent Prasad and appointed her and his Dewan, Jai Prakash Lal, executrix and executor of his estate. He died on the 5th May, 1894, and, according to the case of the plaintiff, was succeeded, to the Raj, by Maharani Beni Prasad who had a life-estate in the Raj by virtue of the will of the late Maharaja. Dulhin Rajbansi died sometime in 1896, and it is the plaintiff''s case that upon her death, the Raj became entitled to resume the maintenance grant including the mauza with which we are concerned in this litigation. Maharani Beni Prasad died on the 12th December, 1907, and upon her death the Court of Wards took possession of the Raj on behalf of one Jung Bahadur said to have been adopted by the Maharani to her husband prior to her death. The present plaintiff thereupon commenced a suit against Jung Bahadur to recover possession o f the Dumraon Raj and obtained a decree in his favour on the 12th August, 1910. He obtained possession of the Dumraon Raj on the 18th September, 1911, and commenced these suits on the 11th December, 1919. According to the case put before us on behalf of the plaintiff his cause of action arose on the 12th December, 1907, which is the date of the death of Maharani Beni Prasad.
The substantial question in this litigation is one of limitation, though the defendants in their written statement raised two other Important points, one as to the construction of the deed executed in favour of Rameshwar Buksh on the 13th November, 1836, and the other as to their status as the successors in interest of Rameshwar Buksh. They alleged in the first place that the deed of the 13th November, 1836, conveyed an absolute title in the properties dealt with by that deed to Rameshwar Buksh, and that whether they are entitled to claim through Rameshwar Buksh or not, the plaintiff has no title to maintain the suits. Secondly they alleged that they are the heirs of Rameshwar Buksh in the direct line and that, assuming that the grant to Rameshwar Buksh was a maintenance grant, the Raj has no right to resume the grant so long as the line of Rameshwar Buksh is not extinct. The learned Subordinate Judge has answered the first question in favour of the defendants, and the second question in favour of the plaintiff. Mr. P.K. Sen, appearing on behalf of the defendant, has accepted the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the status of his clients. It must follow that the defendants have no title whatever to the mnuzas in question unless they have acquired one by lapse of time.
But two important questions remain; first whether on the interpretation of the deed of 1836, any absolute interest was conveyed to Rameshwar Buksh, and, secondly, whether the plaintiff''s suits are barred by limitation. Although the learned Subordinate Judge decided the first question in favour of the defendants, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants has made no attempt to support the decision. Indeed, it is quite impossible to support the view of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point. The identical deed was construed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Beni Prasad Koeri v. Dudhnath Roy (1899) 27 Cal. 156. It will be remembered that Rarmeswar was one of the grantees named in the deed. Rarmeswar died without issue, and the question as to the construction of the deed arose in a suit for resumption instituted by Maharani Beni Prasad against certain persons who claimed under a deed executed by Rarmeswar in favour of one Ram Golam. In dealing with this question, their Lordships said as follows:
Their Lordships will not discuss at length the terms of the grant to Rarmeswar which was expressly made in lieu of maintenance. It was therefore prima facie resumable on the death of the grantor in accordance with the law laid down in the cases cited by the Subordinate Judge. It contains no words purporting to grant a perpetual interest, and as Rarmeswar died childless, it is unnecessary to say whether his family would have taken the benefit of it if not resumed.
I should point out that the law is now well settled that a maintenance grant is resumable on the death of the.grantee, and not on the death of the grantor. See Raja Wooday Aditto Deb v. Mukoond Narain Aditto Babu (1874) 22 W.R. 225, Rameshar Bakhsh Singh v. Arjun Singh (1900) 23 All. 194. This is not disputed before us by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. Now the passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee was cited before the Subordinate Judge; but he thought that "it will not necessary for their Lordships to review the document as a whole" and that "it will not be safe to conclude from the above authority that the estate conferred upon Rameshwar Buksh Singh by the above deed was only for his life."
The learned Judge then proceeded "to advert to the document as a whole" and came to the conclusion that the grant in favour of Rameshwar was "a heritable proprietary grant."
For myself, I am bound by the construction put upon this document by the Judicial Committee, and, if were not, I, with all respect, come to the same conclusion. The learned Subordinate Judge was much impressed by the fact that there was in the mind of the grantor "an apprehension of future disputes between the sons and heirs of the brothers of the executant on the one hand, his grandson on the other hand regarding the succession to the Raj" and he concluded that, the grantees having abandoned some existing right, "it is barely reasonable to presume that they did so on the condition that suitable provisions for their heirs were made."
I may point out at once that a maintenance grant is not absolutely inconsistent, with a grant to the donee and his heirs. Such a grant is prima facie resumable on the death of the grantee, but the context may show that it was intended to make provision, not only for the donee, but for the heirs of the donee. Where the grant is so expressed, the grantor has the right to resume the grant on the extinction of the line of the grantee. It is all a question of construction. All that I need point out at the present stage is that a grant may be a maintenance grant, though it is expressed to be for the benefit of the grantee and his heirs. In the present case Rameshwar Buksh has left no heirs and the Raj has undoubted right to resume the grant, provided it has not lost the right by lapse of time. I have not thought it necessary to deal with the point at length, because it is admitted before us by Mr. P.K. Sen, that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point cannot be supported. It is sufficient for me to say that there are no words in the deed indicating that an absolute interest was conveyed to the grantee.
This brings me to the question of limitation, the only substantial question in this case. In arguing this question, Mr. Sen has followed his own line of reasoning and not that of the Subordinate Judge, and in this he has exercised a wise discretion. It will be convenient to set out the rival contentions before proceeding to discuss the plea. The plaintiff''s case is that upon the death of the original grantee, his widow Dulhin Rajbansi was allowed by the Raj to remain in possession of the grant, and that the right to resume the grant did not accrue to the Raj till 1896 when Rajbansi died. The Raj was in 1896 in the possession of a life tenant, and the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff on the 12th December, 1907, the date of the death of the life tenant. The defendants contend that if the grant was resumable on the death of Rameshwar, the cause of action accrued to the Raj on the 14th July, 1864, and though the Raj may have allowed Rajbansi to continue in possession of the villages which were the subject-matter of the grant, the villages in suit were not in the possession of Rajbansi, and that the defendants were in by the laches of the Raj, and that limitation began to run in their favour from the 14th July, 1864. Next, they contend that Maharaja Radha Prasad brought a suit against Dulhin Rajbansi to enforce a mortgage executed by her husband in favour of the Raj, and purchased the properties tn execution of the decree obtained by him. By such purchase, which took place in 1887, there was a merger of the two interests, the interest of the grantee and the interest of the grantor, and the interest of the grantee having merged in the Raj, the Raj was entitled to re-enter upon all the villages dealt with by the deed of 1836, including the villages in suit. They contend accordingly that time began to run in 1887 and did not cease to run by reason of the subsequent death of the Maharaja in 1894. Lastly they contend that in any event, time began to run in 1896 on the death of Dulhin Rajbansi. Now it will be remembered that in 1896 the Raj was in the possession of Maharani Beni Prasad. The defendants admit that the Maharani had a life estate under the will of the Maharaja, but they contend that she was an executrix as well, and they insist that the right to bring a suit vested in her, not in her right as life tenant, but in her right as executrix, and that time began to run in their favour in 1896. To these contentions the plaintiff replies as follows:
First, in regard to the contention that the cause of action accrued to the Raj in 1864, he says that it was open to the Raj to recognize Dulhin Rajbansi as having succeeded to the interest which was of her husband in the maintenance grant; and if, as is asserted, the Raj did recognize her in that capacity, it was not open to it to institute a suit in regard to the villages which were in the possession of the defendants. Secondly in regard to the contention that the cause of action arose in 1887, when Maharaja Radha Prasad purchased the properties which were1 the subject-matter of the grant the plaintiff replies that the outstanding interest as mekararidars in favour of the defendants prevented merger, and that it was not operi to the Raj as purchaser of the interest of the maintenance holder, to put an end to that mokarari created before the mortgage. If will be remembered that on the 5th Novem; ber, 1848, Rameshwar executed a mokarrari patta in respect of mauza Majhwari in favour of Ganno Koer. The mortgage in favour of the Raj was executed in 1862. The argument is to the effect that, as the purchaser of the interest of Rameshwar as it existed in 1862, the Raj was entitled to rent from th� defendants, but was not entitled to evict them from the mauza which they wer� entitled to hold so long as Dulhin Rajbansi was alive. Lastly, in regard to the contention that where the executor is barred, the heir at law is barred, it is argued that there is no principle to support the proposition and reliance is placed upon Article 141 of the Limitation Act.
In my opinion, the first point urged oft behalf of the defendants must fail. I and inclined to take the view that upon a true construction of the maintenance grant of the 13th November, 1836, a heritable estate was conferred on the grantee, subject to the right of the Raj to resume the grant on the extinction of the line. The operative Clause is in these terms:
I have made a grant of the milkiat right in the mamas named below...by way of maintenance with the detail as follows", and then follows the details of the mauzas granted to each of the grantees. If the deed stopped here, it could not be urge4 that a heritable interest was conferred of the grantees. Prima fade, land granted by way of maintenance is resumable on the death of the grantee; but the context may show that the grant was intended for the maintenance of the grantee and his heirs, in which case it does not revert to the principal estate until the line becomes extinct or there is a failure of heirs. The question is, is there anything in the context to control the prima facie meaning of the words employed by the grantor? I think there is, and it will be found in the Clause which runs as follows:
If any of the said three persons or their heirs put forward hereafter any objecttion against the rais of the Raj as regards the difference in their maintenance grants which, according to the custom obtaining in the family, I am competent to assign more to one and less to another, such objection shall not be held legal or tenable in courts.
If the grant were resumable on the 4eath of the grantee, then obviously there was no room fur any objection on the part of the heirs; and it seems to me that the grantorr by providing against the possibility of an objection on the part of the heirs of the grantees, has clearly indicated that the grantees took a heritable, but not an1 absolute, interest under the grant.
I will assume, however, that the grant was resumable on the death of Rameshwar. Still there was nothing to prevent the Raj from allowing the widow to hold the land upon the terms upon which her husband held; namely, as a maintenance grant resumable on her death. And this is exactly what the Raj elected to do. The name of Dulhin Rajbansi Koer was recorded in the Land Registration Department in the place of her husband without any protest or objection on the part of the Raj. She was allowed to bring rent suits against her tenants, and the Raj sued her upon the mortgage executed by her husband and recovered a decree against her. The plaint filed by the Raj against her, a summary of which is given in Ex. C, the extract from the Register of suits, shows that in the estimation of the Raj, the properties dealt with, by the maintenance grant "on the death of the Babu", that is to say, Rameswar, "have devolved on the defendant by virtue of inheritance as a life interest."
Finally there is abundant oral evidence to support the view that Rajbansi was allowed by the Raj to continue in possession of the villages granted to her husband.
The Raj having elected to recognise Dulhin Rajbansi as having succeeded to the interest of her husband it could not have brought a suit against the defendants for recovery of the villages of which they were in possession until the interest of Dulhin Rajbansi came to an end. The first point raised on behalf of the defendant must accordingly be decided against them.
It was next contended that time began to run in 1887 when Maharaja Radha Prasad purchased the villages including the villages in suit in execution of his mortgage decree. It will be remembered that in 1862Ramesh-war took a loan from the then proprietor of the Dumraon Raj and executed a mortgage in his favour in respect of all the villages covered by the maintenance grant. Previous to that, however, he had made over Majhwari to Mt, Ganno in mokarrari settlement, subject to the payment of a rent to him. Maharaja Radha Prasad sued upon the mortgage in 1882 and purchased the mortgaged properties in 1887 at a judicial sale held in execution of his decree. It was argued that the interest of the maintenance-holder having come to an end by the judicial sale, it was open to Maharaja Radha Prasad to re-enter upon the villages which were in the possession of the defendants and that time began to run in favour of the defendants from the moment the villages were purchased by the Maharaja. The argument, in my opinion, is without substance. In order to succeed the defendants must establish that the effect of the judicial sale was that the interest of the maintenance-holder and that of the reversioner became vested in the same person in the same right, so that the interest of the maintenance-holder merged in the reversioner and so ceased to exist. It must be remembered that, as against the maintenance-holder, the defendants had acquired a tittle by adverse possession, and that they could not be evicted from the disputed villages so long as the interest of the maintenance-holder was in existence.
No doubt the Raj was not bound by a title acquired against the maintenance-holder, but there was no right of re-entry in the Raj until the interest of the maintenance holder ceased to exist. The critical question which we have considered is, did the interest of the maintenance-holder merge in the reversioner as consequence of the judicial sale and so cease to exist?
Now in order that there may be a merger, the two estates must wholly coalesce. I apprehend that the interest of the maintenance-holder could not cease to exist as to some portion of the interest and be kept oh foot as to the remaining portion. If I am right in this view then the intervening estate in village Majhouli in the defendants effectively prevented merger. In order to appreciate the point, it will be necessary to remember that on the 5th November, 1848, Rameshwar, the original grantee under the deed of the 13th November, 1836, executed an Isttamrari mokarrari patta in respect of village Majhouli in favour of Ganno Koer and her heirs. The transaction was perfectly valid and Ganno Kuer was entitled to hold village Majhouli under the patta of 1848 so long as the interest of the maintenance-holder was in existence. In 1862, the then holder of the Raj took a mortgage of the properties covered by the maintenance grant. In whatever form the mortgage may have been expressed it could not possibly affect the subsisting interest of Ganno Koer in village Majhouli under the transaction of 1848. When Maharaja Radha Prasad ultimately purchased the properties in execution of his mortgage decree, he could not have evicted defendants from village Majhouli, as, in my opinion, they were entitled to put forward their prior title under the transaction of 1848, in answer to the claim of the Maharaja in so far as the intervening interest of the defendants in village Majhouli is concerned. As, in my opinion, there could not a merger of part of the interest of the maintenance-holder, there was in law no merger at all.
But there is a more conclusive answer to the argument of the defendants. In order, that there may be merger, the two estates which are supposed to coalesce must be vested in the same person at the same time and in the same right. Now, what are the two estates in this case? Obviously the estate is reversion and the estate which was in the maintenance-holder. But it was not the estate in reversion which acquired the estate of the maintenance-holder. It was a pure accident that the Maharaja of Dumraon took the mortgage in question from the maintenance-holder. The point is that it was not as the owner of the estate in reversion that the loan was given by the Maharaja of Dumraon and the mortgage ta4sen. When he ultimately purchased the properties in execution of his mortgage decree, he did so not as the owner of the estate in reversion, but purely in his personal capacity, so much so that on his death, the properties purchased by him would devolve on his personal heirs, though the Raj might have gone by survivorship to a collateral. This point is clearly established in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Rani Jagdamba Kumari v. Wazir Narain Singh (1923) P.C. 59. The question in that case was whether properties purchased by the Raja of Serampore out of the income of the Raj formed an accretion to the Raj. It was contended that all the investments made by the Raja out of the income of the Raj formed an accretion to the Raj and descended with it. In reply to this argument which succeeded in the High Court, Lord Buckmaster said as follows: "Their Lordships think that this conclusion is wrong, and that its error is due to the idea that the produce of their impartible estate naturally belongs to and forms an accretion to the original property. In fact, when the true position is considered, there is no accretion at all. The income when received is the absolute property of the owner of the impartible estate. It differs in no way from property that he might have gained by his own effort or that had come to him in circumstances entirely dissociated from the ownership of the Raj. It is, therefore, a strong assumption to make that the income of the property of this nature is so affected by the source from which it came that it still retains its original character." In my opinion, it is impossible to contend that there was a merger of the two estates if, as the Judicial Committee has held, the properties purchased by Maharaja Radha Prasad in execution of his mortgage decree are to be regarded as properties that had come to him in circumstances entirely dissociated from the ownership of the Raj. In my opinion, it was not open to Maharaja Radha Prasad on purchasing the properties, which were the subject-matter of the maintenance grant, to treat the maintenance grant as having ceased to exist and to take proceedings against the defendants.
I now come to the most important point argued in the case on which, I think, the defendants are entitled to succeed. It is conceded that the right to resume the grant accrued to the Raj on the death of Dulhin Rajbansi Koer which occurred sometime in 1896. The defendants maintain that the suit not having been brought within 12 years of the date of the death of the Dulhin it is barred under the provisions of Article 144 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff replies that in 1896 the Raj was in the possession of Maharani Beni Prasad, who was entitled to a life estate in the properties comprising the Dumraon Raj, and that the failure or the neglect of the Maharani to bring a suit against the defendants does not affect his right to bring a suit within twelve years of the death of the Maharani under Article 140 or Article 141 of the Limitation Act. The Maharani died on the 12th December, 1907, and the plaintiff contends that the present suits are well within time having been brought on the 11th December, 1919. To this argument the defendants have two replies, first, that the plaintiff having elected to proceed on his presumptive title based on possession and, not on any specific title which, if proved, would attract the operation of Article 140 or Article 141 of the Limitation Act, the court will not allow him to have recourse to Article 140 or Article 141 on the question whether his suits are not barred by lapse of time, and secondly, that the Maharani was the executrix under the will of Maharaja Radha Prasad and as such was the statutory owner of the properties and that this statutory ownership, that is to say, ownership for the purpose of the Probate and Administration Act, prevented the estate from devolving on, her as life tenant so long as administration was not completed and the purposes of the will carried into effect and that her failure to bring a suit against the defendants had the effect of giving a complete title to the defendants, and that there is no principle to support the view that where the executor is barred, there is a revival of the cause of action in the heir-at-law or the beneficiary.
I am of opinion that the plaintiff cannot ask us to hold that either Article 140 or 141 of the Limitation Act applies to this case. Article 140 applies to a suit by a remainder-manor reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee for possession of Immovable property. Article 141 applies to a like suit by a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to the possession of Immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female. Now the plaintiff does not allege in his plaint that he is a remainderman, a reversioner or a devisee within the meaning of those terms as used in Article 140, or a Hindu entitled to the possession of the Raj on the death of a Hindu female within the meaning of Article 141 of the Limitation Act. In his plaint he relies on his presumptive title based on possession and not on any specific title which it would be necessary for him to establish to enable him to bring his case within the terms of either Article 140 or Article 141 of the Limitation Act. Nor has he given any evidence of any specific title. How are we then to say that he is either a remainderman, a reversioner, a devisee, or a Hindu entitled to the possession of the Raj on the death of a Hindu female? In my opinion the plaintiff has neither made nor established a case under Article 140 or 141 of the Limitation Act. That being so, the residuary article, namely Article 144, must apply, and the plaintiff''s suit is barred under that article.
I will, however, ignore the pleadings in these cases and overlook the lack of evidence. I will assume that the Maharani had a life estate under the will of Maharaja Radha Prasad and that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the Raj on her death. Now Article 140 can have no possible application to this case. It is settled law that the terms "reversioner" etc. in Article 140 are used in the technical sense of the English Real Property Law. It is not suggested that the plaintiff was a remainderman, for it is conceded that the Maharaja devised the estate to his widow for life with remainder over to his adopted son to be adopted by his widow. Nor is the plaintiff "a reversioner" in the sense in which that term is understood in English Real Property Law. A reversion arises where the grantor grants a particular estate to a person and does not dispose of the remainder. That which is not disposed of resides in the grantor and is called a reversion. It is the interest in land undisposed of which reverts to the grantor after the exhaustion of the particular estate. See Halsbury''s "Laws of England." Vol. 24 page 212.
But here the complete estate was devised by the Maharaja, the life estate to the Maharani and the remainder to the son to be adopted. The two together made up the estate in fee simple which was completely disposed of, and as was pointed out by Selborne L.C. in the Attorney General of Ontario v. Andrew F. Mercer (1883) 8 A.C. 767.
There cannot, in the usual and proper sense of the term be a reversion expectant upon an estate in fee simple.
Now it may be said that the gift of the remainder to the adopted son never took effect as the adoption was set aside, and that there was only a conditional grant of a fee simple to the adopted son, that is to say, a grant conditional upon the adoption taking place. This is undoubtedly so, but the argument does not help the plaintiff. As has been pointed out, if the fee simple granted is "conditional" or "determinable" what is left in the grantor, is not a reversion, but "a possibility of reverter." See Halsbury, Vol. 24, page 213 at page 237 The case of "a possibility of reverter" is clearly not comprehended within the terms of Article 140.
It is needless to point out that the plaintiff does not claim as a devisee.
It follows, therefore, that Article 140 has application to the case.
But the plaintiff also relies on Article 141 Now just as Article 140 applies to a suit in which the plaintiff claims as a remainderman, reversioner or devisee in the sense in which these terms are used in English Law, so Article 141 is restricted to suits by plaintiff whose title and right, as the heir of the last full owner, to sue for possession accrues upon the death of a female holding a woman''s qualified estate under the Hindu or Muhammadan Law. On reference to the cases decided under Article 141, it will be noticed that the Article has been applied, in the case of Hindus, to the plaintiff suing as reversioner in the sense in which that term is used in Hindu Law. To claim the benefit of Article 141, the plaintiff must prove, first, that there was a qualified estate in the Hindu female and secondly, that he was entitled to possession after the death of the female, as the heir of the last male holder. Now this case is not suggested in the plaint nor established in the evidence, and I do not see how it is possible for the plaintiff to rely on Article 141 in answer to the defendant''s plea.
Assuming that Article 141 applies to this case it must still be shown that having regard to the existing law, the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the properties in dispute at the date of the suit. As the Judicial Committee pointed out in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathura Mohan Goswami (1893) 21 Cal. 8.
The intention of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right.
The facts in that case were as follows:--One Ramanandan died in 1847 leaving a widow Pearimoni and five daughters.
The eldest daughter Drobomoni died in 1867, leaving a son Kala Chand who died in 1868, leaving a son Girish, who was the third defendant. The second daughter Kurromoni died in 1874 leaving a son Mathura Mohan, the first defendant. The third daughter Motimani died in 1857 leaving a son Thakurdas, the second defendant. The fourth died childless, and the last survivor Sampurna died on the 22nd February, 1884, leaving a son Harinath who was-the plaintiff. It will be noticed that Sampurna was entitled to a share to be held by her as a Hindu daughter, and that her son, the plaintiff, was entitled to that share after her death. Not having succeeded in getting possession of her share, Sampurna brought a suit in 1879 which was dismissed in 1881. She died on the 22nd February, 1884, and on the 6th April, 1883, the plaintiff instituted a suit to enforce his right in the estate of his grand-father, and relied on Article 141 as saving limitation. Now the law of the land, as established in the celebrated case known as the Shivaganga case (1863) 9 M.I.A. 530 is that a decree fairly and properly obtained against the holder of a qualified estate binds the reversioner. Their Lordships pointed out that the words "entitled to the possession of Immovable property" in Art 141 refer to the then existing law and came to the conclusion that, having regard to the decision in the Shivaganga case (1863) 9 M.I.A. 530, there was no existing right in plaintiff which he could enforce by suit. The decision of the Judicial Committee is authority for the proposition that Article 141 cannot be construed as altering the law of the land.
Two questions arise; first, whether, having regard to the existing law there was a qualified estate of a Hindu female vested in the Maharani and, secondly, whether there was a existing right in the plaintiff which he could enforce by suit at the date of the suits. If the first question be answered in the affirmative and if it be found that there was a right in existence in the plaintiff within 12 years of the date of the suit, then, subject to the provision of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, Article 141 would maintain and preserve the right for the full period of 12 years. If, however, either of the questions be answered in the negative then it must follow that the plaintiff''s argument founded on Article 141 must fail.
It will be convenient, first, to deal with the question whether there was a qualified estate of a Hindu female vested in the Maharani at the date when the Raj became entitled to resume the maintenance grant, that is to say, in 1896. The Maharani had a life estate under the will of her husband but she was also the executrix of the will. I apprehend that it is settled beyond doubt or controversy that an executor as such is the owner of the properties of the testator and holds these properties in the right of the testator and not in the right of the beneficiaries. Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act, I think, makes the position perfectly clear. That Section runs as follows:
The executor or the administrator, as the case may be of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.
Now a legal representative means "a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person" (See Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code), and the principle established by Section 4 is that the executor is the owner of the properties of the deceased, who lives in the executor, not as a physical person, but as a legal personality.
In Hollis v. Smith (1808) 10 East 294 it was laid down that on the death of the testator or intestate, his executors or administrators are in point of a law the owners of the goods which belonged to him; and consequently whether in actual possession of them or not before the tort committed, they may be barred, as any person may, upon their own property, when wrongfully damaged by another. An executor, as such, could, under the old practice in England, maintain quare impedtt, for a disturbance in his own time, or ejectment where the testator had a lease for years, upon an ouster after his death. [See Williams on Executors, 10th Edition, page 661). After the Land Transfer Act of 1897, the position of the executor must be the same with regard to the realty which belonged to the testator. The old process of ejectment and ouster was abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 in favour of a writ of ejectment, which, in its turn, has given place to an action for the recovery of land, which is commenced by the ordinary writ. It follows that after the Land Transfer Act of 1897, an executor in England is entitled to maintain an action for the recovery of land where there is an ouster after the death of the testator, in his own right, and not in the right of the beneficiaries.
The Hindu Wills Act makes no distinction between Realty and Personality, and it has been held that the effect the Hindu Wills Act is to place the executor in India on the same footing a an English executor Shaik Moosa v. Shaik Essa (1884) 8 Bom. 241. As is pointed out in Mayne on Hindu Law (9th Edition, page 611), "the result is that in all the cases coming within the Hindu Wills Act, or the Probate Act, the executor or the administrator as such is the legal representative of the deceased and statutory owner of property, except such as would otherwise have passed by survivorship to some other person."
This is clearly established in two of the cases to which reference was made by Mr. P.K. Sen in the course of his arguments. In Ganoda Shundary Chaudhurain v. Nalini Ranjan Raha (1909) 36 Cal. 28, the facts were these. One Mohan Chunder Roy Chowdhury died in January, 1895, leaving a will of which he appointed the plaintiff, who was his widow, executrix. The latter obtained probate on the 8th May, 1895. Prior to his death he gave power to adopt and the plaintiff, who adopted a son to him was 11 years old at the date of the suit. The adopted boy was undoubtedly entitled to succeed to the estate of his deceased father, and, on the 3rd June, 1908 (that is to say, 13 years after the death of the testator) the Court of Wards issued a notification assuming charge of the estate left by the testator which was described to be the property of the minor adopted boy.
It was not disputed that if the estate had in fact vested in the minor, the Court of Wards was entitled under the law to assume charge of the estate. It was, however, contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the minor could not become the proprietor until administration was completed, and that the estate not being the estate of the minor until the completion of the administration, the Court of Wards was not competent to assume charge of that estate. This contention found favour with Woodroffe, J. who said as follows:--"The residuary legatee does not become proprietor until after the: administration has been completed and his interest thus ascertained. This interest is subject to the payment of debts and legacies and the discharge of other trusts contained in the will. No doubt he is beneficially interested in the estate subject to these payments and the discharge of these trusts; but he is not proprietor, except when a residue has been ascertained, which on completion of administration is made over to him by the executrix." This case is a clear authority for the proposition that, though beneficially interested in the estate, the Maharani, in her personal capacity, was not the proprietor of the estate until after the administration was completed. In Bhupendra Krishna Ghosh v. Amarendra Nath Day (1915) 43 Cal. 432, the question was raised whether, in the circumstances of the case, the property had vested in a full owner under the ordinary Hindu Law of inheritance and whether the devolution from the full owner could in any way be regulated by the testator by a direction contained in the will. One Herambo Nath Ghosh, died on the 10th November, 1907, leaving a widow Paritoshini his adoptive mother, Kissory Mod, and two sons of his natural sister Benodini, namely Amarendra and Sudhindra. He left a will by which he appointed his widow Paritoshini the sole executrix of his will. He gave her authority to adopt five sons in succession and provided that if she died without adopting a son or such adopted son predeceased her without leaving any male issue, then his estate after the death of his wife should pass to the sons of his sister Binodini who might be living at the time of his death. It will be noticed that there was no devise of the estate either to his widow or to the son to be adopted by her; though he undoubtedly thought that they take an estate of inheritance under the Hindu Law. The only devise in the will was to the sons of his sister which Was to take effect in the event of his widow dying without adopting a son or the adopted son predeceasing his widow without leaving any male issue. After the death of the testator Paritoshini adopted a son to her husband but the adopted son died on the 11th March, 1910 unmarried. Paritoshini died a few days afterwards, and on her death, the sister''s sons claimed the estate under the will of the testator. This was challenged by Kissory Moni, the adoptive mother of the testator, who instituted a suit for the construction of the will of the testator. One of the points urged on her behalf was that once the succession has opened in accordance with Hindu Law, the testator can by no act of his alter that course of succession. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that, upon the death of the testator, his widow took the estate under the law and not under the will; and that, on adoption she was divested of that estate which devolved on the adopted son under the law and not under the will; and that, on his death, adoptive mother took the estate again under the law, and on her death the estate devolved on the plaintiff, as the next heirs of the adopted son. In answer to his contention (which failed on other grounds) it was pointed out by Fletcher, J., in the court of first instance, by Jenkins, C.J. in Court of Appeal and by the Judicial Committee that the appointment of an executor had the effect of preventing the estate from devolving on the heir-at-law. In delivering the Judgment of the Judicial Committee, Mr. Ameer Ali said as follows:
In the present case had the testator given to the widow a power to adopt without constituting her his executrix, she would have taken merely a widow''s interest which would have become divested on her adopting a son. It is clear, however, from the language of the will that the testator was anxious that there being no natural born son, a son should be adopted who and whose male issue should duly perform those religious rites which are considered essential in the Hindu system for the salvation of the deceased. With this object he empowered her to make five successive adoptions and constituted her executrix to give effect to his wishes.
It was contended before us that, though the appointment of an executor may have the effect of preventing the estate from devolving on the heir or the residuary legatee, still the executor represents the interest of the residuary legatee, and that, as in this case, the residuary legatee had only a life-interest in the estate of her husband, all that was vested in the executors was that life-interest, and that consequently the the plaintiff is entitled to a fresh period from the date of the death of the life-tenant. In my judgment, there is no foundation for this argument. I have already indicated my view on this point; but it is worth while repeating that the executor is the legal representative of the testator and does not represent the interest of the residuary legatee so long as administration is not completed. The actual position is stated in these words in Shephard''s "Touchstone": The executor "shall be charged and chargeable for so much as is committed to him as the testator himself; for this cause the executor is said to represent the person of the testator; for as to the estate committed to his trust, he may charge others and be chargeable himself, sue or be sued as the testator himself might. And the estate he hath by his executorship is said to be in him to the uses of the testator in his right; and what he doth in the disposition of his estate is said to be in the right and to the use of the testator also."
(8th edition, volume 2, page 400).
Reference may also be made to the following passage in Halsbury''s Law of England Vol XIV page 217:--"The interest which a personal representative has in the goods of a deceased person differs from the ordinary interest which a person has in his own goods, inasmuch as the representative holds them in the right of the deceased".
It is quite true that when he has carried out the purposes of the will he will hold the residue as trustee for those beneficially entitled, but until the administration is completed, he is the owner of the estate, in the right of the deceased and not in the right of the beneficiaries. This, I think, is clear from the terms of Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act, and is established by the decisions of the English Courts, Nixon v. Smith (1902) 1 Ch. 176 and Attenborrough v. Solomon (1913) A.C. 76.
If this be the true position, then clearly the legal representative must sue in respect of a cause of action that has accrued to the testator, after his death but before administration is completed. Where a cause of action has accrued to the testator before his death there is no difficulty whatever. Time begins to run at once, and Section 9 of the Limitation Act provides that where once time has began to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. Where a cause of action accrues, not only after the death of the testator but also after administration is completed, there h again no difficulty. For the estate has now ceased to be the estate of the testator and has became the estate of the beneficiaries, and, where the beneficiary is a life-tenant, the remainder-man or the reversioner is not prejudiced by the neglect of the life-tenant to sue. But where a cause of action has secured after the death of the testator but before administration is completed, it seems to me that the beneficiary will be barred, if the executor fails to sue within the period prescribed by law, for the estate is still the estate of the testator, and not the estate of the beneficiary who may be a life-tenant under the will of the testator, and consequently, a title that may be acquired by a stranger, by lapse of time, will be a title acquired, against the testator, and not against the life tenant. Both Article 140 and Article 141 presuppose an estate in a life-tenant or in a Hindu or Mahomedan female; but where, in respect of any particular property, the title of the testator is itself extinguished, as it would be u/s 28 of the Limitation Act, where the executor fails to sue within the period prescribed by law, that particular property will not descend to the life-tenant or to the Hindu or Mahomedan female and consequently the case will not attract the operation of Article 140 or 141 of the Limitation Act. I may refer to the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathuramohan Goswami (1893) 21 Cal. 8, in support of this proposition.
But then it may well be that the title of the testator to any particular property may be lost before the right of any person to administer the estate is established. In order to meet this difficulty, the legislature provided in Section 17 of the Limitation Act that "where a person, who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application, dies before the right accrues the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit or application."
Section 17 adopts the general Rule that a complete cause of action cannot...accrue unless there be a person in existence capable of suing another person in existence capable of being sued.
It would, in my opinion, be unnecessary to make this provision, if the beneficiary were not prejudiced by the neglect of the executor to sue. It clearly assumes the existence of the general law that it is the duty of the legal representative to sue in respect of a cause of action that has accrued after the death of the testator and provides that the time shall not begin to run until the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased has been solved In other words, Section 17 extends the period of limitation in cases not falling within the third paragraph. The third paragraph provides that this Rule shall not apply to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption or to suits for the possession of Immovable property or of an hereditary office. As is pointed out by Mr. Mitter in his Tagore Law Lectures on Limitation, "the application of the Rule to such cases would tend to create insecurity of title."
This appears to be in accord with English Law. In my opinion, Section 17 of the Limitation Act proceeds on the assumption that the legal representative holds the property in the right of the deceased and that it is his duty to sue in respect of a cause of action that has accrued to the testator after his death.
It may be contended that where (as here) the testator appoints the residuaiy legatee as the executor of his will there is a merger of the estate held by a man as executor in that which he holds in his own right.... But this is clearly not so; See Williams on Executors, 10th Edition, page 478. As has been said by that learned author, "Though a person is originally entitled to a term, or to an estate of freehold, as an executor or administrator, yet in process of time he may become the owner of the estate in his right. This happens in the case of executors when the executor is also residuary legatee, and he performs all the purposes of the will, and holds the estate as legatee, or pays money of his own, to the value of the term, in discharge of the testator''s debts, and with an intention to appropriate the term to his own use in lieu of the money.... Under these, and the like circumstances, the executor will have the estate in his own right, and when he has the estate in his own right, it will be subject to merger. Generally speaking, it is difficult to ascertain when the charge of executor or administrator ceases, and the ownership independent of that character commences. Every case must depend on its own circumstances. This only it certain that when the executor or administrator ceases to hold the estate in that character, he will hold the same in his own right, and it will be subject to merger."
(Williams on executors, 10th Edition, pages 478 and 479).
The question as to when the executor ceases to hold the property as executor was investigated in Attemborough v. Solomon (1913) A.C. 76 The testator by his will dated the 20th March, 1878, appointed his sons A. A. Solomon and J.D. Solomon, executors and...trustees of his will and devised and bequeathed his residuary estate to his said trustee upon trust to sell the same and to divide the sale proceeds into four equal parts. And the testator directed that each of his said sons should retain one of such fourth parts for his own use and benefit and should stand possessed of the two remaining fourth parts upon trusts for the benefit of his two daughters. It will be noticed that his sons were not only the executors and trustees of the will but were residuary legatees to the extent of half the estate. All the debts, legacies, funeral and testamentary expenses and duty were paid within one year of the testator''s death, and in March 1879 the residuary account was sent in by the respondent and was duly passed. On these facts it was found that the estate was completely administered within a year of the death of the testator. Part of the residuary estate consisted of certain valuable plate which was in the sole possession of A.A. Solomon, pending ultimate division of the trust estate. In 1892, A.A. Solomon pledged the plate with the appellants in his own name to secure an advance of �65 and interest thereon. The appellants had no notice that this plate formed part of the testator''s residuary estate or that A.A. Solomon was not the absolute beneficial owner thereof. The money so raised was applied by A.A. Solomon in payiag a personal debt due from him to the respondent J.D. Solomon. A.A. Solomon died in 1907, and in 1908 the respondent for the first time discovered that the plate had been pledged with the appellants. He commenced an action against the appellants claiming an injunction restraining them from selling the plate, a declaration that the appellants had no right or title in or to the same, and the return thereof to the respondent. It was contended oh behalf of the appellants that the extcutors have full power to pledge the estate of their testator and that any one of the executors can exercise the power of all. This position was not denied in the judgment of the House of Lords, but it was pointed out that as soon as the executor has assented to the dispositions made in the will, and this he may do informally and it may be inferred from his conduct, these dispositions became operative, and then the beneficiaries have vested in them the property in these chattels. But the position, before the executor had assented to the vesting of the estate in the beneficiaries, was stated in these words by Lord Haldane:
The position of an executor is a peculiar one. He is appointed by the will, but then, by virtue of his office, by the operation of law, and not under the bequest in the will, he takes a title to the personal property of the testator which vests him with the plenum dominium over the testator''s chattels. He takes that, I say, by virtue of his office. The will becomes operative so far as its dispositions of personalty are concerned only if and when the executor assents to those dispositions.
It is unnecessary to pursue the subject. It is clear beyond controversy that an executor, who is also the residuary legatee, does not take under the will until the administration is completed and the executor assents to the dispositions of the will taking effect. It is only then that the will becomes operative so far as the dispositions made in the will are concerned.
That being the position, the question arises whether the life-estate vested in the Maharani during her life-time. Maharaja Radha Prasad died in May 1894, and the cause of action to resume the maintenance grant arose in 1896. In order to bring the case within Article 141 of the Limitation Act, it must be shown that in 1896 the will became operative so far as the disposition of the life-estate in the will is concerned, for, if the life estate was not vested in the'' Maharani in 1896J she and Dewan Jai Prakash Lal as executrix and executor of the will were competent to bring a suit for the possession of the villages in suit, and, as is provided in Section 9 of the Limitation Act (which must control Article 141 of the Limitation Act) see Dhonessur Koer v. Roy Goodar Sahay (1877) 2 Cal. 336 "when once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it."
It follows, therefore, that the inability of the plaintiff to sue till the death of the Maharani will not constitute an answer to the plea of limitation, unless it is shown that there was a life-estate vested in the Maharani in 1896. The Maharani and Jai Prakash Lal applied for grant of probate to them, and on the 13th September, 1894, probate was issued to them out of and under the seal of the Calcutta High Court. (Ex 1, Part III, page 134 and page 160). It is only necessary to refer to the terms of the will to hold that the purposes of the will could not have been carried out in the lifetime of the Maharani. The executors could indeed by setting apart a fund for the payment of debts, legacies and annuities and assenting to the dispositions made in the will taking effect, have vested the life-estate in the Maharani but there is no evidence that this was done, and it is well established that there is no presumption, even after 20 years, that the estate has been administered. Charleton v. Earl of Durham (1869) 4 Ch. 433.
I hold that in 1896 Maharani Beni Prasad and the Dewan, Jai Prakash Lal, were in possession of the estate left by Maharaja Radha Prasad as the executrix and the executor of his will, and that there is no evidence that they ceased to occupy that character at any time before the death of the Maharani. That being so, Article 141 cannot apply, for it is not shown that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of Immovable property on the death of a Hindu female.
But I go much further than this. As I have said before, Article 141 will only apply if it is shown that there was an existing right in the plaintiff at the commencement of the period of limitation entitling him to the full period of twelve years prescribed by Article 141. As the Judicial Committee pointed out in Harinath Chatturji v. Mathuramohan Goswami (1893) 21 Cal. 8 "the words entitled to the possession of Immovable property refer to the then existing law."
The "existing law" in this case to which reference must be made is that contained in the Probate and Administration Act and Section 9 of the Limitation Act which, as I have said before, must control the Schedule in the Act. I have already said that, there is ample authority for the view that an executor, as representing the testator or as continuing "the legal personality of the deceased" may bring a suit in respect of a cause of action which has accrued after the decease of the testator. It will be useful, in this connection, to refer to the scheme of the Probate and Administration Act which provides that the executor or the administrator of the deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased vests in him as such. The effect of Section 4 is that the estate or interest of the executor consists in nothing but what constitutes the interest of the deceased that is, his rights, duties and liabilities, for what may be called "the purposes of the will".
Now, what are the purposes of the will contemplated in the Probate and Administration Act? Section 97 provides for the payment of funeral expenses. Section 100 read with Sections 88 and 89 provides for the collection of the property of the deceased and the debts that were due to him at his death. Sections 101 and 102 provide for certain expenses (including the expenses of proving the will) to be paid before the debts. Section 103 and the Sections following provide for the payment of legacies.
Now the Sections which we much consider in this connection are Sections 88, 89, 100 and 147. Section 88 provides that an executor has the same right to sue in respect of all causes of action that survive the deceased and Section 89 declares what are the causes of action that survive the deceased. Section 100 lays the duty upon the executor to collect the property of the deceased, and there is no doubt that under the provision of Section 100, it was the duty of the executors to sue the defendants in respect of the properties which are now in suit. The next Section to which I must refer is Section 147, which, in my opinion, concludes the matter. It runs as follows:--"When an executor or administrator occasions a loss to the estate by neglecting to get any part of the property of the deceased, he is liable to make good the amount" and illustration (b), which is very important, is as follows:
"The executor neglects to sue for a debt, till the debtor is able to plead the Act for the limitation of suits. The executor is liable to make good the amount of the debt." I think it follows from the illustration that where the executor is barred, the heir it law or the beneficiary is equally barred; for if it is open to the beneficiary to say that he is not bound by the laches of the executor and that he has a fresh period from the time the estate falls into possession, obviously no loss has been occasioned to the estate. The illustration given is of a debt, but the principle must equally apply to the case of Immovable property lost to the estate by the neglect of the executor. The illustrations are all taken from the English cases, and, as is well-known, at the date of the Probate and Administration Act, realty did not vest in an executor in England. But the Probate and Administration Act made no difference between realty and personalty. It is hardly necessary to point out fiat after the Land Transfer Act of 1897, realty vests in an executor in England just as much as personalty and chattels real. In my opinion Section 100 read with Section 147 concludes the matter. As I have pointed out, the neglect of the executor to collect the property of the testator cannot be said to occasion any loss to the estate, if it be the right view that the beneficiary or the heir-at-law has a fresh period of limitation from the time the estate falls into possession.
It is settled law in England that speaking generally, the cesti que trust is barred if the trustee is barred by the adverse possession of a stranger; and this is equally so where the cestique trust is under disability or entitled in remainder only. See Godefroi on Trust, 3rd edition, page 844 and 845 and the cases cited therein. On what principle can it be suggested that the heir-at-law or the beneficiary is not barred if the executor is barred? I think the exact opposite has been held in England See Wych v. East India Co. (1734) 3 P.W. 310. The facts were these:--The East India Company were bound by contract to make an allowance of two rupees per cent, to the plaintiff''s intestate, for which the plaintiff, the administrator de bonis non of his father, brought a bill. The intestate with whom the company made the contract, was beyond the sea, and there died, leaving an infant son of tender years.... Upon the death of the intestate, administration was granted to A, until the said son should attain majority. The administrator never commenced any suit on the contract; but the son, within 6 years after his attaining 21 brought this bill against the company who pleaded the statute of limitation. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that he ought not to be barred or prejudiced by the neglect or default of the administrator during his minority. The Lord Chancellor in allowing the plea of limitation, said as follows:
The administrator during the infancy of the plaintiff had a right to sue; and, though the cestique trust was an infant, yet he must be bound by the trustee''s not suing in time; for I cannot take away the benefit of the statute of limitations from the Company who are in no default, and i are entitled to take advantage thereof as well as private persons, since their witnesses may die or their vouchers be lost. And as to the trust, that is only between the administrator and the infant, and does not affect the Company, So where there is an executor in trust for another, and the executor neglects to bring his action within the time prescribed by the statute, the cestique trust or residuary legatee will be barred.
This principle has been acted upon in England in various cases in which it has been held that "if the executor, by his delay in commencing an action, has enabled the debtor of his testator to protect himself under a plea of limitation, this amounts to a devastavit exposing the executor to an action by the beneficiary."
See Williams on Executors, 10th Edition, page 1442. In India, and now in England after the Land Transfer Act of 1897, there is no difference between realty and personalty, and as realty vests in an executor just as much as personalty, an executor would be liable to an action at the instance of the beneficiary, if he has, by his laches, allowed a stranger to acquire a title to, Immovable property by adverse possession. See. 147 of the Probate and Administration Act seems to embody the English Rule on the subject. It seems to me that the principle on which Section 147 is based is that a title gained by a stranger as against the executor is good against the beneficiary, for on no other view can the neglect of the executor be regarded as occasioning a loss to the estate.
If I am right in this view, as I think I am, a cause of action accrued to the executors in 1896 to institute proceedings against the defendants for recovery of possession of the villages in suit. The Maharani died in 1907; but Section 9 of the Limitation Act provides that "Where, once time has begun to run no subsquent disability or inability to sue stops it."
In my opinion, having regard to the existing law as contained in the Probate and Administration Act, and Section 9 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff''s right to sue became barred within a year after the death of the Maharani, and Article 141 of the Limitation Act which, as the Judicial Committee pointed out in Hari Nath Chatterji v. Mathuramohun Goswami (1893) 21 Cal. 8 cannot be construed as altering the law of the land and cannot give the plaintiff a fresh period of 12 years.
In my opinion, the plaintiff''s suits are barred by limitation, and the Subordinate Judge was right in dismissing them.
I would dismiss these appeals with costs.
Ross J.
I agree.