AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
A. Muthukumar, J.—The landlord is the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner filed R.C.O.P for eviction of the respondents.
The case of the petitioner/landlord is as follows:-
The petitioner/Society is a registered society. The petitioner society is a social organisation constituted by Catholic Christians and the object of the
institution is to promote education and medical aid. As per Rule 7 of the Regulations, the Secretary of the Society is empowered to sue and be
sued on behalf of the society. The petitioner society is the owner of the petition mentioned premises. The premises was purchased by the society
on 22.10.81. Even before the said purchase, one Muthukrishnan was the tenant in respect of the petition mentioned premises and he was running a
cycle mart and subsequently attorned to pay the rent to the petitioner. The monthly rent is Rs.210/-. The said Muthukrishnan has not paid the rent
regularly and he has committed wilful default in the payment of rent. Hence, the petitioner filed a suit O.S.No.602 of 87 before the District Munisif
Court, Mayiladuthurai for recovery of the possession after terminating the tenancy. The said Muthukrishnan contended in the above suit that the
suit for recovery of possession is not maintainable and that the petitioner should have filed a petition under Act 18/60 before the Rent Controller.
The tenant also contended that the Vice-President of the Society is not competent to file the suit. However, the said Muthukrishnan has admitted
that the petitioner is the owner of the premises and that he is the tenant. After trial, the learned District Munisif dismissed the suit on 21.1.93 stating
that the Vice-President of the Society is not competent to file the suit and that the provisions of the Act 18/60 alone will be applicable to the facts
of the case. After the judgment in the above case, the said Muthukrishnan died on 29.3.93. The first respondent is his wife and respondents 2 to 7
are his sons and respondents 8 to 13 are his daugthers. Prior to filing of the above suit, Muthukrishnan sent the rent by cheque through his lawyer
upto August 1986. Thereafter, he did not pay the rent inspite of demands. The respondents have not paid the rent after the demise of
Muthukrishnan. The respondents are in arrears of rent from September 1986 to January 1996. The petition mentioned premises is in a dilapidated
condition and it requires immediate demolition and reconstruction. The respondents and Muthukrishnan were not permitted by the petitioner to
effect repairs and hence, the building became ruined and it will collapse at any point of time. The petitioner society has got sufficient funds to
demolish and reconstruct the same. The petitioner undertakes to demolish the building within a month from the date of possession and complete the
reconstruction within the time prescribed. Hence, this petition is filed for eviction of the respondents.
The case of the respondents/tenants is as follows:-
The petition is not maintainable in law and on facts. The petitioner society has been held to be a Public Charitable Trust in the previous suit in
O.S.No.805 of 87. The Court has held in the above suit that the provisions of the Rent Control Act only is applicable and the suit was dismissed
on the ground that the petition mentioned premise was purchased only in the name of the Convent and that the petition filed by the Vice-President
of the Society without proper authority is not valid. Even now in this petition, it is stated that the property belongs to the petitioner society and it is
the owner of the same. When the petitioner society was held as the Public Charitable Trust, its property is exempted from the purview of the Act
and as such, the petition for eviction before the Rent Controller is not at all maintainable. The petitioner has now misconstrued the judgment
rendered in the above suit. The respondent has been paying the rent by cheque through the Advocate during the pendency of the suit and till the
disposal of the same. It is not correct to state that the respondent had paid the rent till August 1986 and that he has not paid the rent thereafter.
After the disposal of the suit, there was a change of Head of Management and new office bearers had come to power and there was some kind of
confusion in the administration of the petitioner society. The respondents'' father also died suddenly and as such, there was some delay in the
payment of rent. But the delay was not wanton or wilful. The respondents have paid the rent to the petitioner by cheque till the month of February
1996 and they have been paying the rent regularly. Thus, there is no arrears of rent. It is not correct to state that the petition mentioned building is
in a dilapidated condition and that it requires immediate demolition and reconstruction. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not allow and infact
prevented the respondents through Police to make and effect necessary repairs to the roof. However the respondents carried out the necessary
repairs to the roof and building at their own cost. The building is now in a good condition. It is false to state that the building has become ruined
and that it would collapse at any time. The petitioner is owning two other buildings occupied by the tenants under the same roof. No demolition or
reconstruction can be safely done and carried out without getting the possession of the building. No action is taken against them. On the other
hand, the petitioner is putting the respondent under pressure by filing the suit and petition. There is no bonafide on the part of the petitioner.
Before the Rent Controller, on the side of the petitioner, P.W.1 was examined and on the side of the respondents, the fourth respondent has
been examined as R.W.1. On the side of the petitioner, Exs.P-1 to P-6 were marked and on the side of the respondents, Ex.R-1 was marked.
The report of the Commissioner and plan are marked as Exs. C-1 and C-2. On a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the Rent
Controller has given a finding that the tenant has committed wilful default. But as regards the requirement of the building for immediate demolition
and reconstruction, the Rent Controller negatived the claim of the petitioner and ultimately, the R.C.O.P was allowed on the ground that the tenants
committed wilful default in the payment of rent. The tenants/respondents who are aggrieved by the said order preferred an appeal in R.C.A.No.9
of 97. The Appellate Authority has held that as the petitioner trust is held to be a Public Charitable Trust and as the petitioner claims to be the
owner of the petition mentioned property, they have no locus standi to file the petition and that the petitioner trust is exempted by G.O.2000 dated
16.8.76 and that the remedy of the petitioner is only to approach the Civil Court. Regarding the findings of the Rent Controller on other issues, the
Appellate Authority has confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller that the tenants have committed wilful default in the payment of rent. As
regards the claim of the petitioner for recovery of possession for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, the Appellate Authority has
confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller and ultimately, the Appeal was allowed and the R.C.O.P was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said finding
of the Appellate Authority, the landlord has come forward with this revision.
The following contentions are raised in this revision:-
The petition mentioned premises belongs to Immaculate Heart of Mary''s Convent, which is not a Public trust and therefore, the Appellate
Authority ought to have held that the petition will lie under Act 18/60. The Appellate Authority failed to see that the petitioner society is only
managing the convent. The judgment rendered in O.S.No.602 of 87 will operate as res judicata as far as the ownership of the building is
concerned. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the building is not in a dilapidated condition is not based on evidence on record. The Rent
Controller and the Appellate Authority have committed error in holding that the claim for demolition and reconstruction is not bonafide on the
ground that the petitioner has not applied for planning permission for putting up a new construction.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/tenants contended that the petition mentioned premises was purchased by the convent
and administered by the petitioner trust and that therefore, the Appellate Authority has given a finding that the R.C.O.P filed by the petitioner trust,
when the petitioner society did not purchase the trust is not sustainable, cannot be assailed in the revision. Learned counsel also relies upon the
finding given by the Appellate Authority that the remedy of the petitioner is only to approach the Civil Court. It is contended by the respondents
that the convent which is the owner has not filed the R.C.O.P and as such, the R.C.O.P is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the respondents
also assails the findings of the Courts below that the tenants have committed wilful default. Regarding the claim for demolition and reconstruction, it
is contended by the tenants that the requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is not bonafide, especially
when no action is taken against the other tenants who are residing under the same roof and structure.
It is not in dispute that Muthukrishnan was the original tenant of the petition mentioned property and that the monthly rent is Rs.210/-. It is also
not in dispute that the respondents are the legal representatives of the deceased Muthukrishnan. It is admitted that the petitioner society filed the
suit against Muthukrishnan in O.S.No.602 of 87 after terminating his tenancy. In the said suit, the tenant has taken a stand that the petitioner
society is not a public charitable trust and that even assuming that the petitioner society shall be deemed to be the public charitable trust, it is only a
private trust and not public trust and that therefore, it is not exempted under the provisions of the Act 18 of 60 and that the tenant has also taken a
stand in the above suit that the remedy of the petitioner is only to initiate proceedings under Act 18 of 60. On a consideration of oral and
documentary evidence, the learned District Munisif, Mayiladuthurai has given a finding that the petition mentioned property was not purchased by
the petitioner society and that the sale deed would show that the property was purchased by Mary''s convent and that though the petitioner society
is a public charitable trust the trust did not purchase the property and therefore, the petitioner cannot claim exemption under the G.O. The Court
has also given a finding that as the property was purchased by the convent only petition under Act 18/60 will have to be filed. The Civil Court has
also given a finding that the Vice-President of the petitioner society has no locus standi to file the suit. Ex.P-1 is the certified copy of the judgment
delivered in the above suit. The above judgment will show that the Civil Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the property was not
purchased by the petitioner charitable trust and that therefore, they are not entitled to claim exemption under the G.O. It is admitted that no appeal
has been filed against the said judgment and as such, it has to be held that the judgment of the Civil Court has become final. The above suit was
filed by the society namely:- The Immugulate Heart of Mary Society, Mayiladuthurai (A society registered under Society Registration Act)
represented by its Vice-President and Assistant Mother General Rev.Mother Charles Mary. The R.C.O.P is filed by the same Mary Society
represented by its Secretary.
As already stated, the Civil Court has given a finding that as the property is not owned by the public charitable trust and as the property was
purchased by the convent, the plaintiff/Trust cannot claim exemption under the provisions of the Rent Control Act on the basis of G.O.No.2000.
As the said finding has become final, the Rent Controller is bound to follow the decision of the Civil Court. But the Appellate Authority has given a
finding contrary to the decision of the Civil Court. The Rent Controller has given a finding that though the premises was purchased in the name of
the convent, it is the petitioner who is in management of the property. On a consideration of the evidence, the Rent Controller has also held thus:-
The Rent Controller has also given a finding that as the property was not purchased by the society, it is not entitled to exemption on the basis of the
G.O. It is significant to note that the tenants have taken inconsistent stand as regards the locus standi of the petitioner to initiate proceedings against
them. The Appellate Authority has held that since the petitioner society has been held to be a public charitable trust, the petitioner society is not
competent to file this R.C.O.P on the ground that it is the owner of the property. The Appellate Authority has also held that since the petitioner
society is held to be a public charitable trust, the petitioner failed to establish as to how they are entitled to file the petition under Act 18/60. As
already stated, the Civil Court has given a finding that the property is not purchased by the petitioner society, though it is a public charitable trust
and that the petitioner society cannot claim any exemption on the basis of the G.O. The said aspect of the Civil Court judgment has not been
properly considered by the Appellate Authority. When the Civil Court, on consideration of the evidence, both oral and documentary, has held that
the petitioner society cannot claim exemption on the basis of the G.O and when the Civil Court has directed the landlord to approach the Rent
Controller, I fail to understand as to how the Appellate Authority under Act 18/60 will give a finding contrary to the decision of the Civil Court. It
is well settled that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority constituted under the Act are bound to follow the judgment of the Civil Court.
When the Civil Court has given a finding regarding the locus standi of the landlord, the Appellate Authority is not competent to give a finding
contrary to the decision of the Civil Court.
It is, no doubt, true that the Civil Court has dismissed the suit on the ground that the Vice-President has no locus standi to file the suit and that it
is the Secretary, who is competent to file the suit. But it is clear that the Civil Court has dismissed the suit on other grounds also. The Civil Court
has held that the petitioner society is not entitled to claim exemption under the G.O. As the above finding of the Civil Court has become final, the
finding of the Appellate Authority directing the landlord to approach the Civil Court again cannot be sustained at all.
It is admitted by the tenants that it is the petitioner, who is collecting the rent from the tenants. Though the property was purchased by the
convent, it is the petitioner society, which is in management of the property by collecting the rent. P.W.1, the Head Mother, of the petitioner
society has stated that though the property was purchased in the name of the convent, the property belongs to the society. It is not the case of the
tenants that the tenants were paying rent to the other officials employed by the convent. The case of the petitioner that the tenants have been paying
rent to the petitioner society has not been seriously disputed. Section 2(6) of the Act defines who is ""landlord"". As per the above section, the
landlord includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or
on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor. The Rent Controller has given a finding that though the property was purchased
by the convent, it is an organisation annexed with the petitioner society. As the petitioner society is managing the properties owned by the convent
also, the petition filed by the Secretary of the Society is perfectly maintainable. As the petitioner is entitled to receive the rent on behalf of the
convent also, the petitioner will fall under the definition of ""landlord"" as defined u/s 2(6) of the Act. Therefore, I hold that the finding of the
Appellate Authority that the petitioner has no locus standi to file petition under Act 18/60 and that the remedy of the petitioner is only to approach
the Civil Court cannot be sustained.
It is the case of the petitioner that the tenants failed to pay rent from September 1986 till January 1996. The Rent Controller on consideration
of the materials has held that it is disclosed from Ex.R-1 that the tenant has paid rent upto July 1987 to the petitioner''s counsel and that after July
1987, the tenant failed to pay the rent. The R.C.O.P was presented on 7.2.1996. It is proved that the LRs of the deceased Muthukrishnan failed
to pay rent from August 1987 till January 1996 i.e., 8 years and 6 months. It is no doubt true that the tenant tendered rent of Rs.21,630/- at the
first hearing of the case through a cheque and the same was accepted by the landlord. Therefore, it is contended by the tenants that the tenants
have not committed any wilful default. In support of the same, they also relied upon the decision reported in ABDUL HAMEED Vs. M.SULTAN
ABDUL KADER (1996 (2) MLJ 579) before the Rent Controller. It is contended by the revision petitioner/landlord that the mere fact that the
tenants paid arrears of rent at the first hearing of the case alone will not support the plea of the tenants that the above default will not amount to
wilful default.
Learned counsel for the revision petitioner also relies upon the decision reported in T. Easwara Rao Vs. N.E. Ansari(decd) and six others, . In
the above case also, it was contended that the tenant deposited the rent at the first hearing and that therefore, the default cannot be construed as
wilful. It is held in the above decision that such deposit has to be considered alongwith other factors to decide whether the default is wilful or not. It
has been clearly held in the above decision thus:-
Merely because tenant deposits arrears of rent on first date of hearing, it cannot be said that landlord cannot sustain petition for eviction if it is
otherwise established that tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent
Following the above decision, the Court has also held in the decision reported in PANDIAN K.S. Vs. G.RUKMANI BAI (2001 (1) CTC 356)
thus:-
When once the eviction petition had been filed, there is no question of landlord losing his right to pursue the same notwithstanding the fact whether
the tenant had deposited or was willing to deposit the arrears of rent at the first hearing of the petition
This Court in the decision reported in NILGIRIS CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING SOCIETY ETC Vs. C.T.UTHANDI 1998 2 L.W.216 has
also held that mere payment of rent after the petition is filed without offering satisfactory explanation for the non-payment cannot be accepted by
way of defence.
The tenants rely upon the decision reported in ABDUL HAMEED Vs. SULTAN ABDUL KHADER 1996 II MLJ 579 wherein it is held that
the entire arrears as on the date of the hearing was paid alongwith the counter on the very first hearing and that it would show that there is no wilful
default in the payment of rent. In the above decision, the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in KRISHNA MUDALIAR Vs. LAKSHMI
AMMAL 1994 2 CTC 540 is relied upon. The facts of the Apex Court decision will show that the landlord wantonly dragged the tenant to the
Civil Court and the Rent Control Court, even though he has admitted the status of the landlord. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the above
case, the Supreme Court has held that as the tenant deposited the arrears of rent at the first hearing of the case, mere non-payment will not amount
to wilful default. The question whether the deposit of arrears of rent at the first hearing of the case will amount to wilful default or not would depend
upon the facts of each case. The explanation offered by the tenants for the delay in the payment will have to be taken into consideration in deciding
the said question.
In this case, it is alleged by the tenants that after the disposal of the civil suit, there was change of Head of Management and new Office
Bearers had come to power and that there was some kind of confusion in the administration of the petitioner society and that the respondents''
father also died suddenly and that therefore, there was delay in the payment of rent. The explanation given by the tenants for non-payment of rent
for about 8 years cannot be accepted to be true. In evidence, R.W.1 has stated that there was change of Chairman of the Society and that he was
not in a position to ascertain as to who is the landlord entitled to receive the rent. But, he has admitted that he did not write any letter to the
petitioner society as regards the payment of rent. If really the tenants entertained a genuine doubt as to who is the landlord entitled to receive the
rent, he could have deposited the rent into Court by filing a petition u/s 8 of the Act. The tenants have not written any letter to the landlord to
specify the name of the bank nor did they tender the rent by money order. It is admitted that the father of R.W.1 died on 29.3.1993. It is, thus,
seen that the original tenant, Muthukrishnan, failed to pay rent for about five and half years. Thereafter, the respondents, who are the LRs of the
deceased Muthukrishnan, failed to pay the rent. The explanation given by R.W.1 in the counter that since his father died, he could not pay the rent
cannot be accepted. The Rent Controller has considered all the aspects and also the materials adduced in this case and has come to the correct
conclusion in holding that the tenants have committed wilful default. I see no reason to differ from the findings of the Rent Controller and the
Appellate Authority on this aspect of the case. Therefore, I hold that the tenants have committed wilful default in the payment of rent.
It is contended by the petitioner society that the building requires demolition and reconstruction as it is in a dilapidated condition. The Rent
Controller has held that the Head Quarters of the petitioner society is situate in Pondicherry and that it is not proved that the Pondicherry Head
Society is possessed of sufficient means and that it is not proved whether any amount is saved from the tution fee paid by the students and that the
petitioner failed to prove as what would be the profits earned by the petitioner society in running the institution. The Rent Controller negatived the
above claim only on the ground that the petitioner society failed to prove that they have got sufficient means to demolish and reconstruct the
building. However, the Rent Controller has accepted the case of the petitioner that the building is in a dilapidated condition. P.W.1, has stated in
her evidence that the remaining two buildings are also in a dilapidated condition and that the tenants of the said portions already vacated the
premises and that the petitioner society took possession of the same. She has also stated that they are in possession of sufficient means. The Rent
Controller on consideration of the evidence and the Commissioner''s report has come to the conclusion that the building is in a dilapidated
condition. The Appellate Authority has held that the petitioner/landlord has not shown that they have taken any steps for commencing the work of
demolition and reconstruction and that the permission obtained from the municipality has not been filed and the plan for the purpose of construction
has not been placed before the Court and that therefore, the requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction is not bonafide. Learned
counsel for the respondents/tenants contended that the landlord without proving that they have got sufficient means to put up construction cannot
claim that the building should be vacated for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the reasons assigned by the Rent Controller and the Appellate
Authority on this aspect of the case have got to be rejected, in view of the decisions of this Court. In this case, the Rent Controller has given a
finding that the building is in a dilapidated condition. In the decision reported in Akbar Ali and 4 others Vs. Donian Rodrigo and another, , this
Court has held that the age and condition of the building as revealed by the Engineer''s report show that the requirement of the landlord is genuine
and that the building is in a dilapidated condition. Regarding the report of the Commissioner, the Apex Court in the decision reported in 1995 Supp
(4) SCC 600 Misrilal Ramratan and Ors. v. A.S. Shaik Fathimal and Ors has held that the report of the Commissioner appointed by the Court
regarding the existence of such necessity cannot be overlooked or rejected merely because non-examination of the Commissioner as a witness.
Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that to prove bonafide on the part of the landlord, it is unnecessary to produce the plan and
report. To substantiate the same, he relies upon the decision reported in RAMADOSS Vs. SYED SHAHABUDEEN 1995 (I) MLJ 227 . It is
held in the above decision that non-production of sanctioned plan by itself would not disentitle the landlord to get an order of eviction. In
BALASUBRAMANIAM Vs. GULAB JAN 94 L.W 102also this Court has held thus:-
It cannot be laid down as a general rule that in all cases of demolition and reconstruction prior sanction should have been obtained. The Act
nowhere provides that a petition for demolition and reconstruction should be made only after getting the required sanction from the authorities
concerned
In S.SARASWATHIAMMAL (DECEASED) AND TWO OTHERS Vs. R.S.MALLIKARJUN RAJA AND TWO OTHERS 1997 2 L.W.
287 this Court has held that the building need not be in a dilapidated condition or in a dangerous state of affairs for ordering eviction u/s 14(1)(b)
of the Act. The principles laid down in the above decision will clearly show that it is not incumbent upon the landlord to produce the sanctioned
plan and permission granted by the municipality for constructing a building. In this case, the landlord has also given an undertaking in the petition
that he would commence the work of demolition within one month and complete the same within time prescribed. It is, thus, seen that the landlord
has given an undertaking in the petition. The evidence of P.W.1 will show that the petitioner society is possessed of means to put up construction.
The report of the Commissioner will show that the building is in a dilapidated condition. It is also proved from the evidence of P.W.1 that the other
two tenants who were residing in the same roof have vacated the premises. If all the above factors are taken into consideration, I am unable to
sustain the finding of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and
reconstruction is not bonafide. I hold that the decision of lower authorities is vitiated by perversity. Hence, I hold that the petitioner/landlord is
entitled to the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction and as such, the R.C.O.P has to be allowed on this ground also.
In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the petitioner society has no locus standi to file
the R.C.O.P is set aside. The findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the tenant has committed wilful default are confirmed.
The findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the premises is not required by the petitioner for demolition and reconstruction
are set aside. The R.C.O.P is allowed. The revision petitioner is entitled to costs throughout. The tenants/respondents are granted two months time
from the date of receipt of copy of the order to vacate the premises.