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Judgment
Ramamurti, J.—This appeal, which has been preferred by the Madras 1 Dock Labour Board, raises an interesting question about the
precise scope and proper interpretation of Section 28 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The brief facts
are : The Respondent, one Dasappan, who was employed as a stevedore worker, while working on board sections City of Swansea, met with an
accident on 24th December 1955 and sustained serious injuries. He was treated in the Stanley Hospital for sometime, and the Civil Assistant
Surgeon gave a certificate to the effect that the Respondent''s disability (consequent upon the injuries sustained by him) was a permanent and
partial one and the loss of his earning capacity was assessed at 15 per cent. The monthly wages received by the Respondent at that time were
estimated at Rs. 85--4--0. An agreement was entered into between the Madras Dock Labour Board and the Respondent that in respect of this
permanent partial disability the Respondent should be paid a sum of Rs. 630 in settlement of his claim, excluding a sum of Rs. 198--5--0 paid
earlier. This agreement was executed on 23rd May 1956 as per Form 1 prescribed by the Act and also registered u/s 28 of the Act, having been
signed by the Appellant and the Respondent. Sometime later the Respondent was declared unfit for service by the Medical Board on 10th
October 1956 and on 27th December 1956 the Appellant dispensed with the services of the Respondent with effect from 10th October 1956.
Thereupon the Respondent filed an application before the Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation on 2nd January 1957 claiming a sum of
Rs. 3,570 as compensation payable to him on the basis of a permanent total disablement, after giving credit for the sum of Rs. 630 already paid in
pursuance of the agreement, dated 23rd May 1956. With the consent of the Appellant the question was again referred to the Medical Board for its
opinion on the question of the loss of earning capacity of the Respondent based solely upon the injuries received by him on 24th December 1955.
The Medical Board, after a study of the history sheet and the necessary scrutiny, gave the opinion that a total loss of cent per cent of the earning
capacity had resulted from the injury sustained by the worker. The Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation held that for the wage group of
the Respondent, he would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,200, and after deducting Rs. 630, directed the Madras Dock Labour Board to a pay a
sum of Rs. 3,570. The present appeal has been preferred u/s 30 of the Act. From a perusal of the order of the Commissioner for Workmen''s
Compensation, it appears that the only objection that was raised was whether the final certificate given by the doctor was correct.
Mr. V.V. Raghavan, learned Counsel for the Appellant, did not canvass the correctness of the opinion given by the Medical Board that a
permanent, total disablement had resulted by reason of the injuries sustained by the Respondent. The only point he argued was that the prior
agreement, dated 23rd May 1956, which was entered into between the parties and registered and recorded u/s 28 of the Act was a bar to the
present claim inasmuch as the Respondent had received a sum of Rs. 630 in settlement of all claims under the Act and that so long as the
agreement is not vitiated by any fraud or misrepresentation the worker cannot reopen that agreement or make a fresh claim arising out of the same
injuries. He further contended that at the time of the registration or recording of the agreement the Commissioner of Labour did not raise any
objection on the ground of unfairness or inadequacy of the compensation u/s 28(d) of the Act and that it should, therefore, be held, as a matter of
law, that the worker has been paid the full amount of compensation which he was entitled to under the Act. In support of his argument he relied
upon a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Angus Co. Ltd. Vs. Chouthi, which fully supports him. On a careful consideration of
all the aspects of the matter I am unable to accept his argument. With respect to the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, I am unable to
share their view.
Before I refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, it may be mentioned that the Workmen''s Compensation Act VIII of 1923, has mainly
adopted and followed the scheme and pattern of the English Workmen''s Compensation Act of 1906, which was later on replaced by the
Workmen''s Compensation Act of 1925. The National Insurance Act which came into operation in England in 1948 now provides for
compensation for injuries sustained by workmen. A reference to the English decisions rendered under the Workmen''s Compensation Act will be
useful and relevant, as the Indian Act has substantially reproduced the provisions of the English Workmen''s Compensation Act.
Section 3 of the Act provides that for any injury sustained by the worker arising out of and in the course of his employment, the employer shall
be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II. (This section corresponds to Section 1 of the repealed English
Workmen''s Compensation Act of 1925.) Under the Act the injuries have been classified under four heads:
(a) Permanent total disablement;
(b) Permanent partial disablement;
(c) Temporary total disablement; and
(d) Temporary partial disablement.
Section 4 of the Indian Act (corresponding to Sections 8 and 9 of the English Act) specifies the amount of compensation payable by the
employer. Section 4(6) provides that when permanent total disablement results from the injury, the compensation shall be paid as per Schedule IV
based upon the monthly wages which the workman was earning at the time of the injury. Section 4(c) provides that where a permanent partial
disablement results from the injury, the compensation shall be with reference to the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by the injury.
Section 4(1)(d) which provides for half monthly payments runs as follows:
(d) Where temporary disablement, whether total or partial, results from the injury, a half monthly, payment payable on the sixteenth day after the
expiry of a waiting period of seven days from the date of the disablement, and thereafter half monthly during the disablement or during a period of
five years, whichever period is shorter--
(i) in the ease of an adult in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first column of Schedule IV--of the sum shown against such
limits in the fourth column thereof and
(ii) in the case of a minor--of one-half of his monthly wages, subject to maximum of thirty rupees.
Section 6 which corresponds to Sections 11 and 12 of the English Act provides that where half-monthly payment is payable under the Act
either under an agreement between the parties or under an order of the Commissioner, the same may be reviewed by the Commissioner on the
application of either of the parties on the ground that there has been a change in the condition of the workman. Section 7 (corresponding to Section
13 of the English Act) provides for the redemption or commutation of half-monthly payments into a lump payment of such amount as may be
agreed to between the parties or determined by the Commissioner. Section 10 (corresponding to Section 14 of the English Act) provides for the
notice and claim to be made by the workman within two years of the occurrence, with power in the Commissioner to extend the time on sufficient
cause being shown. Section 17, which corresponds to Section 1(3) of the English Act, prohibits any contract between the employer and the
workman resulting in the workman relinquishing his right of compensation under the Act. It runs as follows:
Contracting out.--(17) Any contract or agreement whether made before or after the com-mencement of this Act, whereby a workman relinquishes
any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of the employment, shall be null and void in so far as
it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under this Act.
Section 28 which corresponds to Section 23 of the English Act, dealing with recording and registration of agreements, runs as follows:
Registration of agreements.--(28)(1) Where the amount of any lump sum payable as compensation has been settled by agreement, whether by way
of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise, or where any compensation has been so settled as being payable to a woman or a person
under a legal disability a memorandum thereof shall be sent by the employer to the Commissioner, who shall, on being satisfied as to its
genuineness, record the memorandum in a register in the prescribed manner:
Provided that--
(a) no such memorandum shall be recorded before seven days after communication by the Commissioner of notice to the parties concerned;
(b) * * * *
(c) the Commissioner may at any time rectify the register;
(d) where it appears to the Commissioner that an agreement as to the payment of a lump sum whether by way on redemption of a half-monthly
payment or otherwise, or an agreement as to the amount of compensation payable to a workman or a person under a legal disability ought not to
be registered by reason of the inadequacy of the sum or amount, or by reason of the agreement having been obtained by fraud or undue influence
or other improper means, he may refuse to record the memorandum of the agreement and may make such order including an order as to any sum
already paid under the agreement, as he thinks just in the circumstances.
(2) An agreement for the payment of compensation which has been registered under Sub-section (1) shall be enforceable under this Act
notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872), or in any other law for the time being in force.
Section 30 provides for the right of appeal to the High Court, provided a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. Rules 48 to 52
framed under the Act deal with the recording of the memorandum of agreement. Form K prescribed under the Act relates to the agreement for
half-monthly payments in respect of disablement of a temporary nature arising out of an accident, whether then manifest or thereafter to become
manifest. Form L deals with compensation in the case of a permanent disablement in settlement of all claims in respect of all disablement then
manifest. Form M deals with the agreement for compensation for temporary disablement, without any reference to the disablement whether then
manifest or thereafter to become manifest.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that under the scheme of the Act and the rules, review of the compensation agreed to between
the parties or determined by the Commissioner is permissible only u/s 6 and that too, with reference to the half-monthly payments payable under
the Act and that the necessary implication is that in respect of other agreements there can be no review or reopening of the agreement, once it has
been recorded u/s 28.
It is first necessary to set out the whole of the agreement which was entered into between the parties on 23rd May 1956 and recorded u/s 28 of
the Act:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
Vide form 1 and Rule 48 of the rules framed under the Workmen''s
Compensation Act.)
To
The Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation.
Post Box No. 429, Chepauk, Madras.
It is hereby submitted that on the 24th December 1955 personal injury was caused to Sri S. Dasappan, Stevedore worker, Register No. 613,
residing at No. 161, behind Infectious Diseases Hospital, Vinayagapuram, Tondiarpet, Madras, by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment in the Administrative Body, Madras Dock Labour Board, No. 22, North. Beach Road, Madras.
The said injury has resulted in permanent partial disablement to the said workman of the following nature, namely, injuries in the head and hip
regions said to have been caused while on duty. As a result he now has pain and limitation of movement in the left sacro-iliac joints due to arthritic
changes. He has also developed functional paralysis of the left lower extremity, for which he has been advised daily exercise.
The percentage of loss in earning capacity has been estimated at 15 percent (fifteen) only vide attached medical report.
The said workman''s monthly wages are estimated at Rs. 85-4-0; the workman is over the age of 15 years.
The said workman has, prior to the date of this agreement received compensation amounting to Rs. 198-5-0 (rupees one hundred and ninty-eight,
annas five only).
It is further submitted that the Madras Dock Labour Board, the employer of the said workman, has agreed to pay and the said workman has
agreed to accept the sum of Rs. 630 (rupees six hundred and thirty only) in full settlement of all and every claim under the Workmen''s
Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the disablement ""stated above"" and all disablement now manifest. It therefore requested that this
memorandum of agreement be duly recorded.
Dated 23rd May 1956.
Signature of the Employer.
(Signed) -----------.,
Administrative Officer.
Designation :
Witness :
(Signed) -------------
Accounts Officer.
Designation
Signature or thumb-impression of Workman.
Left thumb mark of S. Dasappan,
Register No. 613.
Witness to the explanation and completion of this agreement by the workman :
(Signed) Chitti Baboo,
Clerk, Madras Dock Labour Board.
RECEIPT FOR COMPENSATION
In accordance with the above agreement, I have this day received the sum of Rs. 630 (rupees six hundred and thirty only).
Dated 23rd May 1956.
Left thumb-impression of S. Dasappan,
No. 613.
The money has been paid and this receipt signed in my presence.
Witness :
Occupation :
(Signed) -------------,
Accounts Officer.
The Act is clearly a remedial measure and in the construction of its provisions the Court should not adopt an interpretation which will cut down
or take away the remedy which has been given to the injured person. As the majority of workmen are ignorant and illiterate a statutory protection
is given to them u/s 17, declaring any contract as null and void which would have the effect of a relinquishment or reduction of the compensation
payable to the workman. Any interpretation which is given to Section 28 should have proper regard for and not be inconsistent with, this salutary
provision contained in Section 17. The question naturally arises whether Section 28 can prevail over Section 17 and if so, to what extent. As the
injuries have resulted in a permanent, total disablement, the workman will be entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,200 ''as compensation and any agreement
by which he had agreed to reduction of the said amount of compensation will be clearly null and void u/s 17. The fact that Section 6 contains
provisions for review only in the case of agreements relating to half-monthly payments cannot taken away the right of the workman to obtain full
compensation in other cases. Obviously Section 6 cannot control the operation of Section 17. It is not a case of review, but the workman making a
claim for the full amount of compensation payable to him and the employer relying as a bar to the claim, upon some agreement which has the effect
of reducing the amount of compensation payable. In such a situation, I have no doubt in my mind that any agreement between the workman and
the employer cannot be used as a bar, by reason of the mandatory provision in Section 17 even if the agreement in explicit terms provided that the
amount agreed was in full settlement of all claims under the Act. Here, the situation is not even that. The agreement was entered into on the express
basis that the injury had resulted in a permanent partial disablement and that the claim of the worker was to compensation therefor. The percentage
of the loss of earning capacity has been estimated at 15 per cent and the figure of Rs. 630 has been arrived at as per the Schedule. It is very
important to note that the agreement is not in settlement of all claims for compensation under the Act, but it is expressly in a limited form as being.
In full settlement of all and every claim under the Workmen''s Compensation Act in respect of the disablement stated above and all disablement
now manifest.
i.e., the agreement in its express language has a restricted, limited operation, confined to the compensation payable for permanent, but partial
disablement. At that time, as per the medical opinion known to them, both the parties proceeded on the footing that it was only a partial
disablement and that the workman was capable of turning out some limited quantity of work. The idea of compensation payable on the basis of a
permanent total disablement was not in the minds of either of the parties. Either under the general law of contracts or under the Workmen''s
Compensation Act, I am wholly unable to see how this agreement, which deals with a particular situation, namely, permanent partial disablement,
can operate as a bar to a different claim altogether, i.e., permanent total disablement, which claim was not in the minds of the parties and,
therefore, was never made and never settled. It is a well settled rule of construction of agreements that the words of release should be construed
with reference to the surrounding circumstances and the particular context so as to give effect to the particular object and purpose for which the
agreement came to be executed. The release will not be construed as applying to facts and claims which were not in contemplation of the parties at
that time. Reference may be made to the following statement of law in Halsbury''s Laws of England, third edition, volume XI, page 421, para. 680:
Releases and powers of Attorney : Releases are specially liable to have general words in the operative part controlled by the recitals. The general
words in a release are limited always to those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given
; and since it is the office of recitals to state the particular considerations upon which a deed is founded, they naturally control the operation of the
release. Thus, if in a release of debts there are recitals as to the specific debts to be released, the release will operate only as to these debts ; and a
release to an administrator, founded on a recital of specified assets having been got in, will not extend to other assets.
It is not in accordance with principle or authority to construe deeds of compromise of ascertained specific questions so as to deprive any party
thereto of any right not then in dispute and not in contemplation by any of the parties to the deed. Vide--Cloutte v. Storey (1911) 1 Ch. 18, 34.
The main scheme of the principle of compensation to workman is that the physical condition of the workman and his capacity or incapacity for
work at different periods can never be res judicata or final so as to attract any principle of estoppel. This necessarily follow from the basic principle
that a workman will always be entitled to compensation payable under the Act, which may some times vary depending upon the change in the
physical condition and the capacity for work. For instance, a workman cannot enter into a contract to accept compensation on the basis of a
permanent, partial disablement expressly stating that he will not make any claim, if later on, the disablement turned out to be a permanent, total
disablement. In other words, the workman can enter into a binding agreement only with reference to the rights which he is entitled to in the then
state of circumstances and he cannot irrevocably bind himself for ever with regard to the future. If the agreement had contained an express
reservation for payment of further compensation in the event of the disablement turning out to be a permanent total disablement, surely, the
employer cannot rely upon the absence of the power of review similar to that contained in Section 6, or upon the recording of the agreement u/s 28
of the Act. It is obvious that there is nothing in the Act which prevents the workman from bargaining for such a specific reservation of rights in
future. I would even say that the scheme of the Act undoubtedly recognizes such a right. Having regard to the basis of the settlement, namely,
permanent, partial disablement, the agreement, according to the well settled rules of interpretation, should be construed as containing, by necessary
implication, a reservation to that effect. In other words, the form and the recitals are tantamount to an express reservation of future claim on the
basis of a total permanent disablement. The agreement, in view of the clear unambiguous language, cannot operate as a bar to the claim for a
permanent, total disablement, and u/s 17 it is not open to the employer to bargain with the workman that the latter will not make a claim for a
permanent, total disablement to which he is undoubtedly entitled under the provisions of the Act. I may refer to a decision in Lee v. Lancashire and
Yorkshire Railway Co. (1871) 6 Ch. App. 527 in which a passenger, who was injured by railway accident, sent in a claim for � 691 and gave a
receipt accepting � 400 in full discharge of his claims. The passenger passed a receipt on these terms:
Received from the Lanchashire and Yorkshire Railway Company the sum of � 400, in discharge of my claim in full upon that company for all
loss sustained and expenses incurred by the late accident at Miles Platting, September 25th, 1865, including all expenses attending the same.
Later on, the passenger made a claim for damages for � 3,000 on the ground that the injuries were more serious and permanent than had
been supposed at the time of the settlement. His contention was that by passing the receipt, he did not preclude himself from a claim for further
compensation if his injuries turned out to be more serious than were supposed at the time. Even-though the receipt used the words in full, the Court
remitted the matter for finding out the true agreement between the parties. The instant case is a fortiori where the recitals of release are expressly
qualified and limited in operation.
It is next necessary to refer to the decision in Russell v. Rudd (1923) A.C. 309 in which the question was decided as to how far the parties can
enter into an agreement, contracting out of the provisions of the Act, over ruling the view taken in the several earlier decisions of the Court of
Appeal. The earlier view in England was that if an agreement for payment of compensation had been entered into between the employer and the
workman in full satisfaction of all claims in respect of injury by accident that agreement would operate as a bar and there cannot be a review. The
principle underlying these earlier decisions was a review was permissible only if an agreement was entered into in relation to redemption of weekly
payment and that in all other cases the agreement was absolute and irrevocable. Vide--Haydock v. Goodier (1921) 2 K.B. 384, Ryan v. Hartley
(1912) 2 K.B. 150. But the House of Lords in Russel v. Rudd (1923) A.C. 309 refer to earlier, overruled the earlier decisions in Ryan v. Hartley
(1912) 2 K.B. 150, and Haydock v. Goodier (1921) 2 K.B. 384. The House of Lords held that any agreement between an injured workman and
an employer for the settlement of all claim of compensation under the Workmen''s Compensation Act by the payment of a lump sum, apart from
the provisions of the Act relating to agreement for the redemption of a weekly payment was void as being a contracting out of the Act contrary to
Section 3 of the Act of 1906. The argument, that agreements in relation to redemption of weekly payments alone, can be reviewed or modified
and not any other agreement was not accepted.
The principle of this decision applies to the instant case. This, however, does not mean that by reason of Section 17 the workman will be
entitled to reopen a claim even when it expressly deals with a claim for compensation for a permanent total disablement a claim made by one party
and contested by the other. If such a claim is made and it is settled, Section 17 would not apply as there is no question of contracting out of the
provisions of the Act. Here the workman enters into a contract to secure the full benefits conferred on him under the Act, and at that stage it is for
the Commissioner of Labour, u/s 28, to find out whether the compensation stipulated is fair and adequate and then register the agreement, if so
satisfied. Section 28 will not be attracted if either the claim was never made or the claim was given up expressly or impliedly. I have no doubt in my
mind that Section 28 cannot be interpreted as to authorize the Commissioner to accept the agreement entered into between the employer and the
workman under which the workman gives up or waives his claim to compensation which he is legitimately entitled to under the Act. In Amarshi
Jeram v. Hazrat and Co. AIR 1962 Gug 262 an agreement was entered into between the employer and the workman and the Commissioner of
Labour merely registered it without applying his mind, and it was held that that would not affect the rights of the workman. In that case the
workman sustained injury by falling into a ditch 15 feet deep, and an agreement was entered into under which the workman received a sum of Rs.
500 as compensation. The agreement was registered u/s 28. Later on, the workman made a claim for Rs. 5,100, and the question arose how far
the prior agreement would operate as a bar. It was held that when the agreement was registered u/s 28, the Commissioner did not follow the
proper procedure and did not apply his mind to the terms of the agreement and that therefore, the right of the workman was saved by Section 17.
In Mrs. Kathleen Dias Vs. H.M. Coria and Sons, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that Section 17 protects an ignorant workman
who may be induced by employers to agree to less compensation or to abandon something which he is entitled under the Act to claim. It is true
that in that case the receipt passed by the workman was not registered u/s 28, but that does not affect the principle of the decision governing the
scope of Section 17.
13.1 It only remains to refer to the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Angus Co. Ltd. Vs. Chouthi, on which considerable reliance was
placed by learned Counsel for the Appellant. In that case the workman sustained an injury in the course of his employment the medical opinion was
to the effect that the injury had resulted in a permanent disability involving a loss of sixty per cent of his earning capacity and a sum of Rs. 1,357
was fixed as the total compensation payable on the basis of permanent partial disability and an agreement was also registered u/s 28 of the Act on
18th July 1951. But, subsequently, when, the workman was examined by the company''s doctor, he was pronounced to be unfit for further service
and thereupon he was discharged. The workman made a fresh claim for payment of a lump sum of Rs. 4,200 on the basis of a permanent total
disability, deducting Rs. 1,357 already given. The finding of fact that the disability arising out of the injury was a total permanent disability of a loss
of cent per cent earning capacity was accepted by the High Court.
Chakravarti, C.J.--delivering the judgment of the Bench, came (to quote his own words).
to the reluctant and regretful conclusion that the registration of the prior agreement u/s 28 of the Act operated as a bar to the workman''s claim.
The learned judge took the view that the only provision of review is that contained in Section 6 relating to temporary disablement in Clause (2)
of the section and that in the absence of any other provision there cannot be any modification of the agreement already entered into. He was of the
opinion that a special express provision was made in Section 6 that if the disablement was temporary, there was bound to be a change in the
earning capacity of the worker. Stopping there, I do not see why the same consideration should not apply in the case of a permanent disability. For
instance, a man''s brain would have been affected and in the beginning his working capacity would have been reduced to fifty per cent. But later on
his working capacity might deteriorate and reach zero point. It cannot, for a moment, be contended that the effect or the injurious consequence of
a permanent disability should be felt or realized once for all and there would never be any change in future. If compensation is payable solely in
relation to the loss of earning capacity and if in the case of a temporary disability the amount of compensation fixed is liable to variation depending
upon the corresponding change in the earning capacity, there is nothing in the Act or in principle why a different rule should apply in the case of a
change in the loss of earning capacity consequent upon a permanent disability. Dealing with Section 17, the learned Judge put the matter thus (at
page 620).
That section prevents a workman from contracting himself out of his rights and says that any agreement by which a workman relinquishes any right
of compensation from the employment shall be null and void. Obviously, the section contemplates relinquishment of such compensations as the
workman is entititled to at the time, because unless there is a present Tight in him to claim such compensation, there can be no relinquishment of it.
The section, therefore, cannot and does not contemplate a right to further compensation arising in future out of a change in the circumstances of the
workman''s physical condition. Section 17, therefore, seems to me to be nothing to Mr. Mukherjee''s purpose.
With great respect I am unable to agree with this view. In my opinion, the prohibition u/s 17 would apply whether it is in relation to a present
right to compensation which has accrued or a right in future. Any other interpretation would lead to the startling result that it would be open to the
employer to stipulate with the worker that the worker will not make any claim for compensation for any injury that may be sustained in the course
of his employment at any time whatsoever. The easiest thing for the employer to circumvent the provisions of the Act would be to make it one of
the conditions of service when the workman is employed. (Vide--Willis on Workmen''s Compensation Act, thirty-sixth edition, page 152.).
I am unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge regarding the specific form prescribed by the Act, when an agreement is entered into in
form 1 with respect to a permanent disablement which provides.
In respect of the disablement stated above and all disablement now manifest.
in striking contrast to the form K to be used for a temporary disablement. The L form does not purport to cover a claim relating to a disablement
hereafter to become manifest. This, I consider, is a pointer to the true interpretation of the scope of an agreement u/s 28.
Relying upon the observations in the Calcutta decision, learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that the right of the workman is based upon a
special statute and not under common law and that the right being a creature of the Act the compensation to be claimed must be only within the
four corners of the Act as it prescribes and permits. I am unable to agree. Section 28 can operate as a bar only in respect of matters covered by
the agreement which was registered and not in respect of other matters. In the instant case, the claim for compensation for permanent total
disablement is clearly tie hors the agreement.
I am not to be understood as saying that in all cases Section 28 would yield to Section 17. If a particular claim was put forward, for instance,
permanent total disablement, which claim was resisted by the employer, that at that time, it was only a permanent, partial disablement and would
stop with that without any risk of further deterioration, and if both the parties with conflicting claims entered into an agreement fixing the
compensation, such agreement, if recorded, would operate as a bar. It would not be open to the workman later on to claim further amounts of
compensation on the ground that he was mistaken about the nature of the injuries and their impact. Under the general law in respect of a tort for
personal injury the claim for damages should be made once for all, for past, present and future, certain and contingent. (Vide Halsbury''s Laws of
England, volume XI, page 227, paragraph 395. Also Mayne and McGregor on Damages, twelfth edition, pages 199-200). In the Fatal Accidents
Act, Section 2 expressly provides that there can be only one action or suit in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint. The principle will not
apply to the Workmen''s Compensation Act which classifies the disablement into four categories and an agreement is entered into in respect of one
of the categories.
For all these reasons I dismiss the appeal with costs.