The Madras Race Club vs The State of Tamil Nadu

K. Veeraswami, C.J.—These Petitions assail the validity of abolition of wagering or betting on horse races in Tamil Nadu with effect from

March 31st, 1975 by the Madras City Police and Gaming (Amendment), Act 1949 brought into force by the Tamil Nadu Horse Races (Abolition

of Wagering or Betting) Act, 1974. The Madras Race Club and another interested in horse racing want the Court to forbid the State of Tamil

Nadu from enforcing the provisions of the Acts and enable holding of horse races in Madras as well as in Ootacamund. Substantially their ground

is that as under Entry 34 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which relates to the topic of betting and gambling, the power is

confined to legislate on betting of a gambling character and as horse race is a game of skill, not a gamble, the two enactments together are in

excess of the legislative power, Though the attack on the validity has also been based on Articles 14 and 19, in view of the prevailing proclamation

of emergency, it has not been pursued at the hearing. Our attention was invited to the legislative history of betting on horse races in India which,

however, is not of any assistance to the Petitioners. One other contention, in our opinion too week to uphold, is that the State Legislature in certain

circumstances was estopped from enacting the 1974 Act.

The Public Gambling (India) Act, III of 1867 the operation of which was confined to the then Punjab and North Western Frontier Provinces,

provided for punishment of public gambling and keeping of common gaming houses. The Act defined common gaming-house but not gaming

except what was implicit in that definition itself and did not appear to cover betting on horse races. The Bengal Public Gambling Act 1867, made

public gambling and keeping of common gaming houses in the territories subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal an offence. Gaming was

defined in this Act to include wagering or betting except wagering or betting on a horse race, when any of them took place on the day on which

such race was to be run, and in any enclosure which the stewards controlling such race had, with the sanction of the Local Government, set apart

for the purpose. But the expression gaming did not include a lottery. The next legislation was the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887,

which also defined gaming in the same way as the Act for Bengal except that it added wagering or betting between a person on the one hand and

the licensee of the race course on the other hand in such manner and by such contrivance as might be permitted by the licensee. In this Act too,

lottery was excluded from its purview. It is noteworthy that the title of each of these enactments used the word gambling, but sought to prevent

betting and wagering, and the last two enactments clearly proceeded on the assumption that gaming would include wagering or betting upon horse

races and so provided for a limited exception. In 1912 it was felt necessary to regulate horse racing in the Bombay Presidency and accordingly the

Bombay Race Courses Licensing Act of that year was enacted. It defined horse race to mean any race in which any horse, mare or gelding ran or

was made to run in competition with any other horse, mare or gelding for any prize of what nature or kind so ever, or for any bet or wager made

or to be made in respect of any such horse, mare or gelding or the riders thereof, and at which more than twenty persons should be present.

Provisions were made for grant of licence for horse racing and cancellation thereof on certain grounds as will as for penalty for taking part in horse

race on unlicenced race course. The Madras Gaming Act came in 1930 and was amended in 1933. The expression common gaming house and

gaming were defined. Gaming did not include lottery but included wagering or betting on horse races except when such wagering or betting took

place on the date on which such race was to be run in a place or places within the race enclosure which the authority controlling such race had,

with the sanction of the Local Government, set apart for the purpose Penalty was provided for opening, keeping or using an enclosure for gaming

on horses. Penalty was also imposed for gaming in public places. The Madras City Police Act, 1888 defined common gaming house but not

gaming. The Madras City Police (Amendment) Act, 1929, however, inserted in the main Act a definition of gaming similar to that in the Madras

Gaming Act, 1930. This definition was substituted by another one, by the Madras City Police (Second Amendment) Act 1941, which added that,

for the purpose of the definition, wagering or betting should be deemed to comprise collection or soliciting of bets, receipt or distribution of winning

or prizes, in money or otherwise, in respect of any wager or bet, or any act which was intended to aid or facilitate wagering or betting or such

collection, soliciting, receipt or distribution. The Madras City Police and Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1949, however, redefined gaming in the City

Police Act as not including lottery but including wagering or betting. The deeming provision which we just now referred to was retained in the

definition; but the rest expect wagering or betting on horse races with limitations, we mentioned above, was omitted. A new Section 49-A was

added to the City Police Act which prohibited publication relating to horse races. The Amending Act of 1949 recast the definition of gaming in the

Madras Gaming Act, 1930, and, as recast, the definition with the Explanation was similar to that in the City Police Act as amended by that Act.

Also, Section 11-B, was added to the Madras Gaming Act which corresponds to Section 49-A inserted in the City Police Act. The Madras City

Police and Gating (Amendment) Act, 1949, however, provided that the substitution of the definition gaming in the Madras City Police Act and in

the Madras Gaming Act, 1930, which brought within its scope wagering or betting on horse races, should come into force on such date as the

Provisional Government might, by notification in the Fort Sr. George Gazette, appoint. No notification fixing such date was ever made, but it was

postponed from time to time until the job was done by the impugned 1974 Act by bringing the definition into force with effect from March 31st,

1975.

It may be seen from the legislative history or practice, whatever it be, that gaming was understood in the sense of gambling and that gambling

included wagering or betting on horse races, though, as a matter of fact, by exclusion of such wagering or betting within the stated limits, they were

never rendered illegal anywhere in India, but in Tamil Nadu for the first time with effect from the date above mentioned. It is, thereafter, reasonable

to conclude that in the legislative practice or vocabulary in this country wagering or betting on horse races is gaming or gambling.

That leads us to the Petitioner''s contention that the impugned enactments are in excess of the powers of the State Legislature. It is said that

horse race is a game of skill, that it does not involve any element of gambling and that since the power of the Legislature under Entry 34 of the

State list is only to enactment on betting and gambling and not merely on betting simpliciter not involving any element of gambling, the Acts should

be struck down as incompetent. In other words, the conjunctive and in betting and gambling does not permit legislation on either betting or

gambling, but only such legislation on betting involving or in the nature of gambling. We have, therefore, to examine first whether there is no element

of gambling in betting on horse races, and second, if so, whether the limited interpretation sought to be placed on the subject of Entry 34 of the

State list is correct.

We have already noticed that gaming for purpose as the Madras City Police Act and the Madras Gaming Act as amended by the Madras City

Police and Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1949, includes wagering or betting which shall be deemed to comprise the collection or soliciting of bets,

the receipt or distribution of winnings or prizes, in money or otherwise, in respect of any wager or bet, or any act which is intended to aid or

facilitate wagering or betting or such collections, soliciting receipt or distribution. Section 49-A in the City Police Act and Section 11-B in the

Madras Gaming Act throw farther light that wagering or betting on horse races will be gaming for by those sections, printing or otherwise

producing, publishing, selling, distributing or keeping for sale or distribution, any book, leaflet or other documents containing news of acceptances

for horse races or purporting to give tips or any information which is likely to aid or facilities wagering or betting on horse faces shall be punishable

with fine or imprisonment. Horse racing by itself still continues to be a lawful sport and is not forbidden. But is betting or wagering on horse races

gambling? Hawkins J., in Carlill v. Caraolic Smoke Ball and Co. (1892) 2 Q.B.D. 484 stated that a wagering contract was one by which two

persons professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agreed that, depending upon the determination of

that event, one should win from the other, and that the other should pay or hand over to him a sum of money or stake, neither of the contracting

parties having any other interest in that contract then the sum or stake he would win or lose and there being no other real consideration for the

making of such contract by either of the parties. This statement was approved by the Court of Appeal in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball and Co.

(1893) 1 B. D. 256 According to Cotton L.J., in Thacker v. Hardy 4 Q.B.D. 685. the essence of gating or wagering was that one party was to

win and the other party to lose upon a future event, which, at the time of the contract, was of uncertain nature that is to say, if the event turned out

one way A would lose, but if it turned out the other way he would win. Lord Alverstone in Lock-wood v. Cooper 2 K.B. 428 said much the same

thing, namely to amount to gaming the game played must involve the element of wagering that is to say, each of the players must have a chance of

losing as well as of winning. The element of chance of winning or losing money or money''s worth in the games is, therefore, treated as basic to

gaming which must be one, in the present context, that involves wagering or betting in the sense above mentioned. Lawrence L.J., in Fllesmere v.

Wallace (1929) 2 Ch. D. 1 took it as settled that gamtng included playing at games of skill as well as at games of chance, and pointed out that

horse racing was a game within the meaning of the Gaming Acts in which was present the element of a chance of winning or losing money or stake.

No man bets or enters into a vager on a certain event not depending on chance or even skill the outcome of whose exercise cannot be predicated

with certainty, as in tennis or any game of skill where there is a chance of losing or winning. So, if winning on stakes on horse races can be a

certainty and. not a mere chance, it will not be gaming, as it involves no wagering or betting on a future uncertain event. So, trading on a future

uncertainty is the crux of gaming through wagering or betting. Lottery is one such case in which winning solely depends on chance. R.M.D.

Chamarbaugwalla Vs. The Union of India (UOI), which related to prize competition, produced on the basis that only competitions in which

success did not depend to a substantial degree on skill would be within the ambit of Entry 34 of the State List. There the Court while answering the

validity of the Prize Competitions Act, observed:

The conclusion is therefore, inescapable that the impugned provisions, assuming that they apply by virture of the definition in Section 2(d) to all

kinds of competitions, are severable in their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on skill.

In The State of Bombay Vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, we have these further observations:

Nor has it been questioned that the third category, which comprised any other competition success which does not depend to a substantial degree

upon the exercise of skill constituted a gambling competition. At one time the notion was that in order to be branded as gambling the competition

must be one success in which depended entirely on chance. If even a scintilla of skill was required for success the competition could not be

regarded as of a gambling nature.

The Court of Appeal Coles v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1936) I.K.B. 416 in the judgment under appeal has shown how opinions have changed since

the earlier decisions were given and it is not necessary for us to discuss the matter again. It will suffice to say that we agree with the Court of

Appeal that a competition order to avoid the stigma of gambling must depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill. Therefore, a

competition success wherein does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill is now recognized to be of a gambling nature.

The question is whether, having regard to this approach, batting on horse races is of a gambling nature. We are told that it is not, because betters

bring to bear on betting considerable knowledge each horse as to its ancestry or pedigree, history of its performance in the previous races, various

other factors and related circumstances and skill based on such knowledge and experience in horse racing. We, of course, know the plethora of

publications, information by means of booklets, pamphlets and even books and the knowledge about horses and horse races all over the world for

centuries and the tremendous, enthusiasm exhibited by those race-goers who in deciding to stake on a particular horse, know everything about it

which enables them to judge, that it may in all probability come out successful in a race. Even so, if any skill is involved in the process, it is not the

skill of the horse but of the one who bets on it and, based on such skill, the better cannot say with any certainty that a horse without fail will in any

case come out successful. It may be that the knowledge and experience one would have or skill of one who bets on a horse may with their use

eliminate as far as possible, the odd chance of failure and ensure to a degree so to speak, a probability of success; but the most astute better by

using his substantial skill may still fail to be successful in his stake. The element of chance is not outweighed by any skill of the better or the horse.

The figures we were shown would only show that successful betting on horses sometimes, not necessarily every time goes with substantial skill of

the one who stakes. But we are not persuaded that betting on horse is a game of substantial skill. Horse racing is a competition on speed which will

depend on a variety of changing and uncertain factors which, with the best of knowledge and skill of the batter, cannot be reduced to a certainty,

though of course by such knowledge and skill the probability of success of a particular horse may be approximated. In our opinion, therefore,

batting on horses does involve an element of gambling and we are unable to agree that staking on horses with expert knowledge and skill of the

better is not betting involving an element of gambling.

We are not impressed either by the contention that the use of facility of totalizator would make any difference to the gambling character of

betting on horse races. A totalizator is described in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th volume, as a complex mechanism employing both electrical and

mechanical device and used on race courses for wagering under the pari-mutual system. Its major functions are to print and issue tickets

acknowledging wagers on various contestants; to summarize the sale of such tickets and to display to public view the progress of wagering. Its

popularity and the popularity of racing itself derive largely from the totalizator''s speed and efficiency from its numerous safeguards against unethical

practice. The tote has become very popular because of its safeguards against sharp practice and the fact that it eliminates bookmakers and

submitted all wagers to the easy collection of commission and taxes. The pari-mutual system is designed to suit many types of wagering, including

doubles and triples and it involves cumulative bets. The use of totalizator, however, does not change the character of betting on horses as gambling,

nor does it help to eliminate the element of uncertainty of success of a particular horse in a competitive racing. Fllesmere v. Wallace (1929) 2 Ch.

D. 1, Attorney-General v. Luncheon and Sports Club (1929) A.C. 400 and Tote Investors Ltd. v. Smoker (1967) 3 All. E.R. 242 were

concerned with different problems. They do not, in our opinion, support the contention that betting on horse races is not gaming or that the use of

totalizator transforms that character. The first of these cases decided by the Court of Appeal was concerned with an action brought by a senior

steward of a Jockey Club and a firm as the registry and stakeholders for the Club against the owners of a race horse. There were two races

advertised to be run at the New market First Spring Meeting under the authority of the Jockey Club and nominations were invited, subject to the

Rules of Racing. The first of these races was the Peel Handicap, described as a sweepstakes for five sovereigns, of which two sovereigns were to

be forfeited, with 200 sovereigns out of the stage, fifteen entries or race to be at the option of the stewards of the Jockey Club. The second race

was a long course selling Plate of 200 sovereigns, entrance two sovereigns, 10 entries or the race to be at the option of the stewards and winner to

be sold by auction for 300 sovereigns. The Defendant horse owner nominated a horse for each race. The horse did not run in the races. The

Defendant did not pay the entrance fee for either races. An action was brought to recover the entrance fee which was also the fee for the

nomination of his horse in each of the races. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that the contracts for the two races were between the Club

and the Defendant and not between the various entries inter se and that they were in neither case by way of gaming or wagering within Section 18

of the Gaming Act. The basis for this decision was that for wagering or betting, there must be an element of chance of gain or loss. But in the case

before the Court of Appeal the Jockey Club never stood to lose or win. The Master of the Rolls said.

But I cannot find any win for the Jockey Club as against the Defendant dependent upon any gaming or wagering event to be decided between

them. The payments of 21. do not depend upon the issue of a ""future event"".

That is not the question we have to decide. Here, there is no claim of that type to be enforced. The impugned Act merely prohibits in effect betting

or wagering on horse races. The Club no doubt does not enter into letting and deduction of sums for its expenditure from the stake money does

not depend upon any win for the Club. All the same, when several people bet not always on the same horse but on different horses, each of the

players has a chance of losing as well as winning. That is the essence of gaming.

(7) Attorney-General v. Luncheon and Sports Club (1929) A.C. 400 was a case in which the Crown unsuccessfully claimed betting duty. A

limited company was the proprietor of a social club. Upon the Club premises, betting on horse races was transacted through the instrumentality of

two machines, called totalisators owned by the company and worked out by the company''s servants. Any member desiring to use these machines

for the purpose of backing a horse applied to join the club pool and. if elected as pool member, he became entitled on payment of a small

subscription to operate, and for this purpose he was supplied with credit vouchers of varying amounts. Under the rules of the pool, 10 percent of

the gross amount of the stakes on each race was retained by the company in respect of the facilities provided and the expenses of management and

the balance was divided among the backers, called in the rules investors of the winning horse in the proportion of their stakes. The winning for each

week were paid by the company from its own funds irrespective of any possible loss owing to dishonor of the vouchers. The rules provided that

the club acted simply as a distributing agent. The company admitted that it was a bookmaker, and that the transactions were bets within the

meaning of the Finance Act. The House of Lords held that the bets were not made with the company, but by the members inter se, and that the

claim of the Crown failed. Lord Buckmaster in his speach observed:

In this I can see no trace of gaming or wagering with the Respondents. To them the rise and fall of odds, the success or failure of a horse and all

the hopes and hazards of the turf are completely immaterial. They can never lose except to the extent of discredited vouchers, and loss due to that

act of dishonesty is itself independent of the race...A bet is something staked to be lost or won on the result of a doubtful issue, but no doubtful

issue affects the Respondents--They neither win nor lose on any such chance.

Viscount Dunedin put the matter thus:

In as much as on the determination of the event in question--to wit, whether a certain horse is first or is placed in a race, as the case may be, the

club can neither win nor lose, it follows that there is no bet with the only bookmaker alleged.

Lord Blanesburgh stated:

I am doubtful indeed whether they cannot the making of any bets at all either between pool members individually or between losing pool members

on the one hand and winning pool members on the other. Rather do I view each pool as being something in the nature of a highly developed

sweepstake offering results which, it is true, become practically possible only through the fool-proof accuracy of the totalizator, but which,

theoretically, would be equally attainable with the assistance of a calculating boy of requisite genius and character. Be that as it may, however, of

one thing I feel satisfied and that is that on a sound construction of the by-laws it is impossible for the club to have in any pool a pecuniary interest

the extent of which is ever measured by the result of any race. The fixed fee of 10 percent of the takings allowed to the administration for its

services and the retention by it of the ""fractions"", which are never in any way dependent on the event, represent the sole interest of the club in any

pool, and its practice in paying over winnings without necessarily having received the subscriptions of all the losing participants is, it seems to me,

no more than one of the services rendered by the club in consideration of that fee.

It may be seen from the facts of the case and the decision that the House of Lords did not say that betting on horse races did not amount to gaming

; rather the case entirely proceeded on the assumption that betting on horses amounted to gaming.

Tote Investors Ltd. v. Smoker (1967) 3 All. E.R. 242 was also a similar one. There, the Defendant entered into a credit betting transaction with

a certain T. Ltd. Company who placed her bet with Horse Totalizator Board. T. Ltd., contracted in its own name on behalf of the board, and in

effect the board agreed to collect all moneys staked with the totalizator on the result of the race and to distribute the balance remaining after

deducting expenses to those backing winners. The Defendant lost and T. Ltd. sued her for indebtedness on her bets. It was held by the Court of

Appeal that, in order to constitute a contract by way of wagering within Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845, it was essential that each party might

either win or lose. But in the case before the Court, the Tocalisator Board could not lose and accordingly the contract made by the Defendant was

not a contract of wagering within Section 18, which, therefore, afforded her no defence. Lord Denning M.R., observed:

If I were to interpret Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845, without resort to law books, I should have thought that the contracts which Miss

Smoker made with or through Tote Investors Ltd., were contracts of gaming or wagering. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines a wage as:

Something (esp. a sum of money) laid down arid hazarded on the issue of an uncertain event 2. An agreement or contract under which each of

the parties promises to give money or its equivalent to the other according to the issue of an uncertain event.

The dictionary defines ""gaming"" as ''gambling''. Those definitions fit this transaction; but our law books have been given a special meaning to the

words ""gaming"" and ""wagering"" in this statute.

The Master of the Rolls then referred to the classical definition by Hawkins J., in Carlill v. Carbolic Somke Ball and Co. (1892) 2 Q.B.D. 484 and

proceeded to observe further:

The definition has been approved many times particularly in Fllesmere v. Wallace (1929) 2 Ch. D. 1. I would not myself like to treat it as a rigid

definition or interpret it as a statute, but it does bring out this feature; it is essential that each party may either win or lose. If one party can neither

win or lose, then it is not ""gaming"" or wagering"". This was accepted by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Luncheon and Sports Club

(1929) A.C. 400.

Then the Master of the Rolls extracted the observations of Lord Dunedin in Attorney General v. Luncheon and Sports Club (1929) A.C. 400

which we have already seen, and proceeded to say:

Applying this to the present case it seems clear that the Totalizator Board can neither win nor lose...The cases show the word ""gaming"" adds

nothing to the word ""wagering"". On the authorities I feel compelled to hold that a contract by a backer who puts money on the totalisator is not a

contract by way of gaming or wagering...It seems to me that Parliament has proceeded on the assumption that bets made with the totalizator are

not contracts by way of gaming and wagering.

Lord Wilberforce in agreeing with the Master of Rolls, expressed the same view:

So I think we have to regard the position as being that the totalisator, as the result of transactions with it, is incapable of either winning or losing

and, therefore not engaging in a wagering transaction.

The question we have to decide is not whether the Race club or the totalizator which it used, is a party to a betting contract. If that were the

question, we would have answered it in the nagative, as it was done in Fllemere v, Wallace (1929) 2 Ch. D. 1, Attorney-General v. Luncheon and

Sports Club (1929) A.C. 400 and Tote Investors Ltd. v. Smoker (1967) 3 All E.R. 242. Here, the question rather is whether betting or wagering

for purposes of the impugned Acts does not involve the element of gambling or gaming. We have already answered that it does involve such an

element, because money is laid down and hazarded on the issue of an uncertain event. That is common in both betting and gambling, and as Lord

Denning M.R., puts it, the word gaming adds nothing to the word Wagering and we would only add that it adds nothing to the word betting either,

because we cannot conceive of betting without there being in it an element of gambling in the sense of staking or hazarding on the issue of an

uncertain event. In spite of all that has been urged before us that the skill of a racegoer or better plays a substantial part in his act of staking or

hazarding in backing a horse, we remain unconvinced that he does so on a certain furure event. For aught we know, the horse that one backs with

all the assurance he may have through the knowledge and skill which he has acquired in betting on horse races, may not win.

On that view we must also hold that the Entry gaming and betting in the Sate List as a subject of Legislative power, can validly be invoked by

the Legislature in prohibiting betting simpliciter on horse races or betting and gambling on horse races. Every betting by itself is a gamble and

involves an element of uncertainty. Where there is betting, there is gambling. Where there is gambling by hazarding money on an uncertain event of

winning on a horse, there is betting. Betting is gambling and gambling includes a betting. It follows, therefore, that where the Entry is betting or

gambling or betting and gambling the effect and scope of the power will be the same.

We then come to the last contention based on estoppel. The Government from time to time postponed bringing into Force, Sections 2 and 4 of

the Madras City Police and Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1949, and the last of the orders of Government, G.O. Ms. No. 1570, Home, dated 7th

June, 1973, stated:

The Government after careful consideration of the request of the Madras Race Club, direct that the operation of Sections 2 and 4 of the Madras

City Police and Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1949, be postponed for a further period of three years from 1st July 1973 (i.e.) till 30th June, 1976.

But these sections have been brought into force by the impugned legislation with effect from March 31st, 1975. The Race Club says that in view of

the fact that the Government Order assured that, the b zinging into force of the two sections would be postponed until June 30th, 1976, for running

horse races meanwhile both in Madras and Ootacamund, it had borrowed some lakhs of rupees for giving advance to owners of horses to buy

horses, that it incurred expenditure in connection with races to be run, and that bringing into force those two sections prematurely with effect from

March 31st 1975, would be highly detrimental to the Club. It is also said that the Club has been paying large amounts as taxes and donations in a

large way to charitable causes. The premature abolishing of horse races before June 30th 1976, would work to the disadvantage of some of the

charitable institutions to which the Club has been contributing. We are told that the Club having acted on the last Government Order with the

assurance of the postponement of Sections 2 and 4 until June 30th 1976, as the going back upon the assurance would he seriously injurious to the

interests of the Club, the Government would be estopped from bringing the legislation. But the Government pointed out that the Chief Minister had,

as early as 1974, announced in the Legislature of the proposed abolition of betting on horse races, that the Chairman of the Club himself had

requested by his letter, dated August 24th, 1974, to reconsider the decision of Government to bring into force the two sections from March 31st

1975, and that further, the two sections have been brought into force by the impugned Act because of its accepted beneficial effect upon

thousands of poor and middle class people who lost heavily and underwent sufferings by betting on horse reaces. Apart from the factual aspect,

we are unable to appreciate the argument based on estopped. So far as the Legislature is concerned, there was no representation made by it that

Sections 2 and 4 would not by brought into force earlier than 30th June, 1976. It is no doubt true that legislation is initiated by the Executive. Even

assuming that the Executive by the said order of Government had made a representation which the Club acted upon, that would not prevent the

Legislature, when the legislation was actually introduced, from considering and making it a law. We can find, therefore, no substance in the

contention.

The Petitions are dismissed, but with no costs.

Before we leave these Petitions, we should like to make certain observations. As we pointed out, betting on horse races is a world wide

pleasurable sport of great popularity and has evoked amazing interest and enthusiasm every where. There is no doubt that it is a great and ancient

sport and turf has not been abolished anywhere else in the world, including India. Though we have nothing to do with the policy of Government in

abolishing betting or wagering on horse races, it seems to us that the reasons which prompted the policy can well be satisfied by not necessarily

abolishing horse races, but by introducing suitable restrictions, as is the case in some parts of the word, so that the evil that the impugned legislation

sought to remove can be bogged down and prevented by other means rather than by the total abolition, and thus make it possible for the sport to

continue to satisfy its numerous lovers and enable horse breeding and rearing as before and also make the race club continue to be the source of a

huge amount of revenue to the State and benefaction in a big way to several deserving charities.