The Management, Krishnaveni Roadways, Madurai vs I.P. Punnaivanam and Another

Srinivasan, J.—The only question which arises for consideration in these writ petitions is, whether the first respondent is entitled to claim

wages as he had done for the period during which he was under suspension till the date of his dismissal. He was under suspension from 19th

February, 1980. The order of dismissal was passed on 27th August, 1980. Admittedly there are no Standing Orders for the petitioner

Establishment. There are no Rules and Regulations providing for suspension or payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension.

Hence, the Labour Court, Madurai, came to the right conclusion that even after the suspension, the relationship of employer and employee did not

come to an end and the employer was bound to pay wages during the period of suspension.

It was next contended that the order of dismissal passed against the first respondent was with retrospective effect from the date of suspension.

The decisions of this Court in Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society, Mayalandi v. Labour Court, Madurai Dt. Cooperative Central Bank ltd.,

Madurai and Others 54. FJR. 396 and V. Raju Vs. The President, Madurai Dist. Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, were relied on by

the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is seen that the decisions relate to co-operative societies which had Standing Orders providing for

suspension as well as payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. In the absence of any Standing Orders containing such

provisions, it is not open to the employer to pass an order of dismissal with retrospective effect and choose to deprive the employee of his wages

which he was rightfully entitled to during the period of suspension. It is elementary principle of law that an order of suspension does not sever the

jural relationship of employer and employee between the management and the worker. Once that position is settled, it follows automatically that the

employee is entitled to wages during the period of suspension. By delaying the enquiry into the alleged misconduct and passing an order of

dismissal at the end of the enquiry with retrospective effect, the employer is not entitled to deprive the employee of his wages. The Labour Court

has rightly come to the conclusion that the order of dismissal will not disentitle the first respondent from claiming wages for the period prior to the

dismissal after the date of suspension.

It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner that the order of dismissal has not been challenged by the first respondent and

the Labour Court is not entitled to hold that the Order is not valid in so far as it has retrospective effect. The failure on the part of the first

respondent to challenge the order of dismissal would only mean that he accepts the order of dismissal to take effect from the date of the order.

That does not mean that he has given up his claim for wages prior to the date of dismissal. The order of dismissal, even if it has become final, will

have only prospective effect and it cannot have retrospective effect so as to deprive the first respondent of the wages to which he was rightfully

entitled under law.

Yet, another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that he filed an application before the Labour Court to summon the

records of one Anarkali Transports, Madurai, in which, according to the writ petitioner, the first respondent is employed from the third week of

February, 1980. According to the learned Counsel, the Labour Court failed to summon the records and erroneously dismissed the application filed

by him. The order of dismissal of that application has not been produced before us. If the petitioner is desirous of challenging the correctness of the

order dismissing his application for summoning the records of Messrs. Anarkali Transport, Madurai, he ought to have produced the said order. It

is seen from the notes papers that on 16th March 1982, the representative of the writ petitioner was not present in Court and the matter was

adjourned to 25th March 1982, and the matter was again adjourned to 29th March 1982, on 25th March 1982. On 29th March 1982, the matter

was adjourned to 1st April 1982 and then from 1st April 1982 it was adjourned to 12th April 1982. On 12th April 1982 arguments were heard

and the matter was adjourned to 26th April, 1982. The records which are available before us do not show whether the application for the issue of

summons to Messrs. Anarkali Transports, was pursued before the Labour Court by the writ petitioner or his representative. A certified copy of the

affidavit filed in support of the application is produced before us by learned Counsel for the petitioner to show that such an application was filed.

The certified copy shows that the affidavit was sworn to on 15th March 1982 and presented in Court on 16th March 1982. We have already

referred to the various dates on which the case was posted for hearing. The petitioner''s representative has been absent on the successive dates on

which the case was posted. There is nothing to show that the petitioner pursued his application for issue of summons and argued the same before

the Labour Court. In the circumstances, we cannot take note of the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court

passed an erroneous order dismissing the application for issue of summons.

In the result, the writ petitions fail and the same are dismissed. But in view of the fact that the first respondent has not entered appearance, we

make no order as to costs.