AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—Subject-matter of this appeal is the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court whereby the learned single Judge
has rejected a W.M.P. filed by the original writ-petitioner/appellant herein, the Management of E.I.D. Parry (India) Limited, Ranipet. In that
W.M.P., the appellant had sought to file a single writ petition against a common order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, dated
17.5.1999 in I.A. Nos.140 to 179 of 1998 in P.G.Case Nos.67 to 106 of 1999. Before we approach the controversy, it will be better to have a
factual panorama.
As many as 39 employees, they being respondents 2 to 41 herein, filed applications under Sec. 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. However,
finding that the said applications were belated, subsequently applications to condone the delay came to be filed by all the 39 respondents. The said
applications for condonation of delay were resisted by the writ petitioner and ultimately by a common order dated 17.5.1999, the said applications
came to be allowed. Against that common order, the writ petition came to be filed by the appellant and the appellant took out a W.M.P. for being
permitted to file a single writ petition instead of filing 39 petitions against the 39 respondents. The learned single Judge did not agree and hence this
appeal.
At the time of hearing, the respondents did not appear though adequate notice has been served upon them.
It is an admitted fact that individual applications under Sec. 7(4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act have been filed on behalf of the 39 respondents.
It is also a fact that condonation of delay applications are also filed separately by each applicant. It is also an admitted fact that the delay caused is
not identical. It ranges from 381 days to 8966 days. So far there is no dispute. Learned single Judge has relied upon these factors very heavily as
we see from the judgment to hold that a common writ petition could not have been filed against all the 39 respondents and that the petitioner
should have filed as many as 39 writ petitions.
Learned counsel, Mr.V.Karthik, very earnestly urged that whether a single petition could be entertained or not would be entirely depended
upon the factual panorama and there could be no hard and fast rule regarding the same. The learned counsel painstakingly took us through the
judgments which have been referred by the learned single Judge and criticised the judgment on the ground that the judgments relied upon by the
learned single Judge were not apposite to the present controversy. According to the learned counsel, the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court, reported in General Manager, EID Parry [India] Ltd. Ranipet v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and others, 1995 (1) LLJ 757 was
the only judgment which could have been relied upon by the learned single Judge which has been ignored by the learned single Judge in preference
to some of the Apex Court judgments. Learned counsel argues fervently that the judgments of the Apex Court, more particularly the judgments
reported in Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills and Others Vs. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies and Another, and P. Radhakrishna Naidu and others v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 884 would not be applicable judgments to the present controversy. We shall go to the aspect of
the caselaws later on.
However, before that we would take the stock of the argument of Mr. Karthik that the condonation of delay appiications are only technically
different in case of the 39 respondents and the crux of the applications is absolutely common. Learned counsel showed us that there is only one
common reason given for the condonation of the delay. The reason given appears to be that the said contesting respondents, i.e. the applicants
before the Payment of Gratuity Court had approached the Commissioner of Labour, Madras along with all the other retired employees and
requested him to persuade the petitioner-Management to pay gratuity on ""incentive earnings"" and kept on enquiring with him on several dates and
since the Management refused, the Commissioner of Labour advised them to file individual petitions before the concerned authority, by his order
dated 11.5.1997. The learned counsel pointed out that this reason is absolutely common in all the applications and there are no individual
circumstances which can be discerned from the various applications made by the original applicants, i.e. respondents 2 to 39 herein. The learned
counsel takes his argument further and says that perhaps it was because of this unique aspect that even the 1 st respondent chose to pass a
common order in respect of all the 39 respondents. The order also does not suggest that there were any such individual reasons for the delay
which required individual consideration of any application as such. If this was so then, could this not be a case where the consideration was
absolutely common and filing of separate petitions would be only a technical formality. In our opinion, that precisely is the import of the situation.
There is no doubt that in paragraphs 9 and 10 the learned Judge has taken note of the fact that the cause of action for filing of a claim as well as
the cause of action for taking out different applications are distinct and separate as the claim is for different sum. So also in paragraph 10, it is
mentioned that each one of the 39 claimants have filed separate applications to condone the different number of days of delay. This is solely a
factor relied upon by the learned Judge to hold that the facts relating to each one of the claim as well as each one of the interlocutory applications
are different. In spite of our close consideration of the order, we could not find any other reason having been relied upon to suggest that the
applications for condonation of delay had separate, distinct and different facts from each other.
We are in complete agreement with the learned single Judge that whether a joint petition should be permitted or not would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and that no strait jacket formula could be adopted in that behalf. We have also no quarrel with the
observation that the persons having different cause of action and identity of interest not being the same, cannot join each other to file a joint
petition. We may only say as regards the above observations which are to be found in paragraph 17 of the judgment that this is not a case of
different parties filing a joint petition. Different parties coming together and filing a joint petition would be a totally different aspect from one party
filing a writ petition which may affect several other respondents. There can be no comparison for this. At the most, it can also be decided by finding
whether those 39 respondents, against whom a joint petition has been filed, could have filed only one petition against the Management. Considering
the facts in this case, considering further that the reason given in the delay-condonation applications was common nay identical, the further fact that
these applications were treated by the first authority as a common application and was disposed of by a common order, we have no doubt that the
said 39 respondents, had the order gone against them on their applications, could have filed a common petition. We do not wish to be understood
that that would be a proper test. However, that is one of the factors which can be considered while considering as to whether a common petition
could have been filed against all of them.
Now the caselaw. The learned single Judge has heavily relied on two Supreme Court judgments, they being the decisions reported in
Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills and Others Vs. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies and Another, and Radhakrishna Naidu cases, AIR 1977 SC 884 .
As regards the Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills and Others Vs. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies and Another, , the observations in paragraph 27
seem to have been relied upon by the learned single Judge. That was a case where several petitioners had joined and each petitioner had individual
and independent cause of action. The Supreme Court observes:
A suit by such a combination of plaintiffs would be open to misjoinder. Second, there are triable issues like limitation, estoppel and questions of
fact in ascertaining the expenses incurred by the Government for administrative surcharges of the scheme and allocating the expenses with regard to
quality as well as quantity of rice covered by the permits.
The factual scenario is entirely different. This was a case where a common petition was filed by so many persons having individual and independent
causes of action whereas we have already found on facts that the factual aspect here is common nay identical in respect of all the 39 respondents,
at least in so far as the question of delay is concerned and that is precisely the reason why we are calling it to be an identical aspect. According to
us, this decision would be of no consequence.
The other case relied upon by the learned single Judge is reported in P.R. Naidu case, AIR 1977 SC 884. This was a case where a common
petition was filed challenging the compulsory retirement of several employees. Therefore, the facts were bound to be different in respect of each of
those employees. There was no common factor as we have shown amongst present petitions. This is apart from the fact that again the Supreme
Court was considering the question of filing a joint petition by the petitioners who had separate individual cases. In paragraph 14, the Supreme
Court says:
... in the present writ petitions, several petitioners have joined as petitioners. Their causes of action are separate and independent. Each is alleged
to be an instance of individual assertion of constitutional right in regard to facts and circumstances of each case. Where several petitioners combine
for alleged violation of their rights, it is difficult for court to go into each and every individual case.
Such is not the position in the present scenario. On the other hand, according to us, the judgment which has been quoted by the learned single
Judge reported in 1995 (I) LLJ 757, cited supra, applies on all fours. We can make the same comment in respect of the other cases quoted by the
learned single Judge. It seems that the learned Judge has relied upon the observation stated in paragraph 7 of the decision reported in
Narendrakumar J. Modi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat II, Ahmedabad, to the effect that so many proceedings and orders could not
be challenged in one writ petition. In our opinion, the observation cannot be read as the applicable statement of law in the light of the facts in the
present case. The other judgment relied upon by the learned single Judge is reported in Management of Rain Bow Dyeing Factory Salem and
Others Vs. Industrial Tribunal, High Court Buildings, Madras and Another, wherein it has been held that several persons who were aggrieved by
an order of Tribunal cannot join together as petitioners in a common single writ petition. We think that this decision will not apply as this is not a
case where several persons are joining together who have been aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal. This is apart from the fact that now there is
a provision under Rule 2-A and Rule 2-B of the Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules. The learned Judge has also quoted the decision
reported in M.S. Ganapathi Nadar and Sons Factory and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Others, . The facts in this case are entirely
different. In our opinion, the fact that joint petition cannot be filed by a person having distinct cause of action cannot be relied upon for holding that
one petitioner cannot file a single petition against several respondents. It would be better at this stage, to consider the provisions of Rules 2-A and
2-B of the Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules.
In so far as Rule 2-B of the Appellate Side Rules is concerned, it says:
Where several persons seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is open to the Court to permit
them to join in a single petition having regard to the nature of their grievance, the source of the right which they seek to enforce, the nature of the
cause of action alleged and the nature of the relief prayed for.
In our case, had the order gone against the respondents, their grievances would have been common that the delay caused in filing the application
was not condoned. The source of right which they sought to enforce would have also been absolutely common; so also the nature of the cause of
action and the nature of the relief prayed for would have been identical. Therefore, we have no doubt that they could have filed a joint petition.
In so far as Rule 2-A is concerned, the riders are (i) the writ petitioner not knowing the addresses of several persons who are likely to be
affected by the result of the writ petition and (ii) where the Court considers that having regard to the need for a quick decision and avoidance of
delay, it is necessary to grant such permission. Therefore, what is really of a great significance is ""the discretion of the Court"" and where the Court
considers that the question can be disposed of commonly and without delay, the Court can grant such permission. In our opinion, this is a proper
case where such permission could be given particularly because the applications to condone the delay were on the common grounds, they were
commonly treated and disposed of by a common order and the claims in those petitioners were also identical.
For all these reasons, we cannot agree with the learned single Judge. Hence, the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the appeal is
allowed. Appellant/writ petitioner is permitted to file a single writ petition. W.M.P. No.21411 of 1999 is allowed. Registry is directed to register
the W.P. SR. No.70689 of 1999. No costs.