High CourtsSingle Bench(2017) 12 MP CK 0003

The Manager vs Aminuddin

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 4 December 2017

HON’BLE JUDGES
Vandana Kasrekar
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
4907 of 2016

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

281 paragraphs · 2,662 words
1.

The petitioner has filed the present petition,

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the

award dated 23/12/2015 passed by the Presiding Officer,

Labour Court, Sagar, District Sagar.

2.

Brief facts of the case are that the

respondent was engaged from time to time with the

petitioner on the basis of availability of the work, but respondent started picking up quarrels with the superior

officers demanding whole month work and salary on the

basis of collector''s notification meant for labours other than

agricultural labours. She herself abandoned the work in the

year 2007 and, therefore, she was again offered to continue

work as seasonal labour, but again she started creating

problems and refused to accept the wages calculated on the

basis of notification. The respondent thereafter filed dispute

before Presiding Officer Labour Court on 17/02/2014. The

petitioners filed reply to the said application. Thereafter, the

petitioners moved an application on 20/08/2015 for taking

some material documents on records, but the trial Court has

dismissed the said application. Thereafter, the labour Court

has passed the impugned award by which the labour Court

has directed to reinstate the respondent along with back

wages. Being aggrieved by that award, the petitioner has

filed the present petition.

3.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner argues that the award passed by the labour Court

is illegal and arbitrary. He submits that the labour Court has

failed to consider that the respondent was working as

seasonal labour and was engaged in the petitioner''s

organisation as per the availability of the work. The labour

Court has committed jurisdictional error by shifting the

burden of proof relating to 240 working days on the present

petitioners. He submits that the respondent has failed to

prove that during the last 25 years of her working as

seasonal labour, she has completed one year''s service or

240 days service in order to attract the Section 25-F of the

Industrial Dispute Act. He further submits that the labour

Court has erred in awarding the back wages to the

respondent who is seasonal labour and engaged on the

basis of availability of the work.

4.

The respondent had filed his return and

submits that the respondent never left the job but her

services were illegally terminated thrice. However, before the

Conciliation Officer, the petitioner side conceded to reinstate

the respondent. The notice as contained in Annexure P/11 has never been served on the respondent and they appear

to be fabricated documents and the petitioners were

harassing the respondent. The earlier petitioners paid the

salary as fixed by the Collector but in order to harass the

petitioner, started paying the salary fixed for Agriculture Farm

Labour. The salary was not paid to the petitioner from April

2010 to November 2011 which was admitted by the

petitioners before the labour Court. The findings given by the

labour Court that the respondent has served for more than

240 days in a calendar year and her services were

terminated without complying the provisions of Section 25-F

of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is submitted that as per the

provision of Section 25-F of the ID Act, any termination

without complying with the provision amounts to illegal,

retrenchment and, therefore, for this reason the labour Court

has rightly passed the impugned award. The petitioner has

failed to produce the relevant documents before the labour

Court to demonstrate that answering respondent has not

worked for 240 days in a calendar year although they are in exclusive possession of the petitioner. He further relied on a

judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Gauri

Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan, 2015 (12) SCC 754.

5.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and

perused the record as well as the award passed by the

labour Court. From perusal of the order passed by the labour

Court, it reveals that the respondent was working as a labour

in the petitioner''s association. She was paid the salary as

per the Collector''s basis, however, thereafter the respondent

has started paying her salary as per the Agricultural Farm

Labour. Thereafter, her services were terminated vide order

dated 01/02/2007, she therefore filed an application for

conciliation before the Conciliation Officer. Before the

Conciliation Officer, the petitioner has given an assurance for

reinstating her, however, from April 2010 she has started

working with the petitioners. Thereafter although she had

working from April 2010 to November 2011, however, no

salary has been paid to her. She again approached before

the Conciliation Officer by filing an application. Petitioners

have again given assurance for reinstating her. Thereafter,

she appeared before the petitioners on 08/09/2011, however,

her services were again terminated on 01/01/2012. Before

terminating her services, no departmental enquiry was

initiated against her and she has not paid the compensation

also. Before terminating the services, the petitioner has not

followed the provision of Sections 25-F, 25-G & 25-H, of the

ID Act and, therefore, she filed this application challenging

the order of termination dated 01/02/2012. Respondent has

filed reply and denied that the respondent has completed

240 days in a calendar year. It is submitted that the

respondent has committed misconduct and has not given

her attendance in time and as well as her appointment is on

the basis of availability of the work and, therefore, her

services have been terminated. It is submitted that the

respondent is a seasonal labour and is employed by the

petitioners on availability of the work and, therefore, before

termination of her services, no enquiry is required to be initiated and the compliance of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of

the ID Act is not required to be done.

6.

The labour Court framed the issues and

after recording the evidence has passed the impugned

award. The labour Court while deciding the issue No.2 has

held that the respondent was working with the petitioner''s

association since 1987. The Departmental witness DR. J. P.

Khare has admitted in his statement that the respondent was

working with them from 1987 from time to time. He also

admitted that they have not produced any attendance

register or muster rolls. The attendance register of the

respondent as well as the documents relating to the payment

of salary to the respondent are with the petitioners and as

the petitioners have failed to produce those documents

before the Labour Court, therefore, the labour Court has

given the findings that respondent has proved that she is

employed with the petitioner''s orgaisation since 1987. The

Apex Court in the case of Gauri Shankar (supra) in para 20

has held as under :-

"20. It is not in dispute that the workman was

employed with the respondent Department in

the year 1987 and on the basis of material

evidence adduced by both the parties and in

the absence of the non-production of muster

rolls on the ground that they are not available,

which contention of the respondent

Department is rightly not accepted by the

Labour Court and it has recorded the finding

of fact holding that the workman has worked

from 1.1.1987 to 1.4.1992. The Labour Court

has drawn adverse inference with regard to

non-production of muster rolls maintained by

them, in this regard, it would be useful to refer

to the judgment of this Court in Gopal

Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohd. Haji Latif wherein

it was held thus: (AIR p.1416, para5)

"5........ Even if the burden of proof

does not lie on a party the Court may draw

an adverse inference if he withholds

important documents in his possession

which can throw light on the facts at issue.

It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for

those desiring to rely upon a certain state

of facts to withhold from the Court the best

evidence which is in their possession

which could throw light upon the issues in

controversy and to rely upon the abstract

doctrine of onus of proof. In Murugesam

Pillai V. Manichavasaka Pandara, Lord

Shaw observed as follows: (IA p. 103)

''" practice has grown up in Indian

procedure of those in possession of important

documents or information lying by, trusting to

the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof, and

failing, accordingly, to furnish to, the courts

the best material for its decision. With regard

to third parties, this may be right enough- they have no responsibility for the conduct of the

suit but with regard to the parties to the suit it

is, in Their Lordships opinion an inversion of

sound practice for those desiring to rely upon

a certain state of facts to withhold from the

court the written evidence in their possession

which would throw light upon the proposition.''

This passage was cited with approval

by this Court in a recent decision Biltu Ram

v. Jainandan Prasad. It that case, reliance

was placed on behalf of the defendants upon

the following passage from the decision of the

Judicial Committee in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj

Ranjit Singh . (IA p. 206)

....... But it is open to a litigant to

refrain from producing any documents that he

considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is

dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit

of documents and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appears to him in

such affidavit to be relevant and proper. If he

fails so to do, neither he nor the Court at his

suggestion is entitled to draw any inference

as to the contents of any such documents.''''

7.

The similar was view was taken in the case

of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division v. Bhikubhai

Meghajibhai Chavda, 2010 AIR SCW 542. In the said

judgment in para 15 has held as under :-

"15) Applying the principles laid down in

the above case by this court, the evidence

produced by the appellants has not been

consistent. The appellants claim that the

respondent did not work for 240 days. The

respondent was a workman hired on a daily

wage basis. So it is obvious, as this court

pointed out in the above case that he would

have difficulty in having access to all the official

documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and

deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof

shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that

he did not complete 240 days of service in the

requisite period to constitute continuous

service. It is the contention of the appellant that

the services of the respondent were terminated

in 1988. The witness produced by the appellant

stated that the respondent stopped coming to

work from February, 1988. The documentary

evidence produced by the appellant is

contradictory to this fact as it shows that the

respondent was working during February, 1989

also. It has also been observed by the High

Court that the muster roll for 1986-87 was not

completely produced. The appellants have

inexplicably failed to produce the complete

records and muster rolls from 1985 to 1991,

inspite of the direction issued by the labour court to produce the same. In fact there has

been practically no challenge to the deposition

of the respondent during cross-examination. In

this regard, it would be pertinent to mention the

observation of three judge bench of this court

in the case of Municipal Corporation,

Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195],

where it is observed:

"A Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against this contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld."

8.

As per the said judgment, due to non-

production of muster rolls by the employer, the adverse

inference can be drawn against the employer. In the present

case also as the petitioner has failed to produced the muster

rolls and the attendance register before the labour Court

which was admittedly in their possession, therefore, the

labour Court has rightly drawn inference against the

petitioners, thereby holding that the respondent has worked

for more than 240 days in the petitioners'' association. The

petitioners have also failed to prove that the respondent was

indisciplined while she was on duty. The labour Court has

also held that as the respondent has completed more than

240 days in one calendar year before her termination is

amounts to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the ID Act

and, therefore, before retrenchment the respondents are

bound to comply with the provisions under Section 25(f) of

the Act. In the present case, the petitioner has not issued

prior one month''s notice, neither paid the salary of one

month in lieu of the notice nor paid any retrenchment

compensation therefore, termination of services of the

respondent amount to be illegal retrenchment.

9.

Thus, the findings recorded by the labour

Court are based on proper appreciation of the evidence as well as facts available on record. The Apex Court in the case

of Gauri Shankar (supra) in para 23 & 24 has held as

under:-

"23. The learned single Judge of the High

Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India

as per the legal principles laid down by this

Court in the case of Harjinder Singh (supra)

wherein this Court has held thus : (SCC page

205, para 21)

21.

Before concluding, we consider it

necessary to observe that while exercising

jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of

the Constitution in matters like the present

one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep

in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and

other similar legislative instruments are social

welfare legislation and the same are required

to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and

the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in

general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and

43-A in particular, which mandate that the

State should secure a social order for the

promotion of welfare of the people, ensure

equality between men and women and

equitable distribution of material resources of

the community to sub-serve the common

good and also ensure that the workers get

their dues. More than 41 years ago,

Gajendragadkar, J, opined that

10.

........... The concept of social and

economic justice is a living concept of

revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to

the rule of law and meaning and significance

to the ideal of welfare State.

The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr . .

24.

Therefore, in view of the above said case, the learned single Judge in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India erroneously interfered with the award of reinstatement and future salary from the date of award till date of reinstatement as rightly passed by the Labour Court recording valid and cogent reasons in answer to the points of dispute holding that the workman has worked from 1.1.1987 to 1.4.1992 and that non- compliance of the mandatory requirements under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondent-Department rendered its action of termination of the services of the workman as void ab initio in law and instead the High Court erroneously awarded a compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- in lieu of reinstatement. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench under their supervisory jurisdiction should not have modified the award by awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement which is contrary to the well settled principles of law laid down in catena of cases by this Court.

10.

Thus, as per the said judgment, the High

Court should not interfere into the findings recorded by the

labour Court. Thus, in light of the aforesaid, I do not find that

the labour Court has committed any jurisdictional error in

passing the impugned award. Accordingly, the writ petition is

dismissed.