The Managing Committe, J.S.F.H. Khalsa Hingh School, Nawanshahr vs Baldev Singh Pabla

R.L. Anand, J.—This is a civil revision and has been directed against the order dated 16.11.2000 passed by Addl. District Judge, Nawansahar, who by affirming the order dated 9.2.2000 passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Nawanshahr allowed the application of plain-tiff/respondent Baldev Singh Pabla under Order 39 Rules land 2 CPC.

Some facts can be noticed in the following manner :-

Plaintiff Baldev Singh Pabla filed a suit for declaration that he is the legally and validly appointed headmaster of J.S.F.H. Khalsa High School Nawanshahr. The suit was filed against the Managing Committee, J.S.F.H. Khalsa High School, Nawanshahr through its alleged president R.S. Chinna, Kewal Singh Bhangal, alleged Manager of the said school and the Sikh Education Board, through its alleged President R.S. Chinna. The plaintiff/respondent also prayed that a decree for permanent injunction be passed in his favour against the defendants from obstructing him in the performance of his duties as headmaster of the said school.

The case set up by the plaintiff before the trial Court was that he was appointed headmaster of the school on 28.4.1992 and his appointment was duly approved by DPI Schools. Ever since his appointment he is performing his duties honestly, diligently and with keen sense of duty. The defendants/petitioners claim themselves to be a rival Sikh Education Board and a rival Managing Committee and proclaimed that they have suspended the plaintiff from the post of headmaster of school by means of alleged resolution dated 12.11.1999. The said resolution is illegal, inoperative and does not bind the plaintiff who is not an employee of any such managing committee or board. Rather he is an employee of Sikh Education Board and Managing Committee headed by Kartar Singh Seikhon. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that all the appointments of the employees during the period 1993 up to date have been made by the Managing Committee headed by Kartar Singh Seikhon. The alleged decision dated 12.11.1999 taken by the defendants is illegal, void and is not binding upon him as the defendant-Committee was never legally appointed. The defendants are bent upon in interfering in the discharge of duties of the plaintiff. Hence the suit.

Along with the suit the plaintiff filed the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC praying that till the pendency of the suit the defendant be restrained from interfering in the performance of his duties as headmaster of the school.

Notice of the suit as well as application was given to the defendants, who filed the reply and certain objections were taken such as that the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The State of Punjab has not been made as a party in the application. According to the defendants the plaintiff was placed under suspension vide resolution of the Managing Committee dated 22.11.1999 pending disciplinary inquiry. The plaintiff has no locus standi to file the application. The suit as well as application of the plaintiff are also barred by jurisdiction and the Punjab State School Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide the controversy. According to the defendants, the Managing Committee/Board is headed by R.S. Chinna who is duly elected and appointed Chairman of the Committee/Board. Many irregularities have been committed by the plaintiff and, therefore, the Committee has the right to suspend the plaintiff.

Parties addressed arguments before the learned trial Court, which, for the reasons given in paras 9 and 10 of the order dated 9.2.2000, allowed the application of the plaintiff under Order 39Rules 1 and 2 CPC and the defendants were restrained from obstructing the plaintiff in performing his duties as headmaster of the school in question, except in due course of law.

Aggrieved by the order dated 9.2.2000 the defendants/petitioners filed an appeal under Order 43 Rules 1 and 2 CPC before the Addl. District Judge, Nawanshahr, who dismissed the appeal vide impugned order dated 16.11.2000 for the following reasons as given in paras No. 12 to 16 of the order :-

"12. The resolution No. 2, dated 14.2.2000, vide which Serve Shri Kewal Singh Bhangal and R.S. Chinna appellant is alleged to have been authorized to prefer this appeal, was not filed with the memorandum of appeal revealing that they have been authorized by the alleged resolution to file this appeal. In Re: Municipal Committee Sirhind v. Ishar Dass and another (supra), in paragraph No. 13 of the judgment, it has been observed that "if the appeal was to be instituted by the Municipal Committee, Sirhind or by the Executive Officer, there should be a special resolution by the Municipal Committee, firstly to the effect that a decision has been taken by the Committee to that effect and secondly, a particular person was authorized to institute the appeal on behalf of the committee and further such a person has been authorized to engage a Counsel on behalf of the committee and such officer should further be authorized to sign and verify the pleadings". It has been further observed in the succeeding paragraph of the judgment of our own Hon''ble High Court that "further grounds of appeal are barren that the Executive Officer of the Sirhind Municipal Committee had been authorized to file the appeal in his favour". Adverting to the facts of the instant case, there is no averment in the memorandum of appeal that a decision has been taken by the Managing Committee of the J.S.F.H. Khalsa High School, Nawanshahr to the effect that a special resolution has been passed by the said Committee authorizing Shri R.S. Chinna or Shri Kewal Singh Bhangal to institute this appeal on its behalf. The memorandum of appeal is further cryptic as to the authorizing of such a person to engage a Counsel on behalf of the said Committee and that the said persons have been authorized to sign and verify the pleadings. The memorandum of appeal being silent on the stated aspect, I am of the considered view that the observations made by Hon''ble Mr. Justice R.L. Anand in Re : Municipal Committee Sirhind v. Ishar Dass and others (supra), are fully supportive of the contention raised by Mr. Jain. Further in Re. Punjab Slate Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Milkha Singh and another 1996(3) P L R 190: 1997(4) SCT 473 (SC), appeal was filed by the Managing Director of the Co- operative Bank, a body corporate, but the regulation gave power to him only to institute, conduct, de-rend any legal proceedings by or against the Bank and no decision was taken to institute or defend the proceedings and it was in these circumstances that our own Hon''ble High Court was pleased to observe that "the appeal was not maintainable". In re: Punjabi University, Patiala v. M.R. Garg 1996(1) P L R 484, no separate resolution was passed by the Punjabi University, Patiala and the resolution which was passed merely authorized the Registrar to defend the cases instituted against the University and to file suits on behalf of the University and it was in these circumstances that our own Hon''ble High Court had held that "unless there is a specific resolution by the Syndicate, authorizing the Registrar, to file the appeal, the appeal filed by him is wholly incompetent". Thus the appeal in hand is rendered incompetent. At this juncture, it deserves to be pointed out here that a page bearing resolution No. 2, dated 14.2.2000 appears to have been interpolated but this Court does not want to go deep into this fact in these proceedings. If it was there, its copy should have been filed with the memorandum of appeal.

Mr. Santokh Singh, as noticed before, has sought to place implicit reliance upon the observations made in re : United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and others (supra). In support of his plea that the appeal could not be held to be incompetent even if it is found that Shri Raghubir Singh Chinna or Shri Kewal Singh Bhangal were not authorized to file the same. It can be well culled out from this ruling that it was a suit filed by the Bank for recovery of loan and it was dismissed due to non-verification of the plaintiff by the competent person. It was in these circumstances that the Hon''ble Supreme Court was pleased to observed that "where the courts come to a conclusion that the money had been taken by certain parties from the Bank was justified, it will be a travesty of justice if the Bank is to be non-suited for a technical reason, such as, the plaint was not signed by a competent person, which does not go to the root of the matter and the only defect which was alleged on behalf of the parties was one which was curable. Harking back to the facts of the instant case, the present is not a suit filed by the Bank for the recovery of the loan rather it is a suit for grant of declaration to fhe affect that the plaintiff is legally and validly appointed Head Master of J.S.F.H. Khalsa High School, Nawanshahr with a consequential relief of perpetual injunction, restraining the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff in performing his duties as such. Thus, I am inclined to hold that the facts of the case in hand are poles apart from that of the above mentioned Bank and consequently, the observations made in the aforementioned Bank case are not applicable to the present case.

Mr. Santokh Singh had further driven support from the observations made in Re : D. Appa Rao (supra). I need not discuss this ruling for the obvious reason that it was already been observed that this Court is not required to go into the genuineness or otherwise of the resolution No. 2 dated 14.2.2000.

A careful delving into the photostat copy of the order No. 3/34-92(5), dated 14.1.93, would bring out that the Director, Education Department (Schools), Punjab, Chandigarh, was pleased to approve the release of grant for disbursement of salary of the Respondent as appointed Head Master of the school in question in the scale of Rs. 2000/-, Rs. 3500/-. This document further makes me to observe that the respondent is the duly appointed Head Master and that being so, he is well within his right to seek the relief of perpetual injunction by filing a suit u/s 9 of the CPC to restrain the appellants from obstructing him in the performance of his school duties. Shri K.S. Kang, the then Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nawan-shahr, in his judgment dated 11th March, 1998, delivered in Civil Suit No. 99/1994, titled Sikh Educational Board, Nawanshahr, through Shri Raghubir Singh Chinna, Member and President v. Ajit Singh suit for mandatory injunction, photostat copy of which has been put on the record, has observed at page 10 in paragraph No. 12 that "it sems that resolution No. SEB/32 was not passed on 19.4.1992 but the same was later on added in the proceedings book at the bottom of page No. 20 by utilizing the space available at the bottom of the said page by Raghubir Singh Chinna and, as such, it is held that the alleged resolution Ex. P1, bearing No. SEB/32 is a manipulated one and it was never adopted by the General House meeting of the Sikh Educational Board on 19.4.1992. These observations indicate that the said resolution was held to be manipulated one. In paragraph No. 13, at page 11 of the said judgment, it has been mentioned that "As such, it is held that the meeting which was held on 21.3.93, was not convened as per the rules and regulations which are provided in the Constitution of Sikh Educational Board. And, as such, meeting dated 21.3.1993, it illegal. And accordingly, the resolution, which was passed in the said meeting was also illegal, null and void. As such, plaintiff has failed to establish that Kewal Singh Bhangal was elected as Manager of JSFH Khalsa High School, Nawanshahr, for the period from 21.5.93 to 31.3.93."

In the case, Mohindergarh Central Cooperative Bank Limited and others (supra), referred to by Mr. Santokh Singh, Advocate, wrongful termination of service was challenged and it was in those circumstances, it was held that "Civil Court was not competent to grant the relief of re-instatement in declaratory suit and the remedy was to claim damages." In the case, Sukhdev Singh and another (supra), termination of services of the employee were challenged and it was held that employees of non-statutory Bodies having no statutory status cannot claim declaration for continuous in service and that declaration of nullity is the only relief if the action is in excess of rules." Here in this case, as observed earlier, the respondent has sought declaration with consequential relief that he should not be obstructed in the performance of his duties. In my view, all the rulings sought to be relied upon by Mr. Santokh Singh, Advocate, are not applicable to the facts of the instant case and no exception can be taken to the reasons assigned by the learned trial Court in arriving at the conclusion that prima facie, the case is made out for grant of ad interim injunction."

Stilt not satisfied with the order of the first Appellate Court, the present revision.

I have heard Mr. D. V. Sharma, Advocate on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Arun Jain, Advocate on behalf of the respondent and with their assistance have gone through the records of this case.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that virtually the fight is between the two groups who want to have the control of the institution and the plaintiff is unnecessarily suffering the brunt of the in fight of the two groups. During the course of submissions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court was apprised that there was a lot of litigation earlier between the said two groups and so much so the rival factions even approached the High Court in order to show that they are the real and legally appointed Managing Committee/Board. In this case we have to see whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and whether the balance of convenience lies in his favour or not. The plaintiff is challenging the resolution dated 12.11.1999 on the plea that the Managing Committee and the Board headed by R.S. Chinna has no jurisdiction, rather the Managing Committee and the Board headed by Kartar Singh Seikhon is the legally and validly appointed Committee which alone is competent to run the affairs of the school. In these circumstances, the point for determination before this Court would be whether the resolution dated 12.11.1999 which has been passed by the defendant-Committee has been passed in a legal and valid manner and whether the defendants are the legally constituted Managing Committee/Board. In these circumstances, there is always a triable issue which can only be decided if the parties are afforded opportunity to lead evidence. If the plaintiff at this juncture is suspended in pursuance of the resolution dated 12.11.1999, he will certainly suffer an irreparable loss and he will lose his status. His prestige and personality shall be lowered in the eyes of the public. He will suffer monetarily. All these factors are in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. Therefore, I should be very slow in interfering the impugned orders when both the Courts have exercised their discretion in favour of the plaintiff/respondent.

Though an effort was made by the learned counsel for the parties to show various documents that the rival factions are not the legally constituted Managing Committee/Board, yet I do not want to give any finding on this issue lest it may prejudice the case of either party at the trial stage. Therefore, while dismissing this revision I give direction to the trial Court to expedite the suit and try to dispose of the same as early as possible and preferably within one year from the receipt of the copy of the order.

Nothing stated above shall amount an expression of my opinion on the merits of the suit.

Revision dismissed.