The Official Trustee vs United Commercial Syndicate by Proprietor, K. Appa Rao

P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.—This appeal against the judgment of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., arises out of a suit instituted by the Appellant, the

Official Trustee of Madras, in the City Civil Court, for evicting the Respondent from certain premises in Saiva Muthia Mudali Street, Georgetown,

Madras. It was alleged in the plaint that the suit property which formed part of one of the estates vested in the Official Trustee was leased to the

Respondent on a monthly rental of Rs. 7 in or about 1944, and that the tenancy was duly determined by notice, dated 1st November 1946. In

paragraph 13 of the plaint, it was specifically mentioned that as the leasehold property was only a vacant site, and as the thatched and other sheds

appear to have been recently put up thereon, the Respondent was not entitled to plead any of the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and

Rent Control) Act, in bar of the suit. The Respondent inter alia claimed that he was entitled to the benefits of the said Act, as the lease was not only

of vacant land, but of land with structures enclosed by a compound wall with a gate. The learned City Civil Court Judge, who tried the suit held

that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, had absolutely no application to the case, as the lease was of a vacant site. He decreed

the suit. There was an appeal by the Respondent and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., allowed the appeal on the ground that the suit property was a

building"" within the definition of that term in the Act, as it had compound walls on all sides and contained two latrines, which were enclosed by

walls. In his opinion the definition was wide enough to include the suit property. The Respondent was therefore held to be entitled to the benefits of

the Act. He allowed the appeal, and dismissed the suit. The Official Trustee is the Appellant before us.

The only question in this appeal is whether the property which was leased by the Appellant to the Respondent is a building within the meaning of

Section 2(1) of the Act. The definition is as follows:

building"" means any building or hut or part of a building or but, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes--

(a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with Such

building or hut.

The rest of the definition is not material to the case. The evidence in this case clearly leads us to the conclusion that what was leased to the

Respondent was understood by the parties to be only a vacant site. Exhibit A-l is the earliest document which refers to this lease, where it is

described as ""lease of a vacant site."" In the correspondence between the parties the lease is always referred to as being a lease of vacant land. The

clerk of the Respondent who was examined as P.W. 1 refers to an entry in the account book of the Respondent in which the leased property is

referred to as a vacant site. The Respondent himself, who gave evidence as D.W. 1, deposed that when he took the property there were

compound walls on all the four sides and there were two latrines. But he did not disclose the existence of the latrines to the Official Trustee. In our

opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to hold that there has been a lease of the compound walls and the latrines as such. We are further of opinion

that even if the walls and the latrines were included within the scope of the lease, the requirements of the definition in Section 2(1) of the Act would

not be satisfied. It is sufficient to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1952) 2 M.L.J. 221, 226

Satyanarayana Rao, J., therein observed as follows:

Mere compound walls with a gate enclosing a space cannot, in view of the accepted interpretation of the word ""building"" in the decisions above

cited be considered as a building within the meaning of the Act. The extreme contention of Mr. Srinivasagopalachari for the Respondent was that

apart from other considerations which ought to enter into the decision of the question, even if we take into consideration the compound wall with

the gates, that would itself constitute a ""building"" within the meaning of the Act. It is impossible to accept such an extreme view in the light of the

decisions above cited.

The decisions referred to therein are decisions of Courts in India and in England, and include the decision of the Calcutta High Court in

Corporation of Calcutta v. Benoy Krishna Bose (1910) 16 C.W.N. 84 wherein it was held that a structure can hardly be called a ""building"" unless

it was capable of occupation as falling within the residential class or within the class connected with commercial industry in some way or other.

Obviously, the suit property cannot fall within the definition of a ""building"" in the Act. With respect to the learned Judge, we cannot agree with his

decision that the suit property is a ""building"" and that the Respondent is entitled to the benefit of the Act.

The appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court will be restored with costs throughout.