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154 paragraphs · 3,460 wordsP.S. Kailasam, J.—This appeal is remanded by the Supreme Court for determination of the question whether the appellant (before the
Supreme Court) is guilty of an offence u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, as the question whether the Chief Engineer, Kumbakonam
Electric Supply Corporation was the ""person aggrieved"" had, not been determined by this Court.
Six persons were tried by the Sub-Magistrate of Papanasam for an offence, u/s 379, Indian Penal Code read with Section 39 of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 and Section 44(c) and (d) of the said Act. All the accused were acquitted by the Sub-Magistrate and the State filed an
appeal against the order of acquittal. During the hearing of the appeal in this Court, it was submitted, that the prosecution of an offence alleged to
have been committed by the accused u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act could not be institued except at the instance of an ""aggrieved person"". The
question whether dishonest abstraction, consumption or use of electrical energy which was deemed to be theft by virtue of Section 39 of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910, will amount to an officer against that Act, or one u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code, was referred to a Full Bench. The Full
Bench (1965) M.L.J.51 : ILR (1964) Mad. 653 answered the reference as follows:
The offence of dishonest abstraction, consumption or user of electricity will not be one coming within the mischief of Section 50 of the Indian
Electricity Act, but one u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 39 of that Act.
After the expression of this opinion by the Full Bench, viz., the offence was one under the Indian Penal Code and hence Section 50 of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910, had no application, the preliminary objection that ""the person aggrieved"" had not launched the prosecution did not arise. On
the facts, this Court allowed the appeal against the first accused alone holding him guilty u/s 379, Indian Penal Code, read with Section 39 of the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in view of its decision in Avtar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, , holding that ""dishonest
abstraction of the electricity mentioned in Section 39 of the Act cannot be an offence under the Indian. Penal Code"", set aside the conviction of the
appellant u/s 379, Indian Penal Code. But as the petitioner was also charged u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act and as the questions whether the
accused was guilty or not u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and whether the Chief Engineer, on the facts of the case, may be regarded as
the ""person aggrieved"" to enable him to institute the proceeding, were not considered by this Court, the Supreme Court remanded the case with a
direction that the question whether the appellant was guilty of an offence u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 may be determined. In
pursuance of this remand, the matter comes up before this Court for disposal.
The learned Public Prosecutor at the time of the hearing of the appeal, requested that he may be permitted to adduce additional evidence and
mark certain documents. That petition was ordered, as it was felt that in the circumstances of the case, the material documents should be permitted
to be marked inevidence and that the Chief Engineer, Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation should be examined. The Chief Engineer was
accordingly examined by this Court, and Exhibits P-16 and P-17 were filed.
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provides as follows:
No prosecution shall be institued against any person for any offence against this Act or any rule, license or order, thereunder, except at the instance
of the Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same.
In this case, the licensee is the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation and the question is whether the prosecution is instituted by"" a person
aggrieved"".
The accused applied for a temporary connection by Exhibit P-2 to the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation for the purpose of illuminating
a marriage pandal. Under Exhibit P-3, dated 1st September, 1960, the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation permitted a temporary
connection to the accused''s house. In this communication, P.W. 1, the Chief Engineer had signed ""for the Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation"". In the complaint, Exhibit P-4, P.W. 1 did not state that he was signing on behalf of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation,
though he has signed the complaint. Exhibit P-4, however, states that the complainant is the Chief Engineer of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation.
The agreement for the temporary service connection was signed by the first accused and P.W. 1, K.S. Seshadri, Chief Engineer, for
Kumabakonam Electric Supply Corporation. The Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation,
Ltd., is marked as Exhibt P-16. Provision is made for the appointment of Managing Agents by Articles 83 to 88. Article 84 provides that the India
Company (Private) Ltd. the first Managing Agents of the Company and who have been re-appointed Managing Agents of the Company for a
further period often years on and from 1st January, 1950, shall continue and be the Managing Agents of the Company. Under Article 85, the
Managing Agents have been given full power and authority to appoint all or any attorneys and managers, engineers, officers, fitters, servants, or
agents for the services of, and on behalf of the company. Under Exhibit P-1, P.W. 1, was appointed as the general power-of-attorney agent. On
25th April, 1960, Kumbakonam Electric Supply. Corporation Ltd., and the India Company (Private) Ltd. entered into an agreement by which
India Company (P.) Ltd. was appointed, as Managing Agents. It is recited that notwithstanding the appointment of India Company (P.) Ltd., as
the Managing Agents till 14th April, 1961, the said appointment became terminated by virtue of Section 330 of the Companies Act, 1956, on the
15th of August, 1960. Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation and India Company (P.) Ltd. mutually agreed, that India Company (P.) Ltd., be
appointed as Managing Agents from 15th August, 1960 to 15th August, 1965. It was during this period that the offence was committed, and the
complaint was given by P.W. 1.
It will be seen that under the Article of Association, the Managing Agents have the power and authority to appoint attorneys and managers,
engineers, officers, etc., for the services of and on behalf of the Company. When an attorney, manager or officer is appointed by the Managing
Agents, his services are for and on behalf of the company. By the appointment under Exhibit P-1, P.W. 1 is entitled to act as an attorney or agent
for and on behalf of the company.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the accused is that by Exhibit P-1, the Managing Agents appointed P.W. 1, as the power-of-attorney
of India Company(P.) Ltd., and not on behalf of Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel
referred to certain passages in Exhibit P-1 and submitted that the appointments could not be on behalf of Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation. He also submitted that as the power-of-attorney was executed in the year 1955 and as the Managing Agents were re-appointed, in
1960, the power-of-attorney executed in the year 1955 would not be valid. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the person aggrieved is
the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation and a complaint should have been filed by the Company itself by passing a special resolution
authorising any person to do so, and in the. absence of a specific authorisation, P.W. 1, the Chief Engineer, cannot be said to be acting at the
instance of the Company. The learned Counsel referred to the general power-of-attorney Exhibit P-1, and submitted that the appointment of P.W.
1, was as the attorney for the Managing Agents. He relied on the phrase ""to be our attorney in our name and on our behalf"". The mention of the
word ""company"" in the document, it was submitted, would, refer to India Company (P.) Ltd. and not the Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation. On a careful examination of the general power-of-attorney, I am unable to accept this contention. It may be seen that under Article
85 of the Articles of Association, the Managing Agents have been empowered to appoint attorneys and managers, engineers, or officers, to act for
and on behalf of the company. The Articles of Association and the Agreement between the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation and India
Company (P.) Ltd., referred Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation, as the Company and India Company (P.) Ltd., as the Managing Agents.
In Exhibit P-1, the power-of-attorney, the words ""a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and having its registered office at
Oriental Building, Armenian Street, Madras,"" would refer to the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation. This is made clear by the recital to be
our attorney in our name and on our behalf to do all or any of the following acts or things to the intent that the powers conferred shall extend to all
matters in which the Company is now or may hereafter become interested"". The phrase ""to be our attorney in our name and on our behalf"" would
certainly refer to India Company (P.), Ltd. But the phrase ""the powers conferred shall extend to all matters in which the company is now or may
hereafter become interested"" would refer to the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation. Under Clause (1) of the power-of-attorney, P.W. 1 is
authorised to give a discharge in respect of any property to which the company may be entitled to and to effect a compromise or release of any
claim in respect of all property, money, securities and rights. A distinction between a claim of the company and. a claim against ""us"" (The India
Company (P.) Ltd.) is discernible. Clause (5) of the powers-of-attorney makes the position clear, for it empowers P.W. 1 to present for
registration on behalf of the company any document executed by Sri C.R. Ramaswamy signing on behalf of India Company (P.) Ltd., as managing
agents of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation, and to admit execution thereof, etc. A distinction is, therefore, maintained between the
company and the Managing Agents, and P.W. 1, is authorised to present for registration any instrument or deed on behalf of the Company
executed by Sri C.R. Ramaswamy signing on behalf of the India Company (P.) Ltd.
It is clear that the power-of-attorney was executed by the Managing Agents empowering P.W. 1 to act on behalf of Kumbakonam Electric
Supply Corporation. The power-of-attorney is in accordance with the powers conferred on the Managing Agents under Article 85 of the Articles
of Association. No doubt, after the execution of the power-of-attorney on 25th April, 1960 the managing agency agreement was renewed, as the
agency was terminated by virtue of Section 330 of the Companies Act, 1956. This re-appointment will not in any way affect the validity of the
power-of-attorney. In view of the fact that there has been no break in the managing agency of the company and that the power-of-attorney
executed by the Managing Agency in 1955 would continue to be in operation till it is revoked, it will have to beheld that the appointment of P.W. 1
as the power-of-attorney agent of the Managing Agents would empower him to act on behalf of the Company also. On a reading of Exhibits P-16
and P-17 and also Exhibit P-1, I am satisfied that P.W. 1 was acting as the power-of-attorney agent of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation and the prosecution is at the instance of the aggrieved person.
It is admitted that the company did not file any complaint or pass any resolution authorising any person to file a complaint. But in the
circumstances stated above, I find that the absence of such complaint or resolution will not invalidate the proceedings.
The learned Counsel for the accused submitted that P.W. 1 in his cross-examination in the trial Court admitted that he gave the complaint as
the Chief Engineer and not as the power-of-attorney agent. This admission is relied on for submitting that the complaint was not giver as the
power-of-attorney agent. When his attention was drawn to this statement in his cross-examination in this Court, P.W. 1 replied that the power-of-
attorney was already there and it could speak for itself. He wanted to impress by saying that he signed the complaint as Chief Engineer because he
was responsible for any loss to the company. What P.W. 1 had stated in the evidence would not in any way affect the legal position. The mere fact
that P.W. 1 stated that he gave the complaint as the Chief Engineer and not as the power-of-attorney agent would not alter the position. If the
power-of-attorney was in force, as it had been found to be, he would be acting on behalf of the company and would be a person competent to
institute the complaint.
Even assuming, that P.W. 1, was not a power-of-attorney agent, in the circumstances of the case, it can be found that P.W. 1 was acting at the
instance of Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation. That P.W. 1 was acting on behalf of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation is
clear from Exhibit P-3, the temporary permit granted to the accused. Though Exhibit P-4 was signed by P.W. 1 without specifically stating that it
was on behalf of the company, it was given by P.W. 1 as the Chief Engineer of the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation. Exhibit P-12, the
agreement between the Kumbakonam Electric Supply Corporation and the accused, is signed by P.W. 1 for the Kumbakonam Electric Supply
Corporation as its Chief Electrical Engineer. The documents referred to above clearly show that P.W. 1 as Chief Engineer of the Corporation, was
acting on its behalf.
The meaning of the phrase ""at the instance of"" is given in the Chambers Dictionary as ""at the motion or solicitation of"". In P. Ramanatha Iyer''s
Law Lexicon, the same meaning is given. In Vishwanath Vs. Emperor, , a bench of the Court stated that the phrase ""at the instance of"" means
merely ""at the solicitation of or at the request of"", that it had been introduced so as to make the provision a general one and that if it had been the
intention of the legislature that no case should be instituted in Court except by the Electrical Company itself or other persons mentioned in Section
50 of the Act, the Legislature would have used the ordinary phrase ""on the complaint of"" and the section would have been on the lines that no
Magistrate should take cognizance of any offence referred to in Section 50 of the Act, except upon the complaint of certain persons. The Court
further held that the prosecution should not be instituted by some independent busy-body who had nothing to do with the matter. The officers of
the company discovered the theft and reported it to the police to make an investigation. In the circumstances, the Court held that the officers
intended that prosecution should follow according to the result of the investigation and concluded that the prosecution was at the instance of the
Electric Company. This decision would support the view that the phrase ""at the instance of"" should be given a wider meaning and it was intended
for the purpose of excluding independent persons who had nothing to do with the company from giving a complaint. A complaint by reasonable
officers of the company, even though there is no specific authorisation, would be ""at the instance of"" the company. In Bhagalpur Electricity Supply
Co. Ltd. Vs. Hari Prasad Saha and Others, , following the decision in Vishwanath Vs. Emperor, , the Court expressed it opinion that when a
responsible officer of a company reports an offence to the police and a prosecution is therefore set on foot, that will be considered to be a
prosecution instituted ""at the instance of"" the company. It is no doubt true that in the case cited, the complaint was presented by the residential
engineer after obtaining an authorisation from the Managing Agents, and therefore the observations will be in the nature of an obiter dicta. In AIR
1944 330 (Nagpur) , a Bench of the Court was of the view that the expression ""at the instance of"" does not mean ""on the complaint of"" or ""with
the sanction of"" but only means ""at the asking ""or ""the suggestion of"" and the object of using that phrase was only to prevent indiscriminate
prosecutions by persons without any expert knowledge of the working of electricity. In State Vs. Maganlal Chunilal Bogawat, , a Bench of the
Bombay High Court was of the view that the object of the legislature was that only persons aggrieved may set the law in motion, and in the case
before the Court one Mr. Gore, the officer who acted for and on behalf of the Company having set the law in motion, the prosecution must be
regarded as having been instituted at the instance of the Company. In this case also, sanction was obtained from the head office to lodge a
complaint and therefore the observations are in the nature of an obiter dicta. In the four cases cited above, the Courts have taken the view that
when the law is set in motion by a responsible officer for and on behalf of the company, the prosecution should be regarded as having been
instituted at the instance of the company.
The learned Counsel for the accused relied on the decision in Dhoolckand v. State (1957) 58 Cri. L.J. 233, wherein it was held by the
Rajasthan High Court that the Superintendent, Electrical and Mechanical Department of the Government does not come within the meaning of the
words ""Government"" or ""Electric Inspector"", as he is only a paid servant of the Government and he cannot be said to have been aggrieved at the
offence. The case can be distinguished on the facts, in that, the officer did not verify the truth of the complaint and left it to the police to check up
and do the needful. Further, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the officer was acting on behalf of the Government. On a consideration of
the authorities cited before me, I am of the view that when a prosecution is instituted by a responsible officer of the company, the requirement of
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, that the institution of the prosecution should be at the instance of the aggrieved person is satisfied.
In this case, P.W. 1, the Chief Engineer has stated that he was in entire charge of the administration of the Corporation including the Accounts
Department. It is also clear that he was acting on behalf of the Corporation by signing agreement forms for giving connections to applicants. I
accept the testimony of P.W. 1 and find that he was acting on behalf of the company, and as a responsible officer, he instituted the prosecution
before the police. The signing of the complaint by P.W. 1 as K.S. Sheshadri without mentioning that he did so on behalf of the Corporation would
not make any difference, because, in the complaint itself he had stated that he was the Chief Engineer of the Corporation. I am satisfied that in the
circumstances of the case, the requirement that the institution of the prosecution should be at the instance of the aggrieved person had been
satisfied. There can therefore be no impediment in holding that the accused is guilty of an offence u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the
order of remand is answered accordingly.
Mr. V.T. Rangaswamy Iyengar requested the Court to go into the facts and consider the question whether an offence u/s 39 of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 had been made out. This request is beyond the scope of the remand, for, what is directed to be decided is the question
whether the Chief Engineer of the Corporation may, on the facts of the case, be regarded as the person aggrieved, as the said question had not
been determined by the High Court.
On a consideration of the facts before the remand by the Supreme Court, this Court allowed the appeal of the State in so far as the first
accused is concerned and held that he was guilty of dishonest consumption of electrical energy. This is an offence u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910. A finding is therefore recorded that the accused is guilty of an offence u/s 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.
