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Judgment
20 paragraphs · 411 wordsHorwill, J.—The appellant, as the manager of the Kallianpur Sugar Mills, Limited, was called upon by the Panchayat Board of Kallianpur to
take out a licence for working his boiler. This he failed to do; and so he was prosecuted u/s 193 read with Section 207 of the Madras Local
Boards Act. His vakil raised a preliminary objection before the Bench of Magistrates at Udipi that he, as manager, was not liable under that
section; for Section 193 read with Section 207 makes punishable failure to take out a licence only by the owner or occupier. The Crown has
appealed.
""Owner"" is defined in the Act as including ""the person for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, whether on his own account or as agent,
trustee, guardian, manager...the rent or profits of the property in connection with which the word is used. . . ."" From this it is seen that although a
manager may under certain circumstances be deemed to be the owner, it is not every manager who is an owner for the purposes of this Act; but
only such manager as is entitled to collect the rents or profits of the property. Presumably the accused was not entitled to collect the rents and
profits; he was running his business for the profits of the Kallianpur Sugar Mills, Limited of which he was merely the manager, appointed for the
purpose of seeing that the business was satisfactorily worked.
""Occupier"" is not defined in the Local Boards Act, but the definition of that word in the District Municipalities Act expresses what I think to be
the ordinary meaning of that word and may be taken as a very fair definition of that term. ""Occupier"" according to Section 3 (15) of the District
Municipalities Act, includes,
any person for the time being paying or liable to pay to the owner, the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building or part of the same in
respect of which the word is used.
The accused clearly does not satisfy the extended definition of ""occupier"" in that section, and I do not think it can fairly be said that having
reference to the ordinary meaning of ""occupier"", it can be said that a servant occupies the premises of his master. That is what the learned
Magistrates of the Bench have held; and I think they are right.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
