The Punjab State vs Ramji Dass and Others

R.S. Nerula, J.—This is State''s petition for revision of the order of the Court of Shri Muni Lal Verma, Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, dated May 27, 1969, wherein he held that though he could not furnish to the accused a copy of an alleged previous statement of Assistant Sub-Inspector Kartar Singh, P.W., said to have been given by him before the Deputy Superintendent of Police Richhpal Singh under Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused could proceed to cross-examine the said Prosecution Witness in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act and he may apply for a copy of the relevant previous statement to the proper authority and in a proper manner for that purpose if it becomes necessary to do so.

The petition has been contested by the learned Counsel for Mukhtiar Singh accused, who had made an application to the Court of Session for supplying a copy of the statement of Assistant Sub-Inspector Kartar Singh alleged to have been recorded by Deputy Superintendent of Police Richhpal Singh either in the Police diary or otherwise. The learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, who appears for the State, has submitted that the statement of Assistant Sub-Inspector Kartar Singh had neither been recorded in the police diary nor during the investigation of the criminal case but had in fact been recorded in some departmental proceeding. The learned State counsel, therefore, conceds that the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not bar the use of the statement in question by the accused, if it is otherwise permissible for him to obtain and utilise the same. It is the common case of both sides that the document in question does not fall within the four corners of Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Counsel, therefore, concede that it is no part of the duty of the officer in charge of the police-station to furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused a copy of the statement in question.

For the same reason the Court cannot order the Public Prosecutor to furnish a copy of such a document u/s 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention of Mr. D.N. Rampal, the learned Assistant Advocate-General, is that the normal right of a party to a litigation u/s 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is restricted, so far as an accused person in a criminal trial is concerned, to the obtaining of only those documents which are mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of contradicting a witness with reference to his previous statement. I find no warrant whatever for such a proposition. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in the following terms:

A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.

Section 145 of the Evidence Act is not made subject to Section 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nor has any other statutory bar to the availing of the normal rights and remedies of a litigant u/s 145 of the Evidence Act has been shown to exist for accused persons in criminal trials. I, therefore, hold that the accused can cross-examine the investigating officer as to his previous statement made by him before the Deputy Superintendent of Police during some departmental proceedings, which statement was reduced to writing--though in third person--and which statement or part thereof is relevant to the matters involved in the trial of the accused. It is further held that if during the course of such cross-examination the accused intends to contradict the witness by confronting him with any part of his such previous statement, it would be incumbent on him to call the attention of the witness to those parts of his previous statement, which are sought to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before his such previous statement can be proved. It necessarily follows that to enable an accused person to exercise his above-mentioned rights he must be permitted to obtain a copy of the relevant previous statement of the witness according to law. This is all that the learned Sessions Judge has ordered. I am, therefore, unable to find any flaw in the orders under revision and have no hesitation in upholding the same. This petition for revision accordingly fails and is dismssed.