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Judgment
M. Jaichandren, J.�Since the issues involved in both the Writ Appeals are similar in nature, they have been taken up together and a Common Order is being passed. The present Writ Appeals had been filed against the Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 19.11.2010, made in W.P. No. 4326 of 2006 and W.P. No. 4813 of 2006.
The First Respondents in the present Writ Appeals were the Petitioners in the Writ Petitions, in W.P. No. 4326 of 2006 and W.P. No. 4813 of 2006, respectively.
The Writ Petition, in W.P. No. 4326 of 2006, had been filed praying that this Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus to forbear the Respondents 2 & 3 therein from taking and enforcing any proceedings or actions, under the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948, as amended by the amending Act 29 of 1989, against the Petitioner, in contravention of the Order issued by the First Respondent, dated 18.9.1996, under the Proviso to Section 1(4) of the Employees'' State Insurance Act stating that the provisions of the said Act is not applicable to it.
The Writ Petition, in W.P. No. 4813 of 2006, had been filed praying that this Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus to forbear the Respondents 2 & 3 therein from taking and enforcing any proceedings or actions, under the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948, as amended by the Act 29 of 1989, initiated against the Petitioner, including the proceedings in notice, dated 17.2.2006, on the file of the Third Respondent issued under Section 45-G of the Act, contrary to the Proviso to Section 1(4) of the said Act, read with the Order issued by the Labour Department of the First Respondent, dated 18.9.1996.
The learned Single Judge, by her Common Order, dated 19.11.2010, had allowed the Writ Petitions setting aside the Order passed by the Third Respondent in the said Writ Petitions, accepting the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioners that the provisions of the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948, are inapplicable to the Petitioners, as they had satisfied the conditions found in the Proviso to Section 1(4) of the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948.
The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants had stated that the letter issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government, Labour Department, Government of Puducherry, dated 18.9.1996, stating that the provisions of the Employees'' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is not applicable to the Employees of the Tourism and Transport Corporation Limited, with effect from 20.10.1989, cannot be held to be valid in the eye of law, as he is not the Authority to issue such proceedings, granting the exemption. Further, it has also been stated that the question as to whether the Petitioners could be exempted under the Proviso to Section 1(4) of the Act cannot be answered by an Authority representing the Government concerned before a proper enquiry had been made and a finding is given thereon, with regard to the comparative benefits made available to the Employees concerned. In fact, there is no finding as to whether the benefits made available to the Employees of the Petitioners are substantially more beneficial than those, which are available under the provisions of the Employees'' State Insurance Act.
It had also been stated that a notice issued under Section 45-A of the Act, ought to be considered to be final and it is for the entities claiming exemption from the provisions of the Act to challenge the same, by proving that the benefits granted to their Employees are substantially similar or more beneficial in nature, as compared to those provided by the Act.
It had also been stated that there is no adjudication by the Government concerned in this regard. It is only the Employees'' Insurance Court which is empowered to go into such questions of facts and to render a final decision, with regard to the disputed facts. As Notices had been issued, under Section 45-A of the Act, they have become final, as they had not been challenged by the Petitioners, till date. Therefore, the Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge, dated 19.11.2010, made in W.P. No. 4326 of 2006 and W.P. No. 4813 of 2006, is erroneous in nature and it is liable to be set aside.
The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:
"1. Regional Director, Employees'' State Insurance Corporation v. Narayan Chandra Rajkhowa and others, 1997 (11) SCC 234;
E.S.I.C. Vs. C.C. Santhakumar, ;
Employees'' State Insurance Corporation Vs. M/s. F. Fibre Bangalore (P) Ltd., ;
Workmen of Bharath Electronics Ltd. Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation, ; and
The Puducherry Slum Clearance Board Vs. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, Union of India (UOI) and Pondicherry State Slum Clearance Board Worker''s Union--> ."
Per contra, the learned Counsels appearing for the Respondents had submitted that all the Service Rules of the Government Employees would apply to the Employees of the Petitioner-Corporations. A Proviso had been added to Section 1(4) of the Act, with effect from 20.10.1989. Similarly, Section 90 of the Act has also been amended. As such, Section 90 of the Act would not apply to a Government establishment after the Amendment had come into force. It is only a declaration that has to be made by the Appropriate Authority granting the exemption. As per Section 2(1) of the Act, the appropriate Government to grant the exemption is the Government of India.
The learned Counsels appearing for the Respondents had also submitted that the issue relating to the grant of exemption cannot be raised before the Employees'' Insurance Court, under Section 75 of the Act.
The learned Counsels appearing for the Respondents had relied on the following decisions in support of their contentions:
"12.1. The District Collector, Erode Dist., Erode v. M. Ponnusamy, 2001 (2) CTC 449.
12.2. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corpn., Hyderabad v. Zuari Cement Ltd., 2008 (1) LLN 142 (AP): 2008 Lab I.C. 1602.
12.3. In Rafique Bibi (D) by Lrs. Vs. Sayed Waliuddin (D) by Lrs. and Others, , the Supreme Court had held as follows:
"8. A distinction exists between a Decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a Decree of the Court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A Decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed in executable by the Executing Court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a Decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior Court failing which he must obey the command of the Decree. A Decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings.
It is not the plea of the Judgment-debtors-Appellants that the Court which passed the Decree did not have the jurisdiction to do so. It is also not their case that a ground for eviction of the Tenants on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent was not available to the Landlords-Respondents within the meaning of the Delhi and Ajmer Act or the successor Rajasthan Act. The only submission made is that before passing the Decree the Court should have afforded the Tenant an opportunity of depositing the rent in arrears, which was not done. Firstly, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that it was for the Tenants to have invited the attention of the Court by making an Application in that regard so as to avail an opportunity of wiping out the effect of their default which gave rise to cause of action to the Respondents, by depositing the rent during the pendency of the Suit. That having not been done, the Tenants-Appellants cannot be heard to urge any infirmity in the Decree. Secondly, accepting it at its face value, in the eyes of law, the challenge seeks to expose a procedural irregularity which may, at best, result in the Decree being termed as an ''illegal Decree'', but that in itself would not amount to branding the Decree as ''without jurisdiction'' or ''a nullity''. The plea which is sought to be urged in the Execution proceedings was available to be raised by the Tenants before the High Court in an Appeal against the Decree. Such a plea was not taken before the passing of the Decree and cannot now be allowed to be urged during the Execution proceedings. It is unfortunate that a Decree of eviction passed in a Suit commenced in the year 1956 and culminating into a Final Decree in the year 1986 is still starving for its execution."
12.4. In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) through Lrs. Vs. Jasjit Singh and Others, , the Supreme Court had held as follows:
"18. It is settled law that a Decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction on the subject matter or on the grounds on which the Decree made which goes to the root to its jurisdiction of lacks inherent jurisdiction is a corum non-judice. A Decree passed by such a Court in a nullity and is non-est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very Authority of the Court to pass Decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. In Bahadur Singh and Another Vs. Muni Subrat Dass and Another, , an Eviction Petition was filed under the Rent Control Act on the ground of nuisance. The dispute was referred to the Arbitration. An Award was made directing the Tenant to run the workshop upto a specified time and thereafter to remove the machinery and to deliver vacant possession to the Landlord. The Award was signed by the Arbitrators, the Tenant and the Landlord. It was filed in the Court. A Judgment and Decree were passed in terms of the Award. On expiry of the time and when the Tenant did not remove the machinery nor delivered vacant possession, execution was levied under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. It was held that a Decree passed in contravention of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act was void and the Landlord could not execute the Decree. The same view was reiterated in Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, . In Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, , a compromise de hors grounds for eviction was arrived at between the parties under Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. A Decree in terms thereof was passed. The possession was not delivered and execution was laid. It was held that the Decree was nullity and, therefore, the Tenant could not be evicted. In Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through his Lrs., the Civil Court decreed eviction but the building was governed by Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act (11 of 1973). It was held that the Decree was without jurisdiction and its nullity can be raised in execution. In Union of India Vs. M/s. Ajit Mehta and Associates, Pune and Others, , a Division Bench to which Sawant, J. as he then was, a member was to consider whether the validity of the Award could be questioned on jurisdictional issue under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act. The Division Bench held that Clause 70 of the, Contract provided that the Chief Engineer shall appoint an Engineer Officer to be sole Arbitrator and unless both parties agree in writing such a reference shall not take place until after completion of the works or termination or determination of the Contract. Pursuant to this contract under Section 8 of the Act, an Arbitrator was appointed and Award was made. Its validity was questioned under Section 30, thereof. The Division Bench considering the scope of Sections 8 & 20(4) of the Act and on review of the case law held that Section 8, cannot be invoked for appointment of an Arbitrator unilaterally but Section 20(4) of the Act can be availed of in such circumstances. Therefore, the very appointment of the Arbitrator without consent of both parties was held void being without jurisdiction. The Arbitrator so appointed inherently lacked jurisdiction and hence, the Award made by such Arbitrator is non-est. In Ghellabhai''s case, Sir C. Farran, Kt., C.J. of Bombay High Court held that the Probate Court alone is to determine whether probate of an alleged will shall issue to the Executor named in it and that the Executor has no power to refer the question of execution of Will to Arbitration. It was also held that the Executor having propounded a Will, and applied for probate, a Caveat was filed denying the execution of the alleged Will, and the matter was duly registered as a Suit, the Executor and the Caveatrix subsequently cannot refer the dispute to Arbitration, signing a submission paper, but such an Award made pursuant thereto was held to be without jurisdiction."
In view of the submissions made by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties concerned and on a perusal of the records available and in view of the decisions cited supra, we are of the considered view that the reliefs prayed for by the Petitioners in the Writ Petitions, the First Respondents in the present Writ Appeals, cannot be granted and the Writ Petitions filed by the First Respondents seeking for the issuance of Writs of Mandamus, attempting to prevent the Appellants herein from initiating further action against them, under the provisions of the Employees'' State Insurance Act, cannot be maintained.
It would not be open to the First Respondents to seek such reliefs to pre-empt the Appellants from taking appropriate steps in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act.
Further, it has been stated by the Appellants that Notices, issued under Section 45-A of the Act, had become final and therefore, the reliefs prayed for by the First Respondents in the Writ Petitions had become infructuous, in view of the further proceedings issued by the Appellants, under Section 45-A of the Act. It would be open to the First Respondents to challenge the Notices issued under Section 45-A of the Act before the Appropriate Authority or forum, in accordance with the procedures established by law. In such circumstances, we find it appropriate to allow the Writ Appeals, setting aside the Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 19.11.2010, made in W.P. No. 4326 of 2006 and W.P. No. 4813 of 2006. Accordingly, the Writ Appeals are allowed. No costs.