High CourtsDivision Bench(1895) 12 MAD CK 0008

The Secretary of State for India vs Kota Bapanamma Garu

Madras High Court · Decided on 4 December 1895 · Citation: (1896) ILR (Mad) 165

HON’BLE JUDGES
Arthur J.H. Collins, C.J · Parker, J

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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 510 words
1.

The question in this appeal is whether the plots three and four in the plan which have been taken up as forest reserve belong to the Government

village of Pedda Kopalli or to the claimant''s village of Lakshminarayana devupeta. The District Judge found in favour of the claimant.

2.

It is admitted that the two plots have, for the last thirty years, been in the possession of the claimant, but the Government Pleader contends that,

under the Madras Forest Act, it is for the claimant to make out his title in the first instance; that claimant has not produced his sale-deed, nor has he

proved as against Government an adverse possession of sixty years. It is alleged that the Bhubund accounts prove Government possession up to

1854, and therefore that the presumption that claimant''s thirty years'' possession continued from an earlier period is rebutted.

3.

There is, however, a clear finding of the District Judge in paragraph 15 of his judgment that there is no satisfactory proof of possession at any

time, or of title, in the Government, We may point out that the limitation of sixty years prescribed by Article 149 of the Limitation Act only applies

to suits brought by, or on behalf of, the Secretary of State. The presumption of the Madras Forest Act is that all unoccupied land is at the disposal

of Government, but if the land be really occupied when a notification is published u/s 4, it will be ground for presuming that the occupant is the

prima facie owner and shifting the onus on to Government see the remarks of this Court in the Periya Kalrayen case S.A. 190 of 1888

unreported). Granted that it is incumbent upon the claimant in the first instance under Sections 4 to 10 to prove some prima facie ground of

ownership before Government can be called upon to disprove his title or prove its own, the onus is certainly shifted when the claimant starts with

an admitted possession and enjoyment for thirty years. The Government could not compel the claimant to prove sixty years'' possession, but must

show a subsisting title of its Own Secretary of State v. Vira Rayan ILR 9 Mad. 175 Secretary of State for India v. Bavotti Haji ILR 15 Mad. 315

and the presumption in favour of Government is only as regards unoccupied land.

4.

Even assuming the Bhubund accounts X and XI to be genuine documents, Exhibit G shows cultivation of these three hamlets in 1865 by the

claimant, and the omission of their names in Exhibits VIII and IX is no more significant than the omission of Jillellagudem, which is admitted to

belong to claimant. It is not, however, necessary to consider the documents since the onus has been shifted on to Government, and the finding is

that no subsisting title has been proved.

5.

The District Judge states that there is no dispute as to boundaries, and that the tracts comprised in the notification admittedly fall within the three

hamlets.

6.

The second appeal is dismissed with costs.