High CourtsFull Bench(1916) 01 MAD CK 0021

The Secretary of State for India in Council vs Rangasamy Ayyangar and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 3 January 1916 · Citation: (1916) ILR (Mad) 831

HON’BLE JUDGES
John Wallis, C.J · Phillips, J · Kumaraswami Sastriyar, J

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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 425 words

John Wallis, C.J.—We think the question must be answered in the affirmative. Mr. Narasimha Ayyangar has called our attention to two

decisions of the Privy Council under Bengal Regulation XI of 1796 which apparently were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges who

decided the cases mentioned in the reference. Under Regulation XI of 1796, Section 4, the Magistrate was to order the attachment of any land or

other real property held by the absentee, and u/s 6 on failure of the absentee to attend within six months after the attachment the lands were to be

at the disposal of the Governor General in Council. It was held by the Privy Council in Mussumat Golab Koonwur v. The Collector of Benares

and Baja Oodit Narain Sing (1847) 4 M.I.A. 246 under the Regulation in a case from Benares governed by the Mitakshara law that the undivided

interest of the defaulting member of the joint family passed to the alienee from Government and in Juggomohun Bukshee v. Roy Mothooranath

Chowdry (1867) 11 M.I.A. 223 their Lordships again took the view that the share of the defaulting member of the joint family was liable to

confiscation.

2.

The provisions of Section 88 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure are wider than the Regulation in so far as they include moveable as well

as Immovable property; but as regards procedure, they deal with the matter in greater detail specifying the manner in which each description of

property is to be attached. What has to be attached under the section in a case such as this is the share of the defaulting member of the joint family,

which is of course subject to the rights of the other members of the family and may be realized by a receiver in a suit for partition or otherwise. We

are unable to agree with the observations of Subrahmanya Ayyar, J., in Re Chinniyan (1903) 2 Wei Cr. 43 that a receiver cannot be appointed

under the section to realize the share of the defaulting member, or that such an appointment would necessarily take the property out of the hands of

the managing member. On the other hand we agree with Collins, C.J., and Shephard, J., in Re Umayan (1903) 2 Weir Cr. 43 that there is nothing

in the language of Section 88 to restrict the meaning of the word property and that it must include the rights and interests of persons who as

members of an undivided family are jointly entitled to the property of the family.