The Sessions Judge of the Tinnevelly Division vs Sivan Chetty

Benson and Munro, JJ.—In this case the accused made a complaint of dacoity against certain persons to the Village Munsif, who gave

information to the Station House Officer, who then came to the village and took a statement from the accused in which the accused repeated the

charge of dacoity against the persons named in his complaint to the Village Munsif. The police referred the charge as false, and, with the sanction

of the Superintendent of Police, the person who made the complaint of dacoity has been proceeded against for an offence u/s 211, Indian Penal

Code, and has been committed to the Sessions. The question is whether the facts alleged against him amount in law to an offence u/s 211, Indian

Penal Code. The matter is by no means free from difficulty, and the decisions in regard to it are conflicting. We are, however, of opinion that the

question mast be answered in the affirmative. The section runs as follows: ""Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person institutes, or causes

to be instituted, any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is

no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person,"" shall be punished as prescribed in the section.

We think that in the present case the complaint to the Village Munsif was a ""charge"" of dacoity and was also the institution of criminal

proceedings against the persons named within the meaning of Section 211. The Criminal Procedure Code does not define what constitutes the

making of a ""charge"" of an offence or what amounts to the ""institution of criminal proceedings"". But, in our opinion, a false ""charge"" in this section

must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law

to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to superior authorities with a view to investigation or other

proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the

difference between them is explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Pull Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v.

Queen Emp, 17 C.c 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings ""and there may

be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge"" of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made

to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge ""but is not the

institution of criminal proceedings"". It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a

charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (section 154) ""or he may"" lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint

(section 191) before a Magistrate "". The Court did not refer to the case of a complaint or information of certain grave offences given to a Village

Magistrate, as it was not necessary for the purpose of the question before the Court, but the whole reasoning of the case is, we think, as applicable

to such information as to information given to the Police u/s 154. u/s 45, Criminal Procedure Code, the Village Magistrate or, as he is called in the

section, the ""village headman,"" is bound to ""forthwith communicate to the nearest Magistrate or to the officer in charge of the nearest Police

Station, whichever is the nearer, any information which he may obtain respecting"" certain grave offences of which dacoity is one. In point of fact in

this Presidency the complaint or information to the Village Magistrate is ordinarily the first step in setting the criminal law in motion in the case of the

grave offences specified in Section 45. The injured person hardly ever gives information direct to the station House Officer of Police (section.

154), or makes a complaint (section 191) to the Magistrate. He almost invariably gives information, or makes his complaint, to the Village

Magistrate, well knowing that the latter will report the information or complaint to the Magistrate or the Station House Officer, or to both, which

latter is the regular course in this Presidency. He has, in fact, set the criminal law in motion just as effectually as if he had gone direct to the Station

House Officer u/s 154 or to the Magistrate u/s 191, for the village headman is bound by law to pass on the information or complaint to those

officers. The case would, of course, be different if the information or complaint was not a matter which the village headman was bound by law to

pass on to the higher constituted authorities, In the matter of the Petition of Jamoona 6 C.n 620. In that case it could not be said that the criminal

law was in any way set in motion. But when the information or complaint is one that the village headman is bound by law to pass on, then the

language of the Full Bench in the case referred to above, is just as applicable to it as to an information given direct to the Station House Officer or

a complaint to the Magistrate.

In the language of the Full Bench, ""whichever of these methods is adopted, the thing done by the accuser is the same, that which is called in the

one case giving information, in the other making a complaint. In each case the steps that follow are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code. In

each the first step taken by the accuser is ordinarily also the last, for from that time the control of the investigation or enquiry passes out of his

hands into those of the constituted authorities; subject to this, that if, after an information before the police, the result of their investigation is adverse

to the complainant, he may renew his complaint to the Magistrate. The procedure by information to the police is by far the more common course of

proceeding, especially where any grave offence is alleged. A system similar to the present in those matters was in force when the Penal Code was

passed in 1860; it was embodied in the First Procedure Code of 1861, and has been continued ever since.

The village headman was part of the machinery of the law for bringing grave offenders to justice long before the Criminal Procedure Code was

passed and that Code recognized, and defined his place in the machinery and imposed definite duties on him in regard to information given or

complaints made to him. It is objected to this view that the Village Magistrate is not the only person who has statutory duty to give information u/s

45, Criminal Procedure Code, and that if a complaint to him can be made the basis of a charge u/s 211, information given to the other persons

specified in that section can equally well be made the basis of such a charge. Legally that is so, but we see no reason to shrink from the result. In

practice, however, it is only to the Village Magistrate that information is given with a view to invoking the action of the Police and superior

Magistrates. But if a man made a complaint to one of the other persons having a legal obligation under that section to report to the Police or

Magistrate, and did this with the intention of setting the criminal law in motion, we think that he would come not only within the terms of the section

but within the mischief which, the law desired to meet. In the case of Emperor v. Jonnalagadda Venkatrayudu 28 M.k 505 in which the facts were

very similar to the present, a Bench of this Court quoted with approval the remark of Mr. Mayne (Criminal Law of India, page 589, second

edition): ""surely information given to A, for the purpose of being passed on to B, and which it was his bounden duty so to pass on, must be

considered as having been given and intended to be given to B."" In that case this. Court also held that when the Station House Officer on receiving

information from the Village Magistrate went to the village and examined the complainant, the complainant made a complaint to the Police u/s 154.

The same view was taken by another Bench of this Court in an unreported case (Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1904). A contrary view was taken in

Criminal Revision Case No. 515 of 1902 (un-reported), but the case does not appear to have been argued, and the Court did not deal with the

question now before us, viz., whether the information or complaint to the Village Magistrate could be regarded as a false charge or the institution of

criminal proceedings. It merely held that the Police Officer was making an investigation u/s 161. In Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1903 another Bench

was ""disposed to think"" that fact similar to those in the present case did not warrant a charge of an offence u/s 211, but only u/s 182, Indian Penal

Code.

In a recent case Chinna Ramana Gowd v. Emperor 31 M. 506, another Bench of this Court after consideration of the authorities held, on facts

similar to those in the present case, that the statement made to the Station House Officer could not be treated as a complaint or charge, but must

be regarded as a statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation u/s 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and could not be made the

basis of a charge u/s 211, Indian Penal Code. It also held that the information or complaint to the Village Magistrate could not be regarded as a

charge ""because the Village Magistrate had no power to investigate"" the complaint, or as the institution of criminal proceedings, ""because in its view

it was the report of the Village Magistrate not the person who made a complaint to the Village Magistrate who set the criminal law in motion. For

the reasons stated at length in the earlier part of this judgment we are unable to agree with this view. We think that it does not take sufficient

account of the position of the Village Magistrate as part of the criminal machinery of the administration and of the legal obligation of the Village

Magistrate to take action on the information given or complaint made to him. The reasons for the decision were largely based on the case In the

matter of the Petition of Jamoona 6 C.k 620, but in the latter case the complaint was made to the Station Staff Officer who was not bound by any

statutory provisions to investigate it or to take any action whatever in regard to it. We do not think that such a case is an authority with regard to

the present case, where the Village Magistrate is bound by law to take action and to report the information or complaint to the authorities

empowered to investigate or to take cognizance of the alleged offence. It is now settled law that if an aggrieved person gives false information of an

offence to the Station House Officer (section 154, Criminal Procedure Code) he may be proceeded against for an offence u/s 211 and may be

liable to imprisonment for seven years. It seems unreasonable to hold that if the same person gives the same information to the Village Magistrate,

knowing and intending that it shall be passed on to the Station House Officer and the superior Magistrate, he shall not be guilty of any offence u/s

211 but only of the lesser offence under section, 82, Indian Penal Code, with a liability limited to imprisonment for six months instead of seven

years. The language of Section 211 does not require us to place any such limitation on its scope and we see no reason for holding that the

Legislature intended it. In conclusion, it seems desirable to point out that every information of an offence does not necessarily amount to a charge

of an offence. A man might give the information which he had heard from others, and without himself alleging the truth of the information. But that is

not the present case. Here the person aggrieved made an accusation of dacoity against certain persons named by him, and charged them as guilty

to his own knowledge. In our opinion the accused in the case before us was rightly charged with an offence u/s 211, Indian Penal Code, in regard

to the information or complaint of dacoity which he laid before the Village Magistrate. We, therefore, refuse to quash the commitment, and direct

the Sessions Judge to proceed to dispose of the case according to law.

Sankaran Nair, J.

The question is whether the commitment made under the following circumstances should be set aside.

Sivan Chetty the accused appeared before the Village Magistrate of Karimkulam and made a statement which was reduced to writing that

certain persons therein named entered his house the previous night and committed the offence of dacoity by robbing him and the members of his

family of considerable property. After stating the facts, he said I heard this read out. It is correct and signed it. The statement is attested by a

witness and also signed by the Village Magistrate. There was no prayer therein for an enquiry. The Village Magistrate submitted this statement with

a report of his own to the Sub-Magistrate (Exhibit B.) and sent another report to the Station House Officer (Exhibit C.) requesting him to inquire

into the case. Thereupon the Station House Officer proceeded to the village and took a statement from the accused (Exhibit B.) which, the

Sessions Judge rightly says, shows that it must have been recorded in answer to questions, many of them in the nature of searching cross-

examination."" The Police Inspector submitted what is called a referred charge sheet to the Sub-Magistrate who agreed with the Police that the

charge was false and struck the case off his file.

The accused is now prosecuted u/s 211 of the Indian Penal Code for instituting false criminal proceedings or a false charge. The charge is that

the accused made a false complaint to the Village Magistrate and to the Station House Officer."" The Sessions Judge, being of opinion that

according to a recent decision of this Court in Chinna Ramana Gowd v. Emperor 31 M. k 506, the accused has not committed any offence u/s

211, has requested the High Court to set aside the commitment. It is not denied that if the facts alleged by the prosecution are proved, the accused

must be convicted of an offence u/s 182, Indian Penal Code, of giving false information. It is also admitted by the Public Prosecutor that the

decision in Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 1908, Chinna Ramana Gowd v. Emperor 31 M.k 506, is directly in point. But it is argued that that

decision should not be followed and the question has accordingly been referred to the Full Bench for decision.

I shall first consider whether the accused is liable to conviction for the statement made to the Police Officer. The Police Officer in charge of a

station may investigate any cognizable case within his jurisdiction. It has, therefore, been held that a false complaint of such an offence to him would

make the offender liable to conviction u/s 211, Indian Penal Code. Is this statement (Exhibit D) before us a complaint or statement given for the

purpose of investigation or is it only a statement made by a witness to a Police Officer in the course of his investigation? The first information given

to a Police Officer may be oral or in writing. If given orally, it must be reduced to writing, read over to the informant and signed by him (section

154). A Police Officer on receiving information shall proceed to investigate the offence (section 157) except in the cases referred to in Clause (a)

of that section. He may require the attendance of witnesses. The witness shall be bound to answer"" all questions, except those referred to in

Section 161, put to him relating to the accused and the statement so made shall not be signed by the witness nor used as evidence. There is no

obligation on his part to answer truly and it has been held that he cannot be convicted for making any false statement. Thus it is clear that the only

statement which a Police Officer can ask an informant or a witness to sign is the one made by the first informant u/s 154. In the case before us the

Village Magistrate and not the accused was the first informant of the Station House Officer. That information was in writing (Exhibit C). There was,

therefore, nothing to be reduced to writing u/s 154. If the information is to be taken as given orally, then the statement should be taken from the

Village Magistrate, the informant. I am unable, therefore, to regard the statement taken from the accused as one legally made u/s 154. It is also

clear to me that it was really made under Sections 161 and 162. After receiving the information (Exhibit C.) from the Village Magistrate, the Police

Officer was bound to investigate this offence u/s 157 and the examination of the accused and any other persons who may have been examined

must be taken to have been made under Sections 161 and 162. To hold that this is a statement u/s 154 would be to deny the protection afforded

by law to a person making a statement to the Police under Sections 161 and 162. Again, a complaint or the institution of a criminal proceeding is a

person''s voluntary act. He might state what he likes and no more, whereas u/s 161 a person is bound to answer questions and may have to

undergo, as in this case, a searching cross-examination. It is difficult to hold Exhibit D. which contains statements, against the truth of the

complainant''s case to be a complaint. If the learned Judges in Emperor v. Jonnalagadda Venkatrayudu 28 M.k 505, take the contrary view, then I

think they are wrong. In the case of Mallappa Reddi v. Emperor 27 M. 127 the original information was given to the Station House Officer by the

accused of what the judgment treated--as the reference to Section 154 shows--as a cognizable offence.

Does the statement Exhibit A made to the Village Magistrate come within the scope of Section 211? The decided cases are clearly in support

of our view maintained in Chinna Ramana Gowd v. Emperor 31 M.k 506 that it does not. In the matter of the Petition of Jamoona 6 C.b 620;

which was the case of a complaint before a Staff Officer, found to be false after enquiry by the Military authorities the learned Judges said ""the

Station Staff Officer having neither magisterial nor police powers... it seems to us that Section 211 will not apply. We do not think it is unduly

refining the words of the section to say that the false charge must be made to a Court or to an Officer who has powers to investigate and send up

for trial."" This case was followed and applied to the case of a complaint before a Village Munsif by Benson and Bhashyam Iyengar, JJ. in Criminal

Appeal No. 30 of 1903. That was an appeal against an acquittal. The lower Court held in that case.... In the matter of the Petition of Jamoona 6

C.k 620 lays down that the false charge must be made to a Court or to an Officer who has powers to investigate. Now the Village Magistrate has

no magisterial powers except in regard to petty offences. He is not a Court in respect to this offence. The charge u/s 211, cannot be sustained.

The accused though it was found he made a false charge to a Village Munsif was accordingly acquitted. On appeal the High Court held we are

disposed to agree with the Head Assistant Magistrate that the facts alleged do not amount to an offence u/s 211, Indian Penal Code."" But they

directed a trial for an offence u/s 182(a). This case is directly in point and was decided on appeal by the local Government against an acquittal.

See also the judgment in Criminal Revision Case No. 515 of 1902.

To the same effect is the decision of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and myself in Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 1908, Chinna Ramana Gowd v.

Emperor 31 M.k 506.

I see no reason to differ from these decisions. In the words of Mr. Mayne, paragraph 376, commenting on Section 211 ""a false charge made

to a person who has no magisterial or police authority, does not come within Section 211."" The statement before the Village Magistrate is not the

first step n a proceeding which, in the ordinary course, will lead to the conviction of the accused, if found guilty. The Village Magistrate cannot

enquire into the allegations himself, cannot examine witnesses, cannot place the accused before a Magistrate for trial, cannot do anything to the

prejudice of the accused on that statement. It was argued that the power conferred by Section 45, Criminal Procedure Code, on the Village

Magistrate on receiving the statement to submit a report to the Police or the Magistrate shows that the statement must be treated as the institution

of a criminal proceeding or making a charge. This power, it will be noticed, is conferred on him in common with any ""owner or occupier of land

and agent of such owner and occupier."" It, therefore, follows that if the statement before the Village Magistrate which of course need not be in

writing is the institution of a criminal proceeding, so is any similar statement made before any occupier of land or his agent. A criminal proceeding

can be instituted only in the King''s Court or before any person appointed by the King for that purpose and I find it difficult to believe that the

persons above-named have been constituted authorities, before whom criminal proceedings may be instituted for the sole reason that they have to

communicate any information they might receive about the offence. I need hardly state that the information given to the Village Magistrate is

different in every respect from the criminal information"" known to English law which is a statement informing the Magistrate of the offence for which

a summons or warrant is required. This information is not oven a complaint or an accusation. Further the persons referred to in Section 45

including the Village Munsif need not report in bailable cases with a few exceptions and to the information in such cases, therefore, this argument

will not apply. How can it be a proceeding in some cases and not in others? Above all, if the Village Magistrate or the other persons referred to,

do not act u/s 45 neither the person aggrieved nor any officer has any power under law to compel him to submit the report though he may be

punished under the Indian Penal Code. If it were a criminal proceeding, the informant would be entitled to have his statement enquired into and

disposed of: and to treat it as a step forward taken for the conviction of the accused, if his guilt is proved. The statement itself need not be

transmitted u/s 45. It is only the information that has to be communicated.

For the above reasons I am of opinion that the accused cannot be charged for any offence u/s 211 on account of the statements made before the

Village Magistrate and the Station House Officer. I would, therefore, quash the commitment.