High CourtsSingle Bench(1997) 08 MAD CK 0011

The Special Tahsildar (Adi Dravidar Welfare) and Land Acquisition Officer, Cheranmahadevi vs A.K. Jamal and 5 others

Madras High Court · Decided on 28 August 1997

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jagadeesan, J
CASE NUMBER
Appeal. No. 707 of 1997 and C.M.P. No. 11447/97

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Judgment

62 paragraphs · 1,393 words

Jagadeesan, J.—By consent of both the counsels the appeal itself is taken up for final disposal. The appellant herein acquired an extent of 73

cents in Kolumadai Village for the purpose of providing house sites to the Adi Dravidars. The Respondents are the owners of the land. A

necessary notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, was published on 4.4.90. However the appellant took possession of the Land on

17.8.89. There is nothing on record to show that the possession had been taken with the consent of the Respondents. The Land Acquisition

Officer passed the Award in Award No. 1/1991 dt.18.9.90 wherein he has fixed the compensation for the land at Rs. 20/- per cent. The

respondents preferred a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Sub-Court, Cheranmahadevi had enhanced the compensation for the

land from Rs. 20/- per cent to Rs. 300/- per cent. The appellant did not produce any documents. Only the respondents produced four documents.

On both the sides oral evidence was let in. After considering the oral evidence as well as the documents produced by the respondents the lower

Court has fixed the compensation at Rs. 300/- per cent by the judgment dt. 18.1.1996 in L.A.O.P. No. 18/92. As against the same the present

appeal has been preferred.

2.

The only question argued before this court is the lower Court has relied upon two documents A.2 and A.3 dt. 2.4.85 and 25.5.91 Ex.A.2 is

prior to 4(1) notification and Ex.A.3 is subsequent to 4(1) notification. The lower Court is not correct in taking into consideration Ex.A.3 for fixing

the value of the land since the same is subsequent to 4(1) notification. Further it is contended by the learned Govt. Pleader that since no one

connected with the documents have been examined the same cannot be accepted in view of the recent Supreme Court judgment.

3.

The counsel for the respondents however contended that the documents relied upon by the lower Court are 5 years prior to the date of 4(1)

notification and one year subsequent to the date of 4(1) notification. There is no hard and fast rule that the documents subsequent to 4(1)

notification should not be considered at all. If there is no document available of recent origin, very close to the date of 4(1) notification then the

lower Court can consider the nearest proximate document and ascertain the market value of the land. Now that the lower Court has passed the

award by accepting the documents. The objection now raised by the Govt. Pleader with regard to the non-examination of the parties cannot be

entertained as the same is belated one. The Appellant did not raise any objection with regard to the marking of the documents, before the lower

Court.

In the recent judgment reported in 1996 LACC 196 = AIR 1996 SC (sic) it has been held as follows:-

3) It is settled law in reference u/s 18, claimant being dissatisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, when the proceedings are taken

u/s 20 of the Act, burden is always on the claimant like plaintiff to adduce reliable and acceptable evidence to prove proper, just and adequate

compensation to the acquired land. If such an evidence was adduced, burden shifts on to the State to disprove it. It is further settled law that the

sales transaction filed either in the narration of award or documents, without examination of either the vendee or by the vendor is not evidence. It is

the duty of the Court to carefully assess the evidence on the touchstone of human conduct and prudent purchaser. Admittedly, in this case, though

reference to four sales transactions has been made by the Reference Court, neither the vendee nor the vendor was examined nor was it established

that the sale consideration which passed thereunder is true and the price for which the sales came to be executed, were real one between willing

vendor and willing vendee. Equally, burden is on the claimant to establish that the lands relating to the sales transactions and the land under

acquisition are possessed of same value, nature of the lands are same and capable to fetch same price, and so also other situations as comparable

features. Unfortunately, neither the reference Court nor the High Court has looked into this legal aspect of the matter and proceeded on the terms

of those sale deeds. It is equally settled law that the Courts should avoid feats of imaginations to fix fanciful price, and sit in the armchair of willing

vendee to see whether a prudent purchaser acting in normal market condition would be willing to offer the price which are mentioned in the sale

instances. The Court should clearly and carefully evaluate the evidence and determine market Value avoiding needless burden on the exchequer

and according adequate and just compensation to the acquired land. The very approach adopted by the courts below is beset with illegalities and,

therefore, we do not find any legal basis to consider the evidence on record to determine proper and adequate compensation in respect of the

acquired land.

3.

Under these circumstances, we are left with no option but to set aside the decree and award of the Reference Court as well as of the High

Court and remit the matter to the reference Court to give an opportunity to the claimant as well as the Land Acquisition Officer to adduce evidence

in the case and then to determine the compensation according to law.

In the decision reported in Inder Singh v. Union of India (1993(3) S.C.C. 240) while dealing with the rights of the claimants to receive just and

reasonable compensation and also fixation of the market value of the lands as on the date of the publication of the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land

Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court, has observed as follows:

It would be possible to have reliable evidence when sale transactions are proved by either the vendor or the vendee, and if either of them was not

available, the attesting witness who had personal knowledge of the transaction is to be examined by producing either the original sale deed or

certified copies thereof as evidence. u/s 51-A of the Act as amended in 1984 the certified copies have been permitted to be brought on record as

evidence of sale transaction recorded therein. The examination of the witnesses is to find that the sale transactions are bona fide and genuine

transactions between willing vendor and willing vendee as reasonable prudent men and the price mentioned is not throw-away price at arms length

or distress sales or brought into existence to inflate market value of the lands under acquisition and the sales are accommodating one. Equally it

must be brought on record the comparative nature of the lands covered under the sale deed and the acquired lands whether adjacent or actually

distant are possessed of similar advantages and whether transactions themselves are genuine and bona fide transactions. This proposition of law

since settled law, in fairness has not been disputed across the bar. The contention is that at the relevant time it was not being insisted upon.

Therefore, none of the witnesses was called upon to prove the sale deed or to prove the sale transactions. Therefore, when evidence of potential

value is available, the same could be considered. We find merit in the contention. At one time we thought of remanding the cases but we find that it

would be needless prolongation and the complexion on ground by now would have been completely changed. In view of the above settled legal

position and the circumstances, the documentary evidence of salt transactions or in the mutation entries on either side are clearly not admissible and

therefore, they cannot be looked into, and are accordingly excluded Iron consideration"".

Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgments, I have no other option except to set aside the order of the lower

Court in L.A.O.P. No. 18/92 and remand the matter to the lower Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the observations made by the Apex

Court in the above referred judgment. Accordingly the appeal is allowed The Court fees is directed to be refunded In view of the disposal of the

appeal the C.M.P. No. 11447 of 1997 is closed. No costs.