The State vs S. Gurdial Singh

These proceedings have arisen on a petition of the Advocate General and notice was issued to the respondent to show cause as to why he be not dealt with for contempt of the Court of S. Charan Singh Tiwana, Magistrate 1st Class, Malerkotla. Fourteen persons were alleged to have participated in the commission of various offences including one u/s 307/149, Penal Code. After investigation twelve out of them had been put up for trial and the remaining two were stated to be fugitives from justice. An application for bail was made on behalf of the accused and it came up before the Magistrate on 22-11-1951; but no orders on it could be passed as the Prosecuting Inspector, who had been specially deputed to conduct the case on behalf of the state, was not present. On the next date, viz., 28-11-51 the two absconding accused Hira Singh and Tek Singh were also present, as they had been apprehended and forwarded with supplementary challans. The Presiding Officer, S. Charan Singh Tiwana, had not yet started court work and was dictating a letter to the District Judge when S. Gurdial Singh Dhillon, who is a retired Inspector General of Police of the erstwhile Patiala State, and is, at present, a, Member of the Pepsu Legislative Assembly, walked up to him and took his seat on the dais. He requested the Magistrate to release Kartar Singh, one of the accused, on bail; as he was his friend. He also said that if that accused was not released that day his (respondent''s) election programme would be upset and that he would stand surety for him even though the amount of bail was to be Rs. 5000.

When he (respondent) disclosed the object of his visit to the Magistrate nobody else was present in the Court Room. The respondent was told in reply by the Magistrate that the bail application was yet to be argued and that he had not till then studied the facts of the case. It was further observed by the Magistrate that the case of Kartar Singh appeared to be similar to that of the other accused and, therefore, either all of them would be bailed out or none at all. S. Gurdial Singh Dhillon thereafter left the Court room. This had happened at about 10-30 A.M. Earlier at about 10-15 A.M. the respondent had called at the residence of the Magistrate and not finding him there, he came to the Court room and approached the Magistrate with the request above mentioned. The bail application was taken up on 28-11-1951 and all the accused were enlarged on bail. The Magistrate in his bail order also mentioned the fact of S. Gurdial Singh Dhillon having approached him on behalf of Kartar Singh. The above facts are proved by the affidavits of S. Charan Singh Tiwana and Prof. Gurdial Singh of the Malerkotla College, who, was living in the same house as S. Charan Singh Tiwana. The respondent in his reply has stated that on the date of hearing previous to 28-11-1951 the Magistrate had said that, all the accused could expect bail only after Hira Singh, absconding accused, was produced in Court. Keeping in view that observation of the Magistrate he took Hira Singh to the Court and himself walked into the Court room. On getting on to the dais and seating himself there, he said to the Magistrate that he had'' brought S. Hira Singh Bathal, as desired by the Court on the previous hearing and requested him to take up the bail application at his earliest possible, as he was in a hurry to go back and added that he was prepared to stand surety in any amount if the bail was allowed. The Magistrate told him that he would just take up the case upon which he left the room.

This statement of the respondent has been controverted in his affidavit by S. Charan Singh Tiwana. According to that affidavit the respondent never informed him (Magistrate) that he had brought Hira Singh Bathala accused and that he had, on the contrary, said that he did not know if Hira Singh had come and that he would make enquiries and produce him in Court in case he was near about.

In the last paragraph of his reply the respondent urged that

whatever he did was in the honest belief that he was within his limits, if in any case he may be deemed to have gone beyond the limits and to have in any way exceeded, he , tenders an, apology.

On 1-7-1952 the respondent took time to produce evidence in support of his contention; on 7th July but instead put in an application stating that the respondent tenders unconditional apology for his conduct and throws himself at the mercy of this Hon''ble Court. As mentioned above, no evidence has been led by the respondent in support of the stand taken up by him in his reply. The accusation against the accused is established by the affidavits of Prof. Gurdial Singh and S. Charan Singh Tiwana, There is no scope for doubt that S. Gurdial Singh Dhillon approached S. Charan Singh, Tiwana in Court with the object of influencing his decision in the matter of bail which was before him. What the respondent did was flagrant interference with the administration of justice, as he tried to persuade the Magistrate to give his decision in favour of a particular accused in whom he was deeply interested and whose services he wanted to avail of in his election campaign. The conduct of S. Gurdial Singh Dhillon was both audacious and reprehensible and constitutes a contempt of the Court.

What now remains to be considered is whether any punishment be imposed on the contemner inspite of his unconditional apology. In an apology an expression of the sense of remorse and regret for the objectionable act amounting to an offence is inherent. Section 3, Patiala Contempt of Courts Act under which the proceedings were s taken also permits acceptance of an apology if it is to the satisfaction of the Court. An apology sincerely expressed and unreservedly, and unconditionally tendered may, under proper circumstances, be accepted even where the contempt is of a grave type; for, it invariably extenuates the gravity of the offence and a lenient view of the act of the contemner is warranted. It is also equally clear that an apology is not a universal ready panacea for any sort of contempt committed and the contemner in an appropriate case of high contempt may be punished inspite of his apology however abjectly and genuinely offered. In the present case we are satisfied that the apology has proceeded from a repentent mind and the respondent has abundantly realised his blunder. His case will, we hope, serve as an eye opener and a warning to others.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case we would'' not award any punishment to the contemner but accept his apology