High CourtsDivision Bench(2001) 03 PAT CK 0022

The State of Bihar vs M/s. Parte Products (in 1620), M/s. Lucky Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. (in 1621) and M/s. Lucky Biscuits Company (in 1623)

Patna High Court · Decided on 21 March 2001 · Citation: (2001) 2 PLJR 815

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.N. Jha, J · I.P. Singh, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
L.P.A. No''s. 1620, 1621, 1623 of 2000

AI Structured Summary

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Judgment

4 paragraphs · 637 words
1.

These appeals have been heard together as they arise out of the common judgment of the learned Single Judge. The dispute relates to requirement to take licence under Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. The respondents claim to be manufacturers of confectionary items. The writ petition preferred by them have been allowed following the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & ors. vs. Janta In. Udyog and others, AIR 1991 S.C.447 and three judgments of this Court in Britannia Industries Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others , Pooja Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, and M/s. Jamshedpur Beverages vs. State of Bihar & ors., 1996(1) East.Cr.C.389 Patna, two of which by Division Benches.

2.

The case of the State of Bihar is that as the respondents store the commodities exceeding prescribed limits they were required to take licence. It is not disputed that the respondents do not come under the definition of the terms ''dealer'' under Clause 2(e) of the Unification Order. Reliance, however, has been placed on Clause 18, which lays down that no person shall, either by himself or by any person on his behalf, store or have in his possession at any time any trade article mentioned in Schedule I and Schedule II in quantity exceeding the limits fixed under an order issued by the Central Government or by the State Government with prior concurrence of the Central Government by notification in Official Gazette from time to time. It would appear that the restriction on the storage of trade articles under clause 18 can be fixed only by the Central Government or by the State Government with prior concurrence of the Central Government by issuing a notification in Official Gazette.

3.

In this view of the matter, when the cases were taken up for hearing earlier on 13.3.2001, counsel for the appellants was directed to produce a copy of the notification, if any, issued under Clause 18 of the Unification Order to find out whether a person other than the dealers, as defined in the Unification Order is required to take licence for the purpose of storage of the commodities in question. When the cases were taken up today counsel for the appellants fairly stated that no such notification under Clause 18 of the Unification Order has been issued by the State Government or by the Central Government. He, however, referred to notification bearing G.S.R. 49 dated 17.10.1985 of the State Government. From bare perusal of the said notification it appears that the storage limits as mentioned therein have been fixed under Clause 3 of the Unification Order. Clause 3 of the Unification Order refers to dealers, it lays down that no dealer shall, after the commencement of this order i.e. Unification Order carry on business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any of the trade articles mentioned in Schedule I except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the Licensing Authority under the provisions of the Unification Order. As Clause 3 applies in terms to ''dealers'' and the respondents herein do not fall in the category of dealer, as they are neither engaged in the business of either purchase or sale or storage for sale of any trade articles and the articles which they manufactured are not included in the Schedule, we have no doubt in our mind that the notification dated 17.10.85 referred to above is not applicable to them.

4.

In the result, we have no hesitation to hold that the respondents are not required to take licence under the Unification Order and consequently, we do not find any error in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.