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Man Mohan Singh Gujral, J.—The Central Bureau of Investigation, Delhi Special Police Establishment, New Delhi, registered a case against Messrs Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani, and some others u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, in July 1967 and as a result of investigation filed a number of charge sheets against the Institute and some others. Though the offences in the case were committed in district Hissar but the charge sheets were filed in the Court of the Special Magistrate First Class, Ambala Cantt., who had been conferred powers of a Judicial Magistrate First Class to be exercised within the limits of all districts in Haryana State.
In one of these cases (Case No. 5/1 of 1968) Shri Ram Niwas Birla and Messrs Birla Mills Ginning and Pressing Factory, Malout, were prosecuted u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violating Notification No. 10 (1)/6-CLB II/79 dated 20th February 1967 issued by the Textile Commissioner under the Cotton Control Order, 1955. This order was made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The notification of the Textile Commissioner referred to above prohibited the transportation of cotton bales from Punjab State to Haryana State. In Case No. 5/1 of 1968 the allegations were that the two accused had transported 104 bales of cotton from Punjab to Haryana. In another case (Case No 4/1 of 1968) besides the two accused persons mentioned above, Pushkar Datt Makharia. Champalal Rajgarhia, Narain Parshad and Messrs Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani, were challaned on the allegation that they had entered into a conspiracy to transport cotton from Punjab to Haryana in contravention of the notification mentioned above. These accused were prosecuted u/s 120 B of the Indian Penal Code read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and also u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. In the third case (Case No. 6/2 1967) charge-sheet was filed against Messrs Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani, Pushkar Dutt Makharia, Champalal Rajgarhia, Ranchordas, Syam Sunder and Vijay Mal Sand. The charge-sheet related to offences u/s 120 B of the Indian Penal Code read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. These offences had been committed at Bombay and Bhiwani, and as the Magistrate at Bhiwani had the jurisdiction to try the offences, the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Ambala. In the fourth case (Case No. 7/2 of 1968) charge-sheet was filed against Bhiwani Textile Mills, Bhiwani, through Champalal Rajgarhia and P. D. Makharia, Champalal Rajgarhia, Pushkar Dutt Makharia and Ganpat Rai Mangla. In his case the charge-sheet was also in respect of offences u/s 1208 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and also in respect of substantive offences u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
By a common judgment dated 21st December 1968 the learned Special Magistrate First Class Ambala Cantt., discharged all the accused in Case No 5/1 of 1968 and Case No. 4/1 of 1968 holding that the charge was groundless. In the third case bearing No 6/2 of 1967 the learned Special Magistrate only framed charges against Pushkar Dutt Makharia, Chimpalal Rajgarhia, Ranchordas and Vijay Mal Sand and discharged the other accused. These accused were also discharged in respect of some other offences. At this stage it is not necessary to refer in detail to the charges framed against the various accused. In the fourth case (Case No. 7/2 of 1968) all the accused were discharged by order dated 23rd January 1969.
Aggrieved against the above orders the state through the Public Prosecutor, Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Police Estab ishment, New Delhi, filed four revision petitions in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, challenging the various orders of discharge passed by the Special Magistrate. The accused also filed three revision petitions for setting aside the order whereby charges were framed against them and they were committed to stand their trial. All these revision petitions were heard by the sessions Judge, Hissar, and by order dated 1st December 1969 they were ordered to be returned for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction with the finding that the Court at Hissar had no jurisdiction to hear the revision petitions Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, the state has filed four separate criminal revision petitions to this Court being Criminal Revision Nos. 70 to 73 of 1970 Before filing these petitions the State had also filed revision petitions in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ambala, which are pending disposal there. In the four revision petitions filed in this Court, besides praying for seating aside the order of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, it was also prayed that the revision petitions pending in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ambala, be withdrawn to this Court and the various orders of the Special Magistrate discharging the accused be quashed.
One of the principal questions that arise for determination in this case relates to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, to hear the revision petitions, it being the contention of the petitioners in all these revision petitions that the Sessions Judge, Hissar, had erred in returning the revision petitions for presentation to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ambala.
The impugned order in all these four cases had been passed by Shri V. K Jain, Special Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambala Cantt who, u/s 12 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, had been conferred powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class within the limits of all districts in Haryana State. By virtue of the provisions of section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code Shri Jain had also been conferred the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to try or commit cases investigated by the Government of India through the Special Police Establishment. This power could be exercised throughout the State of Haryana. It is common case of the parties in these cases that all the proceedings had been taken at Ambala Cantt and the impugned orders were also passed at that place. There is also no controversy that the Court presided over by Shri Jain in located at Ambala Cantt. where he ordinarily held Court though it was open to him to try any particular case at any other place within the area of Haryana State.
In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties reference will have to be made to section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the relevant portion of which is in the following terms:
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge or Chief Judicial Magistrate, may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court and may when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order, be suspended and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
The above provision empowers the Courts mentioned therein to call for the records of inferior criminal Courts with a view to examine them for the purpose of satisfying themselves with regard to the legality or propriety of order passed by such inferior Courts. This jurisdiction can, however, only be exercised in respect of an inferior Court which is "situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction." The expression "situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction" came up for interpretation before the Madras High Court in Valia Ambu Poduval v. Emperor I. L. R. 30 Mad. 136, and it was observed as follows:
The word "situate" means fixed or located when applied to a Court it must be taken to refer to a place where the Court ordinarily tits." In this case the controversy arose because there were two sessions divisions in the same district and the Magistrate who had decided the ease had headquarters within the local limits of one sessions division while the offence had been committed within the local limits of the other sessions division. The question arose as to which Sessions Judge was competent to hear the appeal and on the analogy of section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was held that the appeal would lie to the Court of Session in whose jurisdiction the Court or the Magistrate was located irrespective of the fact whether the offence was committed within the local limits of the Sessions Judge''s jurisdiction or not.
The ratio of the above decision was noticed with approval by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hira Lal v. Emperor A. I. R. 1928 Lah. 196, In'' this case the petitioner, who was being tried by Mr. Boyd, Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, for offences under sections 162, 163, etc., of the Indian Penal Code which were alleged to have been committed at Simla had challenged the jurisdiction of Mr. Boyd to try the case on the ground that the notification of the Local Government u/s 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code was ultra vires in as much as the words "any local area" occurring in section 14 could not be extended to cover a whole province. It was contended that the expression "any local area occurring in section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code was restricted to any local area within a specified district or sessions division. In support of this contention one of the arguments raised was that if the expression "any local area" was given wider meaning there would be difficulty as regards appeals from the orders of the Special Magistrate appointed u/s 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code having jurisdiction throughout the Province. While referring to the case of Valia Ambu Poduval (supra) the argument was repelled as under:
The difficulty suggested by Mr. Beechey as regards appeals from the orders of a Special Magistrate having jurisdiction throughout the Punjab does not at present arise but we gee no reason to doubt the correctness of the Madras High Court decision in a similar case, where it was held that the appeal would lie to the Sessions Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Magistrate was in any particular case holding his Court.
In Rahim Poonaji v. Abdul Rahim AIR. 1953 MB 156, it was also held that the jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition by a Sessions Judge is determined by reference to the situation of the Court by which the order sought to be revised is passed and not the place of offence.
A similar question arose for decision before the Rajasthan High Court in Babulal v. State 1962 (1) Cri. L. J. 670. In this case the appellant had been convicted u/s 304-A of the Indian Penal Code by the City Magistrate, Jaipur. Question arose as to whether the appeal lay to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City NO. 2, or to the Court of Sessions Judge of Jaipur district. The place of occurrence was not located within the jurisdiction of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City No. 2, though the Court of the Magistrate was situate in his jurisdiction. Following the view of law expressed in Valia Ambu Poduwal''s case, it was held that the Additional Sessions Judge, City No. 2, had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Court of the Magistrate had its headquarters within his jurisdiction and was an inferior criminal Court within the local limits of that Court''s jurisdiction.
On behalf of the petitioner, for the contention that the Sessions Judge, Hissar, had the jurisdiction to hear the revision petition reliance is mainly placed on The Public Prosecutor v. Sadananda. Patnaik 13 Cri. L.J. 850 Lalta Prasad Saxena Vs. State, and K.C. Paipal Vs. The State of Kerala,
In Sadanada Patnaik''s case the ratio of the decision in the earlier Madras case of Valla Ambu Poduwal was noticed and it was observed that this decision was not in point, as in Valia Ambu Poduwal''s case there were two sessions divisions in the same district. In Sadanada Patnaik''s case the facts were as follows. The old Ganjam Collectorate was divided into an agency district and a non-agency district and there were separate Sessions Judges for each district. In the agency district the Agent himself was the Sessions Judge. The same person had been appointed Sub-Divisional Magistrate First Class for certain areas in both the districts while his headquarters were at Russelkonda which was in non-agency district. The Agent transferred a case to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gumsoor (whose headquarters were at Russelkonda) to try the case in his capacity as a first class Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the agency district. The case resulted in conviction and the appeal was taken to the Sessions Judge of the Ganjam Sessions Division and not to the Agent. On these facts it was held that the Magistrate had tried the case as a Magistrate of the agency tract and that the proper forum of appeal was the Agent and not the Sessions Judge of the Ganjam Sessions Division. A perusal of these facts would show that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, though exercising jurisdiction both in Agency and non-agency tracts, was exercising separate jurisdiction in both the areas. It was not a case where jurisdiction had been conferred u/s 12(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code in any local area which included both the agency and the non-agency districts. In each district there was a separate sessions division. On the other hand, in Valla Ambu Poduwal''s case, the facts of which are analogous to the facts of the present case, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate extended to both the sessions divisions though his headquarters were in one sessions division. In such a situation, he was an inferior criminal Court in respect of the sessions division where his headquarters are located. In Sadananda Patnaik''s case the Agency Deputy Magistrate, Russelkonda was not subordinate to the Sessions Court of non-agency sessions division of Ganjam in regard to the Magistrate''s jurisdiction in the agency district.
In Lalta Prasad Saxena''s case the facts were these. The petitioner was being tried for an offence u/s 161 of the Indian Penal Code by a Magistrate First Class, United Provinces, at Lucknow as powers had been conferred on him to try or commit for trial all cases investigated by the Government of India, Special Police Establishment, throughout the United Provinces. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try the case at Lucknow was challenged by the petitioner on two grounds, namely, that the notification conferring powers on the Magistrate to try cases throughout the State was an abuse of the powers conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code on the State Government and that the notification was wholly illegal. In support of the second contention it was urged that the expression "in any local area" occurring in sub-section (1) of section 14 of Criminal Procedure Code contemplated a defined area within a district and could not include the entire State. While repelling this contention the following observations were made by Raghubar Dayal, J.--
The expression "local area" is wide enough to include the entire State. However, the Code contemplates the appointment of a Special Magistrate having jurisdiction within the entire district or a certain area within it.
It is possible that the same person may have conferred on him magisterial powers with respect to cases arising within an area of several districts as well, but in that case he will combine in himself the officers of a Special Magistrate in each distinct, though as a Special Magistrate for each district he will have a disti not personality. Therefore, the Government can confer magisterial powers on a person in the entire area of the State but the Magistrate would be considered to be a district Special Magistrate for each district.
The above observations, though they appear to support the petitions'' contention, do not in fact offer any help in interpreting the expression "inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction" occurring in section 435(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. While considering this aspect the learned Judge had not accepted the view expressed in Valia Ambu Poduval v. Emperor I. L. R. 30 Mad. 136, for the reason that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for the location of the Courts of Magistrates. It was reasoned that if the Madras view was accepted the Special Magistrate, whose jurisdiction extended to several districts or to the entire province, would have the option to choose his own Court of appeal or revision. This view was also adopted by the Kerala High Court in K.C. Paipal Vs. The State of Kerala, in preference to the view taken in Valia Ambu Poduval''s case. With great respect for the learned Judges who decided Lalta Prasad Saxena''s case and K. C. Paipal''s case, we are unable to accept this reasoning and the interpretation of the expression "inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction" and find the interpretation put on this expression by the Madras High Court in Valia Ambu Poduval''s case more in conformity with the language of the expression. By interpreting the expression "inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction" to mean an inferior criminal Court exercising jurisdiction within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction the word "situate" occurring in this expression is completely left out of consideration. Moreover, in section 435(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code there is no reference to the area within which a Magistrate exercises jurisdiction and the emphasis is only on the situation of the Court. It is well settled rule of construction of a statute to construe words in their ordinary and natural meanings if there is nothing to modify or qualify the language which the statute contains and to give meaning to every word that the statute contains.
Even otherwise the difficulty envisaged in Lalta Prasad Saxena''s case is merely conjectural inasmuch as the jurisdiction under S. 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code is always conferred on a Magistrate having jurisdiction in a particular district or part of district where his Court is ordinarily located. If the word "situate" is given its proper meaning the Special Magistrate would not have the option to choose his own Court of appeal or revision and for this purpose it would be of no consequence where he holds his Court in a particular case as the situation of this Court would remain the same. In fact, if the view taken in Lalta Prasad Saxena''s case is accepted as correct, the anomaly pointed out would become more real in certain situations. In cases where the offences are triable in more than one Court for the reasons mentioned in section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Code it would be open to the Special Magistrate to choose any particular area for trying the case so that appeal or revision from the decision in that case would be heard by the superior Court of that local area. To take an example, if an offence is committed partly in Rohtak district and partly in Gurgaon district the Special Magistrate having jurisdiction over both these districts would be free to try the case either at Gurgaon or at Rohtak and the place of his trial would then determine the Court of appeal or revision in case the word "situate" occurring in the expression "inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction" is either ignored or interpreted to mean as exercising jurisdiction, as suggested in Lalta Prasad Saxena''s case. Accepting the reasoning adopted in Valia Ambu Poduval v. Emperor I. L. R. 30 Mad. 136, and followed in Hira Lal v. Emperor A. I. R. 1928 Lah. 196, and Rahim Poonaji v. Abdul Rahim AIR 1953 MB 156. I hold that the Sessions Judge, Hissar, had no jurisdiction to hear the revision petitions and had rightly declined to go into the merits of the arguments raised before him.
This brings us to the second point over which lot of controversy had been raised. On behalf of the petitioners it is vehemently argued that even if the Sessions Judge at Hissar had no jurisdiction to hear the revision petitions this Court should now decide the revision petitions on merits. Along with the petitions an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act was filed with a prayer that the delay in filing, the revision petitions be condoned and the revisions be entertained. In the main petitions a prayer was also added that the revision petition which were pending before the Sessions Judge, Ambala, be withdrawn by this Court and appropriate orders be passed thereon. On behalf of the respondents the above prayer is strongly opposed and reference is made to the well-established practice of this Court and other High Courts requiring the aggrieved party to first approach the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate especially in those cases where full relief can be obtained from the inferior Court.
While considering the above question it would appropriate to notice two important facts. In all these revision petitions the main attack was against the order of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, whereby the petitioners revision petitions had been returned for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction. The orders of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, could only be challenged in the High Court and as the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, to hear the revision petitions was of considerable importance a rule was issued in all these revision petitions. The second fact which is worthy of notice is that the petitioners have already moved the Sessions Judge, Ambala, against the order of discharge by the Special Magistrate and those revision petitions are pending disposal in the Sessions Court at Ambala.
In sections 435 to 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which deal with revisional jurisdiction, a distinction has been made between those cases where final orders can be passed by the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate (Chief Judicial Magistrate in Haryana) and those cases where a report has to be Submitted to the High Court for obtaining final orders u/s 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code Section 435 empowers the High Court the Sessions Judge, or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to call for the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court. On examining the record of such proceeding the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrate subordinate to him to make further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed u/s 203 or sub-section (3) of section 204 or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged. Similarly, if on examining the record of any case the Sessions Judge or the Chief Judicial Magistrate considers that the case is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and that an accused person has been improperly discharged by the inferior Court, he may order him to be committed for trial upon the matter of which he has been improperly discharged. In all other cases the Sessions Judge or the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on examining the records of any proceeding u/s 435 has to report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination if he thinks fit, and the High Court then would deal with the matter u/s 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
It is not disputed that the Sessions Judge, Ambala, would be able to give full relief in the revision petitions pending before him in case he deems fit, as the orders passed by the Special Magistrate fall under sections 426 and 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in view of this it is urged on behalf of the respondents that this Court should not depart from the practice that unless inferior Courts are approached first the High Court would not interfere save for exceptional reasons.
Even in cases where the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate is not capable of passing effective orders and can only submit a report to the High Courts it is practice in most of the High Courts to insist on the aggrieved party first approaching the inferior Court. In Shailabala Devi Vs. Emperor though the Court found that there existed special reasons in that case but all the same it observed as follows:
In observance of the well established practice of the Allahabad High Court, neither an application in revision by an accused nor an application by a third party for the purpose of informing the High Court, should be entertained, unless there are special reasons why the applicant should not have gone to the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge in the first instance, but if a Judge on very special grounds decides to intervene, he cannot be said to be acting illegally although it may be contrary to the established practice. Once the application has been admitted and the record called for, such an objection should not be entertained.
Similarly, in Veera Ramaya and others v. Udagiri Venkata Seshaaatharam AIR 1956 AP 97, it was ruled by Subba Rao, C.J., as he then was, as follows:
The salutary practice to be followed in Andhra High Court should be that ordinarily the High Court will not entertain a revision unless the aggrieved party approached an inferior Court in the first instance and will not deviate from that practice except on special, exceptional or extraordinary grounds. When there are no such grounds, the mere fact that a revision has been admitted by the High Court cannot make any difference in the enforcement of the rule of practice, for the party, who with open eyes ignored the practice and filed a revision direct in the High Court, cannot take advantage of his deviation from the rule of practice.
It may be mentioned at this stage that this High Court, besides following the above practice, has also framed a rule which implies that a revision petition would not be entertained by the High Court unless the aggrieved party has approached the inferior Court in the first instance. The relevant rule is rule 3 of Part A (b) of Chapter 1 of Volume V of Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court and reads as under:
As regards petitions u/s 436 and section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, the Deputy Registrar will not receive petitions for revision of orders of original Courts in non-appealable cases, unless the applicant files with his petition a copy of the order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, as the case may be, to Show that he has applied to one or the other and his petition has been refused. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can release a prisoner on bail or suspend a sentence pending a reference to the High Court.
As regards those cases where effective orders can be passed by the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate even the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in S. Narayanan Vs. Kannamma Bhargavi and Others, which had taken the view that the High Court was not expected to inquire whether the party seeking the remedy had moved the Sessions Judge first made an exception in insisting that the inferior Court should be approached first. The following observations may be noticed with advantage:
It would be improper to compel a party having a strong case in his favour u/s 438 of the Code, to approach first the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate. He should not be compelled to do so except in cases where the Session Judge or the District Magistrate is capable of passing effective orders, as in a case of discharge or dismissal or complaint. In all other revisional matters the aggrieved party may approach the High Court direct if so inclined.
At this stage it would be appropriate to examine the argument based on the observations in Abdul Matlab v. Nanda Lal Khatel ILR 50 Cal. 423, Bon Behari Mondal Vs. Bhusan Chandra Barui and Others, and Shailabala Devi v. Emperer, that once a revision application has been entertained and records have been called for, the High Court is bound to dispose of the rule on merits. This view was not accepted in Veera Ramayya and others v. Udayagiri Venkata Seshayatharam and another AIR 1956 AP 97. We are in respectful agreement with the view of law enunciated therein and the observations of Subba Rao, C. J. to which reference has already been made Moreover, in the first two cases mentioned above, namely Abdul Matlab v. Nanda Lal Khatel ILR 50 Cal. 423 and Bon Behari Mondal Vs. Bhusan Chandra Barui and Others, the impugned orders were not such regarding which effective orders could be passed by the Sessions Judge.
There is also another aspect of this matter. The view that once the application has been admitted and the record called for the objection that the aggrieved party should have first approached the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge be not entertained, in reality makes no departure from the well established practice that an application in revision be not entertained direct by the High Court unless there are special reasons for the applicant not be approached District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge in the first instance, as in such a case it is presumed that the Judge who admitted the application came to the conclusion that special grounds existed for permitting the aggrieved party to approach the High Court direct. This was the ratio of the decision in Shailabala Devi Vs. Emperor . The following observations made by King, J. in the above case are relevant in this context:
In view of the long settled practice of this Court I would answer this question in the negative. I regard our rule of practice as salutary and reasonable, and its observations as a matter of great importance. The application to this Court should not be entertained unless some valid reason is shown for not applying to the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge in the first instance. The mere fact that the application is by a stranger is not a valid reason. In my opinion a stranger can apply to the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to take action u/s 435 just as well as he can apply to the High Court to take action u/s 439. The question then arises whether the application to this Court should be rejected, on the ground that the applicant has failed to approach the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge in the first instance, even after it has been admitted by an exparte order passed by a Judge of this Court. I think that the answer should be in the nagtive. It may be presumed that the Judge who admitted the application was aware of the rule of practice but decided that special ground had been shown for making an exception to the general rule. For this reason the question of enforcing the general rule of practice should not be reconsidered after the application has been admitted.
The above observations would Indicate that when a revision petition is admitted and no notice is taken of the fact that the applicant has failed to approach the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge it is to be inferred that the Judge admitting the petition was of the view that special grounds existed and that the rule of practice was, therefore, complied with. In the present case, however, the facts are peculiar and the presumption sought to be drawn is not available to the petitioners. As observed earlier, in all these revision petitions the principal challenge was posed to the order of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, whereby he had returned the revision petitions for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to decide the revision petitions. The revision petitions were then filed in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ambala, which are still pending disposal in that Court. The petitioners were, however, not satisfied with the decision of the Sessions Judge, Hissar, on the question of jurisdiction and approached this Court for decision on this point as it was only this Court which could decide as to which of the two Courts had the jurisdiction to hear the revision petitions against the order of the Special Magistrate at Ambala. At the time of admission the main question to be considered was whether the question of jurisdiction needed consideration by this Court or not. Considering the conflict of authorities on this point it is not disputed that the question of jurisdiction needed a decision by this Court. Having regard to these circumstances it cannot be presumed that when the revision petitions were admitted for the decision of the question of jurisdiction it was further considered by the Judge who admitted the petitions that special reasons had been shown for not approaching the inferior Court in the first instance. Coupled with this is the fact that the petitioners have themselves approached the Sessions Judge, Ambala, for a decision and have filed revision petitions in that Court. It is, therefore, not open to the petitioners to contend that the rule having been issued by this Court the petitions should be finally disposed of for that reasons alone. On the other hand, considering that the petitioners have already approached the Sessions Judge, Ambala, for decision of the revision petitions it would be appropriate to follow the general practice which has always been regarded as salutary and reasonable and to leave the matter to be decided by the Sessions Judge, Ambala, in the first instance. Taking this view of the matter, we find no merit in these revision petitions and dismiss the same.
H.R. Sodhi, J.
I agree.