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Judgment
J.N. Bhat, J.—The State has preferred this second appeal against a decree for Ks. 848/10/- passed by the Addl. District Judge Jammu by
his order dated 17-5-63 against it on an appeal by the Respondent before the learned Judge from the judgment and decree of the Sub-judge
(ADM) Jammu dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff'-Respondents,
The Respondent Had brought the suit for Ks. 1245 and costs against the State as the price of some petrol, Mobile oil and allied necessaries
supplied to S. Ghulam Mohd. Khan, Dy. Controller Tuwn/.u Jammu for use of jeeps Nos. 18 and 60 of the J and K. Garages. Five issues were
struck in the case out of which the only issue that was decided against the Plaintiff by the, trial court was the issue of limitation, the trial court
holding that the suit of the Plaintiff-Respondent was time-barred. On appeal, the lower appellate court held certain items to be time-barred, but
ultimately held the sum of Rs. 513/1,0 within time and awarded Ks. 335 as interest on this sum, making it in all Ks. 848/10 for which sum it passed
a decree with proportionate costs in favour of the Respondent.
The oniy point that was argued before us was the point of limitation. The Plaintiff relied o;"" two documents, letter dated 6-1-56 addressed by
the Dy. Controller Tawaza Jammu to one Mr. Patel Superintendent State Motor Garages and Anr. letter No. 640 dated 24-8-55 marked as Ex.P
Wl/1, These letters are admitted. The Plaintiff relies on these letters as acknowledgements and suites that fresh period of limitation would start from
these two letters.
The sole point for determination in this second appeal is whether these two letters can be regarded an acknowledgements within the definition of
Section 19 of the Limitation Act so as to give a fresh period of limitation to the Plaintiff about the arrears of the sale proceeds of petrol etc. due
from the Defendant. These letters were addressed by the then Dy. Controller Tawaza Jammu to Mr. K.B. Patel Superintendent State Garages and
a copy of letter dated 6-1-56 was sent to the Plaintiff. The first letter of 24-8-55 demanded the log books pertaining to Jeeps Nos. 18 and 60 of
the J. and K. Garages for the period the jeeps remained allotted to S. Ghulam Mohd Khan, Dy, Controller Tawaza. The letter adds:
Tnese log BOOKS are required to dispose or a few pending claims pending in this offce and will oe returned to you as soon as done with.
The second letter dated 6-1-56 a copy whereof was sent to the Plaintiff on 16-1-56 is also from the Dy. Controller Tawaza to Mr. Patel, inviting
his attention to letter No. 640 dated 24-8-55 and subsequent reminders No. 940 dated 14-10-55 and No. 2109 dated 22-12-55. This letter
again requested Mr. Patel to give the matter his personal attention and.
send the log books pertaining to J. and K. Garages Jeeps Nos. 18 and 60 for the period they remained allotted to Mr. Ghulam Mohd. Khan, the
then Dy. Controller Tawaza Jammu. The letter adds:
An early action in the matter is requested as a long pending petrol claim case is to be settled....
There is no dispute that the Plaintiff's claim was with respect to jeeps Nos. 18 and 60 of the Jammu and Kashmir Motor Garages and that too
for the period when they remained attached to Mr. Ghulam Mohd. Khan, the then Dy. Controller Tawaza Jammu. in those letters there is an
admission of a ability of some petrol claim, a copy of the later letter having been sent to the Plaintiff to assure him that steps were being taken to
pay him his dv.es. The terms of these letters and their import is nothing but an acknowlegment of a debt by the State authorities in favour of the
Plaintiff. Section 19 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
Where, Derore the expiration of the period pre scribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability
in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some
person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so
signed.
Explanation I - For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or
right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver,
perform, or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to a sector, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or
right.
Explanation II - For the purposes of this section, 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized In this behalf.
The learned Advocate General has not at all contended the competence of the Dy. Controller Tawaza to sign such an acknowledgment. In fact
he was an employee of the State and in the discharge of his official duties as an employee of the State it v/as his duty to take on credit petrol and
other necessaries and settle the claim of the Plaintiff. The whole emphasis of the Advocate General has been on the fact that no particular sum Is
admitted in these letters as due to the Plaintiff, nor is any liability expressly acknowledged by the Dy. Controller. According to him the words
pending petrol claim cases' are too vague to give a fresh period of limitation to the Plaintiff.
We are afraid this contention of the learned Advocate General has no force. There are numerous authorities on this point and only a few of them
need be cited In this Judgment.
In Ebrahim v. Chunllal ILR 35 Bom 302 the Plaintiff's firm had dealings with one Hajl Usman from the 5th January 1901 till the 25th October
1903. Hajl Usman's business was managed by a Gumashta (agent). Hajl Usman died in or about March 1903, and the Plaintiffs had no knowledge
of his death. On the 2nd June 1903 the Gumashta wrote to the Plaintiffs a post card stating.
you mention that there are moneys due: as to that I admit whatever may be found on proper accounts to be owing by me; you need not entertain
any anxiety.
On the 30th May 1906 the Plaintiffs brought a suit against the managers of Haji Usman's estate to recover a certain sum of money on an account
stated.
The Defendants pleaded the bar of limitation on the ground that there was no acknowledgment of the debt by a competent person.
It was held that the suit was not time-barred. The Gumasta's letter of the 2nd June 1903 was an acknowledgment within the moaning of
Section 19 of the Limitation Act. It was further held In this case that Under SE Ction 208 and 209 of the Contract Act the termination of the
Gumasta's authority did not take place before 2nd June 11)03 as the Plaintiffs did not know of the principal's death.
It has been held as far back as 1872 in in re. River Steamer Co. (1871) 6 ch A 822 and Man Ram v. Seth Rupchand ILR 33 Cal 1047 (PC)
decided by the Privy Council that to constitute an acknowledgment an admission that something is or may due is sufficient, no precise amount need
be admitted. A similar view has been taken in Hamida He v. Abdul Gaffar AIR 1933 Hang. 147.
A Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court In Udhavji Anandji Ladha and Others Vs. Bapudas Ramdas Darbar, has observed that once
an admission is made of subsisting: amounts, there is a clear acknowledgment of liability to render accounts and to pay whatever is due. in that case
there was a 'partnership between the Plaintiff's father and the Defendants. The partnership was dissolved on the death of the father of the Plaintiff
on 30th April 1927. The Plaintiff attained majority on 13th December 1928. A suit for accounts was filed on 27th Sept. 1933 relying on an
acknowledgment of 8th December 1931. It was held that the acknowledgment was valid and the suit was within time.
The Supreme Court has discussed the general principles which should be kept in view while holding a certain writing to be an acknowledgment
or not in Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prosad AIR 1961 SC 1230 it has laid down that the essentials of an acknowledgment are that it must
admit jural relationship of debtor and creditor. The admission may be implied, and surrounding circumstances have to be considered to construe
the document. Further, an acknowledgment need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either express ly or by implication. The statement on
which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability, though the exact nature or the specific character of the said
liability may not be indicated in words. The intention must be to admit the relationship of a debtor and creditor which must be implied from the
nature of the admission. The court should generally he in favour of a liberal construction of such a statement.
The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, relied on the following authorities:
Firm Sri chand Sheo arshad v. Lajjla Ham AIR 1939 Lah 31, Jogeslvwar Roy v. Raj Narain Mltter ILR Cal 195 find Andiappa Chetty v,
Devarajulu Naidoo 12 Ind Cas 378 (Mad).
In AIR 1939 Lah 31 (Supra) a guardian tiled the list of debts due by the estate of the minor in the guardianship court. At the end of the list
however, the guardian added three notes. The third note was to the effect that as the original:, documents were in the possession of the creditors, it
was difficult to the correct amount of each 'debt and to admit the correctness of the documents until they had been seen. On these facts it was held
that such an acknowledgment was not an unconditional acknowledgment of a debt and therefore no suit could be based on it.
A cursory glance at this authority would indicate that It has no application to the facts of the present case, in the instant case the liability is not
denied. On the other hand a copy of the letter has been sent to the plaintiff to convince him that his claim would be paid off as soon as the log
books are received.
In ILR Cal 195 in reply to a bill for work done the Defendant wrote.
the bill glanced over is incorrect; large amounts have been wrongly introduced. I will first have the work examined, although I know that the whole
of the work is not yet finished, then I will examine the estimates and after deducting what has to be deducted 1 will see what is due.
On these facts It was held that the writing was not an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19 of the limitation Act.
This authority has hardly any relevance to the facts of the present case. In the Calcutta case the whole thing was left open; the liability was
denied and after examination of the accounts the Defendant said that he would see what was due.
Similarly in 12 Ind Cas 378 (Mad) the debtor in reply to a letter of demand in respect of a definite sum of money asked for a copy of the
accounts and for inspection of the account books, without expressing his liability to pay any amount to the Plaintiff, in that case it was held that such
a letter did not amount to an acknowledgment.
That authority is further distinguishable as it itself lays down:
Where there is an acknowledgment of liability n respect of a right and it is sought to use such Know lodgment for starting a fresh period of
limitation, the right acknowledged must be of the same description as the right which is the subject of the suit. Thus in a suit for the balance due on
taking accounts an admission that accounts must be taken and settled, would be a pertinent acknowledgment but it might be otherwise in a suit
brought to recover a definite sum of money.
Therefore these authorities do not help the case of the Appellant at all. The two documents, letter dated 6th January 195G and Anr. letter
dated 24-8-05 have been rightly held as acknowledgments by the lower appellate Court. There is no force in this appeal which is rejected with
costs.
S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, J.
I agree.