High CourtsDivision Bench

The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Mahadeo

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 11 February 1972 · Citation: (1972) CriLJ 1097 : (1972) JLJ 320 : (1972) 17 MPLJ 447 : (1972) MPLJ 447

HON’BLE JUDGES
T.P. Naik, J · K.K. Dube, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 134 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 40, 95 · Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 — Section 14, 3
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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 293 words

T.P. Naik, J.

On being found guilty u/s 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 (hereinafter called ''the Act''), the learned Judge gave him the benefit of Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code and acquitted him. The learned Counsel for the State contends that Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code could have no application to offences under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act. We do not agree. Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code occurs in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code and u/s 40 of the Indian Penal Code, the word ''offence'' in that Chapter includes an offence under any Special Act such as the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act. It is unfortunate that in AIR 1953 141 (Nagpur) and Emperor v. John Scott (1905) 1 Nag LJ 139. on which reliance is placed, the provisions of Section 40 of the Indian Penal Code were not brought to the notice of the Court.

It was next contended that Section 14 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act precluded its application to the facts of the case. In our opinion, this contention has also no force, as there is nothing inconsistent between Section 14 of the Act and the provisions of Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code. The Act nowhere lays down that, however trivial be the subject-matter of unlawful possession under the Act. the offender must necessarily be held guilty and punished under its provisions.

In our opinion, the case raises no question of any difficulty or such importance as would warrant the grant of the certificate asked for.

The application for a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution is, therefore, dismissed.