The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Param

B.D. Rathi, J.—Defaults, as pointed out by the Office, are ignored. Heard on admission.

This is an application for grant of leave to appeal u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short). By the impugned judgment dated 13/10/2009 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Rehli, District Sagar, in Sessions Trial No. 57/2008, respondent Param has been acquitted of the offence punishable u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC"). Marriage of Kamlabai (since deceased) was solemnized with the respondent and in the wedlock, they were blessed with four children.

As per the prosecution story, respondent persistently used to subject Kamlabai to cruelty and harassment and in pursuance of a recent quarrel, on 6/12/07 at about 2.30 p.m., he, after pouring kerosene oil upon her, set her ablaze. She was taken by her father and others to Hospital, where she gave the dying declaration incriminating her husband. Report (Ex. P/12) was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, we have gone through the impugned judgment and record of the trial Court.

After taking into consideration the evidence of Hallibai (PW 1), Bhagwandas (PW 2), Pappu (PW 3), Bhartu (PW 5), Kamlabai (PW 6), Kusumrani (PW 7), trial Court found that these witnesses had testified in a very exaggerated manner regarding cruel some behaviour of the respondent with the deceased, as well as, with regard to the fact that he had set her ablaze, and their evidence contained material omissions with regard to their corresponding police statements. So far as the dying declaration was concerned, it was found that the same was totally unbelievable and concocted. In the aforesaid premises, trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

After perusal of the entire evidence and material available on record, we agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.