The State of Punjab and Others vs Charanjit Singh

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—The petitioners, viz. the State of Punjab etc. are aggrieved by the order of the Additional District Judge, Sangrur by which an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal has been dismissed. A few facts may be noticed.

Charanjit Singh, respondent filed a suit for declaration that the order dated August 5, 1985, issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police Patiala discharging him from the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector was illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on January 29, 1991. A certified copy of this judgment was delivered to the learned counsel for the petitioners on March 4, 1991. It is stated to have been forwarded to the office of the Legal Remembrancer on March 8, 1991. On examination of the case, the Legal Remembrancer opined on March 20, 1991 that it was not a fit case for filing of appeal before the District Judge. This opinion was conveyed to the Home Department of the Government vide letter dated March 20, 1991. However, on April 15, 1991, the Home Department took the view that an appeal should be filed. Instructions were accordingly issued to the Legal Remembrascer on April 16, 1991. The decision was conveyed to the District Attorney Sangrur, who received it on May 20, 1991. The appeal was filed on May 21, 1991.

The date on which the petitioners filed an application for the issue of a certified copy of the order of the trial Court has not been furnished. However, even if it is assumed that the application was submitted on the date of the decision itself, viz. January 29, 1991, the limitation for filing the appeal expired on April 1, 1991. Consequently, the appeal was barred by about seven weeks. The learned District Judge has after framing an issue and recording the evidence come to a conclusion that no ground for condonation of delay was made out. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

Mrs Cham Tuli, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the official procedure being lengthy, the cases take some time as a result of which delay occurs. She submits that keeping in view the fact that the delay is not intentional, the learned District Judge has erred in refusing to condone the delay. Reliance has been placed on the three Single Bench decisions of this Court in Punjab State Co-operative and Marketing Federation Ltd v. Baldev Singh 1990 (2) S. L. R. 376 Punjab State v. Kultar Chand 1991 (1) S L. R. 27 and Home Secretary to Govt., Punjab Vs. Sarwan Singh, . She has also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, . On the other hand, Mr. G. S. Bal, learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that each of these four cases was decided on the peculiar facts. In the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the delay was only of four days. In the other cases, it was found that there was sufficient cause for condonation, of delay He has pointed out that in Saldev Singh''s case, the delay was condoned as it was found that the counsel had not informed the department about the result of the case. In the case of Sarwan Singh, the delay in filing of appeal had occurred as the Clerk, who had to deal with the file, was on leave. He submits that such is not the situation in the present case. He has also referred to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Virinder Mohan Singh etc., CM. No. 735 (LPA) of 1991.

A perusal of the factual position in this case show that the Legal Remembrancer had recorded a definite opinion on March 20, 1991 that the case was not fit for filing of the appeal before the District Judge It was conveyed to the offce of the Home Secretary. No decision was taken by the Home Department till April 15, 1991, in spite of the fact that the limitation was due to expire on or before April 1, 1991. There is no explanation on record much less than any satisfactory explanation for the failure of the Home Department to decide the matter expeditiously. Still further, even after taking this decision, the orders for filing of the appeal was received by the office of the District Attorney only on May 20,1991. No explanation has been offered for the delay in communication of the instructions of the Home Department to the District Attorney. While it is true that the procedure adopted by the Government was lengthy and time consuming, this does not provide an excuse for inefficiency. Even if the Courts were to adopt a liberal approach in examining cases filed by the State. yet the State cannot claim that however its negligent officers in handling a file and however long the delay, it must be condoned. The Limitation Act requires every litigant, including the State, to initiate proceedings or file the appeal etc within a prescribed time. It does not make a provision that in case of appeals filed by the State, a special consideration has to be shown while considering application for condonation of delay. It was in view of this position that in Virinder Mohan Singh''s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under : --

"However, it is equally clear to us that the State as litigant cannot claim a special status or a right to condonation of delay without showing at least a reasonable amount of care and diligence in pursuing its cases".

The decision in Mst. Katiji and other''s case (supra) was considered by the Division Bench and it was observed that "we are unable to read this judgment to mean, as contended by Mr. Goyal, that no matter howsoever long the delay and howsoever negligent the litigant, the delay has to be condoned. The Limitation Act still exists on the statute book. Its provisions have to be complied with". So far as the decisions cited by the learned ccunsel for the petitioners are concerned, it may be mentioned that these were rendered in the peculiar circumstances of each case.

Even otherwise, the petitioners have come in a revision. The learned Additional District Judge has not committed any error of jurisdiction which may call for interference in the exercise of a revisional power of this Court. The rule laid down by the Privy Council was reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Keshardeo Chamria Vs. Radha Kissen Chamria and Others, . It was thereafter reiterated in D.L.F., Housing and Construction Company (P.) Ltd., New Delhi Vs. Sarup Singh and Others, and Hindustan Aeronautics v. Ajit Parsad AIR 1971 S.C. 76. Consequently, no ground for interference with the order of the learned Additional District Judge is made out in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Accordingly the revision petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.