The State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh

M. Jeyapaul, J.

CM-8113-C-2014

There is a delay of 119 days in filing the appeal.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, the delay is condoned and the application is allowed.

CM-8114-C-2014

As the main case itself has been taken up and disposed of today, the application stands dismissed as infructuous.

RSA-3511-2014

The defendant has preferred the present appeal aggrieved by the acceptance of the appeal partly by the first appellate Court. The plaintiff Mohinder Singh was serving as a Conductor in Punjab Roadways. He was charge-sheeted for misappropriation. Two annual increments with cumulative effect were withheld by 2nd defendant by virtue of the order passed by him on 6.9.2006. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff as against the said order was partly accepted by the appellate authority vide order dated 15.10.2007. Consequently, the penalty of withholding of one annual increment with cumulative effect was imposed upon the plaintiff.

During the course of hearing before the first appellate Court, it was submitted by learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff that he was not challenging the impugned order dated 15.10.2007 passed by the appellate authority and as a result of which the first appellate Court dismissed the prayer made by the plaintiff as regards the above impugned order dated 15.10.2007.

The plaintiff was issued with another charge-sheet by 3rd defendant. As per order dated 26.9.2005, the appointing authority imposed penalty of withholding four annual increments with cumulative effect. Subsistence allowance during the period of suspension also was declined. The plaintiff preferred the appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff by virtue of the order dated 16.3.2009. Challenging the above orders passed thereon, the suit was filed.

The defendant submitted in the written statement that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff only in accordance with the provisions of Punjab Civil Service Rules, the provisions of Constitution of India, Government Instructions and principles of natural justice. The defendants sought for dismissal of the suit.

The trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground that there was no violation of the rules governing the enquiry proceedings. The first appellate Court has held that the appointing authority who differed from the findings of the enquiry officer failed to give detailed reasons for differing from the findings of the enquiry officer. The appellate authority also had passed a non-speaking order. Ultimately, the first appellate Court accepted the appeal of the plaintiff qua the order of stoppage of four annual increments with cumulative effect and the order declaring that the plaintiff was not entitled to any subsistence allowance during the period of suspension.

Learned State counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would vehemently submit that the principles of natural justice were strictly adhered to while holding enquiry on the charge of misappropriation committed by the plaintiff. It was found by the appellate authority that charges were proved.

There is no dispute to the fact that the enquiry officer gave a clean chit to the plaintiff/respondent in the enquiry conducted by him inasmuch, as the charges framed as against him were not established. The plaintiff was exonerated from the charges. But the appointing authority while differing from the findings of the enquiry officer never cited any reason for taking a different view from that of the enquiry officer.

The appointing authority is bound to give reasons for differing from the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, more especially when such a decision by the appointing authority affects the service of the employee. Therefore, such a non-speaking order passed by the punishing authority is liable to be set aside.

The principles of natural justice require that an employee who has been suspended from service is entitled to sustenance allowance. The reason for taking away such a valuable right of an employee during the period of suspension was not spelt-out both by the appointing authority and also by the appellate authority.

In my view, the appointing authority had passed the order without properly applying the principles governing service jurisprudence.

In view of the above, I find that the appellate Court has rightly allowed the appeal in part. There is no merit in the present second appeal and as such the appeal stands dismissed.