The State of Punjab vs Radha Ram and another

Ujagar Singh, J.—This judgment disposes of two Civil Revisions No. 644 of 1985, titled as The State of Punjab v. Radha Ram and Anr., and No. 911 of 1985, titled as Municipal Committee, Barnala v. Radha Ram and Anr., as they arise out of the same order passed by the executing Court on 20.12.1984.

The facts leading to these revisions are that Radha Ram Respondent was working as Moharrir in Municipal Committee, Barnala since 2-1-1965, but by an order dated 26-7-1966 the Committee terminated his services with immediate effect in pursuance of a Government direction, purporting to have been given u/s 41 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Radha Ram instituted the suit on 10-7-1969 for a declaration that the termination order was absolutely wrong. unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, null and void and that he be deemed to be still in service of the Committee, enjoying full rights and privileges of full pay, dearness allowance, including annual grade increments accrued or yet to accrue in future. The suit of Radha Ram Respondent was ultimately decided by this Court on 16-8-1982. Thereafter Radha Ram took out execution proceedings. praying for the award of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the salary from 10.7.1968 to 31.10.1972 and for payment of salary as an inspector from 1-11-1972 and interest thereon. The execution petition was contested by both the revision Petitioners, i.e. the Municipal Committee, Barnala and the State of Punjab. The following issues arose out of the pleadings:

To what amount the decree holder is entitled to recover from Municipal Committee? P DH

Whether the decree holder is entitled to be promoted as Octroi Inspector? If so, from which date? P DH Relief

After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the executing Court decided that Radha Ram Respondent No. 1 was entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12 p.c.p.a. on the amount which was paid to him and to which he was entitled as Moharrir from 10-7-1969 to 20-12-1982. So far as issue No. 2 was concerned, the executing Court held that the decree holder was entitled to be considered for promotion as Inspector from 9-11-1972 on which date his junior Gian Chand was promoted. Under relief, the executing Court directed payment of interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum on arrears of pay as Moharrir from 10.7.1969 to 20.12.1982 and made this interest payable on each month''s pay accruing to to decree holder. As regards promotion as inspector, the Petitioners were directed to consider the case of the decree holder within two months of the date of the order. On preliminary hearing, Civil Revision No. 644 of 1995 was admitted and operation of the impugned order was stayed meanwhile. Civil Revision No. 911 of 1985 was directed to be heard along with the other Civil Revision.

The learned Counsel for the revision Petitioners have argued that there was no question of payment of interert on the arrears of salary directed to have been paid, as there is no specific order in the ultimate decree and judgment. Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 argues that once an order of termination is quashed, it follows that the employee, in the eye of law. continues to be in service, and as a necessary consequence thereof, he would be entitled to all the emolouments accruing from that status. Since the order of termination was quashed, Respondent No. 1 was entitled to salary etc. to which he was otherwise entitled. So far as the question of interest on arrears of pay is concerned, he further submits that it is no longer a disputed question that in such a situation, the employee is entitled to interest, because of illegal deprivation of his salary.

The dispute will be governed by the the provisions of Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This provision is no doubt applicable to a decree for payment of money, but as indicated below, the present decree obtained by the Respondent can also be safely said to be a decree for payment of money. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has referred to a Full Bench judgment between the parties in Radha Ram v. Municipal Committee Barnala (1983) P.L.R. 21, wherein, after referring to the case of Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal Vs. State of Punjab, it was held:

It deserves recalling that originally their Lordships by their judgment had only restored the decree of trial Court which had granted the salary up to the 15th January, 1963. Therefore, the grant of relief of payment of salary for 11 years thereafter was rested wholly on the direction given by their Lordships and not on any existing decree or a prayer for any such relief earlier. It follows inexorable from the above that a direction of this nature is not only within the jurisdiction of the courts of law but from the language used by their Lordships appears to be the proper if not only, mode of relief in such cases.

After discussing some earlier judgments, was further reiterated as under:

Now if it is once held that a declaratory decree enjoins the employer to reinstate decree holder and grant him all the benefits and privileges including his past and future emoluments then it is obvious that a direction to that effect only makes ponintedly explicit what is plainly implicit in the decree. Such a direction, therefore, only clothes in pre-emptory terms what has held to be enjoined by the decree itself. The aforesaid observations of the Full Bench, therefore, are clearly a pointer to the effect that such a direction would not only be feasible and within jurisdiction but would cloth the spirit of the decree with the letter of the law.

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Once the relief of setting aside or quashing the order of termination has been granted, or a declaratory decree has been passed to the similar effect, it necessarily follows that the employee in the eye of law continues to be in service and as a necessary consequence thereof would be entitled to all the emoluments flowing from that status. He must be deemed to be in a position identical with that existing prior to the passing of the order of termination of his service. In the felicitous language of their Lordships the emoluments of the post are a logical consequence of setting aside the order of termination. In such a situation to insist upon the filling of a second suit for a relief which directly flows from the declaratory decree can hardly be warranted. The hallowed rule that the law disfavours multiplcity of proceedings would again require that a consequential relief should be recorded in the original proceedings itself. This seems to be more so in view of the recent judgment of the final court adverted to above holding that in essence the cause of action for the claim to salary and emoluments is co-terminus with the decree setting aside the wrongful termination. Therefore, no issue or bar of limitation now raises any hurdle in this context.

In nut sell, any such declaratory decree, as in this case, enjoins upon the Defendant to pay the arrears of pay and other allowances, considering that he Plaintiff was never dismissed from service and continued to be in service and therefore, entitled to pay and allowances etc. as such. After such a decree is granted, it can be implemented by way of execution and in such proceedings, the executing Court can calculate the total amount to which the Plaintiff decree holder is entitled The executing Court, while calculating this relief of payment of money, will have the same powers as the Court in a suit for payment of money. Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973, therefore, empowers the Court to award interest, on the particular amount adjudged at such rate as the Court deems reasonable from the date of suit to the date of decree. Further interest at such rate note exceeding 6 p.c.p.a. as the Court deems reasonable on such particular sum from the date of decree to the date of payment or such earlier date as the Court thinks fit In view of the facts of the caase, award of interest from the date of suit till 16.8.1982 when this case was finally decided by this Court has been rightly made. Qua future interest from the date of decree till realisation of the decretal amount, the Court can award interest but the rate will not exceed 6 p.c.p.a. The date of final decree is 16.8.1982 and it is not clear from the impugned order where from the date 20.12.19(Sic)2 has been taken into account.

In this view of the matter, I accept both the revisions and modify, the order of the executing Court only to the extent that interest at the rate of 12 p.c.p.a. has to be counted only till 16.8.1982. Thereafter interest at the rate of 6 p.c.p.a. till realisation of the amount has to be counted. No order as to costs.

The executing Court gave 2 months period from its orders to the revision Petitioners for considering Radha Ram for promotion as inspector, but before expiry of that time, there was stay of operation of the impugned order. May be, the case for promotion of Radha Ram has not been considered till today. The same be done now within two months from today.